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C. EXECUTIVE	  SUMMARY	  
	  
	  
The	  prohibition	  of	  anti-­‐competitive	  unilateral	  conduct	  by	  firms	  with	  market	  power	  is	  not	  absolute,	  but	  
allows	  for	  derogation.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  EU	  law,	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  has	  accepted	  that	  a	  so-­‐
called	  ‘objective	  justification’	  plea	  may	  be	  invoked	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  prima	  facie	  abuse	  of	  dominance.	  Even	  
though	  this	  is	  long-­‐standing	  case	  law,	  many	  uncertainties	  remain	  as	  to	  its	  interpretation.	  
	  
This	   thesis	   contains	   a	   detailed	   examination	   of	   this	   concept	   of	   ‘(objective)	   justification’,	   focusing	   in	  
particular	  on	  its	  scope	  and	  the	  applicable	  legal	  conditions.	  The	  thesis	  submits	  that	  this	  concept	  is	  highly	  
important,	  as	  it	  can	  steer	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  away	  from	  a	  formalistic	  approach	  and	  give	  ample	  weight	  to	  
the	  prevalent	  context.	  The	  thesis	  calls	  for	  more	  attention	  regarding	  this	  topic	  to	  improve	  legal	  certainty,	  
as	  EU	  case	  law	  and	  decisional	  practice	  currently	  give	  insufficient	  guidance.	  
	  
Although	  the	  thesis	  focuses	  on	  EU	  law,	  it	  also	  seeks	  inspiration	  from	  the	  approach	  in	  other	  jurisdictions.	  
A	  comparative	  study	  includes	  relevant	  cases	  from	  various	  EU	  Member	  States	  (France,	  Germany,	  Ireland,	  
Luxembourg,	   the	   Netherlands,	   Spain	   and	   the	   UK)	   and	   non-­‐EU	   jurisdictions	   (Australia,	   Canada,	   Hong	  
Kong,	  Singapore,	  South	  Africa	  and	  the	  US).	  The	  study	  reveals	  that	  these	  jurisdictions	  have	  accepted	  the	  
availability	  of	  a	  justification	  plea,	  and	  have	  dealt	  with	  the	  concept	  in	  strikingly	  similar	  ways.	  Even	  though	  
there	   are	   clearly	   many	   differences	   between	   jurisdictions,	   the	   identification	   of	   common	   ground	   is	  
important	  to	  avoid	  any	  undue	  divergences	  in	  the	  interpretation	  of	  justifications.	  
	  
The	  thesis	  uses	  the	  following	  subdivision	  of	  objective	  justification:	  companies	  with	  market	  power	  should	  
be	  allowed	  to	  engage	  in	  (i)	  legitimate	  business	  behaviour	  (either	  as	  part	  of	  their	  commercial	  freedom	  or	  
in	  case	  of	  objective	  necessity),	   (ii)	  efficient	  conduct	  with	  a	  positive	  welfare	  effect	  and	  (ii)	  conduct	  that	  
promotes	  a	  relevant	  public	  interest.	  	  
	  
This	   subdivision	   of	   various	   types	   of	   justification	   should	   not	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   watertight	  
compartmentalisation,	  as	  there	  may	  be	  overlaps.	   Instead,	   it	   is	  an	  analytical	  tool	  to	  help	  determine	  the	  
proper	   application	   of	   objective	   justification.	   It	   is	   time	   that	   we	   start	   considering	   this	   topic	   in	   a	   well-­‐
structured	  manner,	  and	  give	  ‘objective	  justification’	  the	  attention	  that	  it	  deserves.	  
.	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D. SAMENVATTING	  	  
“Objectieve	  rechtvaardiging	  en	  prima	  facie	  anti-­‐competitief	  unilateraal	  gedrag:	  	  
een	  verkenning	  van	  het	  EU	  recht	  en	  daarbuiten”	  
	  
Het	  verbod	  op	  mededingingsbeperkend	  unilateraal	  gedrag	  door	  ondernemingen	  met	  marktmacht	  is	  niet	  
absoluut,	  maar	  staat	  uitzonderingen	  toe.	  Het	  Europese	  Hof	  van	  Justitie	  heeft	  bepaald	  dat	  het	  EU	  recht	  
ruimte	   laat	   voor	   een	   ‘objectieve	   rechtvaardiging’	   in	   het	   geval	   van	   een	   prima	   facie	   misbruik	   van	   een	  
machtspositie.	  Dit	  is	  al	  jarenlang	  vaste	  rechtspraak,	  maar	  toch	  blijven	  er	  vele	  onzekerheden.	  
	  
Het	   proefschrift	   bevat	   een	   gedetailleerd	   onderzoek	   naar	   dergelijke	   rechtvaardigingen,	   en	   richt	   zich	   in	  
het	  bijzonder	  op	  de	  toepasselijke	  werkingssfeer	  en	  de	  juridische	  vereisten	  daarvan.	  Het	  proefschrift	  stelt	  
dat	  ‘objectieve	  rechtvaardiging’	  van	  groot	  belang	  is,	  aangezien	  het	  ruimte	  biedt	  voor	  een	  contextuele	  –	  
in	  plaats	  van	  een	  formalistische	  –	  toepassing	  	  van	  artikel	  102	  VWEU.	  Het	  proefschrift	  roept	  op	  tot	  meer	  
aandacht	   voor	   het	   onderwerp	   met	   het	   oog	   op	   rechtszekerheid,	   aangezien	   Europese	   rechtspraak	   en	  
beschikkingspraktijk	  momenteel	  onvoldoende	  houvast	  bieden.	  
	  
Hoewel	  het	  proefschrift	  zich	  met	  name	  richt	  op	  het	  EU	  recht,	  zoekt	  het	  tevens	   inspiratie	   in	  de	  aanpak	  
van	  andere	   jurisdicties.	  Een	   rechtsvergelijkende	  studie	  bespreekt	  het	   toepasselijke	   recht	   in	  diverse	  EU	  
lidstaten	  (Frankrijk,	  Duitsland,	  Ierland,	  Luxemburg,	  Nederland,	  Spanje	  en	  het	  VK)	  en	  overige	  jurisdicties	  
(Australië,	  Canada,	  Hong	  Kong,	  Singapore,	  Zuid-­‐Afrika	  en	  de	  VS).	  Al	  deze	  jurisdicties	  staan	  een	  beroep	  op	  
een	   rechtvaardiging	   toe,	   en	   kennen	   opvallend	   veel	   parallellen	   in	   de	   toepassing	   van	   het	   concept.	  
Ondanks	  dat	  er	  uiteraard	  vele	  verschillen	  bestaan,	  is	  de	  identificatie	  van	  dergelijke	  parallellen	  van	  groot	  
belang	  om	  uiteenlopende	  interpretaties	  te	  vermijden.	  	  
	  
Het	   proefschrift	   gebruikt	   de	   volgende	   onderverdeling	   van	   objectieve	   rechtvaardiging:	   (i)	   legitiem	  
commercieel	  gedrag	   (als	  een	  uitdrukking	  van	  commerciële	  vrijheid	  of	  objectieve	  noodzakelijkheid),	   (ii)	  
efficiënt	   gedrag	   met	   een	   positief	   welvaartseffect	   en	   (iii)	   gedrag	   dat	   een	   relevant	   publiek	   belang	  
behartigt.	  Een	  onderneming	  zou	  dergelijk	  gedrag	  nog	  steeds	  mogen	  vertonen	  ondanks	  haar	  dominantie.	  
	  
Deze	   categorisering	   is	   niet	   waterdicht,	   aangezien	   de	   typen	   rechtvaardiging	   kunnen	   overlappen.	   Het	  
biedt	  niettemin	  een	  nuttig	  analytisch	  hulpmiddel	   ten	  behoeve	  van	  de	   juiste	   toepassing	  van	  objectieve	  
rechtvaardiging.	   Het	   is	   hoog	   tijd	   dat	   wij	   het	   onderwerp	   op	   een	   gestructureerde	   manier	   gaan	  
behandelen,	  en	  ‘objectieve	  rechtvaardiging’	  de	  aandacht	  geven	  die	  het	  verdient.	  	   	  




Prof.	   Tom	   Ottervanger	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   I	   met	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   2010.	   I	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   started	   working	   at	   the	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  and	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   After	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  unilateral	  conduct.	  
We	  both	  felt	  that	  it	  was	  an	  intriguing	  topic.	  The	  subject	  is	  relatively	  well	  defined,	  but	  also	  touches	  upon	  
many	  of	  the	  broader	  debates	  within	  competition	   law.	   In	  addition,	  we	  believed	  that	  the	  topic	  could	  be	  
interesting	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  academics	  and	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  practice.	  	  
	  
Prof.	  Ottervanger	   provided	   invaluable	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   and	   support	   throughout	   the	   project.	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   gave	  me	   the	  
liberty	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   I	   needed,	   and	   also	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   the	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   my	   research	   plans	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  much	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   the	   core.	  Prof.	  Ottervanger’s	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  on	  me	  does	  not	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  after	   this	  
PhD:	  his	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  as	  a	  solicitor	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  further	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CHAPTER	  I INTRODUCTION	  
	  
	  
1 A	  FIRST	  ENCOUNTER	  WITH	  THE	  TOPIC	  
	  
Few	   legal	   rules	   are	   absolute.	   Practically	   all	   prohibitions	   allow	   for	   derogation	   under	   certain	  
circumstances.	   The	   scope	   and	   meaning	   of	   such	   derogations,	   or	   justifications,	   will	   often	   determine	  
whether	  or	  not	  a	  prohibition	  applies.	  As	  a	  result,	  they	  are	  usually	  highly	  contentious.	  	  
	  
Competition	  law	  is	  no	  stranger	  to	  this	  phenomenon.	  Cases	  involving	  anti-­‐competitive	  agreements	  often	  
boil	   down	   to	   the	   question	  whether	   a	   justification	   applies	   or	   not.1	   Similarly,	   a	  merger	   that	   appears	   to	  
lessen	   competition	   at	   first	   sight	   may	   nonetheless	   be	   cleared	   because	   of	   its	   expected	   efficiencies.2	  
Indeed,	  justifications	  and	  efficiencies	  often	  take	  centre	  stage	  in	  the	  debates	  on	  the	  appropriate	  scope	  of	  
competition	  law.	  
	  
So	   how	   does	   this	   work	   in	   terms	   of	   unilateral	   conduct	   by	   companies	   with	   market	   power?	   Unilateral	  
conduct	  only	  enters	  the	  realm	  of	  competition	  law	  if	  it	  has	  some	  anti-­‐competitive	  aspect;	  i.e.	  if	  it	  is	  prima	  
facie	  anti-­‐competitive.3	  However,	  conduct	  that	  is	  labelled	  prima	  facie	  anti-­‐competitive	  is	  not	  necessarily	  
illegal.	   Competition	   law	   jurisdictions	   around	   the	   world	   have	   accepted	   that	   companies	   can	   provide	   a	  
justification	  plea	  for	  conduct	  that	  would	  otherwise	  be	  prohibited.4	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  See	  e.g.,	  under	  EU	  law,	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU.	  Under	  US	  federal	  antitrust	  law,	  the	  rule	  of	  reason	  has	  a	  similar	  
2	  See	  e.g.,	  under	  EU	  law,	  Recital	  29	  and	  Article	  2(1)(b)	  of	  the	  EU	  Merger	  Regulation.	  Under	  US	  federal	  antitrust	  law,	  
see	  e.g.	  the	  merger	  test	  in	  the	  US	  Clayton	  Act,	  which	  requires	  courts	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  welfare	  effects	  of	  the	  merger.	  
In	  Canada,	  Subsection	  96(1)	  of	  the	  Competition	  Act	  provides	  that	  the	  Competition	  Tribunal	  may	  not	  prohibit	  a	  
merger	  if	  has	  brought	  about	  or	  is	  likely	  to	  bring	  about	  efficiency	  gains	  that	  will	  offset	  any	  anti-­‐competitive	  effects.	  
3	  In	  this	  thesis,	  I	  use	  prima	  facie	  anti-­‐competitive	  unilateral	  conduct	  in	  the	  following	  way:	  unilateral	  behaviour	  by	  a	  
dominant	  firm	  that	  appears	  to	  be	  contrary	  to	  the	  competition	  rules,	  but	  can	  still	  be	  justified.	  
4	  As	  will	  be	  shown	  in	  Chapters	  V	  (on	  EU	  Member	  States)	  and	  VI	  (on	  non-­‐EU	  countries	  such	  as	  the	  US,	  Canada	  and	  
South	  Africa).	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Under	   EU	   law,	   the	   focal	   point	   of	   this	   thesis,	   that	   concept	   is	   known	   as	   ‘objective	   justification’.5	   A	  
dominant	   firm	   can	   only	   abuse	   its	   dominant	   position	   –	   contrary	   to	   Article	   102	   of	   the	   Treaty	   on	   the	  
Functioning	   of	   the	   European	  Union	   (‘TFEU’)	   –	   if	   such	   an	   objective	   justification	   is	   absent.	   EU	  Member	  
States	  have	  adopted	  the	  same	  terminology.	  Various	  non-­‐EU	  jurisdictions	  have	  also	  acknowledged	  that	  a	  
company	   with	   market	   power	   may	   invoke	   a	   justification	   for	   unilateral	   anti-­‐competitive	   conduct	   that	  
would	   otherwise	   be	   prohibited.	   References	   to	   this	   concept	   have	   included	   ‘objective	   justification’	  
(Singaporean	  and	  South	  African	  law),	  ‘legitimate	  business	  justification’	  (Australian,	  South	  African	  and	  US	  
law);	  ‘business	  justification’	  (Canadian	  and	  US	  law)	  and	  ‘valid	  business	  reason’	  (US	  law).	  	  
	  
Notwithstanding	  the	  use	  of	  slightly	  divergent	  terminology,	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  red	  thread:	  unilateral	  conduct	  
may	  be	  justified	  even	  if	  it	  seems	  to	  fall	  foul	  of	  the	  competition	  rules	  at	  first	  sight.	  This	  conceptual	  notion	  
forms	   the	   gist	   of	   the	   thesis,	   as	   it	   examines	   all	   the	   main	   reasons	   why	   prima	   facie	   anti-­‐competitive	  
unilateral	  conduct	  should	  still	  be	  condoned.	  	  
	  
Despite	   the	   widespread	   acceptance	   of	   this	   notion,	   there	   is	   little	   debate	   on	   how	   jurisdictions	   have	  
interpreted	  and	  should	   interpret	  the	  concept.	  As	  a	  consequence,	   legal	  certainty	  and	  consistency	  –	  not	  
least	  across	  borders	  –	  are	  at	  risk.	  This	  study	  examines	  how	  various	  jurisdictions	  deal	  with	  the	  scope	  and	  
meaning	  of	  such	  a	  plea,	  and	  provide	  suggestions	  on	  what	  the	  plea	  should	  mean.	  
	  
	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  The	  ECJ	  held	  in	  several	  cases	  that	  an	  abuse	  implies	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  justification,	  see	  e.g.	  Case	  C-­‐418/01	  IMS	  
Health	  v	  NDC	  Health	  [2004]	  ECR	  I-­‐5039,	  para	  52.	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2 SITUATING	  THE	  RESEARCH	  IN	  A	  BROADER	  DEBATE	  
	  
2.1 Justifications	  &	  Schools	  of	  thought	  
	  
The	   issue	   of	   justifications	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   prima	   facie	   anti-­‐competitive	   unilateral	   conduct	   does	   not	   stand	   in	  
isolation,	   but	   is	   inextricably	   linked	   with	   broader	   debates	   in	   competition	   law.	   This	   is	   little	   surprise	  
considering	   that	   such	   justifications	   are	   relevant	   in	   determining	   whether	   the	   law	   bans	   particular	  
unilateral	   conduct.	   The	   following	   section	   examines	   these	   wider	   debates	   by	   juxtaposing	   US	   federal	  
antitrust	  and	  EU	  competition	  law.6	  
	  
Jurisdictions	  can	  have	  differing	  ideas	  about	  when	  competition	  law	  should	  intervene	  in	  the	  conduct	  of	  a	  
company	  with	  market	  power.	  There	  are	  many	  reasons	  that	  explain	  the	  degree	  of	  commercial	  liberty	  that	  
the	  law	  affords	  to	  such	  companies.	  For	  example,	  US	  antitrust	  case	  law	  appears	  sceptical	  of	  the	  ability	  of	  
courts	   and	   regulators	   to	   steer,	   or	   dictate,	   a	   particular	   market	   outcome.7	   From	   such	   a	   perspective,	  
government	   intervention	   can	   easily	   encroach	   excessively	   on	   commercial	   freedom,8	   contrary	   to	   the	  
conception	  of	  the	  Sherman	  Act	  as	  the	  ‘magna	  carta	  of	  free	  enterprise’.9	  The	   issue	  often	  boils	  down	  to	  
the	   following	   question:	   is	   a	   jurisdiction	   more	   wary	   of	   false	   positives	   (i.e.	   false	   convictions)	   or	   false	  
negatives	   (i.e.	   false	   acquittals)?	   US	   antitrust	   law	   appears	   to	   fall	   within	   the	   first	   category.	   In	   Brooke	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  For	  a	  more	  thorough	  analysis,	  see	  e.g.	  Robert	  E.	  Bloch	  and	  Others,	  ‘A	  Comparative	  Analysis	  of	  Article	  82	  and	  
Section	  2	  of	  the	  Sherman	  Act’,	  (2006)	  7	  Bus.	  L.	  Int'l	  137.	  	  
7	  See	  e.g.	  Verizon	  Communications	  v.	  Law	  Offices	  of	  Curtis	  V.	  Trinko,	  540	  US	  398,	  408	  (2004).	  The	  US	  Supreme	  
Court	  held:	  ‘[e]nforced	  sharing	  also	  requires	  antitrust	  courts	  to	  act	  as	  central	  planners,	  identifying	  the	  proper	  price,	  
quantity,	  and	  other	  terms	  of	  dealing—a	  role	  for	  which	  they	  are	  ill-­‐suited’.	  
8	  Byars	  v.	  Bluff	  City	  News	  Co,	  609	  F	  2d	  843,	  862	  (6th	  Cir.	  1979).	  	  
9	  US	  v.	  Topco	  Assocs.,	  405	  US	  596,	  610	  (1972).	  Note	  that	  this	  approach	  focuses	  mainly	  on	  the	  ‘direct’	  commercial	  
freedom	  of	  the	  company	  that	  has	  market	  power,	  rather	  than	  the	  ‘indirect’	  harm	  that	  its	  conduct	  may	  have	  on	  the	  
commercial	  freedom	  of	  others.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  there	  is	  also	  US	  case	  law	  that	  seemed	  to	  protect	  competitors	  
from	  injury,	  see	  e.g.	  Utah	  Pie	  Co.	  v.	  Continental	  Baking	  Co.,	  386	  US	  685,	  702-­‐703	  (1967).	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Group,	   the	  US	  Supreme	  Court	  held:	   ‘[m]istaken	   inferences	  are	  especially	  costly,	  because	  they	  chill	   the	  
very	  conduct	  the	  antitrust	  laws	  are	  designed	  to	  protect’.10	  
	  
The	  greater	  one’s	  faith	  in	  the	  self-­‐correcting	  mechanisms	  of	  the	  market	  and	  the	  contestability	  of	  market	  
power,	  the	   less	  reason	  there	   is	  to	  worry	  about	  the	  existence	  of	  monopoly	  rents.	   In	  the	  event	  that	  the	  
monopolist’s	   business	   prowess	   starts	   to	   slack,	   a	   more	   efficient	   competitor	   is	   expected	   to	   enter	   the	  
market	   and	   dethrone	   the	   monopolist.	   In	   addition,	   supra-­‐competitive	   profits	   may	   be	   seen	   as	   an	   apt	  
reward	  for	   fierce	  competition	  or	  valuable	   innovation.	   In	  Alcoa,	   Judge	  Learned	  Hand	  observed	  that	  the	  
successful	  competitor,	  having	  been	  urged	  to	  compete,	  must	  not	  be	  turned	  upon	  when	  he	  wins.11	  Indeed,	  
monopoly	   rents	  may	  even	  be	   considered	  beneficial	   for	   competition.	   In	  Trinko,	   the	  US	   Supreme	  Court	  
held	  that	  the	  opportunity	  to	  charge	  monopoly	  prices	  is	  precisely	  what	  attracts	  business	  acumen	  in	  the	  
first	  place.12	  	  
	  
Under	   such	   assumptions,	   there	   is	   little	   reason	   for	   forceful	   competition	   law	   enforcement,	   as	   market	  
forces	   are	   expected	   to	   keep	   a	   company	  with	  market	   power	   in	   check.	   By	   contrast,	   EU	   law	   appears	   to	  
place	   less	   faith	   in	   the	   contestability	   of	   a	   dominant	   position.	   It	   focuses	  more	   on	   the	   structure	   of	   the	  
market,	   considering	   that	   the	   mere	   presence	   of	   a	   firm	   with	   a	   dominant	   position	   –	   although	   not	  
prohibited	   as	   such	   –	   already	   weakens	   competition.13	   There	   also	   appears	   to	   be	   less	   emphasis	   on	   the	  
possibility	   that	   a	   firm	   has	   achieved	   its	   dominance	   through	   superior	   competitiveness,	   as	   its	   ‘special	  
responsibility’	  applies	  ‘irrespective’	  of	  how	  the	  company	  has	  obtained	  its	  dominant	  position.14	  
	  
Another	  often-­‐heard	  dichotomy	  between	  US	  antitrust	  and	  EU	  competition	   law	  –	  especially	   in	   its	   legal	  
analysis	  of	  unilateral	  conduct	  –	  is	  that	  the	  US	  focuses	  more	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  conduct	  under	  review,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Brooke	  Group	  v.	  Brown	  and	  Williamson	  Tobacco	  Corp,	  509	  US	  209,	  222	  (1993).	  Another	  case	  that	  warned	  for	  the	  
competition	  chilling	  effect	  that	  false	  positives	  may	  have	  is	  Matsushita	  Elec.	  Industrial	  Co.	  v	  Zenith	  Radio	  Corp.,	  475	  
U.	  S.	  574,	  594	  (1986).	  
11	  United	  States	  v.	  Alcoa,	  148	  F.2d	  416,	  430	  (2d	  Cir.	  1945)	  
12	  Trinko,	  supra	  note	  7.	  	  
13	  Case	  85/76	  Hoffman-­‐La	  Roche	  v	  Commission	  [1979]	  ECR	  461,	  para	  91.	  
14	  Case	  322/81	  Michelin	  v	  Commission	  (‘Michelin	  I’)	  [1983]	  ECR	  3461,	  para	  57.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  
special	  responsibility	  does	  depend	  on	  the	  circumstances	  of	  the	  case,	  see	  Case	  T-­‐83/91	  Tetra	  Pak	  v	  Commission	  
('Tetra	  Pak	  II')	  [1994]	  ECR	  II-­‐755,	  para	  115.	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whereas	  the	  EU	  approach	  is	  more	  based	  on	  form	  (or,	  said	  differently,	  based	  on	  legal	  presumptions	  that	  
consider	  a	  certain	  type	  of	  behaviour	  to	  be	  harmful).15	  The	  EU’s	  approach	  aims	  to	  protect	  the	  structure	  of	  
a	  market,16	  which	  in	  practice	  may	  boil	  down	  to	  insulating	  companies	  –	  perhaps	  even	  inefficient	  ones	  –	  
that	  compete	  with	  the	  dominant	   firm.	   In	   its	  condensed	  version,	   the	  distinction	   is	   that	  the	  US	  protects	  
competition,	  whereas	  the	  EU	  protects	  competitors.17	  	  
	  
Although	   this	   expression	   of	   the	   EU-­‐US	   divide	   does	   oversimplify	  matters,18	   it	   is	   far	   from	   baseless.	   EU	  
competition	  law	  is	  often	  associated	  with	  Ordoliberalism,	  a	  School	  of	  thought	  that	  is	  sceptical	  of	  market	  
power	   and	   attaches	   great	   weight	   to	   the	   commercial	   freedom	   of	   the	   non-­‐dominant	   market	  
participants.19	  Ordoliberalism	   seems	   to	   have	   left	   its	  marks	   on	   the	   case	   law	  by	   the	   European	  Court	   of	  
Justice	  (‘ECJ’).	  For	  example,	  an	  undertaking	  with	  a	  dominant	  position	  has	  a	  ‘special	  responsibility	  not	  to	  
allow	  its	  conduct	  to	  impair	  genuine	  undistorted	  competition’.20	  The	  special	  responsibility	  may	  not	  only	  
entail	   refraining	  from	  certain	  conduct,	  but	  can	  –	  depending	  on	  the	  circumstances	  –	  also	  call	   for	  active	  
steps	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  that	  competition	  is	  not	  distorted.21	  	  
	  
By	  contrast,	  US	  antitrust	  law	  does	  not	  contain	  such	  a	  ‘special	  responsibility’,	  as	  it	  takes	  the	  position	  that	  
firms	  with	  market	  power	  are	  free	  to	  compete	  like	  any	  other	  firm.22	  The	  US	  approach	  is	  often	  associated	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  See	  e.g.	  E.M.	  Fox,	  ‘We	  protect	  competition,	  you	  protect	  competitors’,	  (2003)	  26	  World	  Competition	  149.	  
16	  Hoffmann-­‐La	  Roche,	  supra	  note	  13,	  para	  91;	  Case	  C-­‐62/86	  AKZO	  v	  Commission	  [1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐3359,	  para	  69.	  
17	  See	  e.g.	  Fox,	  supra	  note	  15.	  See	  also	  the	  speech	  by	  J.B.	  McDonald	  (Deputy	  Assistant	  Attorney	  General,	  Antitrust	  
Division,	  US	  Department	  of	  Justice),	  ‘Section	  2	  and	  Article	  82:	  Cowboys	  and	  Gentlemen’,	  16-­‐17	  June	  2005,	  available	  
at	  http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/210873.htm.	  	  
18	  For	  example,	  there	  is	  US	  case	  law	  that	  seems	  to	  protect	  competitors,	  see	  e.g.	  Aspen	  Skiing	  Co.	  v	  Aspen	  Highlands	  
Skiing	  Corp.,	  472	  US	  585	  (1985)	  and	  FTC	  v	  Brown	  Shoe	  Co.,	  Inc.,	  384	  US	  316	  (1966).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  EU	  
competition	  law	  has	  an	  increasingly	  effects-­‐based	  approach,	  see	  e.g.	  Guidance	  on	  the	  Commission’s	  enforcement	  
priorities	  in	  applying	  Article	  [102	  TFEU]	  to	  abusive	  exclusionary	  conduct	  by	  dominant	  undertakings,	  OJ	  [2009]	  C	  
45/7.	  
19	  See	  e.g.	  D.J.	  Gerber,	  Law	  and	  Competition	  in	  Twentieth	  Century	  Europe	  –	  Protecting	  Prometheus	  (OUP:	  Oxford	  
1998).	  See,	  differently,	  P.	  Akman,	  ‘Searching	  for	  the	  Long-­‐Lost	  Soul	  of	  Article	  82EC’,	  (2007)	  CCP	  Working	  Paper	  07-­‐
5.	  	  Akman	  argues	  that	  consumer	  welfare	  had	  always	  been	  the	  goal	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  
20	  Michelin	  I,	  supra	  note	  14,	  para	  57.	  
21	  Case	  C-­‐333/94	  P	  Tetra	  Pak	  v	  Commission	  [1996]	  ECR	  I-­‐5951,	  para	  24.	  
22	  See	  Olympia	  Equipment	  Leasing	  Company	  v	  Western	  Union	  Telegraph	  Company,	  797	  F.2d	  370	  (7th	  Cir.	  1987).	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with	   the	   influential	  Chicago	  School	  of	   thought.23	  The	  Chicago	  School	   focuses	  on	   the	  welfare	  effects	  of	  
conduct	   under	   review	   and	   stresses	   that	   overly	   intrusive	   antitrust	   rules	   risk	   stymying	   pro-­‐competitive	  
behaviour.24	   In	   refusal	   to	   deal	   cases,	   there	   may	   also	   be	   a	   fear	   that	   mandating	   supply	   may	   result	   in	  
collusion,	  which	  the	  US	  Supreme	  Court	  considers	  ‘the	  supreme	  evil	  of	  antitrust’.25	  
	  
The	   approach	  by	   the	  Chicago	   School	   of	   thought	   clearly	   differs	   from	   some	  of	   the	   key	   ECJ	   competition	  
cases.	   For	  example,	   the	  1983	  Michelin	   I	   judgment,	  on	  discounts	  on	   tyre	  purchases,	   showed	  particular	  
concern	  with	  the	  commercial	  freedom	  by	  third	  parties.	  The	  ECJ	  found	  that	  the	  practice	  was	  an	  abuse,	  as	  
it	   limited	  customers	   to	  switch	  supplier	  and	  made	  market	  access	  by	  competitors	  more	  difficult.26	  More	  
recent	   ECJ	   case	   law,	   however,	   tends	   to	   focus	   more	   on	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   conduct,	   allowing	   greater	  
consideration	  of	  the	  efficiencies	  that	  arise	  from	  the	  conduct	  under	  review.27	  The	  more	  the	  Commission	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Influential	  work	  included	  R.A.	  Posner,	  Antitrust	  Law:	  An	  Economic	  Perspective	  (University	  of	  Chicago	  Press:	  
Chicago	  and	  London	  1976),	  and	  R.H.	  Bork,	  The	  Antitrust	  Paradox:	  A	  Policy	  at	  War	  with	  Itself	  (The	  Free	  Press:	  New	  
York	  1978).	  See,	  for	  a	  recent	  critical	  analysis	  of	  the	  Chicago	  School,	  Robert	  Pitofsky	  (ed.),	  How	  the	  Chicago	  School	  
Overshot	  The	  Mark:	  the	  Effect	  of	  Conservative	  Economic	  Analysis	  on	  US	  Antitrust	  (OUP:	  Oxford	  2008).	  However,	  for	  
a	  defense	  of	  the	  Chicago	  School	  in	  reaction	  to	  this	  book,	  see	  J.D.	  Wright,	  ‘Overshot	  the	  Mark?	  A	  Simple	  Explanation	  
of	  the	  Chicago	  School's	  Influence	  on	  Antitrust’,	  (2009)	  George	  Mason	  Law	  &	  Economics	  Research	  Paper	  No.	  09-­‐23.	  
Note	  that	  some	  commentators	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  in	  fact	  the	  Harvard	  School,	  instead	  of	  the	  Chicago	  School,	  that	  has	  
had	  the	  greatest	  influence	  on	  US	  Antitrust.	  See	  e.g.	  E.	  Elhauge,	  ‘Harvard,	  Not	  Chicago:	  Which	  Antitrust	  School	  
Drives	  Recent	  US	  Supreme	  Court	  Decisions?’,	  3(2)	  (2007)	  Competition	  Policy	  International	  59.	  The	  Harvard	  School	  
attaches	  great	  importance	  to	  the	  ‘structure’	  of	  the	  competitive	  landscape,	  and	  accordingly	  appears	  conceptually	  
closer	  to	  the	  traditional	  EU	  approach	  that	  also	  seeks	  to	  protect	  the	  structure	  of	  competition	  ‘and	  thus	  competition	  
as	  such’	  (see	  e.g.	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐501/06	  P,	  C-­‐513/06	  P,	  C-­‐515/06	  P	  and	  C-­‐519/06	  P	  GlaxoSmithKline	  Services	  and	  
Others	  v	  Commission	  and	  Others	  [2009]	  ECR	  I-­‐9291,	  para	  63).	  
24	  Trinko,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  879.	  
25	  Ibid.	  
26	  Michelin	  I,	  supra	  note	  14,	  para	  85.	  The	  ECJ	  also	  noted	  that	  the	  wish	  to	  sell	  more	  or	  to	  spread	  production	  more	  
evenly	  cannot	  justify	  such	  a	  restriction.	  
27	  Case	  C-­‐95/04	  P	  British	  Airways	  v	  Commission	  [2007]	  ECR	  I-­‐2331;	  Case	  C-­‐209/10	  Post	  Danmark	  A/S	  v	  
Konkurrencerådet	  [2012]	  ECR	  nyr.	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succeeds	  in	  its	  drive	  towards	  a	  more	  effects-­‐based	  approach	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU,	  the	  narrower	  the	  gap	  is	  
likely	  to	  become	  between	  EU	  competition	  law	  and	  US	  antitrust.28	  
	  
2.2 State	  intervention,	  private	  &	  public	  enforcement,	  lex	  specialis	  
	  
2.2.1 Introduction	  
The	   discussion	   above	   has	   made	   clear	   that	   Schools	   of	   economic	   or	   political	   thought	   may	   have	   a	  
considerable	   impact	   on	   the	   severity	   of	   unilateral	   conduct	   law.	  However,	   I	   believe	   that	   there	   are	   also	  
other	   reasons	   explaining	   the	   divergent	   perspectives	   sometimes	   taken	   by	   EU	   competition	   law	   and	  US	  
antitrust.	   I	   shall	  discuss	  a	  number	  of	   these,	  namely	   (i)	   the	  degree	  of	  State	   intervention,	   (ii)	  whether	  a	  
competition	  law	  regime	  depends	  more	  on	  public	  or	  on	  private	  enforcement,	  (iii)	  the	  applicable	  hierarchy	  
of	  norms,	  and	  (iv)	  the	  internal	  market	  imperative.	  	  These	  are	  all	  reasons	  why	  EU	  competition	  law	  is	  –	  or	  
can	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  –	  more	  interventionist	  towards	  dominant	  companies	  compared	  to	  US	  antitrust.	  
	  
2.2.2 Degree	  of	  State	  intervention	  
Dominance	  cases	  in	  the	  EU	  competition	  law	  have	  often	  revolved	  about	  undertakings	  that	  had	  acquired	  
or	   maintained	   market	   power	   largely	   due	   to	   government	   intervention.29	   The	   degree	   of	   government	  
influence	  should	  provide	  at	   least	   two	   important	  considerations	   for	   the	  competition	   law	  analysis.	  First,	  
long-­‐standing	  government	  support	  of	  a	  particular	  company	  can	  entrench	  a	  dominant	  position	  in	  such	  a	  
far-­‐reaching	  manner,	  that	  it	  persists	  even	  long	  after	  the	  government	  has	  pulled	  back	  its	  protection.	  This	  
is	  particularly	  the	  case	  in	  network	  sectors,	  such	  as	  telecommunications	  and	  energy.	  In	  many	  EU	  Member	  
States,	  the	  former	  incumbent	  still	  dominates	  the	  sector	  on	  which	  it	  formerly	  held	  a	  monopoly.30	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  a	  focus	  towards	  economic	  freedom	  and	  an	  effects-­‐based	  focus	  towards	  consumer	  welfare	  do	  not	  
necessarily	  lead	  to	  the	  same	  results.	  L.	  Lovdahl	  Gormsen,	  ‘The	  conflict	  between	  economic	  freedom	  and	  consumer	  
welfare	  in	  the	  modernization	  of	  Article	  82	  EC’,	  (2007)	  3	  European	  Competition	  Journal	  329.	  
29	  See	  e.g.	  Post	  Danmark,	  supra	  note	  27;	  Case	  T-­‐336/07	  Telefónica	  v	  Commission	  [2012]	  ECR	  nyr;	  Case	  C-­‐280/08	  P	  
Deutsche	  Telekom	  v	  Commission	  [2010]	  ECR	  I-­‐9555;	  Case	  C-­‐202/07	  P	  France	  Télécom	  v	  Commission	  [2009]	  ECR	  I-­‐
2369;	  British	  Airways,	  supra	  note	  27.	  
30	  This	  is	  the	  raison	  d’être	  for	  the	  EU	  legislation	  on	  the	  telecom	  sector,	  see	  e.g.	  Directive	  2002/21/EC	  on	  a	  common	  
regulatory	  framework	  for	  electronic	  communications	  networks	  and	  services,	  OJ	  [2002]	  L	  108/33.	  As	  to	  the	  energy	  
sector,	  see	  e.g.	  the	  conclusion	  in	  the	  Commission’s	  2006	  energy	  sector	  inquiry,	  COM(2006)851	  final.	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Second,	  a	  company	  that	  achieves	  market	  power	  without	  any	  external	  help	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  more	  efficient	  
than	  its	  competitors	  –	  whereas	  the	  same	  cannot	  be	  said	  for	  a	  company	  that	  owes	  its	  market	  power	  to	  
the	  government.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  a	  position	  of	  market	  power	  is	  less	  clearly	  associated	  with	  efficiency	  
if	  there	  has	  been	  a	  history	  of	  strong	  government	  involvement	  –	  making	  the	  application	  of	  competition	  
law	   less	   liable	   to	  chill	   competition.	  Generally	   speaking,	  EU	  competition	   law	   is	  more	  clearly	  marked	  by	  
cases	  arising	  from	  (former)	  State	  intervention	  compared	  to	  US	  Antitrust.	  
	  
2.2.3 Private	  and	  public	  enforcement	  	  
Another	  relevant	  factor	  relates	  to	  the	  prevalent	  type	  of	  enforcement	  in	  a	  jurisdiction.	  The	  enforcement	  
of	   US	   antitrust	   law	   typically	   takes	   place	   by	   private	   plaintiffs.31	   If	   the	   plaintiff	   does	   not	   succeed	   in	  
explaining	  why	  endorsement	  of	  its	  monopolization	  claim	  also	  benefits	  some	  public	  interest	  (for	  example,	  
through	  an	  increase	  of	  consumer	  welfare),	  it	  is	  little	  surprising	  that	  courts	  are	  reluctant	  to	  intervene.	  By	  
contrast,	  the	  key	  abuse	  cases	  in	  the	  EU	  have	  been	  initiated	  by	  public	  enforcement	  bodies.32	  Even	  though	  
public	  enforcement	  bodies	  are	  obviously	  not	   immune	  to	   the	  plights	  of	  private	   interests,33	   such	  bodies	  
should	   –	   at	   the	   very	   least	   –	   be	   able	   to	   explain	  why	   their	   enforcement	   action	   is	   also	  beneficial	   to	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  For	  example,	  between	  2007	  and	  2012	  the	  DoJ	  Antitrust	  Division	  initiated	  on	  average	  less	  than	  2	  investigations	  
per	  year	  based	  on	  Section	  2	  of	  the	  Sherman	  Act.	  In	  the	  same	  time	  period,	  it	  initiated	  more	  than	  54	  investigations	  
per	  year	  based	  on	  Section	  1	  of	  the	  Sherman	  Act.	  See	  http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/workload-­‐statistics.html.	  	  
32	  I.e.	  the	  European	  Commission	  and	  the	  National	  Competition	  Authorities	  (NCAs)	  of	  the	  EU	  Member	  States.	  Note	  
that	  there	  is	  little	  data	  on	  private	  enforcement	  at	  the	  domestic	  level,	  which	  hampers	  a	  numerical	  comparison	  with	  
public	  enforcement.	  	  Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  EU	  public	  enforcement	  bodies	  have	  been	  quite	  active	  in	  the	  
enforcement	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  This	  not	  only	  applies	  to	  the	  European	  Commission,	  but	  to	  NCAs	  as	  well.	  Between	  
1	  May	  2004	  and	  28	  February	  2014	  NCAs	  have	  submitted	  an	  envisaged	  enforcement	  decision	  to	  the	  Commission	  in	  
721	  cases.	  Although	  the	  statistics	  don’t	  reveal	  how	  many	  of	  the	  total	  number	  of	  cases	  concerned	  Article	  102	  TFEU,	  
annually	  the	  proportion	  of	  cases	  based	  on	  the	  abuse	  of	  dominance	  hovered	  between	  21%	  and	  36%.	  See	  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/statistics.html.	  Be	  that	  as	  it	  may,	  I	  consider	  the	  legal	  impact	  of	  public	  
enforcement	  in	  the	  EU	  to	  be	  much	  greater	  than	  that	  of	  private	  enforcement.	  Most	  of	  the	  key	  ECJ	  judgments	  in	  the	  
last	  few	  years	  arose	  from	  public	  enforcement.	  This	  not	  only	  applies	  to	  appeal	  rulings,	  but	  also	  to	  rulings	  on	  
preliminary	  references.	  See	  e.g.	  TeliaSonera	  (2011,	  enforcement	  by	  the	  Swedish	  NCA),	  Tele2	  Polska	  (2011,	  
enforcement	  by	  the	  Polish	  NCA),	  Post	  Danmark	  (2012,	  enforcement	  by	  the	  Danish	  NCA)	  and	  Slovenská	  
(2013,	  enforcement	  by	  the	  Slovakian	  NCA).	  
33	  For	  example,	  many	  cases	  are	  triggered	  by	  complaints	  by	  third	  parties	  that	  obviously	  seek	  to	  further	  their	  own	  
interests.	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public	  at	  large.	  In	  turn,	  that	  may	  result	  in	  stronger	  interventionism	  because	  it	  involves	  a	  broader	  public	  
interest,	  rather	  than	  simply	  a	  private	  interest	  by	  a	  market	  participant.	  
	  
2.2.4 The	  lex	  specialis	  adage	  
Another	   relevant	  perspective	   is	   a	   jurisdiction’s	   treatment	  of	   the	   lex	   specialis	   adage.	   In	   the	  event	  of	   a	  
clash	  between	  specific	  rules	  and	  rules	  of	  a	  more	  general	  nature,	  the	  adage	  implies	  that	  the	  specific	  rules	  
take	  precedence.34	  The	  maxim	  is	  useful	  in	  regulated	  industries	  where	  there	  can	  be	  substantial	  overlap	  of	  
detailed	   sector-­‐specific	   regulations	   designed	   to	   foster	   competition,	   and	   the	   general	   provisions	   of	   the	  
competition	  rules.	  
	  
The	  Trinko	   judgment	  by	  the	  US	  Supreme	  Court	   is	  a	  case	  in	  point.	   It	   involved	  the	  question	  whether	  the	  
Sherman	   Act	   required	   access	   to	   a	   telecommunications	   network,	   even	   though	   federal	   sector-­‐specific	  
rules	  had	  already	  established	  a	  detailed	  framework	  as	  to	  when	  such	  access	  should	  be	  granted.	  The	  facts	  
of	  the	  case	  do	  not	  show	  that	  the	  regulatory	  scheme	  was	  inadequate	  in	  any	  way.	  The	  US	  Supreme	  Court	  
rejected	  the	  application	  of	  the	  Sherman	  Act,	  relying	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  on	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  regulatory	  
scheme,	  i.e.	  a	  lex	  specialis.35	  	  
	  
EU	  law	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  dealt	  differently	  with	  such	  a	  case.	  In	  the	  EU,	  the	  competition	  rules	  are	  a	  matter	  
of	  primary	  EU	  law	  (i.e.	  expressed	  in	  a	  Treaty),	  whereas	  most	  of	  the	  sector-­‐specific	  rules	  are	  a	  matter	  of	  
secondary	  EU	  law	  (expressed	  primarily	   in	  directives	  and	  regulations).	  As	  primary	  law	  takes	  precedence	  
over	   secondary	   law,	   the	   competition	   rules	   cannot	   be	   set	   aside	   by	   a	   lex	   specialis	   in	   the	   event	   of	   a	  
conflict.36	   Under	   such	   circumstances,	   the	   EU	   competition	   rules	   have	   a	   wider	   scope	   of	   application	  
compared	  to	  the	  situation	  that	  the	  lex	  specialis	  maxim	  would	  have	  been	  applicable.	  
	  
2.2.5 Internal	  market	  imperative	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  Assuming	  that	  the	  rules	  themselves	  are	  hierarchically	  equivalent.	  
35	  For	  a	  thorough	  analysis	  from	  an	  economic	  point	  of	  view,	  see	  H.A.	  Shelanski,	  ‘The	  case	  for	  rebalancing	  antitrust	  
and	  regulation’,	  (2011)	  109	  Michigan	  Law	  Review	  683.	  
36	  See	  e.g.	  Deutsche	  Telekom,	  supra	  note	  29.	  It	  should	  also	  be	  noted	  that,	  from	  the	  ECJ’s	  perspective,	  there	  will	  not	  
often	  be	  a	  conflict	  so	  long	  as	  the	  regulatory	  rules	  allow	  any	  possibility	  to	  still	  comply	  with	  the	  competition	  rules	  as	  
provided	  by	  the	  Treaty.	  	  
	   30	  
Another	   particularity	   of	   EU	   competition	   law,	   that	   determines	   its	   scope	   of	   application,	   is	   the	   internal	  
market	  perspective.	  The	  ECJ	  interprets	  EU	  competition	  law	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  support	  the	  functioning	  
of	  the	  internal	  market.37	  Conduct	  that	  creates	  divisions	  along	  national	  borders	  is	  highly	  suspect,38	  even	  if	  
the	  dominant	   firm	   is	  able	   to	  show	  the	  efficiency	  of	   such	  conduct.39	  The	   link	  between	  the	  competition	  
and	   internal	   market	   rules	   is	   understandable	   if	   one	   has	   regard	   to	   the	   underlying	   goals	   of	   the	   EU	  
Treaties.40	   The	   TFEU	   seek	   to	   prohibit	   any	   restrictions	   that	   could	   hamper	   the	   attainment	   of	   the	   EU´s	  
objectives,	   irrespective	   of	   whether	   the	   source	   of	   those	   restrictions	   is	   `public´	   or	   ´private´.	   Generally	  
speaking,	  public	  restrictions	  are	  targeted	  by	  the	  free	  movement	  rules,	  whereas	  private	  restrictions	  are	  
targeted	   by	   the	   competition	   rules.41	   In	   sum,	   the	   ´internal	   market	   imperative´42	   is	   an	   understandable	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  See,	  further,	  A.	  Albors-­‐Llorens,	  ‘The	  Role	  of	  Objective	  Justification	  and	  Efficiencies	  in	  the	  Application	  of	  Article	  82	  
EC’,	  (2007)	  44	  CMLRev	  1727,	  at	  1734,	  noting	  that	  the	  competition	  rules	  need	  to	  balance	  economic	  efficiency	  as	  
well	  as	  market	  integration.	  	  For	  an	  earlier	  critical	  analysis,	  see	  e.g.	  W.	  Bishop,	  ‘Price	  discrimination	  under	  Article	  86:	  
Political	  economy	  in	  the	  European	  Court’,	  (1981)	  44	  MLR	  282.	  See,	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  Article	  101	  TFEU,	  Case	  
C-­‐453/99	  Courage	  and	  Crehan	  [2001]	  ECR	  I-­‐6297,	  para	  20:	  the	  provision	  ‘is	  essential	  for	  the	  accomplishment	  of	  the	  
tasks	  entrusted	  to	  the	  [EU]	  and,	  in	  particular,	  for	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  internal	  market’.	  See,	  similarly,	  Case	  C-­‐
126/97	  Eco	  Swiss	  [1999]	  ECR	  I-­‐3055,	  para	  36.	  See,	  differently,	  K.	  Mortelmans,	  ‘Towards	  convergence	  in	  the	  
application	  of	  the	  rules	  on	  free	  movement	  and	  on	  competition’,	  (2001)	  38	  CMLRev	  613,	  at	  631.	  He	  notes	  that:	  
‘since	  the	  completion	  of	  the	  internal	  market,	  the	  emphasis	  of	  competition	  law	  lies	  less	  on	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  
Common	  Market	  and	  more	  on	  prohibiting	  restrictions	  of	  competition	  within	  the	  internal	  market	  [citations	  omitted	  
by	  author].’	  I	  beg	  to	  differ:	  the	  internal	  market	  is	  not	  ‘completed’.	  For	  example,	  cross-­‐border	  integration	  is	  still	  far	  
from	  perfect	  in	  network	  sectors	  and	  many	  services	  industries.	  As	  EU	  competition	  law	  is	  clearly	  part	  of	  a	  bigger	  
whole	  (namely:	  the	  EU	  treaties),	  the	  internal	  market	  perspective	  should	  not	  be	  ignored.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  EU	  
competition	  law	  can	  be	  more	  interventionist	  compared	  to	  US	  antitrust	  if	  such	  interventionism	  is	  necessary	  to	  
preserve	  the	  internal	  market.	  	  	  
38	  For	  an	  example	  under	  Article	  102	  TFEU,	  see	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐468/06	  to	  C-­‐478/06	  Sot.	  Lélos	  kai	  Sia	  and	  Others	  v	  
GlaxoSmithKline	  [2008]	  ECR	  I-­‐7139.	  The	  Court	  confirmed	  that	  there	  is	  an	  abuse	  if	  a	  dominant	  undertaking	  restricts	  
supplies	  in	  order	  to	  limit	  parallel	  trade.	  For	  an	  example	  under	  Article	  101	  TFEU,	  see	  the	  classic	  judgment	  in	  Joined	  
Cases	  56	  and	  58/64	  Consten	  and	  Grundig	  v	  Commission	  [1966]	  ECR	  299.	  
39	  Think	  for	  instance	  of	  a	  case	  where	  a	  dominant	  undertaking	  restricts	  parallel	  trading	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  its	  
differentation	  in	  pricing.	  Such	  pricing	  behaviour	  could	  raise	  consumer	  welfare	  if	  it	  succeeds	  better	  in	  aligning	  
supply	  and	  demand	  than	  a	  unitary	  price	  across	  the	  EU.	  
40	  I.e.	  the	  Treaty	  on	  the	  Functioning	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  and	  the	  Treaty	  on	  European	  Union.	  
41	  The	  State	  aid	  rules	  are	  a	  hybrid:	  they	  are	  directed	  at	  States,	  but	  generally	  considered	  to	  be	  part	  of	  competition	  
law.	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concept	  within	  the	  context	  of	  EU	  law,	  but	  is	  also	  quite	  specific	  to	  that	  body	  of	  law.	  Jurisdictions	  whose	  
economies	   are	   already	   integrated43	   seem	   to	   have	   little	   use	   for	   the	   concept,44	  which	  may	   give	   rise	   to	  
divergent	  interpretations	  of	  the	  law.	  
	  
2.2.6 Conclusion	  
The	  paragraphs	  above	  have	  shown	  that	  the	  question	  whether	  competition	  law	  must	  condone	  or	  prohibit	  
certain	  unilateral	   conduct	  may	  depend	  on	  many	  underlying	   factors.	  Relevant	   factors	   include	   inter	  alia	  
what	  School	  of	  economic	  or	  political	  thought	  one	  abides	  by,	  and	  what	  assumptions	  one	  makes	  about	  the	  
contestability	  of	  market	  power.	  Justifications	  can	  play	  a	  key	  role	  in	  creating	  a	  legal	  distinction	  between	  
conduct	  that	  should	  be	  allowed	  or	  not.	  The	  following	  paragraphs	  explain	  in	  more	  detail	  how	  this	  thesis	  
seeks	  to	  examine	  such	  justifications.	  	  
	  
2.3 Abuse	  of	  dominance	  and	  justifications	  from	  an	  ethical	  perspective	  
	  
2.3.1 Introduction	  	  
This	   PhD	   dissertation	   examines	   to	   what	   extent	   justifications	   are	   –	   and	   should	   be	   –	   available	   for	  
otherwise	  prohibited	  unilateral	  behaviour	  by	  companies	  with	  market	  power.	  Although	  this	  dissertation	  
is	  based	  on	  a	  legal	  examination,	  one	  can	  also	  approach	  the	  topic	  from	  an	  ethical	  perspective	  (I	  use	  ethics	  
and	   moral	   philosophy	   interchangeably).	   Considering	   how	   little	   fashionable	   it	   is	   to	   discuss	   moral	  
philosophy	  in	  antitrust	  or	  economics,45	  why	  should	  we	  consider	  such	  an	  approach?	  
	  
In	   my	   view,	   ethics	   is	   relevant	   in	   view	   of	   the	   mammoth	   fines	   that	   can	   be	   imposed	   for	   violating	   the	  
competition	   rules.	  There	   is	  often	   talk	  about	   the	  sanctions	  being	   ‘criminal’	   in	  nature.	   I	  do	  not	  see	  how	  
conduct	  can	  be	  criminally	  sanctioned	  if	  there	  is	  no	  underlying	  societal	  belief	  that	  the	  conduct	  has	  indeed	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  Derived	  from	  ‘single	  market	  imperative’.	  See	  e.g.	  Richard	  Whish,	  Competition	  Law	  (OUP:	  Oxford	  2009),	  at	  22-­‐23.	  
43	  Or,	  at	  least,	  considered	  to	  be	  integrated.	  
44	  See	  also	  Whish	  2009,	  supra	  note	  42,	  at	  364.	  It	  would	  appear	  that	  the	  internal	  market	  perspective	  is	  a	  ‘relevant	  
difference’	  between	  UK	  and	  EU	  law	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  Section	  60	  Competition	  Act	  1998.	  The	  provision	  allows	  for	  
divergent	  interpretation	  of	  the	  competition	  rules	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  there	  are	  relevant	  differences.	  
45	  T.J.	  Horton,	  ‘The	  Coming	  Extinction	  of	  Homo	  Economicus	  and	  the	  Eclipse	  of	  the	  Chicago	  School	  of	  Antitrust:	  
Applying	  Evolutionary	  Biology	  to	  Structural	  and	  Behavioral	  Antitrust	  Analyses’,	  (2010-­‐2011)	  42	  Loy.	  U.	  Chi.	  L.J.	  469,	  
514.	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an	  unethical	  component.	  	  It	  also	  works	  the	  other	  way	  around:	  if	  we	  can	  consider	  specific	  conduct	  to	  be	  
in	  line	  with	  ethics	  (in	  other	  words:	  if	  conduct	  has	  ‘moral	  worth’),	  there	  may	  no	  longer	  be	  a	  solid	  basis	  for	  
a	  legal	  prohibition.	  
	  
Furthermore,	  the	  gap	  between	  these	  disciplines	  is	  perhaps	  smaller	  than	  one	  might	  imagine.	  The	  moral	  
philosophical	  approach	  named	  ‘consequentialism’	  examines	  the	  morality	  of	  conduct	  by	  focusing	  on	   its	  
effects.	  Consequentialism	  has	  clear	  parallels	  with	  the	  effects-­‐based	  economic	  theory	  that	  many	  consider	  
to	   provide	   the	   theoretical	   cornerstone	   of	   competition	   law.	   Although	   –	   by	   contrast	   –	   the	   moral	  
philosophical	   approach	   that	   focuses	   on	   the	   intent/nature	   of	   one’s	   conduct	   (also	   referred	   to	   as	   a	  
‘deontological’	   perspective)	   is	   conceptually	   further	   removed	   from	   competition	   law,	   it	   also	   offers	   a	  
number	  of	  useful	  insights.	  The	  paragraphs	  below	  examine	  the	  two	  approaches	  in	  more	  detail.46	  	  
	  
2.3.2 Consequentialism	  and	  utilitarianism	  	  
As	  mentioned	   above,	   consequentialism	   focuses	   on	   the	   effects	   of	   conduct	   to	   establish	  whether	   it	   has	  
moral	  worth.	   A	  well-­‐known	   type	   of	   consequentialism	   is	   utilitarianism.	   Utilitarianism	   gained	   particular	  
popularity	   in	   the	   19th	   century	   through	   the	   writings	   of	   Jeremy	   Bentham	   and	   John	   Stuart	   Mill.	   Their	  
approach	   essentially	   condensed	  moral	   issues	   into	   one	   basic	   question:	   does	   an	   act	   lead	   to	   additional	  
‘happiness’	  (i.e.	  utility)	  while	  it	  minimises	  ‘pain’,	  or	  not?	  If	  it	  does,	  the	  act	  has	  moral	  worth.	  The	  theory’s	  
apparent	  simplicity	  is	  one	  of	  its	  key	  attractive	  features.	  
	  
Critics	   have	   argued	   that	   utilitarianism	   ‘presupposes	   omniscience’	   of	   every	   individual’s	   (potential)	  
happiness	   and	   pain,	   whereas	   –	   in	   practice	   –	   their	   individual	   preferences	   are	   difficult	   to	   gauge.47	   In	  
addition,	   utilitarianism	   does	   not	   consider	   intent	   or	   the	   intrinsic	   moral	   worth	   of	   an	   act.	   As	   a	   result,	  
utilitarianism	  may	  attach	  moral	  worth	   to	  conduct	   that	  accidently	   led	   to	  a	  good	  result,48	  or	   to	  conduct	  
that	  seems	  intrinsically	  unethical.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  For	  the	  description	  of	  consequentialism	  and	  deontology,	  I	  have	  relied	  on	  the	  highly	  interesting	  on-­‐line	  lectures	  
by	  prof.	  Sandel,	  available	  at	  http://www.justiceharvard.org/.	  
47	  R.A.	  Posner,	  ‘Utilitarianism,	  economics	  and	  legal	  theory’,	  (1979)	  8	  J.	  Legal	  Stud.	  103,	  113;	  referring	  to	  F.	  A.	  Hayek,	  
Law,	  Legislation,	  and	  Liberty	  17-­‐23	  (1976).	  
48	  For	  instance,	  think	  of	  a	  shooter	  who	  kills	  a	  person	  on	  a	  busy	  square	  because	  the	  latter	  has	  borrowed	  money	  
without	  ever	  repaying.	  After	  the	  killing,	  the	  shooter	  finds	  out	  later	  that	  the	  debtor	  was	  a	  suicide	  bomber	  who	  
intended	  to	  blow	  up	  all	  people	  on	  the	  square.	  From	  a	  utilitarian	  perspective,	  one	  could	  say	  that	  the	  killing	  was	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For	  instance,	  what	  if	  a	  large	  group	  of	  individuals	  derives	  much	  pleasure	  out	  of	  lynching	  a	  single	  victim,	  
whose	   pain	   is	   not	   great	   enough	   to	   ‘compensate’	   for	   the	   pleasure	   of	   the	   group	   at	   large?49	   An	  
uncompromising	  utilitarian	  would	  have	  to	  attribute	  moral	  worth	  to	  the	  actions	  of	   the	   lynch	  mob.	  This	  
bizarre	   result	   is	   often	   referred	   to	   as	   ‘moral	   monstrousness’.50	   As	   Posner	   has	   explained,	   this	  
monstrousness	  basically	  stems	  from	  ‘the	  utilitarian's	  refusal	  to	  make	  moral	  distinctions	  among	  types	  of	  
pleasure’.51	  	  
	  
From	   a	   dogmatic	   perspective,	   the	   criticism	   of	  moral	  monstrousness	   is	   highly	   persuasive.	   However,	   in	  
practice,	   I	   believe	   that	   very	   few	   situations	   would	   actually	   lead	   to	   such	   an	   outcome.	   In	   the	   lynching	  
example	  above,	  I	  consider	  it	  unlikely	  that	  the	  group’s	  pleasure	  would	  indeed	  surpass	  the	  inflicted	  pain.	  
The	  pain	  is	  long-­‐lived	  and	  likely	  to	  impact	  many	  others	  as	  well	  (just	  think	  of	  the	  relatives	  of	  the	  victim),52	  
whereas	   the	  pleasure	  –	   even	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   it	   is	   truly	   experienced	  –	   is	   likely	   to	  be	   transitory	   and	  
superficial.53	  
	  
Another	   –	   perhaps	   less	   extreme	   –	   example	   of	   ‘moral	   monstrousness’	   essentially	   goes	   as	   follows.	  
Suppose	  you	  are	   serving	   in	   a	   jury	  of	   a	  homicide	   case,	   and	   it	   is	   clear	   to	   you	   that	   the	  defendant	   is	  not	  
guilty.	   The	   case	   has	   attracted	   much	   attention	   from	   the	   public,	   as	   the	   facts	   of	   the	   homicide	   were	  
particularly	  grueling.	  Suppose	  that	  the	  general	  public	  believes	  the	  person	  to	  be	  guilty,	  and	  that	  violent	  
riots	   are	   likely	   to	   take	   place	   if	   the	   defendant	   is	   found	   not	   guilty.	   Those	   riots	  may,	   in	   turn,	   lead	   to	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
morally	  right,	  even	  though	  the	  shooter	  killed	  a	  man	  simply	  because	  of	  a	  debt	  (and	  was	  unaware	  of	  the	  lifes	  he	  
would	  save).	  
49	  Similar	  examples	  are	  often	  raised	  when	  discussing	  (and	  criticizing)	  utilitarianism.	  	  
50	  Posner	  1979,	  supra	  note	  47,	  at	  116-­‐119.	  See	  also	  A.T.	  Kronman,	  ‘Wealth	  maximization	  as	  a	  normative	  principle’,	  
(1980)	  9	  J.	  Legal	  Stud.	  227,	  at	  228	  (referring	  to	  the	  ‘utility	  monsters’,	  ‘which	  have	  always	  been	  an	  embarrassment	  
to	  uncompromising	  utilitarians’).	  
51	  Posner	  1979,	  supra	  note	  47,	  at	  116.	  
52	  Others	  may	  also	  be	  negatively	  affected.	  For	  example,	  the	  society	  at	  large	  may	  suffer	  from	  an	  added	  sense	  of	  
insecurity.	  
53	  Also	  consider	  that	  one	  has	  to	  take	  into	  account	  future	  loss	  of	  pleasure	  –	  or	  even	  pain	  –	  by	  the	  perpetrators	  as	  
well,	  for	  example	  if	  they	  start	  feeling	  guilty	  for	  their	  actions.	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number	   of	   casualties.	   Should	   you,	   as	   a	  member	   of	   the	   jury,	   find	   the	   defendant	   guilty	   to	   avoid	   even	  
greater	  harm?	  	  
	  
Although	  this	  example	  is	  often	  used	  to	  describe	  the	  inequitable	  results	  of	  utilitarianism,	  I	  doubt	  whether	  
utilitarianism	  would	  truly	  require	  the	  jury	  member	  to	  find	  the	  defendant	  guilty.	  Utilitarianism	  provides	  
no	  clear	  requirement	  to	  act	  in	  a	  particular	  way	  if	  there	  are	  many	  uncertainties	  related	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  
the	  conduct.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  harm	  following	  from	  a	  conviction	  would	  be	  certain.	  This	  not	  only	  includes	  
the	  harm	  to	  the	  defendant	  and	  his	  immediate	  relatives,	  but	  also	  the	  harm	  to	  (people’s	  faith	  in)	  the	  rule	  
of	  law.	  By	  contrast,	  the	  resulting	  benefits	  would	  still	  be	  uncertain.	  A	  mere	  threat	  of	  riots	  does	  not	  mean	  
that	  they	  would	  indeed	  materialise	  –	  even	  greater	  uncertainty	  exists	  as	  to	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  riots	  
would	  lead	  to	  casualties.54	  
	  
To	   my	   mind,	   the	   previous	   paragraph	   also	   means	   that	   a	   correct	   interpretation	   of	   consequentialism	  
should	   also	   have	   regard	   to	   possible	   alternatives	   as	   relevant	   context.	   	   The	   late	   19th	   century	   English	  
criminal	   case	  R	   v	   Dudley	   and	   Stephens	   provides	   a	   good	   example.55	   The	   case	   concerned	   a	   number	   of	  
shipwrecked	  sailors	  who	  –	  facing	  starvation	  –	  killed	  and	  cannibalized	  Richard	  Parker,	  the	  cabin	  boy.	  The	  
case	   is	   often	   remembered	   as	   setting	   the	   precedent	   that	   necessity	   is	   not	   a	   defence	   to	   a	   charge	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  See	  also	  the	  discussion	  as	  to	  the	  discussion	  on	  the	  former	  §	  14.3	  of	  the	  German	  Aviation	  Security	  Act	  German	  
Act.	  The	  provision	  allowed	  the	  German	  military	  to	  shoot	  down	  a	  civilian	  aircraft	  if	  it	  was	  hijacked	  in	  order	  to	  
prevent	  that	  the	  plane	  would	  be	  used	  to	  crash	  into	  a	  building,	  causing	  even	  more	  deaths.	  	  The	  reasoning	  behind	  
the	  provision	  is	  consequentialist:	  it	  considers	  that	  the	  people	  in	  the	  aircraft	  will	  die	  anyway,	  and	  that	  shooting	  
down	  the	  plane	  will	  avoid	  further	  harm.	  The	  Bundesverfassungsgericht	  annulled	  the	  Act	  due	  to	  its	  incompatibility	  
with	  the	  German	  Basic	  Law	  (being	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  right	  to	  life	  and	  the	  right	  to	  human	  dignity),	  as	  the	  State	  may	  
not	  use	  human	  beings	  as	  ‘mere	  objects’	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  a	  particular	  result	  from	  materializing	  (see	  e.g.	  para	  122	  of	  
Bundesverfassungsricht	  15	  February	  2006,	  1	  BvR	  357/05,	  available	  at	  
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20060215_1bvr035705en.html).	  The	  Court	  thus	  
essentially	  relied	  on	  a	  Kantian	  line	  of	  reasoning,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  we	  cannot	  use	  human	  beings	  as	  a	  means	  to	  an	  
end.	  In	  my	  view,	  one	  could	  also	  have	  questioned	  the	  Act	  from	  a	  more	  utilitarian	  point	  of	  view	  if	  one	  factors	  in	  
uncertainty:	  action	  would	  result	  in	  certain	  death	  of	  the	  people	  on	  board	  the	  aircraft,	  whereas	  there	  are	  many	  
uncertainties	  as	  to	  whether	  one	  actually	  avoids	  any	  harm.	  For	  example,	  it	  may	  be	  the	  case	  that	  the	  plane	  has	  not	  
been	  hijacked,	  or	  has	  been	  hijacked	  by	  people	  who	  simply	  want	  a	  payment	  of	  ransom	  (instead	  of	  torpedoing	  
themselves	  into	  a	  building).	  	  
55	  R	  v	  Dudley	  and	  Stephens	  [1884]	  14	  QBD	  273	  DC.	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murder.	   I	   take	   a	   somewhat	   different	   approach.	   In	  my	   view,	   there	  was	   no	   pressing	  moral	   (and	   legal)	  
dilemma	  to	  begin	  with.	  One	  of	  the	  people	  on	  the	  shipwreck	  was	  bound	  to	  die	  of	  starvation	  before	  the	  
others	  did,	   taking	  away	  the	  need	  for	  a	  pre-­‐emptive	  kill	   (leaving	  only	   the	  –	  much	   less	  pressing	  –	  moral	  
issue	  of	  whether	  one	  may	  consume	  human	  flesh	  in	  order	  to	  survive).	  	  
	  
2.3.3 Consequentialism	  and	  competition	  law	  
The	   paragraphs	   above	   question	   to	   what	   extent	   we	   can	   use	   the	   insights	   of	   consequentialism	   for	   the	  
purposes	  of	  competition	   law.	   In	  my	  view,	   these	  disciplines	  are	  not	   that	   far	   removed	   from	  each	  other.	  
The	   introductory	   chapters	   of	   competition	   law	   handbooks	   often	   include	   a	   discussion	   of	   welfare	  
economics.	  Welfare	  economics	  provides	  an	  answer	  as	   to	  why	  we	  prohibit	  anti-­‐competitive	  conduct	   in	  
the	   first	   place:	   such	   practices	   lead	   to	   higher	   prices	   and	   lower	   quantity	   compared	   to	   the	   equilibrium	  
level.	  Apart	  from	  a	  wealth	  transfer	  from	  producers	  to	  consumers,	  anti-­‐competitive	  conduct	  also	  results	  
in	  a	   loss	  of	   total	  welfare:	   the	  so-­‐called	  deadweight	   loss.	  Welfare	  economics	   is	   thus	  consequentialist	   in	  
nature,56	  as	  it	  focuses	  on	  the	  welfare	  effects	  of	  potentially	  anti-­‐competitive	  conduct.	  
	  
Smith	  famously	  observed	  that	  the	  baker	  does	  not	  produce	  our	  daily	  bread	  out	  of	  benevolence,	  but	  out	  
of	   his	   self-­‐interest.	   Smith’s	   observation	   can	   be	   easily	   misconstrued	   as	   leaving	   no	   room	   for	   ethics.57	  
However,	   Smith	   did	   not	   argue	   that	   pursuing	   one’s	   own	   self-­‐interest	   has	   moral	   worth	   as	   such,	   but	  
observed	  that	  the	  moral	  worth	  lies	  in	  the	  effects	  that	  such	  conduct	  has	  for	  society	  as	  a	  whole.	  Indeed,	  
the	   wish	   to	   make	   profit	   triggers	   the	   baker	   to	   offer	   good	   products	   at	   an	   attractive	   price,	   thereby	  
benefiting	  his	  customers.	  
	  
Smith’s	  theories	  are	  thus	  clearly	  rooted	  in	  the	  moral	  philosophy	  of	  consequentialism.	  This	  is	  sometimes	  
overlooked	   by	   Antitrust	   commentators	   who	   base	   themselves	   on	   the	   free-­‐market	   ideas	   advocated	   by	  
Smith,58	  but	  who	  argue	  that	  Antitrust	  has	  no	  ethical	  component.59	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	  Note	  that	  Posner	  argues	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘welfare'	  should	  be	  clearly	  differentiated	  from	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘utility’.	  
See	  Posner	  1979,	  supra	  note	  47.	  
57	  Or,	  at	  least,	  an	  ethical	  approach	  that	  does	  not	  solely	  rely	  on	  one’s	  own	  self-­‐interest.	  
58	  Note	  that	  Smith	  did	  not	  always	  argue	  in	  favour	  of	  markets	  as	  opposed	  to	  government	  regulation.	  In	  The	  Wealth	  
Of	  Nations,	  he	  primarily	  argues	  against	  barriers	  of	  trade	  between	  nations,	  such	  as	  the	  hefty	  tariffs	  that	  applied	  to	  
the	  import	  and	  export	  of	  many	  commodities	  at	  the	  time.	  See	  in	  particular	  book	  IV	  of	  A.	  Smith,	  The	  Wealth	  of	  
Nations	  (Bantam	  Classic:	  New	  York	  2003).	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2.3.4 Consequentialism	  and	  consumer	  welfare	  	  
Competition	  law	  is	  imbued	  with	  consequentialist	   logic.	  The	  oft-­‐heard	  idea	  that	  competition	  law	  should	  
strive	   for	   the	   maximization	   of	   consumer	   welfare	   is,	   essentially,	   a	   consequentialist	   notion.	   However,	  
several	  criticisms	  can	  be	  leveled	  at	  attributing	  much	  weight	  to	  consumer	  welfare	  –	  and,	  more	  generally,	  
of	   pursuing	   a	   consequentialist	   approach.	   The	   following	  paragraphs	  provide	   a	   short	   discussion	  of	   both	  
theoretical	   and	   practical	   issues.	   The	   point	   is	   to	   show	   that,	   although	   an	   examination	   of	   effects	   can	  
provide	   a	  meaningful	   analysis,	   a	   consequentialist	   approach	   that	   slavishly	   adopts	   a	   consumer	   welfare	  
approach	  encounters	  several	  criticisms.	  
	  
First,	  there	  is	  no	  clear	  consensus	  on	  what	  consumer	  welfare	  really	  means.60	  And	  even	  if	  we	  do	  manage	  
to	  find	  a	  satisfactory	  definition,	   it	  remains	  unclear	  why	  we	  should	  strive	  towards	  consumer	  welfare.	   Is	  
welfare	  a	  goal	  in	  itself,	  or	  should	  we	  consider	  it	  a	  means	  to	  an	  end	  (or	  a	  proxy	  for	  happiness	  –	  a	  goal	  that	  
utilitarians	   argue	   we	   should	   strive	   for)?	   Is	   ‘maximization’	   of	   welfare	   sufficient,	   or	   should	   we	   also	  
consider	  distribution	  issues?	  And	  is	  the	  concept	  of	  welfare	  not	  much	  broader	  than	  wealth,	  even	  though	  
the	  two	  are	  often	  used	  interchangeably?	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  we	  interpret	  welfare	  as	  ‘wealth’	  in	  terms	  of	  
monetary	  benefits,	  Dworkin	  has	  cautioned	  that	  money	  can	  only	  be	  useful	  so	  far	  as	  it	  enables	  us	  ‘to	  lead	  
a	  more	  valuable,	  successful,	  happier,	  or	  more	  moral	  life’,	  warning	  that	  ‘[a]nyone	  who	  counts	  it	  for	  more	  
than	  that	  is	  a	  fetishist	  of	  little	  green	  paper’.61	  
	  
Second,	   the	   static	  price	  model	  –	   that	   can	  be	   considered	   the	  economic	   foundation	   for	   the	   (consumer)	  
welfare	   approach	   –	   focuses	   on	   allocative	   efficiency	   and	   does	   not	   as	   such	   consider	   productive	   and	  
dynamic	   efficiency.	   As	   a	   consequence,	   the	   model	   may	   undervalue	   the	   importance	   of	   cost-­‐saving	   or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  Horton	  2011,	  supra	  note	  45,	  at	  506	  and	  515,	  noting	  that	  neoclassical	  economics	  ‘has	  nothing	  to	  say	  about	  
fairness’,	  except	  that	  a	  free	  market	  will	  lead	  to	  allocative	  efficiency	  and	  maximum	  utility.	  Also	  note	  the	  judgment	  
by	  Dean	  J.	  of	  the	  Australian	  High	  Court	  in	  Queensland	  Wire	  (infra	  note	  1020),	  who	  noted	  that	  the	  statutory	  concept	  
of	  taking	  advantage	  of	  power	  does	  not	  require	  ‘some	  distinct	  examination	  of	  the	  morality	  or	  social	  acceptability	  of	  
the	  conduct	  involved’.	  
60	  K.J.	  Cseres,	  ‘The	  Controversies	  of	  the	  Consumer	  Welfare	  Standard’	  (2007)	  3	  The	  Competition	  Law	  Review	  121,	  at	  
124.	  See	  also	  B.Y.	  Orbach,	  ‘The	  Antitrust	  Consumer	  Welfare	  Paradox’,	  (2010)	  7	  Journal	  of	  Competition	  Law	  &	  
Economics	  133–164.	  
61	  R.M.	  Dworkin,	  ‘Is	  Wealth	  A	  Value?’,	  (1980)	  9	  J.	  Legal	  Stud.	  191,	  201.	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innovation-­‐enhancing	   efficiencies	   that	   may	   raise	   the	   level	   of	   welfare.	   That	   means	   not	   all	   relevant	  
consequences	  are	  being	  taken	  into	  account.	  The	  approach	  may	  also	  diverge	  from	  the	  original	  meaning	  
of	   the	   Treaty’s	   competition	   rules.	   To	   the	   extent	   that	   the	   original	   drafters	   of	   the	   EEC	   Treaty	   used	  
efficiency-­‐related	  language,	  they	  seemed	  to	  chiefly	  refer	  to	  productive	  efficiency.	  The	  drafters	  sought	  to	  
ensure	   that	   European	   companies	  would	  be	  able	   to	  enjoy	   greater	   economies	  of	   scale,	   producing	   for	   a	  
larger	   home	   market.62	   As	   a	   final	   remark,	   the	   static	   price	   model	   is	   unable	   to	   fully	   consider	   dynamic	  
efficiencies,	  even	  though	  –	  if	  one	  agrees	  with	  the	  Schumpeterian	  model	  of	  ‘creative	  destruction’	  –	  such	  
efficiencies	  can	  often	  have	  the	  greatest	  welfare-­‐enhancing	  effect.	  	  
	  
Third,	  in	  an	  ideal	  world,	  where	  all	  effects	  can	  be	  easily	  quantified,	  a	  welfare	  analysis	  is	  simply	  a	  matter	  of	  
assessing	  the	  net	  effect.	  In	  practice,	  however,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  know	  how	  reliable	  such	  quantifications	  are,	  
in	  particular	  due	  to	  the	  uncertainties	  related	  to	  the	  assumptions	  needed	  as	  input	  for	  the	  quantification.	  
In	  addition,	  one	  has	  to	  make	  a	  choice	  whether	  any	  welfare	  transfers	  compensating	  for	  a	  loss	  in	  welfare	  
for	  particular	  individuals	  must	  take	  place	  in	  actual	  fact	  (Pareto	  efficiency)	  or	  must	  simply	  be	  able	  to	  be	  
made	  hypothetically	  (Kaldor-­‐Hicks	  efficiency).	  	  
	  
Fourth,	   the	   ‘consumer	   welfare’	   approach	   relies	   heavily	   on	   the	   assumption	   that	   the	   so-­‐called	  
‘deadweight	  loss’	  embodies	  the	  most	  serious	  aspect	  of	  anti-­‐competitive	  behaviour.	  The	  deadweight	  loss	  
reflects	   unsatisfied	   wants	   that	   the	   market	   no	   longer	   provides	   due	   to	   a	   supra-­‐competitive	   price.	   A	  
weakness	  of	  the	  deadweight	  loss	  concept,	  is	  that	  it	  does	  not	  answer	  the	  question	  how	  consumers	  have	  
spent	   their	  money	   after	   ‘leaving’	   the	  market.	   Perhaps	   they	   have	   spent	   it	   on	   goods	   that	   satisfy	   their	  
wants	  almost	  to	  the	  same	  extent,	  and	  thus	  provide	  almost	  as	  much	  welfare	  as	  the	  situation	  in	  which	  the	  
‘monopolized’	   good	   would	   have	   been	   available	   at	   a	   competitive	   price.	   Dogmatic	   consistency	   would	  
require	   the	   loss	   in	   welfare	   to	   be	   compared	   with	   the	   gains	   that	   result	   from	   consumers	   turning	   to	  
alternatives.	  In	  practice,	  this	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  highly	  difficult	  as	  such	  alternatives	  do	  not	  need	  to	  be	  actual	  
substitutes	   for	   the	   monopolized	   good	   (customers	   can	   turn	   to	   any	   product	   that	   provides	   them	   with	  
utility;	   that	   does	   not	   necessarily	   have	   to	   be	   an	   actual	   substitute	   of	   the	   good	   that	   they	   have	   stopped	  
buying.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62	  As	  was	  noted	  e.g.	  in	  the	  1956	  Spaak	  report.	  See	  P.	  Akman,	  ‘Searching	  for	  the	  Long-­‐Lost	  Soul	  of	  Article	  82	  EC’,	  
(2009)	  29	  Oxford	  Journal	  of	  Legal	  Studies	  267,	  280.	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Finally,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  why	  we	  should	  necessarily	  favour	  consumer	  welfare	  over	  total	  welfare.	  If	  the	  goal	  
is	  indeed	  to	  achieve	  the	  highest	  degree	  of	  efficiency,	  why	  don’t	  we	  consider	  producer	  welfare	  as	  well?	  
Besides:	  it	  not	  always	  evident	  why	  the	  consumer	  should	  receive	  protection,	  while	  the	  producer	  should	  
not.	  Consider	  the	  dominant	  producer	  for	  radar	  systems	  only	  used	  for	  luxury	  private	  yachts.	  Should	  we,	  
as	   a	   society,	   be	   troubled	   in	   the	   event	   that	   such	   a	   company	   charges	   ‘excessive	   prices’?	   The	   dilemma	  
becomes	  particularly	  compelling	  in	  a	  situation	  where	  the	  major	  shareholder	  (i.e.	  a	  recipient	  of	  dividend	  
payments)	   of	   that	   dominant	  manufacturer	   happens	   to	   be	   a	   pension	   fund	   for	   cleaning	   staff.	   It	   is	   not	  
apparent	  why	  we	  should,	  from	  a	  policy	  perspective,	  favour	  the	  welfare	  of	  millionaire	  jetsetters	  over	  the	  
viability	  of	  a	  pension	  fund	  of	  people	  at	  the	  very	  bottom	  of	  the	  income	  scale.	  
	  
Admittedly,	   the	   example	   in	   the	   previous	   paragraph	   is	   somewhat	   stylized.	  Normally,	   it	  makes	   political	  
sense	  to	  protect	  consumers,	  as	  they	  can	  often	  be	  considered	  a	  relatively	  vulnerable	  group.	  This	  explains	  
why	   so	   many	   countries	   have	   enacted	   consumer	   protection	   laws.	   Another	   argument	   in	   favour	   of	  
consumer	  welfare	   is	   that	  we	  should	  consider	  welfare	  not	  only	   in	  absolute	  terms.	  An	   incremental	  euro	  
may	  not	  produce	  the	  same	  additional	  welfare	  for	  every	  recipient.	  A	  consumer	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  a	  higher	  
valuation	  of	  that	  incremental	  euro	  than,	  say,	  a	  multi-­‐billion	  euro	  company.	  So	  what	  could	  seem	  benign	  
in	   a	   total	   welfare	   perspective	   –	   it	   does	   not	   matter	   whether	   a	   consumer	   or	   producer	   receives	   the	  
incremental	  euro	  –	  could	  indeed	  influence	  the	  utility	  that	  such	  an	  increment	  would	  produce.	  
	  
2.3.5 Consequentialism	  and	  justifications	  	  
A	   consequentialist	   perspective	   can	   provide	   a	   theoretical	   basis	   for	   justifications	   of	   otherwise	   illegal	  
unilateral	  conduct	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  rely	  on	  the	  beneficial	  effects	  of	  the	  practice	  under	  review.	  The	  
clearest	  example	  is	  an	  efficiency	  plea.	  Such	  a	  plea	  acknowledges	  that	  an	  act	  can	  have	  both	  pro-­‐	  and	  anti-­‐
competitive	  effects.	  An	  efficiency	  plea	  will	  succeed	  if	  the	  net	  effect	  of	  the	  conduct	  under	  review	  is	  pro-­‐
competitive.	   As	   discussed	   in	   the	   paragraphs	   above,	   there	   are	   many	   difficulties	   associated	   with	  
establishing	  a	  reliable	  quantification	  of	  the	  relevant	  welfare	  effect.	  Nevertheless,	  if	  a	  company	  manages	  
to	  overcome	  these	  issues	  and	  show	  that	  there	  is	  a	  net	  beneficial	  effect,	  the	  practice	  under	  review	  can	  
also	  be	  considered	  to	  have	  moral	  worth	  from	  a	  consequentialist	  perspective.	  
	  
Another	  justification	  that	  may	  be	  based	  on	  consequentialism	  is	  a	  public	  interest	  plea.	  A	  successful	  public	  
interest	  plea	  connotes	  that	  benefits	  to	  the	  public	   interest	  outweigh	  the	  anti-­‐competitive	  effects	  of	  the	  
conduct	   under	   review.	   From	   a	   dogmatic	   perspective,	   it	   is	   irrelevant	   that	   public	   interest	   benefits	   are	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usually	  difficult	  to	  quantify	   in	  monetary	  terms	  (indeed,	  efficiencies	  are	  often	  difficult	  to	  quantify,	  too).	  
As	  long	  as	  the	  act	  under	  review	  avoids	  ‘pain’	  and	  contributes	  to	  ‘pleasure’,	  it	  shall	  be	  condoned	  under	  a	  
utilitarian	  approach.	  
	  
A	   broad	   approach	   towards	   consequentialism	   (which	   I	   favour)	   may	   also	   accommodate	   legitimate	  
business	  behaviour,	  encompassing	  both	  commercial	  freedom	  and	  objective	  necessity.	  As	  to	  commercial	  
freedom,	  allowing	  companies	  with	  market	  power	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  leeway	  has	  –	  generally	  speaking	  –	  a	  
beneficial	   effect	   to	   the	   economy	   as	   a	   whole.	   In	   addition,	   consequentialism	   may	   provide	   a	   basis	   for	  
objective	  necessity,	  as	  the	  harmful	  effect	  would	  have	  resulted	  in	  any	  case.	  Consequentialism	  should	  only	  
actual	   conduct.	   Compare	   it	   to	   a	   situation	   where	   somebody	   throws	   you	   through	   a	   window.	   Only	   an	  
overly	   strict	   interpretation	   of	   consequentialism	   would	   consider	   the	   breaking	   of	   the	   window	   as	   an	  
immoral	  act	  of	  the	  one	  being	  thrown,	  rather	  than	  the	  thrower.	  
	  
2.3.6 Deontology	  	  
Although	  consequentialism	  has	  more	  obvious	  parallels	  with	  competition	  law,	  one	  can	  also	  draw	  lessons	  
from	  deontology.	  Deontology	  focuses	  on	  the	  intrinsic	  moral	  worth	  of	  actions	  themselves,	  deriving	  moral	  
worth	  from	  the	  character	  of	  the	  conduct	  rather	  than	  its	  outcome.	  
	  
2.3.7 Kantian	  ethics	  and	  competition	  law	  	  
Immanuel	   Kant	   developed	   a	   deontological	   approach	   that	   led	   to	   his	   formulation	   of	   the	   ‘categorical	  
imperative’.	   The	   categorical	   imperative	   states	   that	   actions	   can	   only	   be	   considered	   ethical	   if	   they	   are	  
performed	  out	  of	  a	  duty	  to	  abide	  by	  the	  moral	   law.63	  This	   is	  a	  duty	  that	  one	  willfully	  and	  freely	  places	  
upon	  one	  self.	  Accordingly,	  Kant	  suggested	  that	  only	  actions	  that	  are	  adopted	  autonomously,	  and	  thus	  
independent	   of	   the	   actions	   of	   others,	   can	   have	   moral	   worth.	   Note	   that	   this	   does	   not	   mean	   that,	  
reversely,	   autonomous	   acts	   will	   by	   definition	   have	   moral	   worth.	   Kant	   simply	   considers	   autonomous	  
action	  as	  a	  pre-­‐condition	  for	  morally	  sound	  behaviour.	  	  
	  
One	   can	   interpret	   this	   principle	   in	   different	   ways	   while	   transposing	   Kant’s	   ideas	   to	   the	   realm	   of	  
competition	  law.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  Kant’s	  views	  may	  provide	  an	  argument	  why	  we	  should	  not	  impinge	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  See	  e.g.	  M.D.	  White,	  ‘A	  Kantian	  Critique	  of	  Antitrust:	  On	  Morality	  and	  Microsoft’,	  (2007)	  22	  Journal	  of	  Private	  
Enterprise	  161-­‐190.	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on	   the	   autonomy	   of	   the	   dominant	   firm.	   Under	   EU	   competition	   law,	   unilateral	   conduct	   can	   only	   be	  
prohibited	   if	   the	   firm	   is	   dominant,	  which	   the	   ECJ	   interprets	   as	  being	   in	   an	   autonomous	  position.	   This	  
case	  law	  thus	  appears	  to	  take	  a	  fundamentally	  different	  approach	  than	  Kant,	  who	  takes	  autonomy	  to	  be	  
a	   key	   condition	   for	   attributing	   moral	   worth	   to	   conduct.	   In	   addition,	   Kantian	   thought	   is	   difficult	   to	  
reconcile	  with	  the	  basic	   logic	  of	  punishing	  certain	  unilateral	  conduct	  because	  of	   the	  (anti-­‐competitive)	  
consequences	   that	   it	  may	  have.64	   For	  Kant,	   the	  moral	  worth	  –	  or	   lack	   thereof	  –	   is	   inherent	   in	   the	  act	  
itself.	  	  
	  
From	  a	  different	  perspective,	  however,	  Kantian	  thought	  may	  also	  require	  us	  to	  consider	  the	  autonomy	  
of	  others.	  Kant’s	  concept	  of	  morality	  considers	  that	   it	   is	  wrong	  to	  use	  human	  beings	  as	  a	  means	  to	  an	  
end.65	  Consumers	  –	  as	  human	  beings	  –	  may	  thus	  not	  be	  used	  as	  an	  involuntary	  instrument	  to	  achieve	  a	  
certain	   objective.	   It	   is	   unclear	   if	   Kant’s	   views	   can	   be	   extended	   to	   other	  market	   participants,	   such	   as	  
suppliers	  or	  wholesale	  customers.	  
	  
Such	  an	  extension	  does	  seem	  to	  follow	  from	  Ordoliberal	  thought,	  that	  appears	  to	  have	  many	  parallels	  
with	  Kantian	  logic.	  Ordoliberalism	  considers	  the	  economic	  freedom	  of	  all	  market	  participants	  as	  a	  goal	  in	  
itself.66	  As	  a	  consequence,	  no	  one	  may	  restrain	  the	  economic	  freedom	  of	  others	  as	  a	  means	  to	  achieve	  
more	  wealth.	  Ordoliberals	   cherish	  economic	   freedom	  by	  all	  market	  participants,	  and	  draw	  an	  analogy	  
with	   the	   exercise	   of	   ‘public’	   (i.e.	   political)	   power.	   In	   their	   view,	   absolute	   economic	   power	   –	   just	   like	  
absolute	   political	   power	   –	   is	   subject	   to	   abuse	   and	   harmful	   to	   the	   public	   at	   large.67	   This	   explains	   the	  
Ordoliberal’s	  distrust	  of	  market	  power:	  by	   its	  very	  nature,	  a	  monopoly	   involves	  a	  more	   limited	  choice,	  
and	  thus	  less	  economic	  freedom,	  compared	  to	  a	  more	  competitive	  market	  environment.68	  	  
	  
Turning	   back	   to	   Kant’s	   categorical	   imperative,	  we	  may	   also	   draw	   lessons	   from	  his	   formulation	   of	   the	  
‘universal	  law’.	  The	  maxim	  demands	  that	  one	  should	  act	  only	  according	  to	  a	  rule	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  you	  
can	   ‘will’	   that	   it	  becomes	  a	  universal	   law.	  An	  example	   is	   lying:	  as	  you	  cannot	  will	   that	   telling	  untruths	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64	  White	  2007	  (ibid.).	  
65	  Kronman	  1980,	  supra	  note	  50,	  at	  233.	  Also	  consider	  the	  example	  of	  the	  German	  Act	  that	  allowed	  hijacked	  planes	  
to	  be	  shot	  down,	  as	  given	  in	  supra	  note	  54.	  
66	  Akman	  2009,	  supra	  note	  62,	  at	  276.	  	  
67	  M.E.	  Stucke,	  ‘Reconsidering	  Antitrust’s	  goals’,	  (2012)	  53	  B.C.	  L.	  Rev.	  551,	  564.	  
68	  M.E.	  Stucke,	  ‘Should	  the	  government	  prosecute	  monopolies?’,	  (2009)	  U.	  Ill.	  L.	  Rev.	  497,	  528-­‐529.	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would	  become	  a	  universal	   law	  (as	   this	  would	  be	  highly	  disruptive	   for	  society),	   lying	  does	  not	  abide	  by	  
the	  universal	  law.	  Accordingly,	  lying	  does	  not	  have	  moral	  worth.	  
	  
2.3.8 Kantian	  ethics	  and	  justifications	  	  
Kantian	  ethics	  does	  not	  have	  a	  clear-­‐cut	  application	  for	  justifications	  of	  otherwise	  prohibited	  unilateral	  
conduct.	   If	  one	  stresses	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  dominant	  firm,	   its	  actions	  are	  unlikely	  to	  lead	  to	  a	  prima	  
facie	   abuse,	   which	   means	   there	   is	   no	   need	   to	   examine	   justifications.	   However,	   if	   one	   stresses	   the	  
autonomy	   of	   other	   market	   participants,	   two	   elements	   of	   Kantian	   ethics	   may	   provide	   a	   possible	  
foundation	  for	  a	  justification.	  
	  
First,	  the	  universal	  law	  offers	  a	  theoretical	  underpinning	  of	  what	  this	  PhD	  thesis	  discusses	  as	  legitimate	  
commercial	  conduct	  (or	  competition	  on	  the	  merits).	  If	  conduct	  meets	  the	  law	  of	  universality,	  it	  connotes	  
that	  one	  can	  ‘will’	  that	  everyone	  should	  abide	  by	  such	  conduct.	  For	  example,	  one	  can	  definitely	  will	  that	  
all	  businesses	  should	  pay	  their	  bills	  and	  that	  no	  further	  supply	  will	  take	  place	  if	  they	  don’t.	  
	  
Second,	   Kantian	  ethics	  may	  provide	   a	   theoretical	   foundation	   for	   a	   ‘public	   interest’	   justification	   to	   the	  
extent	   that	   the	   underlying	   conduct	   is	   consistent	   with	   the	   categorical	   imperative.	   For	   example,	   a	  
dominant	  firm	  may	  refuse	  to	  do	  business	  with	  a	  company	  that	  engages	  in	  ill	  treatment	  of	  its	  employees.	  
Such	  a	  refusal	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  line	  with	  Kant’s	  strict	  demands	  on	  human	  dignity.	  	  
	  
As	  a	   final	   remark,	  Kantian	  ethics	  does	  not	   seem	  to	  allow	  a	   theoretical	  underpinning	   for	  a	   justification	  
based	   on	   ‘objective	   necessity’.	   Such	   a	   justification	   assumes	   that	   one	   acts	   out	   of	   necessity	   –	  whereas	  
Kant	  would	  only	  ascribe	  moral	  worth	  to	  actions	  that	  are	  adopted	  autonomously.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  still	  
conceivable	   that	   other	   deontological	   approaches	   do	   allow	   for	   an	   ethical	   foundation	   of	   objective	  
necessity,	  for	  example	  if	  such	  an	  approach	  focuses	  on	  the	  actor’s	  intent	  (note	  that	  such	  an	  approach	  is	  
far	  less	  demanding	  than	  Kantian	  ethics).	  As	  an	  anti-­‐competitive	  act	  that	  arises	  from	  objective	  necessity	  is	  
not	  pursued	  intentionally,	  it	  can	  still	  be	  considered	  to	  have	  moral	  worth.	  
	  
2.3.9 Conclusion	  	  
The	  paragraphs	  above	  have	  examined	  to	  what	  extent	  we	  can	  draw	   lessons	   from	  moral	  philosophy	   for	  
the	  purposes	  of	  competition	  law	  –	  and	  more	  particularly	  for	  justifications	  of	  otherwise	  illegal	  unilateral	  
conduct.	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To	  my	  mind,	  consequentialism	  is	  a	  relatively	  good	  fit	  with	  competition	  law,	  as	  it	  has	  many	  parallels	  with	  
the	  economic	  theory	  associated	  with	  competition	  law	  (even	  though,	  as	  I	  have	  noted,	  one	  can	  level	  many	  
criticisms	   against	   a	   slavish	   adoption	   of	   the	   consumer	  welfare	   standard).	   Consequentialism	   provides	   a	  
theoretical	  basis	  for	  considering	  an	  efficiency	  plea	  and	  a	  public	  interest	  plea,	  as	  these	  pleas	  connote	  that	  
the	  beneficial	  effects	  outweigh	   the	  detrimental	  effects.	   In	  my	  view,	  a	  more	   inclusive	   interpretation	  of	  
consequentialism	  also	  provides	  an	  underpinning	  for	  commercial	  freedom	  and	  objective	  necessity.	  
	  
Theoretically,	   a	   disadvantage	   of	   consequentialism	   is	   that	   it	  may	   lead	   to	   inequitable	   situations	   due	   to	  
‘moral	  monstrousness’.	  However,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  these	  criticisms	  are	  largely	  mistaken.	  They	  seem	  to	  
overstate	   the	  benefits	  and	  understate	   the	  harm	  caused	  by	  seemingly	  undesirable	  conduct	   (remember	  
the	  lynching	  example).	  Critics	  also	  seem	  to	  take	  little	  account	  of	  the	  likelihood	  that	  the	  relevant	  effects	  
will	   arise,	   and	   may	   overlook	   potential	   alternatives	   that	   could	   have	   avoided	   the	   moral	   dilemma	  
(remember	  the	  untimely	  death	  of	  cabin	  boy	  Richard	  Parker).	  
	  
By	  contrast,	   it	  appears	  that	   lessons	  from	  Kantian	  ethics	  are	  more	  difficult	   to	  transpose	  to	  competition	  
law.	  Kant	  requires	  actions	  to	  be	  autonomous	  if	  they	  are	  to	  have	  moral	  worth,	  whereas	  competition	  law	  
seems	  more	  circumspect	  of	  autonomy	  to	  the	  extent	  that	   it	  expresses	  market	  failure.	   Indeed,	  the	  rules	  
on	  abuse	  of	  dominance	  only	  apply	  when	  a	  company	  can	  act	  autonomously	  to	  a	  sufficient	  degree.	  More	  
generally,	  competition	  law	  should	  not	  rely	  too	  much	  to	  intent	  as	  this	  could	  easily	  lead	  to	  false	  positives.	  
The	  mere	  wish	  by	  companies	  to	  beat	  their	  competitors	  should	  only	  be	  applauded	  (for	  a	  more	  detailed	  
examination,	  see	  Section	  4.5	  of	  Chapter	  III).	  Another	  disadvantage	  of	  a	  Kantian	  approach	  is	  that	  it	  relies	  
on	  strict	  pre-­‐set	  rules,	  and	  thus	  insufficiently	  accommodates	  for	  the	  relevant	  context.	  	  
	  
However,	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   one	   does	   adopt	   a	   Kantian	   approach,	   it	   could	   provide	   a	   foundation	   for	  
legitimate	  commercial	  conduct	  (to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  conforms	  to	  the	  universal	  law),	  and	  public	  interest	  
(to	   the	   extent	   that	   it	   protects	   human	  dignity).	   A	   deontological	   perspective	   that	   focuses	   on	   an	   actor’s	  
intent	  may	  provide	  a	  theoretical	  underpinning	  for	  a	  justification	  based	  on	  objective	  necessity.	  
	  
	  
3 PROBLEM	  DEFINITION,	  AIM	  AND	  SCOPE	  OF	  THIS	  STUDY	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As	   said,	   competition	   law	   regimes	   throughout	   the	   world	   have	   acknowledged	   the	   availability	   of	   a	  
justification	   plea	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   unilateral	   conduct	   that	   the	   competition	   rules	   would	   otherwise	   prohibit.	  
However,	  the	  topic	  remains	  highly	  under-­‐theorized,	  both	  in	  the	  case	  law	  and	  in	  the	  academic	  literature.	  
The	  exact	  scope	  of	  this	  concept	  and	  the	  applicable	  legal	  conditions	  remain	  shrouded	  in	  mystery.	  
	  
This	   leads	   to	   various	   problems.	  Within	   the	   competition	   law	   jurisdictions	   under	   review,	   justifications	  
should	  work	   as	   an	   important	   counterbalance,	   and	   thus	   as	   a	   quality	   check,	   to	   a	   prohibition	   that	  may	  
otherwise	   be	   overly	   strict.	   The	   less	   pronounced	   its	   contours,	   the	  more	   difficult	   it	  will	   be	   to	   fulfil	   this	  
important	   function.	   Legal	   certainty	   is	   another	   notable	   issue,	   as	   it	   remains	   unclear	   how	   a	   firm	   with	  
market	  power	  may	  –	  or	  may	  not	  –	  justify	  its	  conduct.	  Only	  with	  a	  proper	  understanding	  of	  the	  scope	  and	  
substance	  of	  such	   justifications	   is	   it	  possible	   to	  know	  what	  constitutes	   illegal	  unilateral	  conduct	  under	  
competition	  law.	  The	  current	  opacity	  is	  particularly	  troublesome	  in	  those	  jurisdictions	  (such	  as	  the	  EU)	  
where	  a	  breach	  of	  the	  competition	  rules	  can	  lead	  to	  severe	  penalties.	  It	  is	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  companies	  to	  
know	  how	  they	  can	  abide	  by	   the	   law.	  Other	  entities,	   such	  as	  National	  Competition	  Authorities	   (NCAs)	  
and	  potential	  complainants	  or	  plaintiffs,	  may	  also	  be	  hampered	  if	  the	  law	  is	  insufficiently	  clear.69	  Finally,	  
the	  uncertainty	  regarding	  the	  applicable	  rules	  risks	  leading	  to	  inconsistencies,	  as	  NCAs	  and	  courts	  have	  
little	  guidance	  to	  base	  their	  decisions	  on.	  	  
	  
Consistency	   is	   also	   an	   issue	   between	   the	   various	   competition	   law	   jurisdictions.	   The	   more	   these	  
jurisdictions	  diverge	   in	  terms	  of	  the	  type	  of	   justifications	  they	  will	  allow,	  the	  more	  difficult	   it	  becomes	  
for	   cross-­‐border	   companies	   to	   comply	  with	   the	   law.	   This	   is	   problematic	   in	   a	  world	  where	   businesses	  
increasingly	  operate	  on	  an	   international	   level,	  but	  may	  be	  confronted	  with	  very	  different	   international	  
rules.	   Comparative	   studies	   such	   as	   these	   can	   thus	   contribute	   to	   the	   gradual	   global	   convergence	   of	  
competition	  rules,	  as	  advocated	  by	  bodies	  such	  as	  the	  International	  Competition	  Network.70	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  EU	  competition	  law	  cases	  are	  often	  triggered	  by	  a	  complainant	  that	  lodges	  a	  case	  at	  the	  European	  Commission.	  
US	  antitrust	  cases	  usually	  involve	  a	  plaintiff	  lodging	  a	  case	  before	  a	  Federal	  court.	  
70	  The	  ICN's	  mission	  statement	  is	  to	  advocate	  the	  adoption	  of	  superior	  standards	  and	  procedures	  in	  competition	  
policy	  around	  the	  world,	  formulate	  proposals	  for	  procedural	  and	  substantive	  convergence,	  and	  seek	  to	  facilitate	  
effective	  international	  cooperation	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  member	  agencies,	  consumers	  and	  economies	  worldwide.	  See	  
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/.	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These	  issues	  warrant	  further	  study	  of	  the	  subject-­‐matter	  of	  this	  thesis,	  and	  have	  led	  me	  to	  formulate	  the	  
following	   research	   question:	  What	   is,	   and	   what	   should	   be,	   the	   appropriate	   scope	   of	   justifications	   of	  
otherwise	  prohibited	  unilateral	  conduct,	  and	  what	  should	  be	  the	  applicable	  legal	  conditions?	  	  
	  
I	  have	  subdivided	  the	  principal	  research	  question	  into	  a	  number	  of	  more	  bite-­‐sized	  queries.	  These	  sub-­‐
questions	  aim	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  issue	  mainly	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  EU	  law,	  but	  also	  from	  the	  laws	  of	  
EU	  Member	  States	  and	  several	  non-­‐EU	  jurisdictions.	  They	  are	  as	  follows:	  
• What	   is,	   and	  what	   should	   be,	   the	   appropriate	   scope	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   objective	   justification	  
within	  the	  framework	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU,	  and	  what	  are	  –	  and	  should	  be	  –	  the	  applicable	  legal	  
conditions?	  These	  questions	  are	  examined	  in	  chapter	  III	  and	  chapter	  IV.	  
• What	  lessons	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  other	  areas	  of	  EU	  law,	  notably	  internal	  market	  law	  and	  other	  
competition	   law	   provisions,	   for	   the	   understanding	   of	   justifications	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   Article	   102	   TFEU?	  	  
This	  question	  is	  examined	  in	  chapter	  II.	  
• How	  do	   the	   EU	   rules	   of	   procedure	   on	   the	   burden	   and	   standard	   of	   proof	   function	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   an	  
objective	  justification	  plea	  within	  Article	  102	  TFEU?	  This	  question	  is	  examined	  in	  chapter	  IV.	  
• How	   is	   the	   concept	   of	   ‘objective	   justification’	   interpreted	   at	   the	   level	   of	   EU	  Member	   States?	  
What	  promising	  practices	  can	  be	  identified?	  This	  question	  is	  examined	  in	  chapter	  V.	  
• In	   what	   way	   can	   prima	   facie	   anti-­‐competitive	   unilateral	   conduct	   be	   justified	   in	   a	   number	   of	  
major	  competition	   law	  jurisdictions	  outside	  of	  the	  EU?	  What	   lessons	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  these	  
jurisdictions?	  This	  question	  is	  examined	  in	  chapter	  VI.	  
	  
Chapter	   VII,	   containing	   the	   main	   conclusions	   of	   the	   thesis,	   brings	   together	   the	   answers	   to	   the	   sub-­‐
questions	  in	  an	  endeavour	  to	  answer	  the	  principal	  research	  question.	  
	  
The	  principal	  aim	  of	  this	  study	  is	  to	  provide	  more	  clarity	  on	  the	  scope	  and	  interpretation	  of	  justifications	  
vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  unilateral	  conduct	  that	  would	  otherwise	  be	  contrary	  to	  the	  competition	  rules.	  It	  seeks	  to	  further	  
the	  understanding	  of	  the	  concept	  and	  provides	  suggestions	  to	  improve	  the	  way	  it	  is	  used.	  	  
	  
The	   study	   also	   seeks	   to	   identify	   commonalities	   and	   differences	   between	   jurisdictions	   in	   their	  
interpretation	  of	  the	  concept.	  Hopefully	  the	  unveiling	  of	  such	  (in-­‐)consistencies	  provides	  an	  impetus	  for	  
more	  cross-­‐border	  dialogue	  on	  this	  issue,	  both	  in	  the	  academic	  literature	  and	  in	  institutional	  fora	  such	  as	  
the	  International	  Competition	  Network	  (ICN).	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As	   the	  concept	  of	  objective	   justification	  holds	   so	  many	  question	  marks,	   I	  have	  chosen	   to	   cast	   the	  net	  
wide.	   The	   examination	   includes	   all	   the	  main	   types	   of	   justification	   pleas	   and	   examines	   a	  multitude	   of	  
jurisdictions.	   This	   approach	  undoubtedly	  means	   that	   I	   cannot	   venture	   as	  much	   in-­‐depth	   compared	   to	  
the	   situation	   where	   I	   would	   have	   chosen	   to	   single	   out	   one	   particular	   type	   of	   justification	   plea	   or	  
jurisdiction.	  	  
	  
However,	   I	  believe	  that	  this	  method	  presents	  the	  best	  way	  to	   illuminate	  the	  existing	   interpretation	  on	  
justifications	   and	   to	   strengthen	   future	   ones.	   Although	   the	   focus	   of	   the	   thesis	   is	   on	   EU	   law,	   it	   also	  
examines	   the	   laws	   of	   EU	   Member	   States	   and	   those	   of	   various	   non-­‐EU	   jurisdictions.	   It	   includes	   an	  
assessment	  of	  the	  law	  as	  it	  is	  (lex	  lata)	  and	  how	  the	  law,	  in	  my	  view,	  ought	  to	  be	  (lex	  ferenda).	  The	  study	  
seeks	  to	  identify	  the	  full	  breadth	  of	  what	  may	  constitute	  a	  justification.	  In	  addition,	  the	  examination	  is	  
not	  restricted	  to	  specific	  types	  of	  conduct	  (such	  as	  ‘predation’	  or	  ‘refusal	  to	  supply’),	  but	  encompasses	  
the	  full	  breadth	  of	  what	  is	  traditionally	  considered	  as	  anti-­‐competitive	  unilateral	  conduct.	  In	  the	  context	  
of	  US	  law,	  for	  example,	  the	  study	  thus	  aims	  to	  cover	  conduct	  prohibited	  by	  §2	  of	  the	  1890	  Sherman	  Act	  
(the	  key	  US	  federal	  antitrust	  statute),71	  but	  does	  not	  discuss	  the	  specific	  prohibition	  of	  certain	  forms	  of	  
price	  discrimination	  as	  contained	  by	  the	  1936	  Robinson-­‐Patman	  Act.72	  
	  
The	  broad	  scope	  of	  this	  study	  undoubtedly	  has	  some	  disadvantages,	  too.	  A	  wide	  scope	  of	   inquiry	  calls	  
for	  tough	  choices	  in	  what	  not	  to	  discuss.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  comparative	  analysis	  in	  chapters	  V	  and	  VI,	  I	  
solely	   discuss	   the	   elements	   that	   are	   directly	   related	   to	  my	   research	   question.	   However,	   as	   the	   cases	  
under	   review	   are	   usually	   highly	   fact-­‐specific,	   leaving	   out	   various	   elements	   entails	   the	   risk	   of	   an	  
imbalanced	  discussion.	  This	  issue	  is	  exacerbated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  justification	  plea	  was	  often	  simply	  
one	  of	  the	  many	  relevant	  elements	  in	  the	  cases	  under	  review.	  Notwithstanding	  these	  difficulties,	   I	  still	  
believe	  this	  approach	  is	  warranted.	  A	  comprehensive	  examination	  of	  all	  the	  intricacies	  of	  the	  domestic	  
cases	  would	  have	  lead	  to	  an	  excessively	  long	  study,	  with	  a	  considerable	  risk	  of	  missing	  the	  forest	  for	  the	  
trees.	  In	  addition,	  I	  think	  that	  a	  refusal	  to	  examine	  the	  topic	  from	  a	  cross-­‐border	  perspective	  entails	  risks	  
of	  its	  own:	  namely	  that	  we	  remain	  in	  the	  dark	  on	  how	  jurisdictions	  across	  the	  globe	  deal	  with	  this	  topic.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  Ch.	  647,	  26	  Stat.	  209,	  15	  USC.	  §§	  1–7.	  
72	  Pub.	  L.	  No.	  74-­‐692,	  49	  Stat.	  1526,	  15	  USC.	  §	  13.	  Similarly,	  I	  exclude	  the	  separate	  prohibition	  of	  price	  
discrimination	  in	  Section	  9	  of	  the	  South	  African	  Competition	  Act.	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As	  a	   final	   remark,	   the	  study	   focuses	  almost	  exclusively	  on	  the	  public	  enforcement	  of	  competition	   law.	  
Fully	   incorporating	   private	   enforcement	   as	   well	   would	   simply	   have	   made	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   study	  
excessively	  wide.	  Still,	  Chapter	  IV	  does	  make	  a	  number	  of	  comments	  on	  the	  procedural	  issues	  related	  to	  
objective	  justification	  in	  a	  private	  enforcement	  setting.	  
	  
	  
4 ROAD	  MAP	  
	  
I	   shall	   keep	   this	   road	  map	   short,	   as	   the	   section	   on	   research	  methodology	   provides	   a	  more	   extensive	  
treatment	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  thesis.	  	  
	  
The	   Section	   above	  has	  provided	  a	  basic	   explanation	  of	   objective	   justification	  within	  Article	   102	  TFEU.	  
Chapter	  II	  examines	  the	  topic	  from	  a	  wider	  EU	  legal	  perspective,	  distilling	  lessons	  on	  justifications	  that	  
arise	  from	  internal	  market	  law,	  Article	  101	  TFEU	  and	  merger	  control.	  The	  subsequent	  four	  chapters	  are	  
based	  on	  articles	  that	  have	  been	  published	  or	  accepted	  for	  publication.	  	  
	  
Chapter	   III	   provides	   a	   more	   in-­‐depth	   examination	   of	   objective	   justification	   within	   the	   framework	   of	  
Article	   102	   TFEU,	   focusing	   primarily	   on	   its	   scope	   of	   and	   the	   applicable	   legal	   conditions.73	   Chapter	   IV	  
discusses	   various	   procedural	   issues	   of	   objective	   justification	   within	   EU	   law,	   notably	   the	   applicable	  
burden	   and	   standard	   of	   proof.74	   Chapter	   V	   provides	   an	   account	   of	   the	   laws	   of	   various	   EU	   Member	  
States,	  such	  as	  France,	  Germany	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom.75	  Chapter	  VI	  analyses	  the	  laws	  of	  various	  non-­‐
EU	  countries,	  such	  as	  Australia,	  Canada	  and	  the	  United	  States.76	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  The	  chapter	  is	  a	  revised	  version	  of	  T.	  van	  der	  Vijver,	  ‘Objective	  Justification	  and	  Article	  102	  TFEU’,	  (2012)	  35	  
World	  Competition	  55.	  
74	  The	  chapter	  is	  a	  revised	  version	  of	  T.	  van	  der	  Vijver,	  ‘Article	  102	  TFEU:	  How	  to	  Claim	  the	  Application	  of	  Objective	  
Justifications	  in	  the	  Case	  of	  prima	  facie	  Dominance	  Abuses?’,	  (2012)	  4	  Journal	  of	  European	  Competition	  Law	  &	  
Practice	  121.	  
75	  This	  chapter	  is	  a	  revised	  version	  of	  T.	  van	  der	  Vijver,	  ‘Benighted	  we	  stand:	  justifications	  of	  prima	  facie	  dominance	  
abuses	  in	  EU	  Member	  States’,	  (2013)	  9	  European	  Competition	  Journal	  465.	  
76	  This	  chapter	  is	  a	  revised	  version	  of	  T.	  van	  der	  Vijver,	  ‘Justification	  and	  Anti-­‐competitive	  Unilateral	  Conduct:	  An	  
International	  Analysis’	  (2014)	  37	  World	  Competition	  27.	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5 RESEARCH	  METHODOLOGY	  
	  
The	   research	  methodology	   of	   this	   thesis	   relies	  mainly	   on	   an	   analysis	   and	   interpretation	   of	   academic	  
literature,	   Treaty	   and	   legislative	   provisions,	   case	   law	   and	   decisional	   practice	   as	   well	   as	   guidance	  
documents	   by	   competition	   law	   enforcement	   agencies.	   The	   thesis	   puts	   particular	   emphasis	   on	   an	  
examination	  of	  cases,	  as	  they	  reveal	  many	  lessons	  on	  this	  topic.	  
	  
The	  analysis	  contains	  both	  descriptive	  and	  normative	  elements.	  The	  thesis	  relies	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  on	  a	  
descriptive	   examination	   of	   the	   applicable	   case	   law,	   as	   there	   are	   few	   existing	   studies	   to	   build	   on.	   In	  
particular,	   there	   have	   been	   few	   comparatives	   studies	   on	   this	   topic.	   The	   descriptive	   examination	  
provides	   invaluable	   input	   for	   the	   normative	   claims	   that	   I	   make,	   for	   example	   the	   identification	   of	  
promising	  practices.	  
	  
A	   key	   normative	   aspect	   of	   this	   study	   is	   my	   subdivision	   of	   the	   justification	   plea	   into	   a	   number	   of	  
categories.	   These	   categories	   are	   based	   on	   a	   conceptual	   analysis	   of	   the	   objectives	   that	   I	   think	  
competition	   law	  should	   take	   into	  account	   (relevant	   for	   the	  efficiency	  and	   the	  public	   interest	  pleas)	  or	  
from	  the	  areas	  where	  competition	  should	  not	  intervene	  (relevant	  for	  the	  legitimate	  commercial	  conduct	  
plea).	   I	   have	   found	   various	   indications	   in	   the	   descriptive	   part	   that	   support	   the	   categorization	   as	  
proposed	  by	  this	  thesis.	  
	  
In	  Chapter	  II,	  I	  attempt	  to	  put	  the	  subject	  matter	  of	  this	  thesis	  in	  a	  wider	  EU	  legal	  perspective.	  I	  discuss	  
how	   derogations	   may	   apply	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   internal	   market	   provisions	   (notably	   the	   free	   movement	   of	  
goods)	  or	  the	  competition	  rules	  other	  than	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  (notably	  Article	  101	  TFEU	  and	  the	  merger	  
provisions).	  Although	  these	  areas	  obviously	  differ	  from	  one	  another	  in	  several	  ways,	  they	  do	  hold	  useful	  
lessons	   for	   Article	   102	   TFEU	   on	   the	   scope	   of	   justifications	   and	   the	   applicable	   legal	   conditions.	   This	  
chapter	  primarily	  examines	  case	  law	  and	  legal	  literature	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  provide	  insight	  into	  the	  
scope	  of	  justifications	  and	  their	  applicable	  legal	  conditions.	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Chapters	   III	   and	   IV	   –	   that	   comprise	   the	   first	   and	   second	   articles	   respectively	   –	   discuss	   the	   main	  
substantive	  and	  procedural	  elements	  of	  objective	  justification	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  EU	  competition	  law.	  
These	  chapters	  rely	  mainly	  on	  an	  analysis	  of	  academic	  literature	  and	  of	  ECJ	  case	  law.	  For	  the	  search	  of	  
relevant	   literature,	   I	   have	   used	   search	   engines	   such	   as	  Westlaw,	   Hein	  Online	   and	   the	  website	   of	   the	  
Peace	   Palace	   Library.77	   I	   have	   searched	   for	   relevant	   case	   law	   on	   the	   official	   website	   of	   the	   ECJ.78	  
Important	   search	   terms	  were	   ‘objective	   justification’	   and	   ‘justif*’	   in	   combination	  with	   ‘102’,	   ‘82’	   (the	  
former	  Article	  102),	  ‘abuse’	  or	  ‘dominant	  position’.	  	  
	  
Chapter	  III	  examines	  objective	  justification	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  EU	  law,	  relying	  inter	  alia	  on	  a	  conceptual	  
analysis	  what	  constitutes,	  or	  should	  constitute,	  an	  abuse.	   It	  builds	  upon	  a	  number	  of	  excellent	  articles	  
written	  by	  Loewenthal,79	  Albors-­‐Llorens,80	  Rousseva81	  and	  Østerud.82	  The	  chapter	  proposes	  a	  subdivision	  
of	   the	   concept	   of	   objective	   justification	   that	   is	   used	   throughout	   the	   thesis:	   (i)	   legitimate	   business	  
behaviour,	   (ii)	   efficiencies	   and	   (iii)	   public	   interest.	   A	   publication	   by	   Philip	   Lowe,	   erstwhile	   Director-­‐
General	  of	  Competition	  at	  the	  European	  Commission,	  provided	  the	  inspiration	  for	  the	  categorization.83	  I	  
illustrate	   the	   attractiveness	   of	   this	   subdivision,	   and	   argue	   that	   the	   subdivision	   should	   also	   affect	   the	  
legal	  test	  that	  determines	  whether	  a	  justification	  plea	  should	  be	  accepted.	  
	   	  
Chapter	  IV,	  which	  includes	  an	  examination	  of	  EU	  procedural	  law	  applicable	  to	  objective	  justification,	  has	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  www.ppl.nl.	  	  
78	  www.curia.eu.	  
79	  P.-­‐J.	  Loewenthal,	  ‘The	  Defence	  of	  ‘objective	  justification’	  in	  the	  application	  of	  Article	  82	  EC’,	  (2005)	  28	  World	  
Competition	  455.	  
80	  A.	  Albors-­‐Llorens,	  ‘The	  Role	  of	  Objective	  Justification	  and	  Efficiencies	  in	  the	  Application	  of	  Article	  82	  EC’,	  (2007)	  
44	  CMLRev	  1727.	  
81	  E.	  Rousseva,	  ‘The	  Concept	  of	  ‘Objective	  Justification’	  of	  an	  Abuse	  of	  a	  Dominant	  Position:	  Can	  it	  help	  to	  
Modernise	  the	  Analysis	  under	  Article	  82	  EC?’,	  (2006)	  2	  The	  Competition	  Law	  Review	  27.	  See	  also	  her	  book	  
Rethinking	  Exclusionary	  Abuses	  in	  EU	  Competition	  Law	  (Hart	  Publishing:	  Oxford	  and	  Portland,	  Oregon	  2010).	  
82	  See	  the	  chapter	  ‘The	  Concept	  of	  Objective	  Justification’	  in:	  E.	  Østerud,	  Identifying	  Exclusionary	  Abuses	  by	  
Dominant	  Undertakings	  under	  EU	  Competition	  Law:	  The	  Spectrum	  of	  Tests	  (Kluwer	  Law	  International:	  Alphen	  aan	  
den	  Rijn	  2010),	  at	  245.	  
83	  P.	  Lowe,	  ‘DG	  Competition’s	  Review	  of	  the	  Policy	  on	  Abuse	  of	  Dominance’,	  in:	  Hawk	  (ed.),	  International	  Antitrust	  
&	  Policy,	  Annual	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  Fordham	  Corporate	  Law	  Institute	  2003	  (Juris	  Publishing:	  New	  York	  2004),	  at	  
170-­‐171.	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benefited	   from	   the	   European	   Competition	   Law	   Annual	   2009.84	   The	   book	   shows	   the	   fundamental	  
principles	   that	   apply	   to	   the	   applicable	   standard	   and	   burden	   of	   proof.	   Apart	   from	   examining	   relevant	  
Article	  102	  TFEU	  cases	  (notably	  Microsoft),	  I	  have	  also	  relied	  on	  several	  cases	  related	  to	  Article	  101	  TFEU	  
as	  they	  often	  contain	  a	  particularly	  clear	  enunciation	  of	  procedural	  issues.	  A	  normative	  element	  of	  this	  
chapter	  is	  my	  contention	  that	  the	  difficulty	  with	  which	  the	  evidentiary	  burden	  and	  the	  standard	  of	  proof	  
can	  be	  satisfied	  should	  depend	  on	  the	  type	  of	  justification	  that	  is	  at	  play.	  	  
	  
Next	   to	   the	  analysis	  of	   EU	   law,	   the	   thesis	   also	   includes	   two	  comparative	   studies.	  Chapter	  V	  examines	  
domestic	  competition	   law	   in	  EU	  Member	  States;	  whereas	  chapter	  VI	  explores	  various	  key	  competition	  
law	  jurisdictions	  outside	  the	  EU.	  	  
	  
Before	  discussing	  these	  two	  chapters	  separately,	  some	  general	  comments	  are	  warranted.	  The	  primary	  
focus	  of	  these	  studies	  is	  how	  courts	  have	  dealt	  with	  justifications	  of	  otherwise	  illegal	  unilateral	  conduct.	  
Notwithstanding	   the	   many	   differences	   between	   competition	   law	   regimes,	   I	   think	   that	   such	   a	   cross-­‐
border	   comparison	   can	   be	   made.	   A	   conceptual	   red	   thread	   runs	   through	   all	   the	   jurisdictions	   under	  
review:	   namely	   that	   unilateral	   conduct	  may	   be	   condoned,	   even	   though	   it	   appears	   to	   fall	   foul	   of	   the	  
prohibition	   of	   anti-­‐competitive	   behaviour	   at	   first	   sight.	   I	   also	   think	   that	   such	   a	   comparative	   analysis	  
should	  be	  made.	  Only	  a	  comparison	  can	  show	  to	  what	  extent	  there	  are	  cross-­‐border	  (in-­‐)consistencies	  in	  
the	  way	  that	  jurisdictions	  deal	  with	  this	  topic,	  and	  reveal	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses.	  
	  
As	  to	  chapter	  V	  (the	  first	  comparative	  study),	  I	  made	  a	  selection	  of	  EU	  Member	  States	  according	  to	  the	  
following	  process.	  The	  study	  sought	  to	  present	  a	  broad	  overview	  of	  Member	  State	  competition	  practice,	  
which	  explains	  why	  I	  have	  selected	  more	  than	  just	  a	  few	  Member	  States.	  I	  have	  chosen	  Member	  States	  
where	   I	   found	   relevant	   decisions	   or	   case	   law	   on	   objective	   justification,	   and	   whose	   languages	   I	  
sufficiently	   understand.	   These	   criteria	   led	   to	   the	   selection	   of	   the	   following	   Member	   States:	   France,	  
Germany,	  Ireland,	  Luxembourg,	  the	  Netherlands,	  Spain	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom.	  
	  
I	   have	   used	   a	   number	   of	   resources	   for	   the	   examination	   of	   these	   countries.	   I	   started	   with	   the	  
examination	  of	  relevant	  legislative	  acts	  as	  found	  on	  the	  official	  government	  websites.	  Competition	  law	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84	  C.-­‐D.	  Ehlermann	  and	  M.	  Marquis	  (eds.),	  European	  Competition	  Law	  Annual	  2009:	  The	  Evaluation	  of	  Evidence	  and	  
its	  Judicial	  Review	  in	  Competition	  Cases	  (Hart	  Publishing:	  Oxford	  and	  Portland,	  Oregon	  2011).	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textbooks	  sometimes	  offered	  a	   first	  selection	  of	  potentially	   relevant	  cases,	  even	  though	  their	  sections	  
on	  objective	  justification	  of	  prima	  facie	  dominance	  abuses	  are	  often	  meagre.	  Several	  online	  resources,	  
such	   as	   the	  website	   of	   the	   Institut	   de	   droit	   de	   la	   concurrence,	   offered	  more	   food	   for	   thought.85	   The	  
websites	   of	   the	   National	   Competition	   Authorities	   (NCAs)	   also	   proved	   valuable	   online	   resources,	  
particularly	  those	  of	  France,86	  Germany,87	  Ireland,88	  the	  Netherlands89	  and	  Spain.90	  For	  the	  analysis	  of	  UK	  
law,	  my	  main	  online	  sources	  were	   the	  websites	  of	   the	  OFT91	  and	   the	  CAT.92	   I	  used	   the	  website	  of	   the	  
British	  and	  Irish	  Legal	  Information	  Institute	  for	  case	  law	  by	  non-­‐specialized	  courts.93	  	  
	  
The	   NCA	   websites	   contain	   valuable	   information	   on	   the	   public	   enforcement	   cases	   in	   that	   particular	  
Member	   State,94	   including	   those	   that	   have	   not	   been	   highly	   publicized.	   I	   have	   usually	   searched	   these	  
websites	  using	   the	  Google	   search	  engine,	  as	   the	   search	  engines	  of	   the	  websites	   themselves	  are	  often	  
inadequate.	   I	   have	   also	   explored	   the	   NCA’s	   annual	   reports	   as	   well	   as	   their	   guidance	   documents	   and	  
submissions	  to	  questionnaires	  from	  the	  International	  Competition	  Network.	  
	  
Irrespective	  of	  the	  source,	   I	  have	  mainly	  searched	  for	  terms	  such	  as	  ‘justify’	  and	  ‘justification’,	  or	  their	  
equivalents	  in	  the	  national	  language,	  within	  cases	  on	  the	  abuse	  of	  dominance.	  I	  have	  devoted	  particular	  
attention	  to	  cases	  where	  the	  NCA	  rejected	  a	  complaint	  related	  to	  abuse,	  or	  where	  the	  domestic	  courts	  
upheld	   an	   appeal	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   an	   infringement	   decision.	   It	   is	   not	   unusual	   for	   such	   cases	   to	   rely,	   at	   least	  
partly,	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  objective	  justification.	  	  
	  
Chapter	   V	   concludes	  with	   a	   normative	   part,	   discussing	   a	   number	   of	   promising	   practices.	   I	   have	   used	  
several	  parameters	  to	  identify	  such	  practices.	  The	  most	  important	  ones	  are	  as	  follows:	  









93	  http://www.bailii.org/.	  	  
94	  Mostly	  the	  public	  enforcement	  actions.	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• Transparency:	   a	   clear	   and	   separate	   examination	   of	   a	   justification	   plea.	   This	   will	   provide	   an	  
understanding	   what	   types	   of	   considerations	   should	   be	   subsumed	   under	   the	   finding	   of	   prima	  
facie	  anti-­‐competitive	  conduct,	  and	  what	  should	  be	  subsumed	  under	  a	  justification	  heading.	  
• Context-­‐driven:	  a	  proper	  examination	  of	  a	  justification	  plea	  implies	  due	  account	  for	  the	  specific	  
circumstances	  of	  the	  case.	  Only	  a	  contextual	  analysis	  can	  reveal	  whether	  conduct	  under	  review	  
has	  a	  net	  pro-­‐competitive	  effect	  or	  whether	  it	  should	  be	  condoned	  otherwise.	  Relevant	  context	  
also	   includes	   the	   ease	   with	   which	   conduct	   is	   subsumed	   under	   prima	   facie	   anti-­‐competitive	  
conduct.	  The	  more	  formalistic	  this	  assessment,	  the	  more	  a	  justification	  plea	  should	  function	  as	  a	  
counterbalance	  to	  avoid	  an	  overly	  stringent	  interpretation	  of	  the	  prohibition.	  
• Legal	  conditions:	  a	  clear	  enumeration	  of	  the	  applicable	   legal	  conditions.	  Even	  where	  NCAs	  and	  
courts	  engage	  in	  a	  context-­‐specific	  examination	  of	  the	  case,	  they	  should	  still	  offer	  guidance	  on	  
the	  applicable	  legal	  framework.	  This	  is	  highly	  important	  to	  protect	  the	  interests	  of	  legal	  certainty	  
and	   predictability.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   legal	   conditions	   should	   also	   be	   dependent	   on	   the	  
surrounding	   context:	   for	   example,	   an	   efficiency	   plea	   requires	   a	   different	   legal	   analysis	   than	   a	  
plea	  based	  on	  force	  majeure.	  	  
	  
Chapter	  VI	   focuses	  on	   countries	  outside	   the	   EU.	   The	   jurisdictions	  under	   review	  are	  Australia,	   Canada,	  
Hong	  Kong,	  Singapore,	  South	  Africa	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  The	  selection	  has	  been	  done	  according	  to	  the	  
following	   process.	   Similar	   to	   the	   first	   comparative	   analysis	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   my	   aim	   was	   to	  
provide	  a	  broad	  overview	  of	  the	  prevailing	  competition	  practice.	  I	  wanted	  to	  include	  both	  countries	  that	  
have	   an	   established	   competition	   law	   tradition	   (such	   as	   Canada	   and	   the	   United	   States)	   as	   well	   as	  
countries	  where	   competition	   law	   is	   relatively	   new	   (such	   as	   Singapore	   and	   Hong	   Kong).	   Australia	   and	  
South	   Africa	   were	   included	   because	   they	   are	   important	   jurisdictions	   in	   their	   region	   and	   also	   boast	  
thought-­‐provoking	   judgments	  on	   justifications	  of	  unilateral	   conduct.	  All	   the	   jurisdictions	  under	   review	  
have	   considerable	   economic	   and	   political	   clout	   beyond	   their	   borders,	   making	   the	   lessons	   for	   other	  
jurisdictions	  all	  the	  more	  pertinent.	  In	  addition,	  the	  selected	  countries	  all	  share	  –	  in	  a	  greater	  or	  lesser	  
degree	  –	  a	  common	  law	  tradition95	  and	  use	  the	  English	  language,	  facilitating	  a	  comparison.	  	  
	  
For	   the	   examination	   of	   these	   competition	   regimes,	   I	   have	   relied	   in	   great	   part	   on	   online	   resources.	  
Although	   perhaps	   atypical	   for	   common	   law	   countries,	   I	   again	   used	   the	   relevant	   legislative	   acts	   as	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95	  For	  example,	  South	  Africa	  has	  a	  combined	  system	  of	  common	  law	  and	  civil	  law.	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starting	   point.96	   I	   believe	   this	   to	   be	   an	   acceptable	   method.	   The	   study	   focuses	   on	   the	   ‘regular’	  
competition	   law	   prohibitions	   that	   have	   been	   enacted	   in	   legislation	   in	   all	   the	   countries	   under	   review,	  
rather	  than	  the	  common	  law	  concept	  of	  restraint	  of	  trade.97	  
	  
Other	   resources	   that	   I	   have	  used	   include	   the	   following.	   For	   the	  examination	  of	  Australian	   law,	   I	   have	  
used	  the	  commendable	  website	  by	  Julia	  Clarke98	  and	  the	  website	  of	  the	  Australasian	  Legal	  Information	  
Institute.99	  The	   latter	  website	   is	  particularly	  noteworthy	   for	   its	   inclusion	  of	   case	   law	  as	  well	   as	  a	  wide	  
range	   of	   relevant	   literature.	   For	   the	   analysis	   of	   Canadian	   and	   South	   African	   competition	   law,	   I	   have	  
mainly	  relied	  on	  the	   informative	  websites	  of	   their	   respective	  Competition	  Tribunals.100	  These	  websites	  
also	   include	  relevant	  case	   law	  by	  other	  courts.	  The	  analysis	  of	  Hong	  Kong	  competition	   law	  focuses	  on	  
the	  Competition	  Bill	  enacted	  by	  the	  Legislative	  Council,	  as	  there	  has	  been	  no	  enforcement	  action	  in	  that	  
jurisdiction	  as	  of	  yet.101	  For	  the	  examination	  of	  Singaporean	  law,	  I	  have	  mainly	  used	  the	  website	  by	  the	  
Competition	  Commission	  of	  Singapore.102	  
	  
The	   most	   extensive	   analysis	   of	   non-­‐EU	   jurisdictions	   deals	   with	   US	   federal	   antitrust	   law.	   I	   have	   used	  
Westlaw	   to	   identify	   relevant	   cases,	   focusing	  mainly	   on	   the	   US	   Supreme	   Court	   and	   the	   Circuit	   Courts	  
(even	  though	  the	  study	  contains	  some	  District	  Court	   judgments	  as	  well).	  The	  main	  search	  terms	  that	   I	  
have	  used	  are	  ‘(valid)	  business	  reason’	  and	  ‘(legitimate)	  business	  justif*’,	  as	  US	  federal	  courts	  ordinarily	  
use	   such	   terms	   when	   referring	   to	   a	   possible	   justification	   of	   behaviour	   that	   would	   otherwise	   be	  
prohibited	  under	  Section	  2	  of	  the	  Sherman	  Act.	  
	  
The	   chapter	   concludes	   with	   some	   comparative	   notes,	   and	   also	   identifies	   lessons	   for	   EU	   law.	   I	  
deliberately	   make	   fewer	   normative	   claims	   than	   the	   ‘promising	   practices’	   identified	   in	   the	   previous	  
chapter,	   largely	  because	  the	  substantial	  differences	  between	  the	   jurisdictions	  merit	  careful	   treatment.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96	  As	  found	  on	  the	  official	  government	  websites.	  
97	  This	  common	  law	  concept	  appears	  to	  have	  had	  a	  limited	  role	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  
competition	  laws,	  at	  least	  for	  the	  interpretation	  of	  what	  may	  constitute	  justification.	  
98	  http://www.australiancompetitionlaw.org/.	  
99	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/.	  
100	  http://www.ct-­‐tc.gc.ca/Home.asp	  and	  http://www.comptrib.co.za/.	  
101	  http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-­‐10/english/bills/b201007022.pdf.	  	  
102	  http://www.ccs.gov.sg/content/ccs/en.html.	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In	   addition,	   there	   is	   less	   impetus	   to	   achieve	   the	   level	   of	   convergence	   that	   would	   be	   desirable	   with	  
regard	   to	   the	   EU	   Member	   States.	   In	   my	   view,	   the	   descriptive	   analysis	   of	   justifications	   in	   non-­‐EU	  
jurisdictions	  already	  provides	  useful	  observations,	  as	  a	  broad	  comparative	  study	  of	  this	  kind	  has	  –	  to	  my	  
knowledge	  –	  not	  yet	  been	  undertaken.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  I	  do	  make	  normative	  claims,	  I	  again	  make	  use	  
of	   the	   parameters	   mentioned	   in	   the	   preceding	   chapter.	   The	   parameters	   include	   whether	   the	  
interpretation	   of	   the	   justification	   plea	   is	   transparent,	   context-­‐driven,	   and	   is	   subject	   to	   a	   clear	   and	  
adaptive	  use	  of	  legal	  conditions.	  
	  
Chapter	  VII	  offers	  a	  general	  conclusion	  of	  this	  thesis,	  drawing	  on	  the	  findings	  in	  the	  preceding	  chapters.	  
It	   aims	   to	   bring	   together	   the	   most	   important	   findings	   of	   my	   research	   in	   order	   to	   answer	   my	   main	  
research	  question,	  both	  its	  descriptive	  element	  (what	  are	  justifications?)	  and	  its	  normative	  component	  
(what	  they	  should	  be?).	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Chapters	   III	   and	   IV	   spend	  ample	  attention	  on	   justifications	  within	   the	   framework	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  
This	  chapter	  seeks	  to	  put	  that	  examination	   in	  a	  wider	  EU	   law	  perspective.	   It	  examines	   justifications	  of	  
otherwise	  prohibited	  conduct	  in	  the	  law	  on	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods,	  Article	  101	  TFEU	  and	  merger	  








Justifications	   have	   played	   a	   prominent	   role	   in	   the	   EU	   internal	   market	   law	   case	   law.	   This	   section	  
examines	  what	  lessons	  these	  cases	  hold	  for	  the	  ‘objective	  justification’	  concept	  in	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  Of	  
course	   there	  are	   several	  differences	  between	   these	   two	   legal	  areas.	  For	  example,	   the	   internal	  market	  
provisions	  are	  primarily	  directed	  at	  the	  rules	  enacted	  by	  EU	  Member	  States,	  whereas	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  is	  
directed	   at	   the	   conduct	   of	   undertakings.	   Their	   focus	   is	   different	   as	   well.	   The	   internal	   market	   rules	  
primarily	   seek	   to	   ascertain	   whether	   a	   national	   measure	   may	   have	   a	   discriminatory	   effect,	   while	   the	  
competition	  rules	  essentially	  focus	  on	  the	  effect	  on	  competition.	  More	  specifically,	  the	  ECJ	  has	  held	  that	  
justifications	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  free	  movement	  provisions	  may	  not	  serve	  economic	  ends,	  reflecting	  that	  
they	  identify	  broadly	  with	  the	  non-­‐economic	  interests	  of	  the	  State.103	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  economic	  
considerations	  are	  irrelevant,	  but	  rather	  that	  ‘aims	  of	  a	  purely	  economic	  nature	  cannot	  justify	  a	  barrier	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103	  See	  Albors-­‐Llorens	  2007,	  supra	  note	  80,	  at	  1734	  (discussing	  mandatory	  requirements).	  She	  refers	  to	  Case	  95/81	  
Commission	  v	  Italy	  [1982]	  ECR	  2187,	  para	  27	  (free	  movement	  of	  goods);	  Case	  C-­‐398/95	  Ypourgos	  Ergasias	  [1997]	  
ECR	  I-­‐3091,	  para	  23	  (free	  movement	  of	  persons).	  See	  also	  Case	  C-­‐153/08	  Commission	  v	  Spain	  [2009]	  ECR	  I-­‐9735,	  
para	  43.	  The	  ECJ	  refers	  to	  Case	  C-­‐388/01	  Commission	  v	  Italy	  [2003]	  ECR	  I-­‐721,	  paras	  19	  and	  22,	  and	  Case	  C-­‐243/01	  
Gambelli	  and	  Others	  [2003]	  ECR	  I-­‐13031,	  para	  61.	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to	  the	  fundamental	  principle	  of	  freedom	  to	  provide	  services.’104	  By	  contrast,	  the	  justifications	  in	  Article	  
102	  TFEU	  do	  allow	  for	  considerations	  of	  an	  economic	  nature.105	  
	  
Despite	   these	   differences,106	   I	   do	   think	   it	   is	   useful	   to	   draw	   parallels	   between	   these	   areas	   of	   EU	   law.	  
There	  is	  no	  strict	  boundary	  between	  the	  prohibitions	  themselves.	  For	  example,	  the	  free	  movement	  rules	  
may	  –	  under	  certain	  circumstances	  –	  also	  affect	  private	  actors,	  connoting	  that	  their	  scope	  of	  application	  
is	  wider	  than	  simply	  applying	  to	  Member	  States.107	  	  In	  addition,	  both	  sets	  of	  rules	  may	  apply	  to	  conduct	  
by	   an	   undertaking	   in	   the	   (quasi-­‐)public	   sphere.108	   The	   possibility	   of	   parallel	   application	   is	   a	   reason	   to	  
conceptually	   bring	   these	   areas	   closer	   together.109	   In	   addition,	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	   Treaty,	   EU	  
internal	  market	  law	  and	  competition	  law	  jointly	  strive	  for	  the	  same	  goal,	  namely	  to	  establish	  an	  internal	  
market	   with	   undistorted	   competition.110	   Indeed,	   it	   could	   be	   argued	   that	   the	   provisions	   on	   the	  
fundamental	  freedoms	  and	  competition	  should	  all	  have	  the	  same	  basic	  legality	  standard.111	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104	  	  Ypourgos	  Ergasias	  (ibid),	  para	  23;	  Case	  C-­‐158/96	  Kohll	  v	  Union	  des	  caisses	  de	  maladie	  [1998]	  ECR	  I-­‐1931,	  para	  
41.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  there	  may	  be	  an	  overriding	  reason	  in	  the	  general	  interest	  capable	  of	  justifying	  a	  barrier	  if	  
there	  is	  a	  risk	  that	  the	  financial	  balance	  of	  the	  social	  security	  system	  may	  be	  seriously	  undermined.	  
105	  Albors-­‐Llorens	  2007,	  supra	  note	  80,	  at	  1734-­‐1735.	  See	  e.g.	  Case	  27/76	  United	  Brands	  v	  Commission	  [1978]	  ECR	  
207,	  para	  189.	  
106	  Mortelmans	  (2001,	  infra	  note	  109,	  at	  649)	  notes	  that:	  ‘[t]he	  magic	  line	  between	  public	  and	  private	  interests	  
should	  […]	  only	  be	  crossed	  cautiously’.	  I	  have	  serious	  doubts	  whether	  such	  a	  neat	  division	  between	  public	  and	  
private	  interests	  can	  be	  made,	  as	  they	  will	  often	  have	  a	  substantial	  overlap.	  
107	  This	  is	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘horizontal’	  application	  of	  the	  free	  movement	  rules.	  See	  e.g.	  Case	  C-­‐281/98	  Angonese	  v	  
Cassa	  di	  Risparmio	  di	  Bolzano	  [2000]	  ECR	  I-­‐4139	  (on	  free	  movement	  of	  persons).	  The	  ECJ	  held	  that	  the	  free	  
movement	  rules	  preclude	  an	  employer	  from	  requiring	  job	  applicants	  to	  provide	  evidence	  of	  their	  linguistic	  
knowledge	  exclusively	  by	  means	  of	  one	  particular	  diploma	  issued	  only	  in	  one	  particular	  province	  of	  a	  Member	  
State.	  
108	  See,	  for	  instance,	  the	  activities	  of	  football	  bodies	  as	  examined	  in	  Case	  C-­‐415/93	  Bosman	  [1995]	  ECR	  I-­‐4921.	  
109	  See	  also	  K.	  Mortelmans,	  ‘Towards	  convergence	  in	  the	  application	  of	  the	  rules	  on	  free	  movement	  and	  on	  
competition’,	  (2001)	  38	  CMLRev	  613.	  
110	  See	  Protocol	  (No	  27)	  on	  the	  internal	  market	  and	  competition,	  referring	  to	  the	  ‘internal	  market’	  objective	  set	  out	  
in	  Article	  3	  Treaty	  on	  European	  Union.	  For	  criticism	  on	  the	  internal	  market	  objectives	  of	  competition	  law,	  see	  e.g.	  
see	  B.	  Hawk,	  ‘System	  failure:	  Vertical	  Restraints	  and	  EC	  competition	  law’,	  (1995)	  32	  CMLRev	  973;	  W.	  Bishop,	  ‘Price	  
discrimination	  under	  Article	  86:	  Political	  economy	  in	  the	  European	  Court’,	  (1981)	  44	  MLR	  282.	  
111	  See	  Mortelmans	  2001,	  supra	  note	  109,	  at	  622,	  fn	  45,	  referring	  to	  a	  publication	  by	  Gyselen.	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I	   also	   think	   that	   the	   combination	   of	   these	   fields	   serves	   a	   particularly	   useful	   purpose	   for	   objective	  
justifications	  under	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  The	  examination	  of	  justifications	  and	  derogations	  from	  the	  internal	  
market	   provisions	   shows	   what	   kind	   of	   interests	   may	   be	   taken	   into	   account,	   and	   how	   they	   are	  
examined.112	   Craig	   &	   de	   Búrca	   confirm	   that	   objective	   justification	   under	   Article	   102	   TFEU	   and	  
justifications	  within	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods	  are	  essentially	  ‘similar	  ideas’.113	  Mortelmans	  views	  the	  
proportionality	  requirement	  as	  common	  ground	  between	  the	  two	  sets	  of	  provisions.114	  Competition	  law	  
is	   no	   stranger	   to	   the	   type	  of	   interests	   that	   are	   also	   relevant	   in	   internal	  market	   law.115	   Indeed,	   recent	  
competition	  law	  judgments	  such	  as	  AstraZeneca	  (on	  Article	  102	  TFEU)116	  and	  Pierre	  Fabre	  (on	  Article	  101	  
TFEU)117	  have,	  in	  their	  reasoning	  on	  justifications,	  explicitly	  relied	  on	  internal	  market	  case	  law.	  	  
	  
The	   following	   sections	   explain	   how	   the	   case	   law	   on	   the	   internal	   market	   deals	   with	   justifications	   or	  
derogations,	   and	   mentions	   what	   lessons	   might	   be	   transposed	   to	   Article	   102	   TFEU.118	   The	   focus	   will	  
mainly	  be	  on	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods,	  as	  this	  area	  has	  produced	  a	  particularly	  rich	  body	  of	  case	  law.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112	  Albors-­‐Llorens	  (2007,	  supra	  note	  80,	  at	  1729-­‐1736)	  also	  examines	  the	  lessons	  of	  EU	  internal	  market	  law.	  
113	  P.	  Craig	  &	  G.	  de	  Búrca,	  EU	  Law:	  Text,	  Cases	  and	  Materials	  (OUP:	  Oxford	  2003),	  at	  1030.	  
114	  Mortelmans	  2001,	  supra	  note	  109,	  at	  636.	  
115	  G.	  Monti,	  ‘Article	  81	  EC	  and	  Public	  Policy’,	  (2002)	  39	  CMLRev	  1057,	  at	  1071-­‐1078,	  referring	  to	  interests	  such	  as	  
consumer	  protection	  and	  environmental	  protection.	  Of	  course,	  not	  all	  agree	  that	  such	  interests	  should	  be	  taken	  
into	  account.	  
116	  Case	  T-­‐321/05	  AstraZeneca	  v	  Commission	  [2010]	  ECR	  II-­‐2805,	  para	  842.	  The	  Court	  refers	  to	  Case	  C-­‐15/01	  
Paranova	  Läkemedel	  and	  Others	  [2003]	  ECR	  I-­‐4175,	  paras	  25	  to	  28	  and	  33;	  Case	  C-­‐113/01	  Paranova	  [2003]	  
ECR	  I-­‐4243,	  paras	  26	  to	  29	  and	  34;	  and	  Case	  C-­‐172/00	  Ferring	  [2002]	  ECR	  I-­‐6891,	  paras	  38	  to	  40.	  
117	  Case	  C-­‐439/09	  Pierre	  Fabre	  Dermo-­‐Cosmétique	  [2011]	  ECR	  I-­‐9419,	  para	  44.	  The	  Court	  refers	  to	  Case	  C-­‐322/01	  
Deutscher	  Apothekerverband	  [2003]	  ECR	  I-­‐14887,	  paras	  106,	  107	  and	  112;	  as	  well	  as	  Case	  C-­‐108/09	  Ker-­‐Optika	  
[2010]	  ECR	  I-­‐12213,	  para	  76.	  
118	  For	  example,	  Article	  45(1)	  TFEU	  determines	  that	  the	  free	  movement	  for	  workers	  within	  the	  EU	  shall	  be	  secured.	  
The	  provision	  aims	  for	  the	  ‘abolition	  of	  any	  discrimination	  based	  on	  nationality	  between	  workers’,	  see	  Article	  45(2)	  
TFEU.	  However,	  Member	  States	  still	  have	  the	  right	  to	  impose	  ‘limitations	  justified	  on	  grounds	  of	  public	  policy,	  
public	  security	  or	  public	  health’,	  see	  Article	  45(3)	  TFEU.	  See	  also	  Article	  65(1)(b)	  TFEU,	  that	  provides	  a	  derogation	  
from	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  capital,	  for	  example	  to	  prevent	  infringements	  of	  the	  tax	  rules	  or	  to	  take	  measures	  
which	  are	  justified	  on	  grounds	  of	  public	  policy	  or	  public	  security.	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2.2 Justifications	  under	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods	  –	  Article	  36	  TFEU	  
	  
Article	   34	   and	   35	   TFEU	  provide	   that	   quantitative	   restrictions	   on	   imports	   and	   exports,119	   as	  well	   as	   all	  
measures	  having	  an	  equivalent	  effect,	  shall	  be	  prohibited	  as	  they	  affect	  trade	  between	  Member	  States.	  
However,	  not	  every	  restriction	  is	  prohibited.	  Article	  36	  TFEU	  lists	  a	  number	  of	  grounds	  that	  a	  Member	  
State	  may	  invoke	  to	  justify	  such	  restrictions.120	  As	  Horspool	  and	  Humphreys	  have	  noted,	  these	  grounds	  
are	  as	  follows:121	  
• Public	  morality.	   The	  ECJ	  has	   given	  a	   relatively	  wide	  margin	  of	  discretion	   to	  Member	   States	   to	  
decide	  what	   public	  morality	  means.122	   For	   example,	   a	   UK	   ban	   on	   the	   import	   of	   pornographic	  
films	  and	  magazines	  was	  considered	  justified.123	  However,	  if	  a	  ban	  only	  affects	  importers	  while	  
leaving	  domestic	  trade	  unaffected,	  the	  ECJ	  is	  likely	  to	  reject	  the	  justification	  plea.124	  	  	  
• Public	  policy.	  The	  concept	  of	  public	  policy	  must	  be	  interpreted	  strictly,125	  which	  is	  perhaps	  better	  
conveyed	   by	   the	   French	   term	   ordre	   public.	   Public	   policy	   may	   only	   be	   invoked	   ‘if	   there	   is	   a	  
genuine	   and	   sufficiently	   serious	   threat	   to	   a	   fundamental	   interest	   of	   society’.126	   At	   the	   same	  
time,	  the	  ECJ	  does	  allow	  a	  certain	  margin	  of	  discretion	  to	  the	  competent	  national	  authorities,	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119	  This	  section	  only	  deals	  with	  Article	  34	  TFEU	  (import	  restrictions),	  as	  such	  restrictions	  have	  been	  far	  more	  
prevalent	  in	  the	  case	  law	  than	  Article	  35	  TFEU	  (export	  restrictions).	  
120	  Also	  note	  Case	  5/77	  Tedeschi	  v	  Denkavit	  Commerciale	  [1977]	  ECR	  1555,	  para	  35.	  If	  a	  directive	  provides	  for	  the	  
complete	  harmonization	  of	  a	  particular	  interest	  (in	  that	  case:	  the	  protection	  of	  animal	  and	  human	  health),	  the	  
national	  measure	  must	  be	  examined	  in	  light	  of	  that	  directive.	  
121	  The	  following	  enumeration	  relies	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  on	  M.	  Horspool	  &	  M.	  Humphreys,	  European	  Union	  Law	  (OUP:	  
Oxford	  2008),	  at	  320	  et	  seq.	  
122	  Horspool	  &	  Humphreys	  2008	  (ibid.),	  at	  321.	  	  
123	  Case	  34/79	  R	  v.	  Henn	  and	  Darby	  [1979]	  ECR	  3795.	  
124	  Case	  121/85	  Conegate	  [1986]	  ECR	  1007.	  
125	  See	  e.g.	  Case	  177/83	  Kohl	  v.	  Ringelhan	  &	  Rennet	  [1984]	  ECR	  3651,	  para	  19.	  On	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  workers,	  
see	  Case	  41/74	  Van	  Duyn	  [1974]	  ECR	  1337,	  para	  18	  as	  well	  as	  Case	  30/77	  Bouchereau	  [1977]	  ECR	  1999,	  para	  33.	  
126	  See,	  inter	  alia,	  Case	  C-­‐54/99	  Église	  de	  Scientologie	  [2000]	  ECR	  I-­‐1335,	  para	  17	  (on	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  
services).	  For	  a	  rare	  example	  where	  the	  ECJ	  accepted	  a	  public	  policy	  plea,	  see	  Case	  7/78	  R	  v	  Thompson	  [1978]	  ECR	  
2247.	  The	  case	  concerned	  a	  UK	  ban	  on	  exporting	  silver	  coins	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  them	  from	  being	  melted	  down	  or	  
destroyed	  in	  another	  Member	  State.	  The	  ECJ	  considered	  the	  ban	  to	  be	  justified	  on	  grounds	  of	  public	  policy,	  
because	  ‘it	  stems	  from	  the	  need	  to	  protect	  the	  right	  to	  mint	  coinage	  which	  is	  traditionally	  regarded	  as	  involving	  the	  
fundamental	  interests	  of	  the	  State.’	  (para	  34).	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the	  circumstances	  that	  may	  justify	  application	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  public	  policy	  may	  vary	  from	  one	  
country	  to	  another.127	  The	  need	  to	  observe	  human	  rights	  may	  be	  considered	  under	  the	  heading	  
of	  public	  policy.128	  
• Public	   security.	   This	   concept	   is	   similar	   to	   public	   policy.	   It	   should	   thus	   be	   interpreted	  
restrictively,129	   but	   also	   allows	   the	   Member	   State	   leeway	   to	   act	   according	   to	   the	   specific	  
circumstances	  of	  the	  case.	  For	  example,	  the	  Campus	  Oil	  case	  concerned	  an	   Irish	  rule	  requiring	  
oil	  companies	  to	  buy	  part	  of	  their	  supplies	  from	  a	  State-­‐owned	  installation	  at	  a	  price	  determined	  
by	  the	  State.	  The	  ECJ	  found	  that	  the	  rule	  was	  justified	  as	  it	  supported	  the	  security	  of	  petroleum	  
supply.130	   However,	   such	   a	   measure	   will	   not	   be	   justified	   if	   it	   is	   based	   purely	   on	   economic	  
grounds	  rather	  than	  the	  protection	  of	  public	  security;131	  an	  understandable	  criterion	  given	  the	  
desire	  to	  prohibit	  any	  disguised	  restrictions	  of	  trade.	  	  
• The	   protection	   of	   health	   and	   life	   of	   humans,	   animals	   or	   plants.132	   The	   protection	   of	   human	  
health	  is	  a	  regularly	  invoked	  argument,133	  but	  often	  fails	  because	  of	  the	  disproportionate	  scope	  
or	   effect	   of	   the	   relevant	  measure.134	   However,	   the	   ECJ	   does	  not	   require	   agreement	   between	  
Member	   States	   about	   the	   health	   implications	   of	   a	   certain	   good.	   In	   the	   absence	   of	  
harmonisation,	   it	   is	   already	   sufficient	   if	   the	  Member	   State	   can	   show	   that	   there	   is	   bona	   fide	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127	  Van	  Duyn,	  supra	  note	  125,	  para	  18;	  Bouchereau,	  supra	  note	  125,	  para	  34.	  
128	  Case	  C-­‐112/00	  Schmidberger	  v	  Austria	  [2003]	  I-­‐5659,	  para	  74.	  The	  case	  concerned	  a	  decision	  by	  Austria	  not	  to	  
prohibit	  a	  demonstration,	  which	  resulted	  in	  a	  lengthy	  closure	  of	  a	  motorway	  that	  allegedly	  restricted	  the	  free	  
movement	  of	  goods.	  Indeed,	  measures	  that	  do	  not	  observe	  human	  rights	  are	  ‘not	  acceptable’	  in	  the	  EU,	  see	  Case	  
C-­‐260/89	  ERT	  [1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐2925,	  para	  41,	  and	  Case	  C-­‐299/95	  Kremzow	  [1997]	  ECR	  I-­‐2629,	  para	  14.	  See	  also	  Case	  C-­‐
36/02	  Omega	  [2004]	  ECR	  I-­‐9609,	  paras	  34-­‐35.	  
129	  See	  e.g.	  Case	  36/75	  Rutili	  v	  Minister	  for	  the	  Interior	  [1975]	  ECR	  1219,	  para	  28;	  Case	  C-­‐348/96	  Criminal	  
Proceedings	  Against	  Donatella	  Calfa	  [1999]	  ECR	  I-­‐11,	  para	  21.	  
130	  Case	  72/83	  Campus	  Oil	  [1984]	  ECR	  2727,	  paras	  41	  and	  51.	  
131	  Ibid.,	  para	  35.	  See	  also	  Rutili,	  supra	  note	  126,	  para	  30	  and	  Case	  C-­‐398/98	  Commission	  v	  Greece	  [2001]	  I-­‐7915,	  
para	  30.	  	  	  
132	  It	  appears	  that,	  more	  generally,	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  environment	  can	  also	  be	  relevant.	  See	  Case	  C-­‐379/98	  
PreussenElektra	  v	  Schleswag	  [2001]	  ECR	  I-­‐2099,	  para	  76:	  ‘environmental	  protection	  requirements	  must	  be	  
integrated	  into	  the	  definition	  and	  implementation	  of	  other	  [EU]	  policies’.	  
133	  Horspool	  &	  Humphreys	  2008,	  at	  323-­‐324.	  	  
134	  See	  e.g.	  Case	  178/84	  Commission	  v	  Germany	  [1987]	  ECR	  1227,	  paras	  28,	  39,	  44-­‐45	  and	  Case	  C-­‐24/00	  
Commission	  v	  France	  [2004]	  I-­‐1277,	  para	  52.	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scientific	  doubt	  on	  its	  health	  effects,	  also	  known	  as	  the	  ‘precautionary	  principle’.135	  A	  Member	  
State	   is	   then	  allowed	   to	   take	  protective	  measures	  without	  having	   to	  wait	  until	   the	   reality	  and	  
seriousness	  of	   those	   risks	  are	   fully	  demonstrated.136	  As	   the	  necessity	   test	   in	   this	  vein	   is	  highly	  
dependent	   on	   context,137	   a	   prohibition	   in	   one	  Member	   State	   may	   be	   condoned	   even	   where	  
similar	  bans	  do	  not	  exist	  in	  other	  Member	  States.	  
• The	   protection	   of	   national	   treasures	   possessing	   artistic,	   historic	   or	   archaeological	   value.	   The	  
lessons	  arising	  from	  this	  derogation	  provision	  do	  not	  seem	  particularly	  relevant	  for	  Article	  102	  
TFEU.	  
• The	   protection	   of	   industrial	   and	   commercial	   property.	   Case	   law	   on	   this	   derogation	   provision	  
does	  not	  seem	  to	  offer	  much	  additional	   insight	  considering	  the	  case	  law	  that	  already	  exists	  on	  
the	  interplay	  between	  Intellectual	  Property	  rights	  and	  Article	  102	  TFEU.138	  
	  
Although	  the	  ECJ	  has	  repeatedly	  held	  that	   ‘all	  derogations	  from	  a	  fundamental	  principle	  of	  the	  Treaty’	  
(such	   as	   the	   free	   movement	   of	   goods)	   must	   be	   interpreted	   restrictively,139	   it	   is	   clear	   from	   the	  
enumeration	   above	   that	   various	   cases	   have	   accepted	   such	   derogations.	   The	   reader	   may	   wonder,	  
however,	  to	  what	  extent	  these	  cases	  can	  hold	  lessons	  for	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  Do	  they	  not	  refer	  mainly	  to	  
non-­‐economic	  interests140	  that	  are	  the	  prerogative	  of	  the	  State,	  and	  thus	  unavailable	  for	  private	  actors?	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135	  Case	  174/82	  Sandoz	  [1983]	  2445,	  para	  16.	  However,	  the	  measure	  must	  conform	  to	  the	  proportionality	  principle	  
(ibid.,	  para	  18).	  See	  also	  Case	  C-­‐42/90	  Bellon	  [1990]	  ECR	  I-­‐4863,	  paragraph	  11;	  Case	  C-­‐192/01	  Commission	  v	  
Denmark	  [2003]	  ECR	  I-­‐9693;	  Case	  C-­‐41/02	  Commission	  v	  Netherlands	  [2004]	  ECR	  I-­‐11375;	  Case	  C-­‐286/02	  Bellio	  
Fratelli	  Srl	  v	  Prefettura	  di	  Treviso	  [2004]	  ECR	  I-­‐3465.	  An	  example	  where	  the	  Member	  State	  was	  unable	  to	  produce	  
sufficient	  evidence	  as	  to	  health	  risks,	  is	  Case	  270/02	  Commission	  v	  Italy	  [2004]	  I-­‐1559.	  
136	  Case	  C-­‐157/96	  National	  Farmers'	  Union	  and	  Others	  [1998]	  ECR	  I-­‐2211,	  para	  63.	  However,	  such	  a	  risk	  assessment	  
cannot	  be	  based	  purely	  on	  hypothetical	  grounds,	  see	  Case	  C-­‐236/01	  Monsanto	  Agricoltura	  Italia	  and	  Others	  [2003]	  
ECR	  I-­‐8105,	  para	  106.	  
137	  Sandoz,	  supra	  note	  135,	  para	  22.	  See	  also	  Case	  C-­‐228/91	  Commission	  v	  Italy	  [1993]	  ECR	  I-­‐2701,	  para	  27.	  
138	  See	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐241/91	  P	  and	  C-­‐242/91	  P	  RTE	  and	  ITP	  v	  Commission	  (‘Magill’)	  [1995]	  I-­‐743;	  	  
Case	  C-­‐418/01	  IMS	  Health	  v	  NDC	  Health	  [2004]	  ECR	  I-­‐5039.	  
139	  Calfa,	  supra	  note	  129,	  para	  23.	  See	  also,	  inter	  alia,	  Omega,	  supra	  note	  128,	  para	  30	  and	  Église	  de	  Scientologie,	  
supra	  note	  126,	  para	  17.	  
140	  See	  e.g.	  Case	  7/61	  Commission	  v	  Italy	  [1961]	  ECR	  317,	  at	  329.	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I	  think	  that	  such	  a	  position	  relies	  too	  much	  on	  a	  watertight	  separation	  between	  the	  private	  and	  public	  
spheres;	   a	   separation	   that,	   in	   practice,	   is	   usually	   difficult	   to	   make.	   Indeed,	   even	   though	   the	   free	  
movement	  rules	  traditionally	  only	  address	  measures	  by	  Member	  States,	  they	  may	  also	  affect	  conduct	  by	  
private	  actors	  in	  the	  semi-­‐public	  sphere.141	  The	  Bosman	   judgment	  makes	  clear	  such	  private	  actors	  may	  
indeed	   invoke	   the	   derogations	   based	   on	   Article	   36	   TFEU	   as	   well.142	   There	   is	   thus	   no	   conceptual	  
impossibility	   that	   a	   private	   actor	   can	   invoke	   derogations	   based	   on	   public	   policy	   (even	   though,	   as	  
Mortelmans	  argues,	  there	  may	  be	  additional	  reason	  for	  a	  stricter	  proportionality	  test).143	  
	  
This	  finding	   is	  relevant	  for	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  cases	  where	  the	  dominant	  undertaking	  wishes	  to	   invoke	  a	  
justification	   plea	   based	   on	   an	   objective	   that	   is	   traditionally	   protected	   by	   the	   State.	   Although	   there	   is	  
reason	  to	  examine	  such	  pleas	  with	  additional	  circumspection,	  they	  should	  not	  be	  rejected	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  
law.	  I	  think	  that	  the	  grounds	  in	  Article	  36	  TFEU	  could	  provide	  particular	  insight	  for	  the	  examination	  of	  a	  
refusal	  to	  deal.	  	  
	  
For	  example,	  think	  of	  a	  dominant	  healthcare	  insurer	  that	  refuses	  to	  refund	  a	  particular	  medical	  device,	  
as	  bona	  fide	  indications	  emerge	  that	  the	  device	  has	  detrimental	  health	  effects.	  The	  device	  manufacturer	  
may	  challenge	  the	  refusal,	   stating	  that	   it	  needs	  the	  refunds	  to	  keep	  competing	   for	  sales	   to	  healthcare	  
providers.	  It	  may	  also	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  not	  the	  job	  of	  a	  private	  party	  to	  make	  decisions	  of	  a	  ‘public’	  nature,	  
suggesting	  it	  should	  be	  for	  the	  legislator	  to	  enact	  a	  ban.	  
	  
I	  believe	   that	   this	  example	  aptly	   shows	   that	  even	  private	  companies	  may	  be	  confronted	  with	  genuine	  
public	  interest	  issues.	  Indeed,	  there	  could	  be	  different	  rationales	  for	  the	  health	  insurer’s	  refusal.	  It	  may	  
be	  primarily	   by	   actual	   health	   concerns,	   or	   perhaps	   by	  more	  mundane	   reputation	   issues.	   Be	   that	   as	   it	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141	  See	  e.g.	  Bosman,	  supra	  note	  108.	  
142	  Bosman	  (ibid.),	  para	  86:	  ‘[t]here	  is	  nothing	  to	  preclude	  individuals	  from	  relying	  on	  justifications	  on	  grounds	  of	  
public	  policy,	  public	  security	  or	  public	  health.	  Neither	  the	  scope	  nor	  the	  content	  of	  those	  grounds	  of	  justification	  is	  
in	  any	  way	  affected	  by	  the	  public	  or	  private	  nature	  of	  the	  rules	  in	  question.’	  This	  approach	  was	  confirmed	  in	  
Angonese,	  supra	  note	  107.	  
143	  Mortelmans	  2001,	  supra	  note	  109,	  at	  642.	  Often	  the	  test	  involved,	  in	  practice,	  just	  suitability	  and	  necessity	  (see	  
e.g.	  Case	  66/82	  Fromançais	  v	  Forma	  [1983]	  ECR	  395).	  Sometimes	  it	  also	  included	  a	  test	  of	  proportionality	  stricto	  
sensu	  (see	  e.g.	  Case	  C-­‐331/88	  Fedesa	  [1990]	  ECR	  I-­‐4023).	  	  See,	  as	  regards	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  persons,	  e.g.	  
Bosman,	  supra	  note	  108,	  para	  104;	  Case	  C-­‐55/94	  Gebhard	  [1995]	  ECR	  I-­‐4165,	  para	  37.	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may,	   it	   simply	   seems	  desirable	   to	   shield	   the	  public	   from	  medical	  devices	   that	   are	   likely	   to	  harm	   their	  
health	  –	  even	  if	  the	  legislator	  has	  not	  yet	  enacted	  a	  formal	  ban.	  It	  appears	  that	  the	  ECJ’s	  internal	  market	  
case	  law	  can	  provide	  useful	  guidance	  to	  assess	  such	  a	  case,	  in	  particular	  those	  cases	  that	  have	  shed	  light	  
on	  the	  precautionary	  principle	  and	  the	  proportionality	  test.	  	  
	  
A	  key	  hurdle	  of	  the	  proportionality	  assessment	  is	  the	  necessity	  test.	  The	  measure	  will	  be	  illegitimate	  if	  
less	   restrictive	  measures	  could	  also	  have	  achieved	   the	  proffered	  objective.	  This	  criterion	  seems	  highly	  
stringent	  at	  first	  sight.	  One	  can	  often	  imagine	  alternative	  routes	  that	  may	  have	  affected	  trade	  in	  a	  lesser	  
degree.	  However,	   the	  case	   law	  shows	  that	   the	  necessity	   test	  depends	  to	  a	   large	  extent	  on	  the	  overall	  
context	   of	   the	   case.	   For	   example,	   a	   measure	   is	   not	   automatically	   incompatible	   with	   EU	   law	   if	   other	  
Member	   States	   have	   less	   restrictive	   measures	   in	   force.144	   According	   to	   the	   ECJ,	   ‘the	   specific	  
circumstances	  which	  may	  justify	  recourse	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  public	  policy	  may	  vary	  from	  one	  country	  to	  
another	  and	  from	  one	  era	  to	  another’.145	  The	  lack	  of	  similar	  restrictions	  in	  other	  Member	  States	  may,	  of	  
course,	  be	  relevant	  while	  assessing	  the	  proportionality	  stricto	  sensu	  of	  the	   justification.146	  A	   lesson	  for	  
Article	  102	  TFEU	  is	  that	  context	  matters	  when	  applying	  the	  necessity	  test.	  
	  
2.3 Justifications	  under	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods	  –	  The	  ‘mandatory	  requirements’	  
	  
Article	  36	  TFEU	  provides	  a	  seemingly	  exhaustive	  list	  of	  derogations.	  Combined	  with	  the	  ECJ’s	  stance	  that	  
derogations	  of	  the	  free	  movement	  rules	  must	  be	  interpreted	  ‘strictly’,	  one	  would	  be	  forgiven	  in	  thinking	  
that	  no	  other	  justification	  pleas	  are	  open	  to	  Member	  States.	  However,	  the	  case	  law	  has	  shown	  that	  it	  is	  
indeed	  possible	  to	  justify	  measures	  that	  affect	  trade	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  Article	  36	  TFEU.	  The	  situation	  
is	   best	  described	  by	   first	   explaining	   the	  development	   in	   the	  ECJ’s	   case	   law	  on	   the	   scope	  of	  Article	  34	  
TFEU.	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  Omega,	  supra	  note	  128,	  para	  37.	  The	  ECJ	  distances	  itself	  from	  a	  reading	  of	  the	  earlier	  Schindler	  judgment	  that	  
the	  proportionality	  test	  fails	  if	  another	  Member	  State	  protects	  the	  same	  legitimate	  aim	  with	  a	  less	  restrictive	  
measure.	  See	  Case	  C-­‐275/92	  Schindler	  [1994]	  ECR	  I-­‐1039,	  para	  60.	  
145	  Omega	  (ibid.),	  para	  31.	  Member	  States	  thus	  have	  a	  margin	  of	  discretion,	  see	  Van	  Duyn,	  supra	  note	  125,	  para	  18,	  
and	  Bouchereau,	  supra	  note	  125,	  para	  34.	  
146	  Case	  C-­‐333/08	  Commission	  v	  France	  [2010]	  I-­‐757,	  para	  105.	  The	  ECJ	  noted	  that	  the	  strict	  French	  rules	  were	  
absent	  in	  ‘all	  or	  nearly	  all	  of	  the	  other	  Member	  States’.	  See,	  similarly,	  Case	  C-­‐421/09	  Humanplasma	  v	  Austria	  
[2010]	  ECR	  I-­‐12869,	  para	  41;	  and	  Case	  C-­‐514/03	  Commission	  v	  Spain	  [2006]	  ECR	  I-­‐963,	  para	  49.	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The	   landmark	   Dassonville	   case	   concerned	   a	   national	   provision	   that	   prohibited	   the	   import	   of	   certain	  
alcoholic	   goods	   where	   such	   goods	   did	   not	   have	   an	   official	   government	   certificate	   issued	   by	   the	  
government	  of	  origin	  certifying	  their	  right	  to	  be	  exported.147	  The	  ECJ	  put	  forward	  an	  expansive	  view	  of	  
Article	   34	   TFEU:	   the	   provision	   applies	   to	   all	   domestic	   measures	   that	   are	   capable	   of	   affecting	   trade	  
between	  Member	   States,	   even	   if	   they	   are	   not	   directly	   discriminatory	   (so	   even	   if	   they	   are	   ‘indistinctly	  
applicable’).148	  
	  
The	  Dassonville	   formula	   is	   so	  broad,	   that	   it	  could	  conceivably	  cover	  almost	  any	  national	  measure	   that	  
regulates	   trade.	   In	   an	   apparent	   attempt	   to	   cushion	   the	   judgment’s	   far-­‐reaching	   implications,	   the	   ECJ	  
hinted	   that	   Member	   States	   may	   be	   able	   to	   justify	   such	   trade	   restrictions	   outside	   of	   the	   explicit	  
derogations	  mentioned	  in	  Article	  36	  TFEU.	  As	  there	  was	  no	  EU	  harmonisation	  guaranteeing	  consumers	  
the	   authenticity	   of	   a	   product’s	   designation	   of	   origin,149	   the	   ECJ	   held	   that	   Member	   States	   may	   take	  
measures	   to	   prevent	   unfair	   practices.	   Such	   measures	   must	   be	   ‘reasonable’	   and	   should	   not	   act	   as	   a	  
hindrance	   to	   inter-­‐State	   trade.150	   The	   measures	   may	   equally	   not	   constitute	   a	   means	   of	   ‘arbitrary	  
discrimination’	   or	   ‘a	   disguised	   restriction	   on	   trade	   between	   Member	   States’.151	   Finally,	   the	  
proportionality	  principle	  applies	  as	  well,	  including	  a	  suitability	  and	  necessity	  test.152	  
	  
The	  ECJ	  expanded	  upon	  the	  possibility	  to	  provide	  justifications	  for	  rules	  restrictive	  of	  trade	  in	  Cassis	  de	  
Dijon,	   another	   internal	   market	   classic.153	   The	   ECJ	   confirmed	   that	   obstacles	   to	   the	   free	   movement	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147	  Case	  8/74	  Procureur	  du	  Roi	  v	  Benoît	  and	  Gustave	  Dassonville	  (‘Dassonville’)	  1974	  [ECR]	  837,	  para	  2.	  In	  many	  
ways,	  the	  impact	  of	  Dassonville	  can	  be	  compared	  to	  the	  impact	  of	  Consten	  and	  Grundig	  for	  the	  development	  of	  EU	  
competition	  law;	  see	  Joined	  Cases	  56	  and	  58/64	  Consten	  and	  Grundig	  v	  Commission	  [1966]	  ECR	  299.	  
148	  Dassonville	  (ibid.),	  para	  5.	  Note	  that	  Article	  36	  TFEU	  may	  also	  apply	  to	  directly	  discriminatory	  measures.	  	  
149	  Note	  that,	  if	  there	  is	  such	  harmonization	  the	  analytical	  framework	  should	  be	  the	  harmonized	  rule.	  See	  Tedeschi,	  
supra	  note	  120;	  and	  Mortelmans	  2001,	  supra	  note	  109,	  at	  615.	  
150	  Dassonville,	  supra	  note	  147,	  para	  6.	  
151	  Dassonville,	  (ibid.),	  para	  7.	  I.e.	  the	  mandatory	  requirements	  may	  only	  be	  invoked	  with	  the	  aim	  to	  justify	  
indistinctly	  applicable	  measures,	  see	  Craig	  &	  de	  Búrca	  2003,	  supra	  note	  113,	  at	  636.	  	  
152	  Case	  C-­‐154/89	  Commission	  v	  France	  [1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐659,	  paras	  14	  and	  15;	  Case	  C-­‐180/89	  Commission	  v	  Italy	  [1991]	  
I-­‐709,	  para	  17;	  Commission	  v	  France,	  supra	  note	  134,	  para	  52.	  
153	  Case	  120/78	  Rewe-­‐Zentral	  AG	  v	  Bundesmonopolverwaltung	  für	  Branntwein	  (‘Cassis	  de	  Dijon’),	  [1979]	  ECR	  649.	  
	   64	  
provisions	   resulting	   from	  disparities	  between	  national	   laws	  must	  be	  accepted	   if	   they	  are	  necessary	  to	  
satisfy	  overriding	  public	  interest	  concerns,	  also	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘mandatory	  requirements’	  or	  the	  ‘rule	  or	  
reason’.	   154	   The	   judgment	   enumerates	   four	   such	  mandatory	   requirements:	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   fiscal	  
supervision,	   the	   protection	   of	   public	   health,	   the	   fairness	   of	   commercial	   transactions	   and	   consumer	  
protection.155	  
	  
Subsequent	   case	   law	   has	   made	   clear	   that	   the	   enumeration	   in	   Cassis	   de	   Dijon	   is	   by	   no	   means	  
exhaustive.156	  Other	  mandatory	  requirements	  include	  the	  protection	  of	  workers,157	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  
environment,158	   and	   the	   diversity	   of	   the	   press.159	   These	   cases	   suggest	   that	   a	  mandatory	   requirement	  
plea	  is	  particularly	  persuasive	  if	  it	  is	  in	  line	  with	  a	  stated	  EU	  Treaty	  or	  policy	  objective.	  An	  aim	  will	  also	  be	  
legitimate	  if	  it	  conforms	  to	  one	  of	  the	  (unwritten)	  general	  principles	  of	  EU	  law.	  For	  example,	  the	  Omega	  
case	  (on	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  services)	  concerned	  a	  municipal	  ban	  of	  a	  laser	  game.	  The	  prohibition	  was	  
based	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  firing	  on	  human	  targets	  was	  contrary	  to	  human	  dignity.160	  The	  ECJ	  accepted	  the	  
restriction,	  holding	  that	  the	  protection	  of	  human	  dignity	  is	  a	  legitimate	  objective	  that	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  
a	  general	  principle	  of	  EU	  law.161	  
	  
The	  case	  law	  on	  mandatory	  requirements	  holds	  a	  number	  of	  lessons	  for	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  First,	  the	  ECJ	  
has	   relied	   on	   unwritten	   derogations	   to	   compensate	   for	   an	   otherwise	   overly	   stringent	   prohibition	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154	  The	  concept	  is	  also	  referred	  to	  as	  overriding	  interests	  or	  reasons	  in	  the	  general	  interest.	  
155	  Cassis	  de	  Dijon,	  supra	  note	  153,	  para	  8.	  
156	  Craig	  &	  de	  Búrca	  2003,	  supra	  note	  113,	  at	  638.	  
157	  Case	  C-­‐113/89	  Rush	  Portuguesa	  [1990]	  ECR	  I-­‐1417,	  paragraph	  18.	  
158	  Case	  302/86	  Commission	  v	  Denmark	  [1988]	  ECR	  4607,	  para	  9.	  The	  ECJ	  rejected	  the	  plea,	  because	  the	  measure	  
failed	  the	  proportionality	  test.	  However,	  the	  ECJ	  accepted	  a	  plea	  based	  on	  environmental	  protection	  in	  Case	  C-­‐
2/90	  Commission	  v	  Belgium	  [1992]	  ECR	  I-­‐4431,	  para	  30-­‐32.	  The	  case	  concerned	  restrictions	  on	  the	  inflow	  of	  waste	  
into	  Wallonia	  from	  other	  Member	  States.	  Also	  note,	  more	  generally,	  Case	  240/83	  Procureur	  de	  la	  République	  v	  
Association	  de	  défense	  des	  brûleurs	  d'	  huiles	  usagées	  [1985]	  ECR	  531,	  noting	  that	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  
environment	  is	  ‘one	  of	  the	  [EU’s]	  essential	  objectives’.	  
159	  Case	  C-­‐368/95	  Familiapress	  v	  Bauer	  Verlag	  [1997]	  ECR	  I-­‐3689,	  para	  18.	  The	  ECJ	  reasons	  that	  press	  diversity	  
helps	  to	  safeguard	  freedom	  of	  expression,	  as	  protected	  by	  Article	  10	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  
Rights.	  
160	  Omega,	  supra	  note	  128.	  
161	  Ibid.,	  para	  34.	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Article	   34	   TFEU.	   This	   is	   relevant	   for	   Article	   102	   TFEU,	   as	   the	   scope	   of	   that	   prohibition	   is	   similarly	  
narrowed	  down	  by	  the	  unwritten	  plea	  of	  objective	  justification.	  
	  
Second,	  a	  prima	  facie	  restriction	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  condoned	  if	   it	  clearly	  seeks	  to	  achieve	  an	  objective	  that	  
conforms	  to	  a	  stated	  EU	  objective	  or	  general	  principle	  of	  EU	   law.	   I	  see	  no	  ground	  why	  private	  entities	  
should	  be	  a	  priori	  banned	  to	  invoke	  such	  broader	  EU	  goals	  and	  values.	  For	  example,	  it	  may	  e.g.	  provide	  a	  
justification	   for	   a	   dominant	   online	   platform	   to	   ban	   certain	   content	   providers	   from	   its	   network,	   if	   the	  
platform	  considers	  the	  content	  to	  be	  harmful	  to	  human	  dignity.	  
	  
Third,	   the	  case	   law	  on	  mandatory	   requirements	  also	   shows	   the	   importance	  of	  a	   contextual	  approach,	  
suggesting	  that	  a	  minor	  restriction	  of	  trade	  will	  be	  more	  easily	  condoned	  by	  a	  mandatory	  requirement.	  
For	   example,	   the	   restriction	   in	  Omega	   seemed	   trivial,	   whereas	   the	   protection	   of	   human	   dignity	   was	  
afforded	  particular	  weight.162	  I	  think	  that	  a	  similar	  analysis	  is	  possible	  under	  Article	  102	  TFEU,	  where	  one	  
has	   regard	   to	   the	   significance	   of	   the	   restriction	   of	   competition	   combined	   with	   the	   weight	   of	   the	  
proffered	  justification.	  
	  
Finally,	  the	  examination	  above	  also	  shows	  how	  we	  can	  consider	  justifications	  in	  a	  more	  holistic	  way.163	  
The	  distinction	  between	  the	  justifications	  of	  Article	  36	  TFEU	  and	  the	  mandatory	  requirements	  has	  slowly	  
obfuscated.164	  For	  example,	  justifications	  related	  to	  environmental	  protection	  and	  public	  health	  can	  be	  
considered	  both	  under	  Article	  36	  TFEU	  as	  well	  as	  under	  the	  mandatory	  requirements.165	  It	  is	  submitted	  
that	  we	  should	  focus	  more	  on	  what	  justifications	  do	  (i.e.	  balancing	  a	  prohibition	  that	  would	  otherwise	  
be	  too	  strict)	  rather	  than	  where	  they	  originate	  (e.g.	  an	  explicit	  Treaty	  provision	  or	  a	  general	  principle	  of	  
EU	  law).	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162	  Such	  as	  Omega,	  supra	  note	  128,	  at	  34.	  The	  ECJ	  appeared	  to	  make	  a	  specific	  reference	  to	  Germany’s	  history	  as	  
relevant	  context	  why	  the	  protection	  of	  human	  dignity	  was	  specifically	  important	  (even	  though,	  in	  that	  case,	  human	  
dignity	  was	  already	  considered	  as	  a	  general	  principle	  of	  EU	  law).	  
163	  Craig	  &	  de	  Búrca	  2003,	  supra	  note	  113,	  p.	  661.	  
164	  Albors-­‐Llorens	  2007,	  supra	  note	  80,	  at	  1731.	  See	  also	  Craig	  &	  de	  Búrca	  (ibid.),	  at	  660.	  
165	  PreussenElektra,	  supra	  note	  132	  (Article	  36	  TFEU);	  Commission	  v	  Denmark,	  supra	  note	  158	  and	  Commission	  v.	  
Belgium,	  supra	  note	  158	  (mandatory	  requirements).	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2.4 Other	  derogations	  under	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods	  
	  
The	   paragraphs	   above	   have	   made	   clear	   how	   Article	   36	   TFEU	   and	   the	   unwritten	   ‘mandatory	  
requirements’	  may	  justify	  a	  restriction	  of	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods.	  However,	  many	  commentators	  
have	  argued	  that	  the	  scope	  of	  Article	  34	  TFEU	  was	  still	  too	  wide	  and	  unjustifiably	  caught	  measures	  that	  
had	  no	  real	  bearing	  on	  inter-­‐State	  trade.166	  	  
	  
The	   Court	   seemed	   receptive	   of	   this	   criticism,	   and	   has	   developed	   case	   law	   to	   limit	  Dassonville’s	   wide	  
scope	  of	  application.167	  	  In	  a	  number	  of	  cases,	  starting	  with	  Krantz,	  the	  ECJ	  has	  confirmed	  that	  Article	  34	  
TFEU	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  national	  measures	  if	  their	  effect	  on	  trade	  is	  ‘too	  uncertain	  and	  indirect’.168	  The	  
Krantz	   judgment	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  require	  a	  de	  minimis	   test.169	   Instead,	  the	   ‘indirect’	   limb	  calls	   for	  an	  
examination	  of	  the	  causal	   link	  between	  the	  conduct	  under	  review	  and	  the	   impact	  on	  trade,170	   filtering	  
out	   those	   cases	   where	   the	   link	   is	   too	   weak	   or,	   in	   other	   words,	   too	   remote.	   This	   explains	   why	   the	  
examination	   is	   often	   called	   the	   ‘remoteness’	   test.171	   In	   addition,	   I	   think	   that	   the	   ‘uncertain’	   limb	  
acknowledges	  that,	  even	  though	  a	  potential	   restriction	  of	   trade	  may	  already	  be	  prohibited,	   it	  must	  go	  
beyond	  being	  merely	  hypothetical.	  	  
	  
Apart	   from	  Krantz,	   a	   different	   category	   of	   derogations	   developed	   from	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘Sunday	   trading’	  
cases;172	  a	   string	  of	   case	   law	   that	  drew	  particular	   ire.	  The	  ECJ	   found	   that	  Article	  34	  TFEU	  extended	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166	  E.	  White,	  ‘In	  search	  of	  the	  limits	  to	  Article	  30	  of	  the	  EEC	  Treaty’,	  (1989)	  26	  CMLRev	  235.	  
167	  T.	  Horsely,	  ‘Unearthing	  buried	  treasure:	  art.34	  TFEU	  and	  the	  exclusionary	  rules’,	  (2012)	  37	  ELRev	  734,	  at	  742.	  
168	  See	  e.g.	  Case	  C-­‐69/88	  Krantz	  v	  Ontvanger	  der	  Directe	  Belastingen	  [1990]	  E.C.R.	  I-­‐583,	  para	  11;	  Case	  C-­‐291/09	  
Francesco	  Guarnieri	  &	  Cie	  v	  Vandevelde	  Eddy	  [2011]	  ECR	  I-­‐2685,	  para	  17.	  See	  also	  Horsely	  2012	  (ibid.),	  at	  737.	  
169	  Such	  a	  de	  minimis	  criterion	  had	  already	  been	  rejected	  in	  Case	  177	  and	  178/82	  Officier	  van	  Justitie	  v	  Van	  de	  Haar	  
[1984]	  ECR	  1797,	  para	  13.	  
170	  Guarnieri	  &	  Cie,	  supra	  note	  168,	  para	  17.	  For	  a	  debate	  whether	  this	  test	  can	  be	  equated	  with	  a	  causation	  test,	  
see	  e.g.	  Horsely	  2012,	  supra	  note	  167,	  at	  741	  et	  seq.	  
171	  See	  e.g.	  E.	  Spaventa,	  ‘The	  Outer	  Limit	  of	  the	  Treaty	  Free	  Movement	  Provisions:	  Some	  Reflections	  on	  the	  
Significance	  of	  Keck,	  Remoteness	  and	  Deliège’,	  in	  C.	  Barnard	  and	  O.	  Odudu	  (eds),	  The	  Outer	  Limits	  of	  European	  Law	  
(Hart	  Publishing:	  Oxford	  2009),	  at	  245.	  
172	  Craig	  &	  de	  Búrca	  2003,	  supra	  note	  113,	  at	  645.	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domestic	  prohibitions	  on	  retail	  shops	  from	  selling	  on	  Sundays,173	  suggesting	  that	  such	  a	  measure	  might	  
affect	  the	  number	  of	  goods	  sold	  from	  other	  Member	  States.	  This	  reasoning	  is	  notoriously	  shaky,	  because	  
such	  a	   rule	  does	  not,	   in	   itself,174	  affect	   the	  sale	  of	  goods	   from	  other	  Member	  States	  any	  more	   than	   it	  
affects	  domestic	  goods.	  As	  Weatherill	  noted,	  not	  all	  limits	  on	  commercial	  freedom	  can	  be	  connected	  to	  
a	  cross-­‐border	  aspect	  of	  the	  activity.175	  
	  
Later,	   the	   ECJ	   seemed	   cognisant	   that	   it	   had	   taken	   a	   bridge	   too	   far,	   and	   introduced	   a	   category	   under	  
which	  a	  national	  measure,	  even	   if	   it	  may	  have	  some	   effect	  on	   trade,	  may	   fall	  outside	  of	   the	   scope	  of	  
Article	  34	  TFEU	  altogether.	  In	  Keck,	  the	  ECJ	  had	  to	  decide	  whether	  a	  French	  rule	  prohibiting	  retailers	  to	  
resell	  at	  a	   loss	  was	  contrary	  to	  Article	  34	  TFEU,	  as	  the	  rule	  may	  restrict	   the	  volume	  of	  sales	   (including	  
sales	   from	   other	  Member	   States).176	   The	   case	   clearly	   sought	   to	   temper	   the	   ‘increasing	   tendency’	   by	  
traders	  to	  invoke	  Article	  34	  TFEU	  to	  challenge	  ‘any’	  rule	  that	  may	  limit	  their	  commercial	  freedom.177	  The	  
ECJ	  held	  that	  so-­‐called	  ‘selling	  arrangements’	  by	  Member	  States	  –	  as	  opposed	  to	  ‘product	  requirements’	  
–	  fall	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  Article	  34	  TFEU.178	  The	  Keck	  derogation	  does	  require	  that	  the	  measure	  may	  
not	   affect,	   in	   law	   and	   in	   fact,	   domestic	   products	   differently	   compared	   to	   those	   from	   other	  Member	  
States.179	  
	  
Although	   many	   agreed	   with	   the	   final	   outcome	   in	   Keck,	   the	   ruling	   was	   subject	   to	   hefty	   criticism.180	  
Commentators	  felt	  that	  the	  judgment	  was	  overly	  formalistic,	  and	  that	  it	  would	  be	  difficult,	  in	  practice,	  to	  
draw	  a	  clear	  line	  between	  ‘selling	  arrangements’	  and	  ‘product	  requirements’.181	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173	  Case	  C-­‐145/88	  Torfaen	  v	  B&Q	  [1989]	  ECR	  3851;	  Case	  C-­‐169/91	  Stoke-­‐on-­‐Trent	  [1992]	  ECR	  I-­‐6635.	  
174	  Of	  course	  there	  may	  be	  a	  context	  where	  such	  rules	  do	  hinder	  the	  market	  access	  of	  goods	  from	  other	  EU	  
Member	  States	  more	  than	  they	  do	  domestic	  goods.	  The	  ECJ	  took	  into	  account	  this	  possibility	  in	  various	  cases,	  such	  
as	  De	  Agostini,	  infra	  note	  184.	  
175	  S.	  Weatherill,	  ‘After	  Keck:	  Some	  Thoughts	  on	  how	  the	  Clarify	  the	  Clarification’,	  (1996)	  33	  CMLRev	  885,	  904-­‐906:	  
‘the	  limit	  on	  commercial	  freedom	  could	  not	  be	  directly	  connected	  to	  any	  cross-­‐border	  aspect	  of	  the	  activity’.	  
176	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐267/91	  and	  C-­‐268/91	  Criminal	  proceedings	  against	  Bernard	  Keck	  and	  Daniel	  Mithouard	  (‘Keck’)	  
[1993]	  ECR	  I-­‐6097.	  
177	  Ibid.,	  para	  14.	  
178	  Ibid.,	  para	  17.	  
179	  Ibid.,	  para	  16.	  
180	  Craig	  &	  de	  Búrca	  2003,	  supra	  note	  113,	  at	  656.	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However,	   apart	   from	   the	   distinction	   that	   Keck	   made,	   the	   judgment	   also	   provides	   a	   clue	   about	   its	  
underlying	   goal.	   The	   ECJ	   sought	   to	   condone	   a	   measure	   that,	   even	   though	   it	   may	   affect	   the	   sale	   of	  
products	  from	  other	  Member	  States,	  does	  not	  ‘prevent	  their	  access	  to	  the	  market	  or	  […]	  impede	  access	  
any	   more	   than	   it	   impedes	   the	   access	   of	   domestic	   products’.182	   Several	   commentators,	   including	  
Weatherill,	   have	   argued	   that	   the	   impact	   on	  market	   access	   should	   be	   the	   key	   focal	   point	   (instead	   of	  
labelling	  the	  measure	  based	  on	  its	  ‘nature’).183	  The	  criticism	  did	  not	  fall	  on	  deaf	  ears.	  Subsequent	  case	  
law	  did	  indeed	  shift	  the	  focus	  more	  towards	  the	  degree	  in	  which	  the	  measure	  affected	  market	  access.184	  
In	  the	  2009	  Motorcycle	  trailers	  judgment,	  the	  ECJ	  held	  that	  Article	  34	  TFEU	  applies	  to	  ‘[a]ny	  […]	  measure	  
which	   hinders	   access	   of	   products	   originating	   in	   other	   Member	   States	   to	   the	   market	   of	   a	   Member	  
State’.185	  	  
	  
So	   despite	   VerLoren	   van	   Themaat’s	   warning	   that	   Keck	   could	   herald	   divergence	   between	   the	   internal	  
market	   rules	   and	   the	   competition	   rules,	   the	   case	   law	   seems	   to	   have	   come	   full	   circle.186	   The	   cases	  
examined	  above	  show	  that	  one	  must	  take	  into	  account	  the	  context	  and	  the	  effects	  of	  a	  measure	  before	  
labelling	   it	  as	  a	   ‘selling	  arrangement’.	  Even	   though	   the	   term	   ‘selling	  arrangement’	   is	   still	  unfamiliar	   to	  
competition	   law,	   the	  underlying	   conceptual	   analysis	   seems	  much	   the	   same.	   Indeed,	  Craig	  &	  de	  Búrca	  
have	   suggested	   that	   the	   ‘market	  access’	  perspective	  allows	   the	   internal	  market	   rules	   to	   strive	   for	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181	  Horsely	  2012,	  supra	  note	  167,	  at	  745;	  and	  the	  articles	  cited	  by	  Horsely	  at	  fn	  69.	  	  
182	  Keck,	  supra	  note	  176,	  para	  17.	  
183	  Weatherill,	  supra	  note	  175.	  See	  also	  N.	  Reich,	  ‘The	  ‘November	  Revolution’	  of	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice:	  
Keck,	  Meng	  and	  Audi	  Revisited’,	  (1994)	  31	  CML	  Rev	  459.	  See,	  differently,	  S.	  Enchelmaier,	  ‘The	  Awkward	  Selling	  of	  a	  
Good	  Idea,	  or	  a	  Traditionalist	  Interpretation	  of	  Keck’,	  (2003)	  22	  YEL	  249.	  
184	  See,	  in	  particular,	  Case	  C-­‐405/98	  Konsumentombudsmannen	  v	  Gourmet	  International	  [2001]	  ECR	  I-­‐1795,	  paras	  
21	  and	  24.	  Earlier	  cases	  include	  Case	  C-­‐412/93	  Leclerc-­‐Siplec	  v	  TF1	  and	  M6	  [1995]	  ECR	  I-­‐179,	  para	  22;	  Case	  C-­‐
418/93	  Semeraro	  Casa	  Uno	  [1996]	  I-­‐2975,	  para	  24;	  and	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐34/95,	  C-­‐35/95	  and	  C-­‐36/95	  
Konsumentombudsmannen	  v	  De	  Agostini	  and	  TV-­‐Shop	  [1997]	  ECR	  I-­‐3843,	  paras	  39	  and	  44.	  	  
185	  Case	  C-­‐110/05	  Commission	  v	  Italy	  (‘Motorcycle	  Trailers’)	  [2009]	  ECR	  I-­‐519,	  paras	  36-­‐37.	  	  
186	  See	  P.	  VerLoren	  van	  Themaat,	  ‘Gaat	  de	  Luxemburgse	  rechtspraak	  over	  de	  vier	  vrijheden	  en	  die	  over	  het	  
mededingingsbeleid	  uiteenlopen?’,	  (1998)	  SEW	  398.	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maximisation	   of	   sales,	   an	   optimal	   allocation	   of	   resources	   and	   free	   choice	   for	   consumers.187	   These	  
objectives	  are	  clearly	  in	  line	  with	  the	  aims	  of	  competition	  law.	  
	  
Taking	   the	   previous	   paragraphs	   together,	   the	  Krantz	   and	  Keck	   lines	   of	   case	   law	   clearly	   differ	   in	   their	  
approach.	   The	   first	   is	   essentially	   about	   a	   lack	   of	   causation,	   whereas	   the	   second	   is	   a	   rule-­‐oriented	  
approach	  that	  has	  gradually	  developed	  in	  a	  market	  access	  test.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  their	  aims	  are	  strongly	  
related.	  According	   to	  Horsely,	  both	  doctrines	   seek	   to	  adopt	   the	  principle	  of	   subsidiarity,	  which	  means	  
that	   the	   Treaty	   should	   only	   prohibit	   measures	   if	   there	   is	   a	   sufficiently	   strong	   nexus	   with	   intra-­‐EU	  
trade.188	  I	  agree	  that	  there	  should	  be	  a	  sufficiently	  strong	  connection	  between	  the	  relevant	  conduct	  and	  
the	  interest	  that	  the	  Treaty	  seeks	  to	  protect	  –	  in	  this	  case	  the	  internal	  market.	  This	  reasoning	  can	  clearly	  
be	   transposed	   to	   the	   prohibition	   of	   Article	   102	   TFEU.	   Dominant	   undertakings	   still	   have	   a	   degree	   of	  
commercial	   leeway;	   a	   degree	   of	   freedom	   that	   cannot	   be	   set	   aside	   simply	   because	   of	   a	   hypothetical	  
restriction	  of	  competition.	  
	  
	  




Apart	   from	   EU	   internal	  market	   law,	   justifications	   are	   also	   highly	   relevant	   in	   EU	   competition	   law.	   This	  
thesis	  mainly	  deals	  with	  the	  role	  of	   justifications	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  However,	  other	  
parts	  of	  EU	  competition	  law	  also	  offer	  valuable	  insights	  on	  how	  justifications	  may	  exonerate	  a	  practice	  
that	   would	   otherwise	   be	   prohibited.	   The	   following	   sections	   examine	   lessons	   for	   Article	   102	   TFEU	   by	  
discussing	  Article	  101	  TFEU	  and	  the	  EU	  rules	  on	  merger	  control.189	  
	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187	  Craig	  &	  de	  Búrca,	  supra	  note	  113,	  at	  656.	  
188	  Horsely	  2012,	  supra	  note	  167,	  at	  752-­‐753.	  Horsely	  refers	  to	  G.	  Bermann,	  ‘Taking	  Subsidiarity	  Seriously’,	  (1994)	  
94	  Columbia	  Law	  Rev	  331,	  400.	  See	  also	  Spaventa	  2009,	  supra	  note	  171,	  at	  264.	  Spaventa	  puts	  more	  emphasis	  on	  
the	  absence	  of	  a	  sufficiently	  strong	  effect	  on	  intra-­‐EU	  trade.	  
189	  Other	  segments	  of	  EU	  competition	  law,	  such	  as	  the	  State	  aid	  rules,	  shall	  not	  be	  discussed.	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3.2 Justifications	  under	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU	  
	  
3.2.1 The	  relationship	  between	  Article	  101	  TFEU	  and	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  
Article	   101(1)	   TFEU	   prohibits	   anti-­‐competitive	   agreements	   which	  may	   affect	   trade	   between	  Member	  
States.190	  Acknowledging	   that	   there	  may	  be	   reasons	   to	  condone	  such	  agreements	  nonetheless,	  Article	  
101(3)	  TFEU	  provides	  a	  number	  of	  conditions	  for	  an	  exemption.	  Before	  turning	  to	  its	  substance,	  it	  is	  apt	  
to	  discuss	  why	  lessons	  from	  Article	  101	  TFEU	  are	  relevant	  for	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  
	  
Articles	  101	  and	  102	  TFEU	  clearly	  have	  a	  different	  scope	  of	  application.191	  It	  is	  thus	  little	  surprise	  that	  the	  
ECJ	  held	  in	  Società	  Italiana	  Vetro	  that	  it	  is	  not	  sufficient	  for	  the	  Commission	  to	  ‘recycle’	  the	  arguments	  
for	   Article	   101	   TFEU	   when	   it	   seeks	   to	   establish	   an	   infringement	   of	   Article	   102	   TFEU.192	   In	   addition,	  
guidelines	   by	   the	   Commission	   confirm	   that	   ‘not	   all	   restrictive	   agreements	   concluded	   by	   a	   dominant	  
undertaking	  constitute	  an	  abuse	  of	  a	  dominant	  position’.193	  	  
	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  Articles	  101	  and	  102	  TFEU	  do	  share	  important	  commonalities.	  Both	  provisions	  ‘seek	  to	  
achieve	  the	  same	  aim’,194	  namely	  ‘the	  maintenance	  of	  effective	  competition’.195	  This	  calls	  for	  a	  degree	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190	  In	  full:	  agreements	  between	  undertakings,	  decisions	  by	  associations	  of	  undertakings	  and	  concerted	  practices	  
which	  may	  affect	  trade	  between	  Member	  States	  and	  which	  have	  as	  their	  object	  or	  effect	  the	  prevention,	  
restriction	  or	  distortion	  of	  competition	  within	  the	  internal	  market.	  	  
191	  Case	  6/72	  Europemballage	  Corporation	  and	  Continental	  Can	  Company	  v	  Commission	  (‘Continental	  Can’)	  [1973]	  
ECR	  215,	  para	  25,	  noting	  that	  the	  provisions	  function	  at	  different	  levels.	  Nazzini	  argues	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  codification	  
of	  objective	  justification	  within	  the	  context	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  means	  that	  there	  should	  be	  no	  full	  consistency	  
between	  Article	  101	  and	  102	  TFEU.	  See	  R.	  Nazzini,	  The	  Foundations	  of	  European	  Union	  Competition	  Law:	  The	  
Objective	  and	  Principles	  of	  Article	  102	  (Oxford:	  OUP,	  2011),	  p.305.	  
192	  Joined	  Cases	  T-­‐68/89,	  T-­‐77/89	  and	  T-­‐78/89	  Società	  Italiana	  Vetro	  and	  Others	  v	  Commission	  [1992]	  ECR	  II-­‐1403,	  
para	  360.	  
193	  See	  the	  Article	  101(3)	  guidelines,	  supra	  note	  198,	  para	  106.	  The	  Commission	  gives	  the	  example	  of	  a	  situation	  
‘where	  a	  dominant	  undertaking	  is	  party	  to	  a	  non-­‐full	  function	  joint	  venture,	  which	  is	  found	  to	  be	  restrictive	  of	  
competition	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  involves	  a	  substantial	  integration	  of	  assets’.	  
194	  Continental	  Can	  (ibid.),	  para	  25.	  Confusingly,	  the	  ECJ	  held	  in	  Compagnie	  Maritime	  Belge	  that	  the	  objectives	  of	  
the	  provisions	  ‘must	  be	  distinguished’.	  See	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐395/96	  P	  and	  C-­‐396/96	  P	  Compagnie	  maritime	  belge	  
and	  Dafra-­‐Lines	  v	  Commission	  [2000]	  ECR	  I-­‐1365,	  para	  33.	  I	  think	  this	  refers	  to	  the	  different	  types	  of	  conduct	  that	  
the	  provisions	  target,	  rather	  than	  an	  actual	  distinction	  in	  their	  underlying	  goals.	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‘logical	   coherence’,196	   but	   it	   is	   unclear	   how	   far	   such	   coherence	   goes.	   It	   is	   little	   controversial	   that	   the	  
application	  of	  Articles	  101	  TFEU	  does	  not	  preclude	  application	  of	  102	  TFEU	   if	  all	   their	  conditions	  have	  
been	  met.197	  But	  can	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  still	  be	  applied	  to	  an	  agreement	  that	   is	  exempted	  under	  Article	  
101(3)	   TFEU?	  The	   case	   law	   seems	   little	   consistent	  on	   this	  point.	   Some	   judgments	   suggest	   that	  Article	  
102	   TFEU	   can	   still	   be	   applied	   under	   such	   circumstances,198	   whereas	   other	   judgments	   suggest	   it	  
cannot.199	  
	  
The	  first	  category	  of	  cases	  displays	  judicial	  reluctance	  to	  transpose	  an	  exemption	  based	  on	  Article	  101(3)	  
to	  102	  TFEU.	   This	  hesitation	   is	   particularly	  understandable	  under	   the	   ‘old’	   competition	   regime,	  under	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195	  Continental	  Can	  (ibid.),	  para	  25.	  See	  also	  Case	  T-­‐51/89	  Tetra	  Pak	  Rausing	  v	  Commission	  (‘Tetra	  Pak	  I’)	  [1990]	  
ECR	  II-­‐309,	  para	  22.	  The	  General	  Court	  held	  that	  the	  provisions	  ‘pursue	  a	  common	  general	  objective’,	  but	  
nonetheless	  constitute	  ‘two	  independent	  legal	  instruments	  addressing	  different	  situations’.	  
196	  Tetra	  Pak	  I	  (ibid.),	  para	  21.	  In	  the	  earlier	  Continental	  Can	  (ibid.),	  para	  25,	  the	  ECJ	  held	  that	  the	  provisions	  ‘cannot	  
be	  interpreted	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  they	  contradict	  each	  other’.	  The	  ECJ	  also	  held	  that	  ‘a	  diverse	  legal	  treatment	  
would	  make	  a	  breach	  in	  the	  entire	  competition	  law	  which	  could	  jeopardize	  the	  proper	  functioning	  of	  the	  common	  
market’.	  	  
197	  Case	  85/76	  Hoffmann-­‐La	  Roche	  v	  Commission	  [1979]	  ECR	  461,	  para	  116;	  Case	  66/86	  Ahmed	  Saeed	  1989	  ECR	  
803,	  para	  37.	  Tetra	  Pak	  I	  (ibid.),	  para	  21;	  Compagnie	  maritime	  belge,	  supra	  note	  194,	  paras	  33	  and	  130.	  
198	  Case	  T-­‐65/89	  BPB	  Industries	  and	  British	  Gypsum	  v	  Commission	  [1993]	  ECR	  II-­‐389,	  para	  75:	  ‘an	  exemption	  under	  
Article	  [101](3)	  of	  the	  Treaty	  does	  not	  prevent	  the	  application	  of	  Article	  [102	  TFEU]’.	  See	  also	  Tetra	  Pak	  I	  (ibid.),	  
para	  25:	  ‘the	  grant	  of	  exemption,	  whether	  individual	  or	  block	  exemption,	  under	  Article	  [101](3)	  cannot	  be	  such	  as	  
to	  render	  inapplicable	  the	  prohibition	  set	  out	  in	  Article	  [102	  TFEU]’.	  See,	  further,	  Case	  T-­‐66/01	  ICI	  v	  Commission	  
[2010]	  ECR	  II-­‐2631,	  para	  25.	  See	  also	  Communication	  from	  the	  Commission,	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  application	  of	  Article	  
[101](3)	  of	  the	  Treaty,	  OJ	  [2004]	  C	  101/97,	  para	  106	  and	  Commission’s	  guidelines	  on	  vertical	  restraints,	  infra	  note	  
201,	  para	  127.	  
199	  See	  Joined	  Cases	  T-­‐191/98,	  T-­‐212/98	  to	  T-­‐214/98	  Atlantic	  Container	  Line	  v	  Commission	  [2003]	  ECR	  II-­‐3275,	  para	  
1456:	  ‘where	  the	  Commission	  grants	  an	  individual	  exemption	  pursuant	  to	  Article	  [101](3)	  of	  the	  Treaty	  in	  respect	  
of	  agreements	  notified	  by	  undertakings	  holding	  a	  dominant	  position	  it	  indirectly	  bars	  itself,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  
change	  in	  the	  facts	  or	  the	  law,	  from	  considering	  that	  the	  same	  agreements	  constitute	  abuses	  contrary	  to	  Article	  
[102]	  of	  the	  Treaty’.	  See	  also	  Case	  T-­‐193/02	  Laurent	  Piau	  v	  Commission	  [2005]	  ECR	  II-­‐209,	  paragraphs	  117	  and	  119.	  
As	  the	  Commission	  held	  that	  the	  license	  system	  under	  review	  could	  be	  exempted	  under	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU,	  this	  
‘would	  accordingly	  lead	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  there	  was	  no	  infringement	  under	  Article	  [102	  TFEU]’.	  The	  ECJ	  
rejected	  an	  appeal,	  see	  Case	  C-­‐171/05	  P	  Laurent	  Piau	  v	  Commission	  [2006]	  ECR	  I-­‐37.	  See,	  further,	  P.-­‐J.	  Slot	  &	  A.	  
Johnston,	  An	  Introduction	  to	  Competition	  Law	  (Hart	  Publishing:	  Oxford	  and	  Portland,	  Oregon	  2006),	  at	  134	  et	  seq.	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which	   agreements	   had	   to	   be	   notified	   and	   examined	   ex	   ante,	   whereas	   the	   abuse	   of	   dominance	   was	  
examined	  ex	  post.	  Since	  the	  abolishment	  of	  the	  notification	  system,200	  both	  provisions	  are	  examined	  ex	  
post.	  There	   is	  currently	  more	  ground	  to	  uphold	  consistency	  between	  these	  provisions,	  and	  reduce	  the	  
interpretative	  gap	  between	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU	  and	   ‘objective	   justification’	   for	   the	  purposes	  of	  Article	  
102	  TFEU.201	  
	  
Indeed,	  the	  gap	  between	  these	  two	  forms	  of	  derogation	  appears	  to	  be	  getting	  smaller.	  The	  conditions	  of	  
Article	   101(3)	   TFEU	   are	   increasingly	   finding	   their	   way	   into	   the	   ‘objective	   justification’	   concept	   within	  
Article	  102	  TFEU.	  This	  Commission	  relies	  on	  these	  conditions	  in	  its	  guidance	  document	  on	  its	  Article	  102	  
TFEU	  enforcement	  priorities.202	  Similarly,	  in	  its	  recent	  Post	  Danmark	  judgment,	  the	  ECJ	  introduced	  a	  test	  
for	  pro-­‐competitive	  effects	  that	  is	  strikingly	  similar	  to	  the	  wording	  of	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU.203	  I	  welcome	  
the	  endeavour	   towards	   conceptual	   coherence	  between	  Article	  101(3)	   TFEU	  and	  objective	   justification	  
under	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  Although	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  has	  no	  paragraph	  (3),	  there	  is	  no	  clear	  reason	  to	  label	  
conduct	  as	  an	  abuse	  if	  its	  pro-­‐competitive	  gains	  outweigh	  its	  anti-­‐competitive	  effects.	  
	  
3.2.2 The	  substance	  of	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU	  
Having	   established	   the	   conceptual	   relevance	   of	   Article	   101	   TFEU	   for	   Article	   102	   TFEU,	   it	   is	   apt	   to	  
examine	  its	  exemption	  framework	  in	  more	  detail.	  The	  prohibition	  of	  Article	  101(1)	  TFEU	  does	  not	  apply	  
to	  agreements	  that	  meet	  the	  conditions	  of	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU.	  These	  requirements	  are	  as	  follows.	  
1. The	   agreement	   should	   contribute	   to	   improving	   the	   production	   or	   distribution	   of	   goods	   or	   to	  
promoting	   technical	   or	   economic	   progress.	   The	   alleged	   benefit	   must	   entail	   ‘appreciable	  
objective	   advantages’,	   rather	   than	   simply	   represent	   a	   private	   benefit	   to	   the	   parties	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200	  Under	  Regulation	  1/2003.	  
201	  See	  the	  Commission	  guidelines	  for	  the	  assessment	  of	  vertical	  restraints,	  OJ	  [2010]	  C	  130/1,	  para	  127.	  The	  
Commission	  argues	  that	  ‘since	  Articles	  101	  and	  102	  both	  pursue	  the	  aim	  of	  maintaining	  effective	  competition	  on	  
the	  market,	  consistency	  requires	  that	  Article	  101(3)	  be	  interpreted	  as	  precluding	  any	  application	  of	  the	  exception	  
rule	  to	  restrictive	  agreements	  that	  constitute	  an	  abuse	  of	  a	  dominant	  position’.	  
202	  Guidance	  on	  the	  Commission’s	  enforcement	  priorities	  in	  applying	  Article	  [102	  TFEU]	  to	  abusive	  exclusionary	  
conduct	  by	  dominant	  undertakings,	  OJ	  [2009]	  C	  45/7,	  para	  30.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  here	  that	  I	  do	  think	  that	  the	  
Commission	  puts	  too	  much	  focus	  on	  efficiencies,	  as	  shall	  be	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  below.	  
203	  Case	  C-­‐209/10	  Post	  Danmark	  A/S	  v	  Konkurrencerådet	  [2012]	  nyr,	  para	  42.	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themselves.204	   The	   benefits	   must	   be	   able	   to	   offset	   the	   competition	   issues	   identified	   under	  
Article	  101(1)	  TFEU.205	  
2. 	  The	  agreement	  should	  allow	  consumers	  a	  fair	  share	  of	  the	  resulting	  benefits.	  According	  to	  the	  
Commission,	   the	   notion	   of	   ‘consumers’	   should	   include	   both	   end	   consumers	   and	   intermediate	  
customers.206	  	  
3. The	   agreement	   may	   not	   impose	   on	   the	   undertakings	   concerned	   restrictions	   that	   are	   not	  
indispensable	   to	   the	   attainment	   of	   these	   objectives.	   The	   Commission	   has	   suggested	   that	   the	  
condition	  requires	  a	  test	  of	  (i)	  whether	  the	  restrictive	  agreement	  is	   itself	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  
achieve	   the	   pro-­‐competitive	   effect;	   and	   (ii)	  whether	   the	   individual	   restrictions	   of	   competition	  
flowing	  from	  the	  agreement	  are	  reasonably	  necessary	  for	  the	  attainment	  of	  the	  efficiencies.207	  
Although	   this	   does	   not	   require	   undertakings	   to	   consider	   ‘hypothetical	   and	   theoretical	  
alternatives’,	   they	   do	   need	   to	   show	   ‘why	   seemingly	   realistic	   and	   significantly	   less	   restrictive	  
alternatives	  would	  be	  significantly	  less	  efficient’.208	  
4. The	  agreement	  may	  not	  afford	  the	  contracting	  parties	  the	  possibility	  of	  eliminating	  competition	  
in	  respect	  of	  a	  substantial	  part	  of	  the	  products	  in	  question.209	  The	  condition	  asks	  for	  an	  analysis	  
of	   the	   remaining	   competitive	   pressures	   on	   the	   market	   still	   left	   by	   the	   agreement	   under	  
review.210	   In	   the	   Commission’s	   view,	   the	   test	   allows	   for	   a	   sliding	   scale	   approach:	   ‘[t]he	  more	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204	  See	  Consten	  and	  Grundig,	  supra	  note	  147,	  at	  348-­‐349.	  See	  also	  Case	  T-­‐168/01	  GlaxoSmithKline	  Services	  v	  
Commission	  [2006]	  ECR	  II-­‐2969,	  para	  247.	  See	  also	  Guidelines	  on	  Vertical	  Restraints,	  OJ	  [2010],	  C	  130/01,	  para	  124.	  
Such	  advantages	  may	  arise	  not	  only	  on	  the	  relevant	  market,	  but	  also	  on	  other	  markets.	  See	  Case	  T-­‐86/95	  
Compagnie	  générale	  maritime	  and	  Others	  v	  Commission	  [2002]	  ECR	  II-­‐1011,	  para	  343.	  
205	  Joined	  Cases	  209/78	  to	  215/78	  and	  218/78	  Van	  Landewyck	  and	  Others	  v	  Commission	  [1980]	  ECR	  3125,	  paras	  
183	  to	  185.	  
206	  I.e.	  all	  ‘direct	  or	  indirect	  users’.	  See	  Commission	  guidelines	  on	  Article	  101(3),	  supra	  note	  198,	  para	  84.	  
207	  Commission	  guidelines	  on	  Article	  101(3),	  supra	  note	  198,	  para	  73.	  The	  Court	  did	  not	  consider	  the	  
indispensability	  criterion	  to	  be	  met	  e.g.	  in	  Joined	  Cases	  T-­‐528/93,	  T-­‐542/93,	  T-­‐543/93	  and	  T-­‐546/93	  Métropole	  
television	  and	  Others	  v	  Commission	  [1996]	  ECR	  II-­‐649,	  para	  93.	  	  
208	  Commission	  guidelines	  on	  vertical	  restraints,	  supra	  note	  204,	  para	  125.	  
209	  The	  Court	  did	  not	  consider	  this	  criterion	  to	  be	  met	  e.g.	  in	  Joined	  Cases	  T-­‐185/00,	  T-­‐216/00,	  T-­‐299/00	  and	  T-­‐
300/00	  M6	  and	  Others	  v	  Commission	  [2002]	  ECR	  II-­‐3805,	  para	  86.	  See	  also	  GlaxoSmithKline	  Services	  (GC),	  supra	  
note	  204,	  para	  233.	  
210	  Commission	  guidelines	  on	  vertical	  restraints,	  supra	  note	  204,	  para	  127.	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competition	   is	   already	  weakened	   in	   the	  market	   concerned,	   the	   slighter	   the	   further	   reduction	  
required	  for	  competition	  to	  be	  eliminated	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  Article	  [101](3)’.211	  	  
	  
It	   is	   clear	   that	   the	   conditions	   of	   Article	   101(3)	   TFEU,	   as	   enumerated	   above,	   seek	   to	   balance	   an	  
agreement’s	  pro-­‐	  and	  anti-­‐competitive	  effects.	  The	  European	  Night	  Services	   (‘ENS’)	   judgment	  provides	  
an	  example	  of	  how	  a	  balancing	   test	  can	  be	  done.212	  The	  case	  concerned	  agreements	  between	  various	  
incumbent	   European	   rail	   operators	   to	   provide	   joint	   overnight	   rail	   services	   through	   the	   Channel	  
Tunnel.213	   The	   General	   Court	   considered	   that	   the	   duration	   of	   the	   exemption	   granted	   under	   Article	  
101(3)	  TFEU	  should	  be	  sufficient	  to	  achieve	  the	  relevant	  benefits,214	  and	  to	  allow	  the	  parties	  to	  achieve	  a	  
satisfactory	  return	  on	  their	   investments.215	  This	  reasoning	  is	  clearly	  transplantable	  to	  Article	  102	  TFEU,	  
as	  Slot	  and	  Johnston	  have	  noted.216	  
	  
The	  balancing	  test	  may	  raise	  the	  question	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  beneficiairies	  of	  efficiencies	  must	  be	  the	  
same	   as	   those	   who	   ‘suffer’	   from	   the	   anti-­‐competitive	   effects.	   In	   my	   view,	   the	   ‘fair	   share’	   criterion	  
implies	   that,	   overall,	   consumers	   must	   at	   least	   be	   compensated	   for	   the	   negative	   effects	   of	   the	  
agreement.217	  This	  does	  not	  necessarily	   require	   that	   consumers	  benefit	   in	  exactly	   the	   same	  degree	  as	  
other	  market	  participants,	  as	  long	  as	  their	  share	  is	  still	  fair.	  A	  proportionality	  test,	  stricto	  sensu,	  will	  be	  
able	   to	   examine	   whether	   there	   is	   still	   an	   equitable	   balance	   in	   terms	   of	   how	   the	   benefits	   accrue	   to	  
different	  market	  participants.	  In	  addition,	  the	  ‘fair	  share’	  test	  does	  not	  require	  that	  benefits	  must	  accrue	  
to	   each	   and	   every	   consumer	   individually.218	   Any	   other	   approach	   would	   be	   highly	   impractical.	   It	   is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211	  Commission	  guidelines	  on	  Article	  101(3),	  supra	  note	  198,	  para	  107.	  
212	  Joined	  Cases	  T-­‐374/94,	  T-­‐375/94,	  T-­‐384/94	  and	  T-­‐388/94	  European	  Night	  Services	  and	  Others	  v	  Commission	  
[1998]	  ECR	  II-­‐3141.	  
213	  Case	  IV/34.600	  Night	  Services	  [1994]	  OJ	  L	  259/	  20.	  
214	  ENS,	  supra	  note	  212,	  para	  230.	  Note	  that	  the	  GC	  did	  not	  find	  the	  agreement	  contrary	  to	  Article	  101(1)	  TFEU	  in	  
the	  first	  place.	  However,	  it	  did	  examine	  how	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU	  would	  have	  been	  applied	  to	  this	  case.	  
215	  ENS,	  supra	  note	  212,	  para	  231.	  
216	  Slot	  and	  Johnston	  2006,	  supra	  note	  199,	  at	  133-­‐134.	  
217	  See	  also	  Guidelines	  on	  vertical	  restraints,	  supra	  note	  204,	  para	  126,	  and	  the	  Guidelines	  on	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU,	  
supra	  note	  198,	  para	  85.	  	  
218	  Case	  C-­‐238/05	  Asnef-­‐Equifax	  [2006]	  ECR	  I-­‐11125,	  paras	  70	  and	  72.	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virtually	  impossible	  to	  prove	  that	  the	  conduct	  under	  review	  does	  not	  leave	  any	  consumer	  worse	  off.219	  
As	  a	   final	   remark,	   there	  may	  be	  very	   limited	  overlap	   in	   the	  groups	  of	   ‘beneficiaries’	   and	   (involuntary)	  
‘benefactors’	   if	  they	  are	  present	   in	  different	   levels	  of	  the	  value	  chain.	  A	  restriction	  of	  competition	  in	  a	  
procurement	   market	   may	   be	   particularly	   harmful	   to	   upstream	   suppliers,	   even	   though	   it	   may	   be	  
beneficial	  to	  downstream	  customers	  due	  to	  better	  buying	  conditions	  that	  are	  subsequently	  passed	  on.	  
In	   such	   a	   situation,	   it	   is	   not	   evident	   that	   the	   upstream	   suppliers	   must	   receive	   compensation	   of	   the	  
adverse	  effects	  that	  they	  suffer.	  
	  
3.2.3 Article	  101(3)	  TFEU	  –	  efficiencies	  and	  beyond?	  
The	  balancing	   test	   of	  Article	   101(3)	   TFEU	   clearly	   allows	   efficiencies	   to	   be	   taken	   into	   account.	   A	  more	  
difficult	   question,	   however,	   is	   to	   what	   extent	   the	   provision	   can	   and	   should	   only	   be	   responsive	   to	  
efficiencies.220	   The	   Commission	   currently	   seems	   to	   view	   the	   role	   of	   Article	   101(3)	   TFEU	   as	   solely	  
confined	  to	  matters	  of	  efficiency.221	  	  
	  
I	   disagree	   with	   this	   approach,	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   efficiency	   is	   strictly	   defined	   as	   the	  maximisation	   of	  
(consumer)	   welfare.222	   First,	   competition	   concerns	   may	   be	   broader	   than	   efficiency	   issues.	   Second,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219	  Remember	  that	  a	  loss	  in	  consumer	  welfare	  due	  to	  anti-­‐competitive	  practices	  largely	  follows	  from	  the	  
deadweight	  loss.	  Deadweight	  loss	  implies	  that	  certain	  transactions	  are	  no	  longer	  made.	  I	  fail	  to	  see	  how	  
one	  could	  reverse-­‐engineer	  the	  competitive	  outcome	  for	  each	  and	  every	  consumer,	  and	  thus	  be	  able	  to	  
balance	  pro-­‐	  and	  anti-­‐competitive	  effects	  on	  an	  individual	  basis.	  
220	  For	  two	  diverging	  views	  on	  this	  topic,	  see	  O.	  Odudu,	  The	  Boundaries	  of	  EC	  Competition	  Law:	  The	  Scope	  of	  Article	  
81	  (OUP:	  Oxford	  2006)	  and	  C.	  Townley,	  Article	  81	  EC	  and	  Public	  Policy	  (Hart	  Publishing:	  Oxford	  2009).	  This	  debate	  
essentially	  boils	  down	  to	  the	  view	  one	  holds	  about	  the	  objectives	  that	  competition	  law	  strives	  for,	  or	  should	  strive	  
for.	  	  
221	  See	  e.g.	  the	  Commission	  guidelines	  on	  horizontal	  agreements,	  OJ	  [2011]	  C	  11/1,	  section	  2.3.1;	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
Guidelines	  on	  vertical	  restraints,	  supra	  note	  204.	  
222	  It	  should	  be	  noted,	  however,	  that	  the	  wider	  one’s	  interpretation	  of	  efficiency	  is,	  the	  more	  the	  conclusion	  is	  
warranted	  that	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU	  only	  accommodates	  such	  considerations.	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although	  ‘welfare’	  can	  arguably	  be	  subsumed	  under	  the	  objectives	  pursued	  by	  the	  Treaty,223	  that	  does	  
not	  mean	  that	  efficiency	  is	  the	  only	  relevant	  concern	  while	  applying	  the	  competition	  rules.224	  
	  	  
Several	  ECJ	  judgments	  and	  Commission	  decisions	  have	  confirmed	  that	  the	  analysis	  of	  Article	  101	  TFEU	  is	  
not	  restricted	  to	  a	  mere	  efficiency	  analysis.225	  For	  example,	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  plays	  a	  
key	   role	   in	   the	   interpretation	   of	   Article	   101	   TFEU.226	   As	   a	   consequence,	   agreements	   that	   segment	  
markets	  along	  national	  borders	  are	   likely	   to	  be	  prohibited.227	  The	  ECJ	   considers	   that	   such	  agreements	  
obstruct	  the	  economic	  interpenetration	  of	  national	  markets,	  contrary	  to	  the	  internal	  market	  objective	  of	  
the	  Treaty.228	  It	  is	  submitted	  that	  this	  internal	  market	  goal,	  even	  though	  it	  may	  often	  lead	  to	  efficiency	  
(e.g.	  through	  economies	  of	  scale),	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  an	  efficiency	  standard.	  	  
	  
Think	   of	   a	   case	   of	   price	   discrimination.	   A	   particular	   type	   of	   content	   (e.g.	   broadcasting	   rights	   of	   the	  
domestic	   football	   league)	  may	  be	  particularly	  valuable	   in	   its	  home	  Member	  State,	  and	   less	  so	   in	  other	  
Member	  States.229	  This	  may	  be	  due	  to	  a	   lower	  willingness	  to	  pay	   for	   the	   license,	   for	  example	  because	  
the	  foreign	  football	  league	  is	  considered	  less	  interesting	  than	  the	  domestic	  league.	  It	  may	  also	  be	  due	  to	  
a	   lower	   ability	   to	   pay,	   for	   example	   because	   of	   the	  Member	   State’s	   small	   population	   or	   low	  GDP	  per	  
capita.	  Either	  way,	  it	  makes	  perfect	  economic	  sense	  for	  the	  rights	  holder	  to	  adjust	  the	  price	  according	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223	  Article	  3(1)	  TEU	  states	  that	  the	  EU	  aims	  to	  promote	  ‘the	  well-­‐being	  of	  its	  peoples’.	  Article	  3(3)	  TEU	  provides	  that	  
the	  EU	  shall	  ‘work	  for	  the	  sustainable	  development	  of	  Europe	  based	  on	  balanced	  economic	  growth’.	  It	  is	  submitted	  
that	  these	  provisions	  are	  an	  apt	  basis	  for	  policies	  that	  support	  (consumer)	  welfare.	  	  
224	  See	  also	  P.	  Lugard	  &	  L.	  Hancher,	  ‘Honey,	  I	  Shrunk	  the	  Article!	  A	  Critical	  Assessment	  of	  the	  Commission's	  Notice	  
on	  Article	  81(3)	  of	  the	  EC	  Treaty’,	  (2004)	  25	  ECLR	  410.	  
225	  G.	  Monti,	  ‘Article	  81	  EC	  and	  Public	  Policy’,	  (2002)	  39	  CMLRev	  1057.	  See,	  further,	  R.	  Whish,	  Competition	  Law	  
(OUP:	  Oxford	  2009),	  at	  152-­‐155.	  Whish	  refers,	  inter	  alia,	  Case	  IV/33.814	  Ford/Volkswagen	  [1993]	  OJ	  L	  20/14,	  
where	  the	  Commission	  took	  note	  of	  the	  economic	  benefits	  the	  agreement	  under	  review	  would	  have	  for	  one	  of	  the	  
poorest	  regions	  in	  the	  EU.	  
226	  See	  e.g.	  Consten	  and	  Grundig,	  supra	  note	  147,	  showing	  the	  importance	  of	  internal	  market	  considerations.	  
227	  For	  an	  early	  case	  law	  example,	  see	  e.g.	  Case	  42/84	  Remia	  and	  Others	  v	  Commission	  [1985]	  ECR	  2545,	  para	  22.	  
228	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐403/08	  and	  C-­‐429/08	  FAPL	  [2011]	  ECR	  I-­‐9083,	  para	  139.	  See	  also	  e.g.	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐468/06	  to	  
C-­‐478/06	  Sot.	  Lélos	  kai	  Sia	  and	  Others	  [2008]	  ECR	  I-­‐7139,	  paragraph	  65.	  Such	  agreements	  are	  considered	  as	  a	  
restriction	  ‘by	  object’	  under	  Article	  101(1)	  TFEU.	  
229	  These	  facts	  are	  inspired	  by	  FAPL	  (ibid.).	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the	  prospective	  customer’s	  valuation.230	  And	   to	  ensure	   the	  price	  differentiation’s	  effectiveness,	   it	  also	  
makes	   sense	   if	   the	   rights	   holder	   does	   not	   allow	   parallel	   trading	   across	   borders.231	   If	   competition	   law	  
prohibits	  such	  a	  system,	  it	  may	  well	  lead	  to	  inefficient	  results.	  The	  price	  mechanism	  will	  be	  less	  flexible	  
in	  matching	  supply	  and	  demand.	  In	  addition,	  it	  may	  lead	  to	  substantial	  reduction	  in	  output.	  If	  the	  rights	  
holder	   is	   faced	  with	  net	   losses	  due	   to	  parallel	   trading,	   it	  may	  well	   choose	   to	   raise	   the	  price	   to	   such	  a	  
level	  that	  exceeds	  the	  willingness	  or	  ability	  to	  pay	  in	  many	  Member	  States.	  Stringent	  application	  of	  the	  
internal	  market	  prerogative	  may	   thus,	   ironically,	   lead	   to	   less	   cross-­‐border	   content	  being	   shown	  and	  a	  
sub-­‐optimal	  market	  result.232	  	  
	  
Even	  apart	  from	  the	  internal	  market,	  EU	  competition	  law	  may	  attach	  relevance	  to	  issues	  that	  do	  not	  fit	  
neatly	  into	  an	  efficiency	  analysis.	  The	  early	  Metro	  judgment	  made	  clear	  that:	  ‘the	  requirements	  for	  the	  
maintenance	   of	   workable	   competition	   may	   be	   reconciled	   with	   the	   safeguarding	   of	   objectives	   of	   a	  
different	  nature	  and	  that	  to	  this	  end	  certain	  restrictions	  on	  competition	  are	  permissible’.233	  Indeed,	  the	  
General	  Court	  confirmed	  in	  Métropole	  télévision	  that	  ‘considerations	  connected	  with	  the	  pursuit	  of	  the	  
public	   interest’	   may	   indeed	   be	   taken	   into	   account	   as	   relevant	   context	   while	   assessing	   whether	   an	  
agreement	  can	  be	  subsumed	  under	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU.234	  	  
	  
This	   inclusive	   approach	   has	   prompted	   a	   broad	   interpretation	   of	   the	   conditions	   stipulated	   by	   Article	  
101(3)	   TFEU.	   For	   example,	   the	   Metro	   and	   Remia	   judgments	   show	   that	   the	   improvement	   in	   the	  
‘production	   […]	   of	   goods’	  may	   include	   benefits	   to	   the	   provision	   of	   employment	   –	   even	   though	   strict	  
application	  of	  an	  efficiency	   test	   is	  unlikely	   to	  attach	  must	  weight	   to	   such	  considerations.235	   In	  Laurent	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
230	  This	  was	  clearly	  not	  the	  outcome	  in	  FAPL	  (ibid.).	  
231	  The	  ECJ	  seems	  not	  to	  agree:	  in	  Sot.	  Lélos	  (supra	  note	  228,	  at	  65),	  it	  referred	  specifically	  to	  agreements	  ‘aimed	  at	  
preventing	  or	  restricting	  parallel	  exports’	  as	  a	  restriction	  by	  object	  under	  Article	  101(1)	  TFEU.	  
232	  In	  Sot.	  Lélos	  (supra	  note	  228,	  at	  68),	  the	  ECJ	  seemed	  aware	  of	  such	  a	  risk	  in	  the	  pharmaceutical	  sector:	  ‘the	  [EU]	  
rules	  on	  competition	  are	  also	  incapable	  of	  being	  interpreted	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that,	  in	  order	  to	  defend	  its	  own	  
commercial	  interests,	  the	  only	  choice	  left	  for	  a	  pharmaceuticals	  company	  in	  a	  dominant	  position	  is	  not	  to	  place	  its	  
medicines	  on	  the	  market	  at	  all	  in	  a	  Member	  State	  where	  the	  prices	  of	  those	  products	  are	  set	  at	  a	  relatively	  low	  
level’.	  However,	  the	  same	  fear	  does	  not	  feature	  as	  prominently	  in	  FAPL	  (supra	  note	  228).	  
233	  Case	  26/76	  Metro	  v	  Commission	  [1977]	  ECR	  1875,	  para	  65.	  
234	  Métropole	  télévision,	  supra	  note	  207,	  para	  118.	  
235	  Metro,	  supra	  note	  233,	  para	  43;	  Case	  42/84	  Remia	  and	  Others	  v	  Commission	  [1985]	  ECR	  2545,	  para	  42.	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Piau,	  the	  General	  Court	  held	  that	  ‘economic	  progress’	  may	  include	  a	  beneficial	  effect	  to	  the	  professional	  
and	  ethical	  standards	  for	  a	  certain	  group	  of	  professionals.236	  	  
	  
Apart	   from	   these	   cases,	   the	   fact	   that	   Article	   101(3)	   TFEU	   accommodates	   other	   interests	   than	   simply	  
efficiency	   benefits	   is	   already	   clear	   from	   a	   plain	   reading	   of	   the	   text.	   The	   requirement	   that	   consumers	  
should	   receive	  a	   ‘fair	   share’	  of	   the	  benefits	   resulting	   from	  the	  agreement	   finds	  no	  basis	   in	  a	   standard	  
that	  simply	  focuses	  on	  efficiencies.	  From	  an	  efficiency	  perspective,	  it	  is	  merely	  relevant	  whether	  the	  net	  
effect	  on	  welfare	  is	  beneficial	  or	  not,	  and	  accordingly	  provides	  no	  answer	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  allocation	  of	  
those	  benefits	  is	  ‘fair’	  or	  not.	  	  
	  
Notwithstanding	  these	  precedents,	  Whish	  has	  noted	  that	  a	  more	  recent	  ruling,	  namely	  GlaxoSmithKline	  
Services,237	  suggested	  that	  the	  General	  Court	  was	  comfortable	  in	  adopting	  the	  Commission’s	  efficiency-­‐
based	  approach	  towards	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU.238	  I	  disagree	  with	  this	  interpretation.	  In	  its	  judgment,	  the	  
General	  Court	  examined	  whether	  the	  Commission	  had	  provided	  sufficient	  evidence	  and	  reasoning	  in	  its	  
rejection	   of	   GlaxoSmithKline’s	   plea	   based	   Article	   101(3)	   TFEU.239	   As	   GlaxoSmithKline	   relied	   on	   an	  
efficiency	   plea,	   it	  makes	   sense	   that	   the	  General	   Court	   also	   couched	   its	   ruling	   in	   these	   terms240	   –	   few	  
would	  contend	  that	  efficiency	  cannot	  be	  a	  part	  of	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU.	  However,	  this	  does	  not	  mean,	  a	  
contrario,	  that	  non-­‐efficiency	  arguments	  have	  no	  place	  anymore	  within	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU.	  
	  
In	  my	  opinion,	  neither	  the	  Treaty	  nor	  the	  case	  law	  provides	  a	  solid	  basis	  to	  interpret	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU	  
in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  it	  can	  only	  accommodate	  efficiency	  considerations.	  As	  the	  case	  law	  has	  acknowledged	  
the	   importance	   of	  many	   non-­‐efficiency	   factors	   that	   the	   Commission	   also	   seems	   to	   hold	   dear,241	   one	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
236	  Case	  T-­‐193/02	  Laurent	  Piau	  v	  Commission	  [2005]	  ECR	  II-­‐209.	  The	  case	  concerned	  a	  mandatory	  license	  system	  
for	  the	  agents	  of	  football	  players.	  
237	  See	  GlaxoSmithKline	  Services	  (GC),	  supra	  note	  204.	  The	  ECJ	  dismissed	  an	  appeal	  in	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐501/06	  P,	  C-­‐
513/06	  P,	  C-­‐515/06	  P	  and	  C-­‐519/06	  P	  GlaxoSmithKline	  Services	  and	  Others	  v	  Commission	  [2009]	  I-­‐9291.	  
238	  Whish	  2009,	  supra	  note	  225,	  at	  156.	  
239	  The	  General	  Court	  concluded	  that	  the	  Commission	  had	  not	  provided	  sufficient	  reasoning.	  
240	  GlaxoSmithKline	  Services	  (GC),	  supra	  note	  204,	  para	  280.	  The	  General	  Court	  noted	  that	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU	  
‘allows	  the	  exemption	  of	  agreements	  producing	  a	  gain	  in	  efficiency’.	  
241	  Such	  as	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  internal	  market.	  Even	  though	  this	  may	  indirectly	  strive	  towards	  efficiency,	  it	  is	  not	  
an	  efficiency-­‐based	  interest	  itself.	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could	   wonder	   why	   the	   Commission	   appears	   so	   eager	   to	   narrow	   the	   scope	   of	   Article	   101(3)	   TFEU.	  
Perhaps	   the	   Commission	   feared	   that	   the	   decentralization	   of	   competition	   law	   enforcement,	   brought	  
about	  by	  Regulation	  1/2003,	  would	  lead	  to	  inconsistencies	  if	  NCAs	  and	  domestic	  courts	  were	  to	  include	  
non-­‐efficiency	  considerations	  in	  their	  decisions.	  Or	  perhaps	  the	  Commission	  wanted	  its	  enforcement	  to	  
be	  more	  in	  line	  with	  the	  efficiency-­‐focused	  approach	  in	  the	  US.	  Whatever	  the	  reason,	  my	  contention	  is	  
that	  non-­‐efficiency	  factors	  can	  –	  and	  should	  –	  still	  matter	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU.	  
	  
3.2.4 Lessons	  from	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU	  
The	   examination	   above	   contains,	   in	   my	   view,	   several	   lessons	   for	   objective	   justification	   within	   the	  
meaning	  of	  Article	   102	  TFEU.	  Article	   101(3)	   TFEU	  acknowledges	   that	   seemingly	   restrictive	   conduct	  by	  
undertakings	  may	  have	  different	  facets	  and	  conflicting	  effects,	  and	  provides	  a	   legal	   framework	  for	  the	  
assessment	  thereof.	  The	  paragraphs	  above	  have	  shown	  that	  the	  remit	  of	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU	  is	  wide	  and	  
can	  encapsulate	  efficiency	  as	  well	  as	  non-­‐efficiency	  considerations.	  	  
	  
The	  interpretation	  of	  the	  conditions	  of	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU	  also	  provides	  food	  for	  thought	  for	  Article	  102	  
TFEU.	   Benefits	   must	   have	   a	   wider	   remit	   than	   simply	   accruing	   to	   the	   undertakings	   themselves.	  
Consumers,	  as	  a	  group,	  must	  at	   least	  be	  compensated	  for	  the	  anti-­‐competitive	  effects	  of	  the	  conduct.	  
The	  conduct	  must	  also	  be	  necessary	  for	  the	  benefits	  to	  arise	  –	  but	  that	  does	  not	  require	  undertakings	  to	  
consider	   a	   course	   of	   action	   that	   is	   unrealistic	   in	   the	   specific	   circumstances	   of	   that	  market.	   Finally,	   as	  
regards	  the	  condition	  that	  the	  restriction	  may	  not	  eliminate	  residual	  competition,	  it	  is	  relevant	  that	  the	  
Commission	  proposes	  a	  sliding	  scale	  approach	  that	  takes	   into	  account	  that	  the	  competition	   is	   ‘already	  
weakened’	  by	  the	  restrictive	  agreement.	  There	  is	  an	  obvious	  parallel	  with	  Article	  102	  TFEU,	  as	  the	  case	  
law	   on	   that	   provision	   considers	   competition	   to	   be	   weakened	   due	   to	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   dominant	  
position.	  The	  ‘weakened’	  level	  of	  competition	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  degree,	  again	  underlining	  the	  importance	  of	  
context.	  
	  
3.3 Derogations	  under	  Article	  101(1)	  TFEU	  
	  
3.3.1 Introduction	  
Apart	   from	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU,	   the	  ECJ	  has	  also	  considered	  several	  other	  grounds	  to	  remove	  conduct	  
from	   the	   ambit	   of	   Article	   101	   TFEU.	   If	   such	   a	   ground	   applies,	   an	   agreement	   does	   not	   fall	   within	   the	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scope	  of	  Article	  101(1)	  TFEU	  in	  the	  first	  place	  –	  thus	  removing	  the	  need	  to	  consider	  an	  exemption	  under	  
Article	  101(3)	  TFEU.242	  
	  
3.3.2 Ancillary	  restraints	  
There	   is	   a	  wealth	   of	   case	   law	  on	   agreements	   that	  may	   look	   like	   restrictions	   at	   first	   sight,243	   but	   have	  
escaped	   the	   application	   of	   Article	   101(1)	   TFEU	   nonetheless.	   These	   restrictions	   are	   often	   ancillary	   to	  
otherwise	  legitimate	  practices.	  In	  Société	  Technique	  Minière,	  the	  ECJ	  found	  that	  an	  exclusivity	  provision	  
laid	   upon	   a	   distributor	   may	   not	   infringe	   Article	   101(1)	   TFEU	   if	   it	   ‘seems	   really	   necessary	   for	   the	  
penetration	  of	  a	  new	  area	  by	  an	  undertaking’.244	  In	  Pronuptia,	  the	  ECJ	  held	  that	  Article	  101(1)	  TFEU	  does	  
not	   apply	   to	   the	   provisions	   of	   franchise	   agreements	   for	   the	   distribution	   of	   goods	   which	   are	   ‘strictly	  
necessary’	  for	  the	  franchise	  system	  to	  function.245	  Such	  agreements	  must,	  however,	  be	  limited	  in	  terms	  
of	  their	  duration	  and	  scope	  in	  order	  to	  meet	  the	  proportionality	  test.246	  	  
	  
Seemingly	  restrictive	  provisions	  in	  selective	  distribution	  schemes	  may	  also	  escape	  application	  by	  Article	  
101(1)	   TFEU.	   In	  Metro,	   the	   ECJ	   held	   that	   the	   prohibition	   does	   not	   apply	   to	   a	   selective	   distribution	  
network	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  resellers	  are	  chosen	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  objective	  and	  non-­‐discriminatory	  criteria	  
of	   a	   qualitative	   nature,	   that	   such	   a	   network	   is	   needed	   to	  maintain	   the	   quality	   and	   proper	   use	   of	   the	  
relevant	  product	  and,	  finally,	  that	  the	  criteria	  laid	  down	  do	  not	  go	  beyond	  what	  is	  necessary.247	  In	  AEG-­‐
Telefunken,	  the	  ECJ	  made	  clear	  that	  there	  are	  ‘legitimate	  requirements’	  which	  may	  justify	  a	  reduction	  of	  
competition	   on	   price	   in	   favour	   of	   other	   types	   of	   competition.	   248	   It	   provided	   the	   example	   of	   ‘the	  
maintenance	  of	  a	  specialist	  trade	  capable	  of	  providing	  specific	  services	  as	  regards	  high-­‐quality	  and	  high-­‐
technology	  products’.249	  Such	  selective	  distribution	  systems,	  insofar	  as	  they	  aim	  to	  improve	  competition	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242	  It	  is	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ‘rule	  of	  reason’.	  However,	  Whish	  has	  aptly	  explained	  why	  this	  qualification,	  which	  
originates	  from	  US	  antitrust	  law,	  should	  be	  avoided.	  Whish	  2009,	  supra	  note	  225,	  at	  133.	  
243	  Otherwise	  Article	  101(1)	  TFEU	  would	  not	  come	  into	  view.	  
244	  Case	  56/65	  Société	  Technique	  Minière	  v	  Maschinenbau	  Ulm	  [1966]	  ECR	  235,	  at	  250.	  
245	  Case	  161/84	  Pronuptia	  [1986]	  ECR	  353,	  paras	  27	  and	  33.	  
246	  Remia,	  supra	  note	  235.	  The	  case	  concerned	  a	  non-­‐competition	  clause	  related	  to	  a	  transfer	  of	  an	  undertaking.	  
247	  Metro,	  supra	  note	  233,	  paragraph	  20;	  Case	  31/80	  L’Oréal	  [1980]	  ECR	  3775,	  paragraphs	  15	  and	  16.	  	  
248	  Case	  107/82	  AEG-­‐Telefunken	  v	  Commission	  [1983]	  ECR	  3151,	  para	  33.	  See	  also	  Pierre	  Fabre,	  supra	  note	  116,	  
para	  40.	  
249	  Ibid.	  
	   81	  
in	   relation	   to	   factors	   other	   than	   price,	   are	   considered	   in	   conformity	   with	   Article	   101(1)	   TFEU.	   The	  
underlying	  rationale	  is	  that	  such	  restrictions	  are	  seen	  as	  restraint	  ancillary	  to	  secure	  the	  implementation	  
of	   a	   lawful	   agreement,	   also	   dubbed	   an	   ‘inherent	   restriction’.250	   In	   sum,	   such	   agreements	   should	   be	  
accepted	  as	  they	  seek	  to	  achieve	  a	  legitimate	  commercial	  purpose.251	  
	  
A	  recent	  case	  on	  a	  selective	  distribution	  scheme	  is	  Pierre	  Fabre.	  The	  case,	  triggered	  by	  a	  Paris	  Court	  of	  
Appeal	   reference	   for	  a	  preliminary	   ruling,	   concerned	  a	  de	   facto	  ban	  by	  Pierre	  Fabre	  on	   the	   sale	  of	   its	  
cosmetics	  via	  the	  Internet.252	  The	  ECJ	  reiterated	  that	  such	  a	  selective	  distribution	  scheme	  is	  a	  restriction	  
by	   object	   within	   the	   meaning	   of	   Article	   101(1)	   TFEU,	   but	   only	   ‘in	   the	   absence	   of	   objective	  
justification’.253	   It	   is	  up	  to	  the	  referring	  court	  to	  decide	  whether	  the	  restrictions	  of	  competition	  pursue	  
legitimate	  aims	   in	  a	  proportionate	  manner.254	   Interestingly,	   the	  ECJ	  based	   its	   judgment	  on	  earlier	  case	  
law	  related	  to	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  services,255	  suggesting	  that	  it	  seeks	  to	  bring	  these	  areas	  of	  EU	  law	  
closer	  together.	  	  
	  
The	  Pierre	  Fabre	   ruling	   is	  worthy	  of	  note	   for	  a	  different	   reason	  as	  well.	  Earlier	   judgments,	  such	  as	   IAZ	  
International,	  have	  held	  that	  a	  restriction	  by	  object	  cannot	  escape	  the	  application	  of	  Article	  101(1)	  TFEU	  
on	   the	   basis	   that	   the	   agreement	   under	   review	   also	   pursued	   other,	   legitimate,	   objectives.256	   Is	   this	  
consistent	  with	  the	  ‘objective	  justification’	  approach	  by	  Pierre	  Fabre?257	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
250	  Mortelmans	  2001,	  supra	  note	  109,	  at	  628.	  
251	  Whish	  2009,	  supra	  note	  225,	  at	  126.	  	  
252	  Pierre	  Fabre,	  supra	  note	  116,	  paras	  2	  and	  14.	  
253	  Ibid.,	  para	  39.	  At	  para	  46,	  the	  ECJ	  did	  note	  that	  the	  aim	  of	  ‘maintaining	  a	  prestigious	  image’	  is	  not	  a	  legitimate	  
aim	  that	  can	  remove	  an	  agreement	  from	  the	  ambit	  of	  Article	  101(1)	  TFEU.	  See	  also	  the	  Opinion	  as	  regards	  Pierre	  
Fabre.	  AG	  Mazák	  noted	  that	  a	  legitimate	  objective	  ‘must	  be	  of	  a	  public	  law	  nature	  and	  therefore	  aimed	  at	  
protecting	  a	  public	  good’	  (see	  para	  35).	  
254	  Pierre	  Fabre,	  supra	  note	  116,	  para	  43.	  
255	  Case	  C-­‐322/01	  Deutscher	  Apothekerverband	  v	  DocMorris	  [2003]	  ECR	  I-­‐14887,	  paras	  106,	  107	  and	  112;	  Case	  C-­‐
108/09	  Ker-­‐Optika	  [2010]	  I-­‐12213,	  para	  76.	  In	  the	  latter	  case,	  the	  ECJ	  found	  that	  legislation	  prohibiting	  the	  online	  
sale	  of	  contact	  lenses	  was	  a	  disproportionate	  means	  to	  protect	  public	  health.	  	  
256	  Consten	  &	  Grundig,	  supra	  note	  147,	  at	  342;	  Joined	  Cases	  96	  to	  102,	  104,	  105,	  108	  and	  110/82	  NV	  IAZ	  
International	  Belgium	  and	  Others	  v	  Commission	  [1983]	  ECR	  3369,	  paras	  23-­‐25.	  See	  also;	  Case	  C-­‐235/92	  P	  
Montecatini	  v	  Commission	  [1999]	  ECR	  I-­‐4539,	  para	  122;	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐238/99	  P,	  C-­‐244/99	  P,	  C-­‐245/99	  P,	  C-­‐247/99	  
P,	  C-­‐250/99	  P	  to	  C-­‐252/99	  P	  and	  C-­‐254/99	  P	  Limburgse	  Vinyl	  Maatschappij	  and	  Others	  v	  Commission	  [2002]	  ECR	  I-­‐
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It	   is	   submitted	   that	   these	   approaches	   can	   indeed	  be	   reconciled.	   Judgments	   such	   as	  T-­‐Mobile	   confirm	  
that	  a	  restriction	  by	  object	  can	  only	  be	  found	  after	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  content	  and	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  
agreement	  as	  well	  as	  the	  relevant	  economic	  and	  legal	  context.258	  This	  means	  that	  legitimate	  objectives	  
can	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  provide	  relevant	  context	  to	  explain	  the	  agreement’s	  
purpose.259	  Importantly,	  such	  reasons	  (‘objective	  justification’,	  in	  the	  parlance	  of	  Pierre	  Fabre)	  should	  be	  
examined	   before	   being	   able	   to	   label	   the	   agreement	   as	   a	   restriction	   by	   object.260	   However,	   once	   an	  
agreement	  has	   indeed	  been	   labelled	  as	  a	   restriction	  by	  object,	   it	   can	  no	   longer	  be	   removed	   from	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8375,	  para	  491.	  See	  also	  Case	  C-­‐551/03	  P	  General	  Motors	  v	  Commission	  [2006]	  ECR	  I-­‐3173,	  para	  64:	  ‘an	  agreement	  
may	  be	  regarded	  as	  having	  a	  restrictive	  object	  even	  if	  it	  does	  not	  have	  the	  restriction	  of	  competition	  as	  its	  sole	  aim	  
but	  also	  pursues	  other	  legitimate	  objectives’.	  
257	  Bailey	  reconciles	  these	  two	  strands	  of	  case	  law	  as	  follows:	  ‘the	  Court	  in	  Pierre	  Fabre	  was	  considering	  whether	  
certain	  types	  of	  prima	  facie	  restrictive	  conduct	  fall	  outside	  Article	  101(1),	  as	  opposed	  to	  whether	  a	  restriction	  by	  
object	  can	  be	  saved	  by	  a	  legitimate	  objective	  under	  Article	  101(1):	  a	  subtle,	  but	  important,	  difference’.	  See	  D.	  
Bailey,	  ‘Restrictions	  of	  competition	  by	  object	  under	  Article	  101	  TFEU’,	  (2012)	  49	  CMLRev	  559,	  at	  581.	  
258	  Case	  C-­‐8/08	  T-­‐Mobile	  and	  Others	  v	  Raad	  van	  Bestuur	  van	  de	  Nederlandse	  Mededingingsautoriteit	  [2009]	  ECR	  I-­‐
4529,	  para	  27.	  See	  also	  GlaxoSmithKline	  Services	  (ECJ),	  supra	  note	  237,	  para	  58;	  Case	  C-­‐209/07	  Beef	  Industry	  
Development	  Society	  and	  Barry	  Brothers	  (‘BIDS’)	  [2008]	  ECR	  I-­‐	  8637,	  paras	  16	  and	  21.	  More	  recently,	  see	  Case	  C-­‐
226/11	  Expedia	  v	  Autorité	  de	  la	  concurrence	  and	  Others	  [2012]	  nyr,	  para	  21.	  
259	  Relevant	  context	  in	  Pierre	  Fabre	  included	  that	  it	  concerned	  a	  vertical	  agreement.	  The	  Commission	  guidelines	  on	  
vertical	  restraints	  (supra	  note	  201)	  note	  that	  prima	  facie	  anti-­‐competitive	  agreements	  may	  be	  objectively	  justified.	  
At	  para	  60,	  the	  guidelines	  provide	  the	  example	  of	  a	  public	  prohibition	  on	  the	  sale	  of	  dangerous	  substances.	  In	  its	  
Article	  101(3)	  guidelines	  (supra	  note	  198,	  para	  18),	  the	  Commission	  holds	  that:	  ‘certain	  restraints	  may	  in	  certain	  
cases	  not	  be	  caught	  by	  Article	  [101](1)	  when	  the	  restraint	  is	  objectively	  necessary	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  
agreement	  of	  that	  type	  or	  that	  nature’.	  
260	  Indeed,	  the	  Court	  held	  in	  IAZ	  International	  Belgium	  (supra	  note	  256,	  para	  25)	  that,	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  the	  
‘purpose’	  of	  the	  agreement,	  regard	  must	  be	  had	  to	  its	  entire	  legal	  and	  economic	  context.	  See	  also	  Case	  C-­‐68/12	  
Protimonopolný	  úrad	  Slovenskej	  republiky	  v	  Slovenská	  sporiteľňa	  (‘Slovenská’)	  [2013]	  ECR	  nyr,	  para	  19-­‐21.	  The	  ECJ	  
rejected	  an	  ‘illegality	  defense’	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  an	  agreement	  that	  could	  already	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  restriction	  by	  object.	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ambit	  of	  Article	  101(1)	  TFEU:261	  the	  provision	  clearly	  applies	  to	  any	  such	  restriction.	  The	  only	  way	  that	  
such	  a	  restriction	  can	  be	  condoned	  if	  through	  application	  of	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU.262	  
	  
3.3.3 State	  compulsion	  
The	   cases	   above	   mainly	   concern	   situations	   where	   the	   agreement	   constitutes	   legitimate	   commercial	  
conduct,	  and	  accordingly	  does	  not	  merit	  application	  of	  Article	  101(1)	  TFEU.	  Activities	  may	  also	  escape	  
that	  provision	   if	  State	  compulsion	  restricts	  undertakings	  from	  actually	  competing.263	  The	  most	  obvious	  
example	  is	  where	  a	  State	  regulates	  all	  aspects	  of	  supply	  and	  demand,	  and	  substantially	  limits	  the	  ability	  
to	   negotiate	   on	  price.264	   The	  defence	  will	   not	   easily	   be	   accepted,	   however.	   It	  will	   only	   succeed	   if	   the	  
following	  three	  conditions	  have	  been	  met:265	  	  
(i) the	  State	  actually	  compels	  undertakings	  to	  act	   in	  a	  particular	  way;	   it	   is	  not	  sufficient	   if	  the	  
State	  merely	  facilitates	  or	  encourages	  that	  conduct;	  
(ii) there	  is	  a	  legal	  basis	  for	  the	  State’s	  compulsion;	  otherwise	  there	  is	  no	  clear	  reason	  why	  an	  
undertaking	  could	  ‘set	  aside’	  its	  obligations	  under	  the	  Treaty;	  
(iii) in	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   governmental	   policy,	   the	   undertakings	   have	   no	   leeway	   to	  
compete.	  
	  
The	   underlying	   rationale	   is	   that	   conduct	   cannot	   be	   attributed	   to	   an	   undertaking	   if	   it	   acts	   out	   of	  
compulsion.	  The	  reasoning	   is	  clearly	  transposable	  to	  Article	  102	  TFEU,	  where	  State	  compulsion	  should	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261	  Joined	  Cases	  T-­‐49	  to	  51/02	  Brasserie	  nationale	  and	  Others	  v	  Commission	  [2005]	  ECR	  II-­‐3033,	  para	  85.	  I	  assume	  
here	  that	  the	  agreement	  affects	  trade	  between	  Member	  States.	  
262	  Even	  a	  restriction	  by	  object	  can	  escape	  qualify	  for	  exemption	  under	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU,	  see	  Case	  T-­‐17/93	  
Matra	  Hachette	  v	  Commission	  [1994]	  ECR	  II-­‐595,	  para	  85.	  See	  also	  Consten	  and	  Grundig,	  supra	  note	  147,	  pp.	  342,	  
343	  and	  347.	  
263	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  national	  legislation	  itself	  may	  be	  contrary	  to	  EU	  law,	  according	  to	  the	  doctrine	  in	  
Case	  C-­‐198/01	  Consorzio	  Industrie	  Fiammiferi	  v	  Autorità	  Garante	  della	  Concorrenza	  e	  del	  Mercato	  (‘CIF’)	  [2003]	  I-­‐
8055;	  Case	  267/86	  Van	  Eycke	  v	  ASPA	  [1988]	  ECR	  4769.	  
264	  Joined	  Cases	  40	  to	  48,	  50,	  54	  to	  56,	  111,	  113	  and	  114/73	  Suiker	  Unie	  v	  Commission	  [1975]	  ECR	  1663,	  paras	  63-­‐
68.	  
265	  Whish	  2009,	  supra	  note	  225,	  at	  135.	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offer	  a	  forceful	  justification	  under	  the	  heading	  of	  ‘objective	  necessity’	  –	  connoting	  that	  the	  undertaking	  
under	  review	  could	  not	  have	  acted	  differently.266	  
	  
3.3.4 Influence	  by	  (quasi)	  public	  bodies	  
Apart	   from	  actual	  compulsion	  by	  the	  State,	   there	  may	  also	  be	  regulation	  by	   (quasi)	  public	  bodies	   that	  
restricts	  competition	  but	  nevertheless	  falls	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  Article	  101(1)	  TFEU.	  The	  Wouters	  case	  
provides	  a	  thought-­‐provoking	  example.267	  The	  case	  concerned	  a	  prohibition	  by	  the	  Dutch	  Bar	  association	  
of	   multi-­‐disciplinary	   partnerships	   between	   members	   of	   the	   Bar	   and	   accountants.	   The	   question	   was	  
whether	  this	   rule	  violated	  Article	  101(1)	  TFEU.	  The	  ECJ	   first	  notes	  that	  such	  a	  blanket	  prohibition	  may	  
indeed	  adversely	  affect	  competition,	  as	  it	  disallows	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  service	  for	  which	  there	  is	  possible	  
demand	  and	  which	  may	  lower	  costs.268	  	  
	  
However,	   the	   Court	   held	   that	   not	   every	   agreement	   between	   undertakings	   (or	   every	   decision	   by	   an	  
association	  of	  undertakings)	  which	  restricts	   freedom	  of	  action	  necessarily	   falls	  within	  the	  scope	  of	   the	  
Article	  101(1)	  TFEU	  prohibition.269	  The	  ECJ	  noted	  that	  one	  must	  take	  into	  account	  the	  overall	  context	  of	  
the	   conduct	   under	   review	   and,	   subsequently,	   whether	   the	   restrictions	   at	   play	   are	   inherent	   to	   those	  
objectives.270	   The	   ECJ	   examined,	   in	   particular,	   the	   rule’s	   legal	   framework	   (observing	   that	   no	   EU	   rules	  
applied	   in	  the	  specific	   field)	  and	   its	  objectives	  (holding	  that	  the	  Dutch	  rule	  seeks	  to	  protect	  standards,	  
such	  as	  strict	  professional	  secrecy,	  that	  do	  not	  apply	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  accountants).271	  It	  concluded	  that	  the	  rule	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
266	  See	  Commission	  guidance	  on	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  enforcement	  priorities,	  supra	  note	  202,	  para	  28-­‐29	  (noting	  the	  
possibility	  for	  dominant	  undertakings	  to	  rely	  on	  objective	  necessity).	  
267	  Case	  C-­‐309/99	  Wouters	  v	  Algemene	  Raad	  van	  de	  Nederlandse	  Orde	  van	  Advocaten	  [2002]	  ECR	  I-­‐1577.	  In	  the	  
terminology	  of	  some	  commentators,	  the	  Wouters	  case	  is	  an	  example	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  reason:	  M.	  Schechter,	  ‘The	  Rule	  
of	  Reason	  in	  European	  Competition	  Law’.	  (1982)	  2	  LIEI	  1;	  V.	  Korah,	  ‘EEC	  Competition	  Policy	  –	  Legal	  Form	  or	  
Economic	  Efficiency’,	  (1986)	  39	  CLP	  85.	  However,	  for	  forceful	  arguments	  why	  there	  should	  not	  be	  a	  US-­‐style	  rule	  of	  
reason	  in	  EU	  competition	  law,	  see	  R.	  Whish	  and	  B.	  Sufrin,	  ‘Article	  85	  and	  the	  Rule	  of	  Reason’,	  (1987)	  7	  YBEL	  1,	  at	  
12-­‐20.	  
268	  Wouters	  (ibid.),	  para	  87-­‐90.	  
269	  Ibid.,	  para	  97.	  
270	  Ibid.	  
271	  Ibid.,	  paras	  99-­‐106.	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under	  review	  did	  not	  infringe	  Article	  101(1)	  TFEU,272	  as	  it	  was	  necessary	  for	  the	  proper	  functioning	  of	  the	  
legal	  profession	  in	  the	  Netherlands.273	  Even	  though	  other	  Member	  States	  did	  not	  have	  such	  prohibitions,	  
the	   ECJ	   did	   find	   the	   rule	   necessary	   in	   the	   particular	   context	   of	   the	   case.	   The	   ruling	   shows	   that	   the	  
necessity	  test	  requires	  more	  than	  simply	  assessing	  whether	  similar	  actors	  have	  less	  restrictive	  practices	  
in	  place.	  
	  
The	   Meca-­‐Medina	   judgment	   follows	   the	   line	   of	   reasoning	   in	   Wouters.	   The	   case	   concerned	   two	  
swimming	   athletes	   who	   argued	   that	   certain	   anti-­‐doping	   rules	   adopted	   by	   the	   International	   Olympic	  
Committee	  were	  contrary	  to	  Article	  101	  TFEU.	  The	  Commission	  rejected	  their	  complaint.274	  On	  appeal,	  
the	  General	  Court	  held	  that	  Article	  101(1)	  TFEU	  did	  not	  apply	  to	  the	  relevant	  rules,	  as	  they	  pertained	  to	  
a	   ‘purely	   sporting	   interest’	   and,	   accordingly,	   had	   nothing	   to	   do	   with	   the	   ‘economic	   relationships	   of	  
competition’.275	   In	  a	   further	  appeal,	   the	  ECJ	  took	  a	  different	  tack.276	   It	  disagreed	  that	  rules	  that	  purely	  
pertain	  to	  sports	  are,	  as	  such,	  outside	  the	  ambit	  of	  Article	  101(1)	  TFEU.277	  However,	  the	  ECJ	  did	  consider	  
that	   the	  relevant	  rules	   intended	  to	  conduct	   fair	  competitive	  sports,	  with	  the	   ‘need	  to	  safeguard	  equal	  
chances	   for	   athletes,	   athletes’	   health,	   the	   integrity	   and	   objectivity	   of	   competitive	   sport	   and	   ethical	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
272	  Note	  that	  the	  ECJ	  was	  unable	  to	  apply	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU,	  because	  –	  at	  the	  time	  –	  this	  competence	  was	  a	  
prerogative	  of	  the	  Commission	  upon	  a	  notification	  by	  the	  relevant	  undertakings.	  The	  Wouters	  case	  did	  not	  involve	  
such	  a	  notification,	  but	  a	  ruling	  upon	  a	  preliminary	  reference	  arising	  from	  domestic	  litigation.	  
273	  Wouters,	  supra	  note	  267,	  paras	  109-­‐110.	  The	  ECJ	  held	  that	  the	  rule	  did	  not	  go	  ‘beyond	  what	  is	  necessary	  in	  
order	  to	  ensure	  the	  proper	  practice	  of	  the	  legal	  profession’,	  even	  though	  other	  Member	  States	  did	  allow	  
partnerships	  between	  members	  of	  the	  Bar	  and	  accountants.	  
274	  Case	  COMP/38158,	  Meca-­‐Medina	  and	  Majcen/IOC	  (1	  August	  2002).	  
275	  Case	  T-­‐313/02	  Meca-­‐Medina	  and	  Majcen	  v	  Commission	  [2004]	  II-­‐3291,	  para	  40-­‐42.	  The	  General	  Court	  thus	  
applied	  the	  case	  law	  on	  the	  freedom	  of	  movement	  of	  persons	  and	  services;	  see	  in	  particular	  Case	  36/74	  Walrave	  
and	  Koch	  [1974]	  ECR	  1405,	  para	  8.	  
276	  Case	  C-­‐519/04	  P	  Meca-­‐Medina	  and	  Majcen	  v	  Commission	  [2006]	  ECR	  I-­‐6991.	  
277	  Ibid.,	  paras	  27	  and	  33.	  At	  para	  42,	  the	  ECJ	  confirmed	  that	  ‘[n]ot	  every	  agreement	  between	  undertakings	  or	  
every	  decision	  of	  an	  association	  of	  undertakings	  which	  restricts	  the	  freedom	  of	  action	  of	  the	  parties	  or	  of	  one	  of	  
them	  necessarily	  falls	  within	  the	  prohibition	  laid	  down	  in	  Article	  [101](1)	  [TFEU]’.	  See,	  more	  recently,	  OTOC,	  infra	  
note	  281,	  para	  93.	  This	  finding	  applies	  even	  though	  the	  Treaty’s	  system	  of	  undistorted	  competition	  ‘can	  be	  
guaranteed	  only	  if	  equality	  of	  opportunity	  is	  secured	  as	  between	  the	  various	  economic	  operators’	  (OTOC,	  para	  88;	  
Case	  C-­‐49/07	  MOTOE	  [2008]	  ECR	  I-­‐4863.	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values	   in	   sport’.278	   So	   even	   where	   such	   rules	   limit	   the	   appellants’	   freedom	   of	   action,	   they	   may	   fall	  
outside	  the	  scope	  of	  Article	  101(1)	  TFEU	  as	  they	  are	  ‘justified	  by	  a	  legitimate	  objective’.279	  On	  the	  facts,	  
the	   ECJ	   did	   not	   consider	   that	   the	   anti-­‐doping	   rules	   were	   disproportionate	   and	   dismissed	   the	   actions	  
brought	  by	  the	  appellants.280	  	  
	  
Recent	   cases	   involving	   professional	   training	   for	   Portuguese	   chartered	   accountants281	   and	   the	  
remuneration	  for	  Italian	  geologists282	  show	  that	  Wouters	   is	  still	  standing	  case	  law.283	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  
ECJ	  considered	  that	  the	  restrictions	  at	  issue	  were	  not	  necessary	  to	  reach	  their	  respective	  objectives.	  
	  
3.3.5 Lessons	  from	  Article	  101(1)	  TFEU	  
The	  cases	  above	  provide	  a	  number	  of	  lessons	  for	  the	  concept	  of	  objective	  justification	  for	  the	  purposes	  
of	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  If	  an	  undertaking	  engages	  in	  legitimate	  commercial	  conduct,	  its	  conduct	  shall	  not	  be	  
caught	  by	  the	  prohibition	  in	  Article	  101(1)	  TFEU.	  Such	  derogation	  exists	  even	  though	  Article	  101(1)	  TFEU	  
does	   not	   mention	   it,	   and	   despite	   the	   fact	   that	   another	   provision	   (Article	   101(3)	   TFEU)	   exists	   to	  
accommodate	   justifications.	   Apparently	   the	   ECJ	   saw	   an	   added	   value	   in	   considering	   that	   certain	  
agreements,	  even	  though	  they	  involve	  some	  restriction	  of	  competition,	  are	  not	  sufficiently	  restrictive	  to	  
fall	  within	   the	  ambit	  of	  Article	  101(1)	  TFEU.	  This	   is	   clearly	   relevant	   for	  Article	  102	  TFEU,	   that	   lacks	  an	  
exemption	  provision	  altogether.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
278	  Ibid.,	  para	  43.	  
279	  Ibid.,	  para	  45.	  The	  Court	  added	  that	  such	  rules	  are	  ‘inherent	  in	  the	  organisation	  and	  proper	  conduct	  of	  
competitive	  sport	  and	  its	  very	  purpose	  is	  to	  ensure	  healthy	  rivalry	  between	  athletes’.	  
280	  Ibid.,	  paras	  55	  and	  60.	  
281	  Case	  C-­‐1/12	  Ordem	  dos	  Técnicos	  Oficias	  de	  Contas	  (‘OTOC’)	  v	  Autoridade	  da	  Concorrência	  [2013]	  nyr,	  para	  40:	  
the	  Treaty	  rules	  on	  competition	  ‘do	  not	  apply	  to	  an	  activity	  which,	  by	  its	  nature,	  its	  aim	  and	  the	  rules	  to	  which	  it	  is	  
subject,	  does	  not	  belong	  to	  the	  sphere	  of	  economic	  activity’.	  
282	  Case	  C-­‐136/12	  Consiglio	  nazionale	  dei	  geologi	  v	  AGCM	  [2013]	  nyr.	  
283	  Note	  that	  it	  was	  not	  evident	  that	  the	  ECJ	  would	  continue	  to	  allow	  some	  sort	  of	  balancing	  act	  within	  Article	  
101(1)	  TFEU.	  Before	  the	  adoption	  of	  Regulation	  1/2003,	  courts	  were	  unable	  to	  directly	  apply	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU,	  
which	  may	  explain	  Wouters	  as	  a	  need	  to	  deploy	  a	  balancing	  act	  somewhere	  else	  –	  namely	  within	  Article	  101(1)	  
TFEU.	  However,	  the	  cases	  mentioned	  in	  supra	  notes	  281	  and	  282	  show	  that	  Wouters	  is	  still	  applicable	  after	  the	  
adoption	  of	  Regulation	  1/2003	  (note	  that	  the	  Meca-­‐Medina	  decision	  was	  pre-­‐Regulation	  1/2003,	  too).	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Another	   lesson	   is	   that	  many	  reasons	  may	  be	   invoked	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  which	  ostensible	   restrictions	  can	  
still	  escape	  application	  of	  Article	  101(1)	  TFEU.	  Sometimes	  the	  anti-­‐competitive	  elements	  under	  review	  
were,	   in	   their	   context,	   simply	   not	   grave	   enough	   to	   merit	   application	   of	   Article	   101(1)	   TFEU.284	   Or	  
perhaps	  the	  restrictions	  were	  considered	  ‘ancillary’	  to	  otherwise	  efficient	  business	  conduct	  (such	  as	   in	  
Pronuptia)	   or	   legitimate	   aims	   pursued	   by	   bodies	   with	   a	   distinct	   regulatory	   competence	   (such	   as	   in	  
Wouters	   and	  Meca-­‐Medina).	   In	   any	   case,	   the	   case	   law	   appears	   to	   afford	   undertakings	  with	   a	   certain	  
degree	  of	  ‘commercial	  freedom’	  to	  run	  their	  business,	  taking	  in	  the	  realities	  of	  business	  practice	  and	  the	  
relevant	   context	   in	   which	   the	   agreement	   under	   review	   has	   been	   set	   up.	   Conversely,	   the	  Wouters	  
judgment	   confirms	   that	   not	   all	   activities	   restricting	   the	   freedoms	  of	   others	   come	  within	   the	   ambit	   of	  
Article	  101(1)	  TFEU.	  Only	  an	  in-­‐depth	  analysis	  of	  the	  relevant	  context	  can	  reveal	  whether	  the	  agreement	  
under	  review	  is	  not	  anti-­‐competitive	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  Article	  101(1)	  TFEU.	  	  
	  
Finally,	  the	  case	  law	  makes	  clear	  that	  a	  justification	  plea	  requires	  an	  analysis	  of	  both	  the	  proportionality	  
and	  the	  necessity	  tests.	  As	  to	  the	  latter,	  Wouters	  shows	  that	  the	  context	  is	  highly	  relevant	  to	  determine	  
whether	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  attain	  a	  certain	  goal.	  The	  necessity	  test,	  in	  particular,	  is	  not	  always	  as	  strict	  
as	  it	  may	  seem.	  
	  
3.4 Merger	  control	  
	  
3.4.1 The	  legislative	  framework	  
EU	  merger	  control	  entails	  the	  ex	  ante	  assessment	  of	  a	  proposed	  concentration	  of	  formerly	  independent	  
undertakings.	  The	  merger	  provisions	  and	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  are	  not	  applied	  simultaneously,	  as	  the	  latter	  
involves	  an	  ex	  post	  examination.	  However,	  merger	  control	  and	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  do	  share	  a	  number	  of	  
analytical	  characteristics.	  Under	  the	   ‘old’	  Merger	  Regulation,	   the	  test	   focused	  on	  whether	  the	  notified	  
merger	   created	   or	   strengthened	   a	   dominant	   position	   –	   285	   which	   has	   obvious	   parallels	   with	   an	  
assessment	  under	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
284	  See	  e.g.	  Case	  27/87	  Erauw-­‐Jacquery	  v	  La	  Hesbignonne	  [1988]	  ECR	  1919.	  
285	  See	  Article	  2	  of	  Regulation	  No	  4064/89,	  OJ	  [1989]	  L	  395/1.	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The	  present-­‐day	  test	  is	  different,	  as	  it	  examines	  whether	  a	  concentration	  significantly	  impedes	  effective	  
competition.286	  However,	  the	  test	  still	  takes	  into	  account	  whether	  the	  merger	  creates	  or	  strengthens	  a	  
dominant	  position.287	  It	  should	  include	  an	  examination	  whether	  the	  merged	  entity	  has	  the	  capacity	  and	  
the	   incentive	  to	  abuse	  a	  possible	  dominant	  position.	  Considering	  these	  analytical	  parallels	  with	  Article	  
102	  TFEU,	  it	  is	  worthwhile	  to	  assess	  what	  type	  of	  substantive	  claims	  merging	  parties	  may	  invoke.	  
	  
According	   to	   the	   Merger	   Regulation,	   the	   Commission	   should	   consider	   whether	   the	   concentration	   is	  
beneficial	   to	   ‘the	   development	   of	   technical	   and	   economic	   progress	   provided	   that	   it	   is	   to	   consumers’	  
advantage	   and	   does	   not	   form	   an	   obstacle	   to	   competition’.288	   This	   provision	   leaves	   scope	   for	   a	   plea	  
holding	  that	  the	  merger	  has	  a	  net	  pro-­‐competitive	  effect.	  	  
	  
More	   specifically,	   the	   preamble	   of	   the	   Merger	   Regulation	   clearly	   allows	   for	   an	   efficiency	   plea,289	  
stipulating	  that	  ‘it	  is	  appropriate	  to	  take	  account	  of	  any	  substantiated	  and	  likely	  efficiencies	  put	  forward	  
by	  the	  undertakings	  concerned’.290	  The	  Merger	  Regulation	  demands	  that	  the	  merger-­‐related	  efficiencies	  
should	  be	  able	  to	  ‘counteract	  the	  effects	  on	  competition’,	  referring	  in	  particular	  to	  ‘the	  potential	  harm	  
to	  consumers’.291	  Otherwise	  the	  Merger	  Regulation	  gives	  no	  delineation	  of	  the	  types	  of	  efficiencies	  that	  
may	  be	  taken	  into	  account,	  suggesting	  that	  no	  efficiency	  plea	  will	  be	  a	  priori	  inadmissible.	  
	  
The	  Merger	   Regulation	   requires	   the	   Commission	   to	   publish	   guidance	   on	   how	   it	   shall	   take	   efficiencies	  
into	  account	  in	  its	  assessments.292	  In	  its	  horizontal	  mergers	  guidelines,293	  the	  Commission	  confirms	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
286	  Article	  2(2)	  and	  2(3)	  of	  Regulation	  No	  139/2004	  (‘Merger	  Regulation’),	  OJ	  [2004]	  L	  24/1.	  The	  test	  seeks	  to	  
examine	  whether	  a	  merger	  is	  compatible	  with	  the	  common	  market,	  see	  Article	  2(1)	  of	  the	  Merger	  Regulation.	  
287	  Ibid.	  See	  also	  recitals	  26	  and	  29	  of	  the	  Merger	  Regulation.	  
288	  Article	  2(1)(b)	  of	  the	  Merger	  Regulation.	  
289	  I	  shall	  not	  use	  the	  term	  ‘efficiency	  defence’,	  as	  efficiencies	  should	  be	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  Commission’s	  
assessment.	  See	  e.g.	  Whish	  2009,	  supra	  note	  225,	  at	  863.	  
290	  Recital	  29	  of	  the	  Merger	  Regulation.	  
291	  Ibid.	  
292	  Ibid.	  
293	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  assessment	  of	  horizontal	  mergers	  under	  the	  Council	  Regulation	  on	  the	  control	  of	  
concentrations	  between	  undertakings,	  OJ	  [2004]	  C	  31/5.	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it	  will	   consider	   any	   substantiated	   efficiency	   put	   forward	   by	   the	   parties.294	   The	   efficiencies	   need	   to	   (i)	  
benefit	  consumers,	  (ii)	  be	  merger-­‐specific	  and	  (iii)	  be	  verifiable.295	  	  
	  
Relevant	  considerations	  regarding	  these	  three	  cumulative	  conditions	  include	  the	  following:	  
• Consumers	  may	  not	  be	  worse	  off	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  merger.	  Efficiencies	  should	  be	  substantial	  and	  
timely,	   and	   should	   benefit	   consumers	   in	   those	   markets	   where	   competition	   concerns	   would	  
otherwise	  arise.296	  A	  key	  element	   is	  whether	   the	  merged	  entity	  will	  have	  an	   incentive	   to	  pass	  
efficiency	  gains	  on	  to	  consumers,	   in	  particular	  resulting	  from	  the	  competitive	  pressure	  still	   left	  
after	  completion	  of	  the	  merger.	  
• The	   efficiencies	   should	   be	   a	   direct	   consequence	   of	   the	  merger.297	   Although	   it	   makes	   perfect	  
sense	  not	  to	  allow	  efficiencies	  that	  would	  have	  materialized	  anyway,	  the	  Commission	  also	  takes	  
from	   this	   criterion	   that	   the	   merging	   parties	   will	   have	   to	   show	   that	   there	   are	   no	   less	   anti-­‐
competitive,	   realistic	   and	   attainable	   alternatives	   that	   would	   also	   have	   produced	   the	   claimed	  
efficiencies.298	  
• Finally,	  the	  efficiencies	  have	  to	  be	  verifiable	  so	  that	  the	  Commission	  ‘can	  be	  reasonably	  certain	  
that	  the	  efficiencies	  are	  likely	  to	  materialise,	  and	  be	  substantial	  enough	  to	  counteract	  a	  merger's	  
potential	   harm	   to	   consumers’.299	   Efficiencies	   should	   preferably	   be	   quantified.300	   If	   such	  
quantification	  is	  impossible,	  there	  must	  nonetheless	  be	  a	  ‘clearly	  identifiable	  positive	  impact	  on	  
consumers’.301	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294	  Ibid.,	  paras	  12	  and	  77.	  
295	  Ibid.,	  para	  78.	  
296	  Ibid.,	  para	  79.	  
297	  Ibid.,	  para	  85.	  An	  example	  where	  the	  Commission	  rejected	  an	  efficiency	  plea	  as	  it	  did	  not	  find	  the	  gains	  merger	  
specific	  is	  Case	  COMP/M.3099,	  Areva/Urenco/ETC	  (6	  October	  2004),	  para	  220.	  
298	  See	  e.g.	  Case	  COMP/M.4000,	  Inco/Falconbridge	  (4	  July	  2006),	  paras	  529-­‐550.	  The	  Commission	  noted	  that	  the	  
parties	  had	  failed	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  efficiencies	  were	  not	  attainable	  by	  less	  anti-­‐competitive	  means.	  
299	  Horizontal	  merger	  guidelines,	  supra	  note	  293,	  para	  86.	  For	  an	  example	  where	  the	  Commission	  rejected	  an	  
efficiency	  plea	  (partly)	  partly	  because	  the	  efficiencies	  were	  not	  verifiable,	  see	  Case	  COMP/M.4439,	  Ryanair/Aer	  
Lingus,	  (27	  June	  2007),	  para	  1135.	  
300	  Horizontal	  merger	  guidelines	  (ibid.),	  para	  86.	  
301	  Ibid.	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The	  Commission	  has	  made	  clear	  that	  it	  will	  use	  these	  conditions	  are	  relevant	  for	  the	  assessment	  of	  non-­‐
horizontal	   mergers	   as	   well.302	   The	   conditions	   imply	   that	   the	   Commission	   will	   use	   a	   ‘sliding	   scale’	  
approach	  when	  examining	   the	   supposed	  benefits:	   the	  more	   ‘immediate’	   and	   ‘direct’	   the	  benefits	   are,	  
the	   more	   likely	   the	   Commission	   is	   to	   find	   that	   they	   counteract	   the	   anti-­‐competitive	   effects.303	   The	  
guidelines	  suggest	  that	  efficiencies	  may	  be	  particularly	  pressing	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  non-­‐horizontal	  mergers,	  as	  they	  
provide	  ‘substantial	  scope	  for	  efficiencies’.304	  	  
	  
3.4.2 Efficiencies	  in	  merger	  decisions	  
Under	   the	   former	   Merger	   Regulation,	   the	   Commission’s	   decisional	   practice	   on	   how	   to	   deal	   with	  
efficiencies	  was,	  at	  best,	  ambivalent.	  The	  early	  Aerospatiale-­‐Alenia/DeHavilland	  decision	  suggested	  that	  
efficiencies	   could	   indeed	   be	   relevant	   in	   the	   decision	   to	   clear	   a	   merger.305	   However,	   several	   other	  
decisions	  suggested	  that	  efficiencies	  may	  even	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  harmful	  effect	  of	  the	  merger,	  as	  they	  may	  
contribute	   to	   the	   creation	   or	   strengthening	   of	   a	   dominant	   position.306	   In	   Danish	   Crown/Vestjyske	  
Slagterier,307	   the	   Commission	   held	   that	   once	   it	   has	   been	   found	   that	   a	   merger	   creates	   a	   dominant	  
position,	  efficiencies	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  taken	  into	  account.308	  This	  formalistic	  approach	  may	  have	  made	  
some	   sense	  under	   the	   former	  merger	   test,	   but	   should	  not	  be	   transposed	   to	   the	   current	   test.	   Indeed,	  
efficiencies	   should	   be	   duly	   considered	   before	   one	   can	   conclude	   whether	   or	   not	   a	   merger	   entails	   a	  
significant	  impediment	  to	  effective	  competition.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
302	  See	  paras	  21	  and	  53	  of	  the	  Commission	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  assessment	  of	  non-­‐horizontal	  mergers,	  OJ	  [2008]	  C	  
265/6;	  referring	  to	  the	  Section	  VII	  of	  the	  horizontal	  guidelines	  (ibid.),	  that	  deals	  with	  efficiencies.	  	  
303	  Ibid.,	  para	  21.	  
304	  Ibid.,	  para	  31.	  
305	  Case	  IV/M.53,	  Aerospatiale-­‐Alenia	  /DeHavilland	  (2	  October	  1991),	  para	  65.	  Although	  the	  Commission	  did	  reject	  
the	  efficiency	  claims	  on	  the	  facts,	  it	  did	  remain	  open	  to	  the	  possibility	  that	  cost	  savings	  may	  be	  relevant.	  
306	  See	  e.g.	  Case	  IV/M.50,	  AT&T/NCR	  (18	  January	  1991),	  para	  30;	  Case	  COMP/M.2333,	  De	  Beers/LVMH	  (25	  July	  
2001),	  paras	  102-­‐105.	  See	  also	  Case	  T-­‐114/02	  BaByliss	  v	  Commission	  [2003]	  ECR	  II-­‐1279,	  para	  360.	  The	  
concentration	  would	  enable	  the	  merging	  parties	  ‘to	  make	  economies	  of	  scale	  and	  implement	  various	  
rationalisation	  measures,	  thus	  generating	  a	  reduction	  in	  costs	  of	  which	  it	  could	  take	  advantage	  to	  reduce	  prices	  or	  
allow	  retailers	  a	  bigger	  margin	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  its	  market	  share’.	  
307	  Case	  IV/M.1313,	  Danish	  Crown/Vestjyske	  Slagterier	  (9	  March	  1999).	  
308	  Ibid.,	  para	  198.	  Conversely,	  in	  Case	  COMP/M.3108,	  Office	  Depot/Guilbert	  (23	  May	  2003),	  the	  Commission	  did	  
not	  consider	  efficiencies	  as	  it	  had	  already	  concluded	  that	  the	  merger	  was	  unlikely	  to	  create	  or	  strengthen	  a	  
dominant	  position,	  see	  para	  69.	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Later	   Commission	   decisions	   often	   appear	   more	   accommodating	   for	   efficiencies.	   In	   its	  
Korsnäs/Assidomän	  Cartonboard	  decision,	  the	  Commission	  took	  into	  account	  various	  efficiency	  benefits,	  
such	   as	   better	   capacity	   utilization.309	   The	   Commission	   considered	   it	   likely	   that	   the	   efficiencies	   would	  
enable	   the	   merged	   entity	   to	   act	   pro-­‐competitively	   for	   the	   benefit	   of	   consumers.310	   Other	   merger	  
decisions	  confirm	  that	  the	  Commission	  has	  increasing	  regard	  to	  efficiencies.311	  
	  
Although	  several	  recent	  cases	  provide	  some	  guidance	  on	  the	  assessment	  of	  efficiencies,	  surprisingly	  few	  
cases	  contain	  an	   intricate	  analysis	  of	   the	  pro-­‐	  and	  anti-­‐competitive	  effects	   involved	  –	   let	  alone	  a	  clear	  
balancing	   test.312	  Apart	   from	  the	  obvious	  difficulties	   in	  quantifying	   future	  effects,	   it	  may	  be	  caused	  by	  
the	  fact	  that	  a	  balancing	  act	  of	  efficiencies	  is	  rarely	  considered	  decisive.	  Often	  the	  Commission	  does	  not	  
consider	   that	   the	   merger	   has	   an	   anti-­‐competitive	   effect,	   thus	   taking	   away	   the	   need	   for	   a	   precise	  
quantification	  of	  effects.313	   In	  addition,	   the	  need	  to	  quantify	  efficiencies	  may	  be	   little	  pressing	   if	   there	  
are	  also	  other	  reasons	  to	  clear	  the	  merger.	   Indeed,	  the	  author	   is	  unaware	  of	  any	  EU	  merger	  case	  that	  
has	  been	  cleared	  solely	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  efficiencies.314	  This	  makes	   it	  difficult	   to	  describe	  with	  precision	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
309	  Case	  COMP/M.4057,	  Korsnäs/Assidomän	  Cartonboard	  (12	  May	  2006),	  para	  63.	  See,	  similarly,	  Case	  
COMP/M.2502,	  Cargill/Cerestar	  (18	  January	  2002),	  para	  19.	  
310	  Ibid.,	  para	  64.	  
311	  Case	  COMP/M.4854,	  TomTom/TeleAtlas	  (14	  May	  2008),	  paras	  238-­‐250;	  Case	  COMP/M.4942,	  Nokia/Navteq	  (2	  
July	  2008),	  para	  364-­‐367.	  In	  the	  latter	  case,	  the	  Commission	  observed	  that	  the	  vertical	  integration	  of	  the	  merged	  
entities	  would	  eliminate	  a	  double	  mark-­‐up.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  Commission	  (at	  para	  367)	  observed	  that	  a	  
precise	  estimation	  of	  efficiencies	  was	  unnecessary,	  as	  the	  merger	  did	  not	  have	  an	  anti-­‐competitive	  effect	  (apart	  
from	  the	  potential	  efficiencies).	  
312	  R.J.	  van	  den	  Bergh	  &	  P.D.	  Camesasca,	  European	  Competition	  Law	  and	  Economics:	  A	  Comparative	  Perspective	  
(Sweet	  &	  Maxwell:	  London	  2006),	  at	  370.	  
313	  See	  e.g.	  TomTom/TeleAtlas	  and	  Nokia/Navteq,	  supra	  note	  311.	  
314	  Note	  that	  there	  have	  been	  such	  cases	  at	  the	  domestic	  level.	  In	  the	  UK,	  see	  e.g.	  the	  OFT	  Case	  ME/3638/08,	  
Global	  Radio	  UK/GCap	  Media	  (8	  August	  2008).	  It	  appears	  that	  efficiencies	  were	  decisive	  for	  the	  OFT’s	  clearance,	  
even	  though	  there	  were	  other	  reasons	  to	  clear	  the	  merger	  as	  well.	  	  In	  the	  Netherlands,	  there	  have	  also	  been	  
mergers	  that	  have	  been	  cleared	  because	  of	  efficiency	  benefits.	  See	  NMa	  (currently	  ACM)	  decision	  in	  Case	  
6424/Ziekenhuis	  Walcheren/Oosterscheldeziekenhuizen	  (25	  March	  2009),	  para	  173.	  Based	  on	  the	  remedies	  offered	  
by	  the	  merging	  parties,	  the	  NMa	  concluded	  that	  the	  efficiencies	  were	  sufficient	  to	  offset	  the	  anti-­‐competitive	  
effects.	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what	   the	   independent	   role	   of	   efficiencies	   in	  merger	   control	   is.	  Nevertheless,	  we	   can	  draw	   the	   lesson	  
that	   efficiencies	   are	   becoming	   ever	   more	   important	   in	   European	   merger	   control;	   and	   that	   certain	  
activities	  (such	  as	  creating	  economies	  of	  scale)	  are	  often	  considered	  a	  proxy	  for	  efficiencies	  without	  the	  
need	  to	  enter	  into	  a	  reliable	  and	  precise	  quantification.	  
	  
3.4.3 The	  failing	  firm	  plea	  
Another	   plea	   of	   interest	   is	   the	   ‘failing	   firm’	   plea.	   In	   essence,	   the	   plea	   attempts	   to	   justify	   the	   anti-­‐
competitive	   effects	   of	   a	  merger	   as	   (one	   of)	   the	  merger	   parties	  would	   not	   survive	   anyway,	   producing	  
even	   greater	   competitive	   issues.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   plea	   implies	   that	   any	   loss	   in	   competition	   is	   not	  
attributable	   to	   the	   concentration.315	   In	   its	   Kali+Salz	   decision,	   the	   Commission	   acknowledged	   that	   a	  
failing	  firm	  plea	  may	  be	  accepted	   if	   there	   is	  no	   link	  of	  causality	  between	  the	  merger	  and	  the	  merger’s	  
anti-­‐competitive	  aspects.316	  The	  ECJ	  confirmed	  the	  Commission’s	  approach,	  holding	  that	  such	  a	  plea	  can	  
be	  accepted	   if	   the	  competitive	  structure	  resulting	   from	  the	  concentration	  would	  deteriorate	   in	  similar	  
fashion	  even	  if	  the	  concentration	  had	  been	  prohibited.317	  
	  
The	   Commission	   further	   developed	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   failing	   firm	   defense	   in	   the	   BASF/Eurodiol	  
decision,318	  noting	  that	  the	  merger	  could	  be	  cleared	  as	  the	  following	  conditions	  were	  satisfied:319	  
• the	  acquired	  undertaking	  would	  in	  the	  near	  future	  be	  forced	  out	  of	  the	  market	  if	  not	  taken	  over	  
by	  another	  undertaking;	  
• there	  is	  no	  alternative	  that	  would	  be	  less	  anti-­‐competitive;	  
• the	  assets	   to	  be	  purchased	  would	   inevitably	  disappear	   from	  the	  market	   in	   the	  absence	  of	   the	  
merger.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
315	  See	  V.	  Baccaro,	  ‘Failing	  Firm	  Defence	  and	  Lack	  of	  Causality:	  Doctrine	  in	  Europe	  of	  Two	  Closely	  Related	  
Concepts’,	  (2004)	  25	  ECLR	  11.	  
316	  Case	  IV/M.308,	  Kali+Salz/MDK/Treuhand	  (14	  December	  1993),	  para	  136.	  
317	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐68/94	  and	  C-­‐30/95	  France	  v	  Commission	  [1998]	  ECR	  I-­‐1375,	  paras	  112	  to	  116.	  The	  ECJ	  upheld	  the	  
Commission’s	  analysis	  of	  whether	  the	  acquiring	  undertaking	  would	  gain	  the	  market	  share	  of	  the	  acquired	  
undertaking	  if	  it	  were	  forced	  out	  of	  the	  market.	  The	  Commission,	  however,	  abandoned	  this	  criterion	  in	  its	  
BASF/Eurodiol/Pantochim	  decision	  (infra	  note	  318).	  	  
318	  Case	  COMP/M.2314	  BASF/Eurodiol/Pantochim	  (11	  July	  2001).	  
319	  Ibid.,	  paras	  140	  and	  141,	  144,	  147,	  151,	  152	  and	  163	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3.4.4 Public	  interest	  concerns	  in	  merger	  control	  
As	   a	   final	   matter,	   the	   Merger	   Regulation	   allows	   some	   room	   to	   consider	   public	   interest	   concerns	   in	  
mergers	  with	  a	  EU	  dimension.	  320	  The	  Commission	  then	  continues	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  competition	  analysis,	  
but	  the	  Member	  State	  involved	  may	  carry	  out	  a	  separate	  examination	  of	  the	  legitimate	  interests	  at	  play.	  
Such	   interests	   include,	   in	   any	   case,	   matters	   of	   public	   security,	   plurality	   of	   the	  media	   and	   prudential	  
supervision.	   321	   If	  a	  Member	  State	  considers	   that	   there	  are	  strong	  reasons	  of	  public	   interest	  at	  play,	   it	  
may	  request	  a	  reference	  of	  the	  case	  to	  examine	  all	  the	  aspects	  of	  the	  merger.322	  A	  final	  possibility	  is	  that	  
the	  merger	  has	  no	  EU	  dimension	  but	  does	  fall	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  Member	  State	  merger	  control.	  In	  that	  
case,	   the	  Merger	  Regulation	  does	  not	  apply	  and	  cannot	  preclude	  Member	  States	  to	   let	  public	   interest	  
interests	  prevail	  over	  competition	  concerns.	  
	  
The	  UK	  has	  a	  particularly	  detailed	  framework	  how	  to	  consider	  public	  interest	  issues	  in	  a	  relevant	  merger	  
situation.	  Sections	  42	  and	  59	  Enterprise	  Act	  2002	  allow	  the	  competent	  Secretary	  of	  State	  to	  intervene	  in	  
public	   interest	   cases	   by	   giving	   a	   notice	   to	   the	   OFT.	   An	   example	   is	   the	   intervention	   notice	   on	   public	  
interest	  grounds	  to	  ensure	  ‘the	  stability	  of	  the	  UK	  financial	  system’	  related	  to	  the	  2008	  takeover	  of	  HBOS	  
by	  Lloyds	  TSB.323	  The	  OFT	  submitted	  a	  report	  in	  which	  it	  observed,	  inter	  alia,	  a	  realistic	  prospect	  that	  the	  
anticipated	  merger	  will	   result	   in	  a	   substantial	   lessening	  of	   competition	   in	   relation	   to	  personal	   current	  
accounts,	  banking	  services	   for	  small	  and	  medium	  sized	  enterprises	  and	  mortgages.324	  The	  Secretary	  of	  
State	   considered,	   however,	   that	   the	   stability	   of	   the	   UK	   financial	   system	   outweighed	   the	   competition	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
320	  Recital	  19	  and	  Article	  21(4)	  of	  the	  Merger	  Regulation.	  Of	  course	  such	  measures	  must	  be	  compatible	  with	  EU	  
law.	  
321	  Article	  21(4)	  of	  the	  Merger	  Regulation.	  Any	  other	  public	  interest	  must	  be	  communicated	  by	  the	  Member	  State	  
to	  the	  Commission	  according	  to	  the	  procedure	  set	  out	  by	  Article	  21(4)	  of	  the	  Merger	  Regulation.	  
322	  Article	  9	  of	  the	  Merger	  Regulation,	  also	  known	  as	  the	  ‘German	  clause’.	  
323	  See	  the	  Enterprise	  Act	  2002	  (Specification	  of	  Additional	  Section	  58	  Consideration)	  Order	  2008	  (S.I.	  2008	  No.	  
2645).	  	  
324	  OFT	  report	  to	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  Case	  ME/3862/08,	  Lloyds/HBOS	  (31	  October	  2008),	  available	  at	  
http://oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/press_release_attachments/LLloydstsb.pdf.	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concerns	  identified	  by	  the	  OFT,	  and	  decided	  not	  to	  refer	  the	  case	  to	  the	  Competition	  Commission.325	  The	  
Competition	  Appeal	  Tribunal	  rejected	  an	  application	  for	  review	  against	  this	  decision.326	  
	  
3.4.5 Lessons	  for	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  
Merger	   control	   clearly	   has	   relevant	   lessons	   for	   the	   concept	   of	   objective	   justification	   within	   the	  
framework	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  First,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  efficiencies	  can	  be	  highly	  relevant	  when	  determining	  
whether	   a	   merger	   is	   anti-­‐competitive	   or	   not.	   The	   efficiencies	   should	   be	  merger-­‐specific.	   There	   is	   no	  
reason	   to	  uphold	  an	  efficiency	  plea	   in	   the	  absence	  of	  a	  clear	  causal	   link	  between	   the	  merger	  and	   the	  
stated	  efficiencies.	   In	   addition,	   efficiencies	   shall	   only	  be	   accepted	   if	   they	   cannot	  be	   achieved	   through	  
other,	   less	  anti-­‐competitive,	  means.	  Perhaps	  this	  rule	  should	  be	  seen	  in	  connection	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  no	  
full	   balancing	   test	   is	   required	   –	   and	  may	   thus	   function	   as	   an	   escape	   valve	   if	   the	   effects	   on	   efficiency	  
remain	   unclear.	   Another	   lesson	   is	   that	   the	   Commission	   does	   not	   preclude	   companies	   to	   invoke	   any	  
particular	   type	   of	   efficiency,	   showing	   the	   wide	   possible	   scope	   of	   the	   efficiency	   plea.327	   Finally,	   an	  
efficiency	   claim	   requires	   that	   consumers	   are,	   on	   the	  whole,	   better	   off	   –	   although	   there	   is	   no	   explicit	  
requirement	  that	  consumers	  must	  receive	  a	  ‘fair	  share’	  as	  required	  by	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU.328	  
	  
Second,	   merger	   control	   allows	   a	   ‘failing	   firm’	   defense.	   The	   plea	   acknowledges	   that	   there	   must	   be	   a	  
causal	   link	  between	   the	  merger	  and	   the	  alleged	   impediment	   to	   competition.	  The	  plea	  also	   shows	   the	  
importance	  of	   the	  counterfactual:	  even	   if	   the	  merger	  were	   to	   lessen	  competition	   to	  some	  extent,	   the	  
situation	  absent	  the	  merger	  would	  be	  even	  worse.	  In	  a	  way,	  the	  plea	  can	  be	  compared	  to	  a	  situation	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
325	  Intervention	  Notice	  of	  18	  September	  2008,	  Department	  for	  Business	  Enterprise	  and	  Regulatory	  Reform	  
http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file47995.pdf.	  	  
326	  Merger	  Action	  Group	  v	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Business,	  Enterprise	  and	  Regulatory	  Reform	  [2008]	  CAT	  36.	  The	  
CAT	  rejected	  the	  applicants’	  contention	  that	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  had	  failed	  to	  exercise	  his	  discretion	  
independently.	  
327	  Admittedly,	  it	  may	  be	  that	  –	  generally	  speaking	  –	  some	  types	  of	  efficiency	  may	  be	  easier	  to	  prove	  than	  others.	  
For	  instance,	  the	  resulting	  benefits	  are	  clearly	  more	  tangible	  if	  the	  merging	  parties	  propose	  to	  combine	  production	  
capacity,	  thus	  cutting	  costs	  by	  raising	  the	  rate	  of	  utility,	  compared	  to	  the	  situation	  where	  they	  refer	  to	  potential	  
future	  benefits	  of	  shared	  research	  and	  development.	  
328	  Note	  that	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU	  is	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  an	  efficiency	  defense	  as	  well,	  even	  though	  the	  provision	  
appears	  to	  be	  broader	  than	  that	  (see	  section	  3.2.3	  in	  chapter	  II).	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objective	  necessity,	  as	  there	  is	  no	  viable	  alternative	  that	  is	  less	  anti-­‐competitive.	  For	  those	  purposes,	  the	  
examination	  understandably	  makes	  use	  of	  a	  necessity	  test.	  	  
	  
Third,	  the	  Merger	  Regulation	  allows	  Member	  States	  to	  examine	  public	  interest	  concerns	  that	  may	  follow	  
from	  a	  merger	  with	  a	  EU	  dimension.	  Formally	  speaking,329	  such	  a	  domestic	  examination	  cannot	  alter	  the	  
outcome	  of	  the	  Commission’s	  competition	  assessment.	  However,	  it	  does	  show	  that	  this	  area	  of	  EU	  law	  
acknowledges	   that	  non-­‐competition	   interests	  may	  be	   ‘legitimate’	  as	  well,	   and	  may	  be	  affected	  by	   the	  





As	   each	   sub-­‐topic	   has	   already	   concluded	  with	   lessons	   for	  Article	   102	   TFEU,	   there	   is	   little	   need	   for	   an	  
extensive	   final	   conclusion.	   The	   central	   tenet	   of	   this	   chapter	   is	   that	   prohibitions	   in	   EU	   law	  have	   often	  
been	   interpreted	   expansively,	   but	   have	   –	   at	   the	   same	   time	   –	   allowed	   ample	   scope	   for	   derogations.	  
Unwritten	  justifications	  can	  play	  an	  important	  role	  –	  crucial	  for	  Article	  102	  TFEU,	  which	  does	  not	  have	  an	  
explicit	   derogation	   clause.	   The	   examination	   has	   shown	   that	   a	   prohibition	   only	   applies	   if	   it	   has	   a	  
sufficiently	   strong	   impact	   upon	   an	   interest	   that	   the	   Treaty	   seeks	   to	   protect.	   Finally,	   the	   study	   has	  
clarified	  that	  the	  examination	  of	  derogations	  is	  crucial	  in	  order	  to	  consider	  the	  conduct	  under	  review	  in	  
its	  proper	  context.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
329	  A	  Member	  State	  may	  wish	  to	  exert	  political	  pressure	  to	  influence	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  case.	  It	  is	  obviously	  
impossible	  to	  deduce	  from	  publicly	  available	  sources	  how	  often	  the	  latter	  scenario	  unfolds.	  If	  the	  Member	  State	  
wishes	  to	  decide	  the	  full	  case,	  it	  should	  request	  a	  referral	  of	  the	  case	  based	  on	  Article	  9	  of	  the	  Merger	  Regulation.	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Article	  102	  TFEU	  of	  the	  Treaty	  on	  the	  Functioning	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  (‘TFEU’)	  prohibits	  the	  abuse	  of	  
a	  dominant	  position.	  The	  European	  Commission	  (‘the	  Commission’)	  and	  the	  EU	  courts330	  have	  examined	  
the	   scope	  of	   the	  prohibition	   in	  numerous	  cases.	   Legal	  doctrine	  has	  also	  analysed	   the	  provision	   to	   the	  
hilt.	  
	  
Nevertheless,	  there	  is	  still	  a	  fundamental	  lacuna	  in	  our	  understanding	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  
an	  abuse	  will	  only	  exist	   in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  so-­‐called	   ‘objective	   justification’.331	  However,	   the	  case	   law	  
leaves	   unanswered	   most	   of	   the	   questions	   about	   the	   scope	   and	   substance	   of	   objective	   justification.	  
Although	  several	  authors	  have	  published	  highly	  valuable	  contributions	  in	  this	  field,332	  many	  uncertainties	  
on	  the	  topic	  remain.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
*	  This	  Chapter	  is	  a	  revised	  version	  of	  T.	  van	  der	  Vijver,	  ‘Objective	  Justification	  and	  Article	  102	  TFEU’,	  (2012)	  35	  
World	  Competition	  55.	  Elements	  of	  this	  paper	  have	  also	  been	  used	  in	  T.	  van	  der	  Vijver,	  ‘Objectieve	  rechtvaardiging	  
&	  misbruik	  economische	  machtspositie:	  analyse	  van	  een	  known	  unknown’	  [Objective	  justification	  &	  abuse	  of	  a	  
dominant	  position:	  analysis	  of	  a	  known	  unknown],	  (2013)	  16	  Markt	  en	  Mededinging	  [Market	  and	  Competition]	  3.	  
330	  This	  encompasses	  both	  the	  General	  Court	  as	  well	  as	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  (‘ECJ’).	  
331	  See	  e.g.	  Case	  C-­‐457/10	  P	  AstraZeneca	  v	  Commission	  [2012]	  nyr,	  para	  130;	  Case	  C-­‐260/89	  ERT	  [1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐2925,	  
para	  37;	  Case	  311/84	  CBEM	  v	  CLT	  and	  IPB	  (‘Télémarketing’)	  [1985]	  ECR	  3261,	  para	  26.	  See,	  further,	  the	  Opinion	  of	  
AG	  Poiares	  Maduro	  in	  Case	  C-­‐109/03	  KPN	  v	  OPTA	  [2004]	  ECR	  I-­‐11273,	  paras	  53-­‐54;	  and	  the	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Cosmas	  
in	  Case	  C-­‐344/98	  Masterfoods	  v	  HB	  Ice	  Cream	  [2000]	  ECR	  I-­‐11369,	  para	  101.	  Cosmas	  noted,	  quite	  rightly,	  that	  ‘it	  
would	  be	  difficult	  to	  accept	  that	  an	  objectively	  justified	  business	  measure	  was	  also	  an	  abuse’.	  See,	  further,	  R.	  
Whish,	  Competition	  Law	  (OUP:	  Oxford	  2009),	  at	  206;	  R.	  O’Donoghue	  &	  A.J.	  Padilla,	  The	  Law	  and	  Economics	  of	  
Article	  82	  EC	  (Hart	  Publishing:	  Oxford	  and	  Portland,	  Oregon	  2006),	  at	  227	  et	  seq;	  F.E.	  Gonzáles	  &	  J.	  Temple	  Lang,	  
‘The	  Concept	  of	  Abuse’,	  in	  F.E.	  Gonzáles	  &	  R.	  Snelders	  (eds.),	  EU	  Competition	  Law:	  Abuse	  of	  Dominance	  under	  
Article	  102	  TFEU	  (Claeys	  &	  Casteels:	  Deventer	  2013),	  in	  particular	  paragraph	  3.116	  et	  seq.	  
332	  Important	  publications	  in	  the	  field	  include	  P.-­‐J.	  Loewenthal,	  ‘The	  Defence	  of	  “objective	  justification”	  in	  the	  
application	  of	  Article	  82	  EC’,	  W.Comp.	  28	  (2005),	  at	  455;	  A.	  Albors-­‐Llorens,	  ‘The	  Role	  of	  Objective	  Justification	  and	  
Efficiencies	  in	  the	  Application	  of	  Article	  82	  EC’,	  (2007)	  44	  CMLRev	  1727;	  E.	  Rousseva,	  ‘The	  Concept	  of	  “Objective	  
Justification”	  of	  an	  Abuse	  of	  a	  Dominant	  Position:	  Can	  it	  help	  to	  Modernise	  the	  Analysis	  under	  Article	  82	  EC?',	  
	   98	  
	  
This	   chapter	   examines	   the	   concept	   in	   more	   detail.	   It	   proposes	   the	   use	   of	   different	   categories	   of	  
objective	  justification	  to	  create	  more	  clarity	  on	  its	   interpretation	  and	  application.	  Paragraph	  2	  sets	  the	  
general	  framework,	  discussing	  the	  background	  and	  rationale	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  In	  paragraph	  3,	  I	  shall	  
introduce	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘objective	  justification’.	  Paragraph	  3.4	  expands	  upon	  the	  three	  headings	  under	  
which	  an	  objective	  justification	  may	  be	  accepted.	  Paragraph	  4	  analyses	  the	  common	  legal	  requirements	  
and	  tries	  to	  differentiate	  between	  elements	  that	  should	  or	  should	  not	  be	  relevant.	  Paragraph	  5	  assesses	  
how	   objective	   justification	   may	   function	   as	   regards	   various	   kinds	   of	   prima	   facie	   abuses.	   A	   short	  
conclusion	  in	  paragraph	  6	  wraps	  up	  the	  Chapter.	  	  
	  
	  
2 ARTICLE	  102	  TFEU	  	  
	  
2.1 The	  background	  and	  objectives	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  
	  
Article	  102	  TFEU	  prohibits	  unilateral	  behaviour	  of	  a	  dominant	  undertaking	  that	  amounts	  to	  an	  abuse.333	  
According	   to	   established	   ECJ	   case	   law,	   a	   firm	   should	   be	   considered	   dominant	   if	   it	   has	   the	   economic	  
strength	   to	   hinder	   effective	   competition,	   allowing	   it	   to	   behave	   independently	   of	   its	   competitors,	  
customers	  and	  consumers.334	  As	  a	  counterweight	   to	   its	   strong	  market	  position,	  a	  dominant	   firm	  has	  a	  
‘special	   responsibility’	  not	   to	  allow	   its	   conduct	   to	   impair	  undistorted	   competition.335	   The	   rationale	   for	  
this	   doctrine	   is	   that	   the	   mere	   presence	   of	   a	   dominant	   firm	   on	   the	   market	   already	   means	   that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(2006)	  2	  The	  Competition	  Law	  Review	  27;	  E.	  Østerud,	  'The	  Concept	  of	  Objective	  Justification'	  in:	  E.	  Østerud,	  
Identifying	  Exclusionary	  Abuses	  by	  Dominant	  Undertakings	  under	  EU	  Competition	  Law:	  The	  Spectrum	  of	  Tests	  
(Alphen	  aan	  den	  Rijn:	  Kluwer	  Law	  International	  2010),	  at	  245.	  See	  also	  E.	  Rousseva,	  Rethinking	  Exclusionary	  Abuses	  
in	  EU	  Competition	  Law	  (Hart	  Publishing:	  Oxford	  and	  Portland,	  Oregon	  2010).	  
333	  For	  a	  general	  explanation,	  see	  Whish	  2009,	  supra	  note	  331,	  at	  170	  et	  seq.	  Of	  course,	  there	  might	  not	  only	  be	  
dominance	  by	  one	  undertaking	  but	  also	  ‘collective	  dominance’	  enjoyed	  by	  multiple	  undertakings.	  The	  ECJ	  laid	  
down	  the	  legal	  test	  for	  collective	  dominance	  in	  Case	  T-­‐342/99	  Airtours	  v	  Commission	  [2002]	  ECR	  II-­‐2585.	  
334	  Case	  322/81	  Michelin	  v	  Commission	  (‘Michelin	  I’)	  [1983]	  ECR	  3461.	  See	  also	  Case	  85/76	  Hoffmann-­‐La	  Roche	  v	  
Commission	  [1979]	  ECR	  461,	  para	  38.	  
335	  Michelin	  I	  (ibid.),	  para	  57.	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competition	  is	  weakened.336	  Competition	  law	  should	  thus	  prevent	  dominant	  undertakings	  from	  further	  
reducing	   the	   feeble	   level	   of	   competition	   on	   the	   market.337	   According	   to	   the	   ECJ,	   The	   special	  
responsibility	   may	   entail	   quite	   onerous	   requirements.	   For	   example,	   it	   may	   prevent	   a	   dominant	  
undertaking	  from	  providing	  a	  discount	  that	  tends	  to	  remove	  or	  restrict	  a	  customer’s	  freedom	  to	  choose	  
its	  sources	  of	  supply.338	  
	  
The	  main	  objective	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU	   is	  said	   to	  be	  the	  protection	  of	  consumers	  and	  the	  competitive	  
process.339	   The	   prohibition’s	   rationale	   stems	   from	   the	   belief	   that	   dominant	   firms	   are	   capable	   of	  
unilaterally	  harming	  other	  market	  participants	  and	  consumers.	  These	   firms	  are	  able	   to	  do	  so	  either	   (i)	  
directly	  by	  imposing	  unreasonable	  terms	  and	  conditions	  (exploitative	  abuses)	  or	  (ii)	  indirectly	  by	  altering	  
the	   structure	   of	   the	   market	   to	   their	   advantage	   (exclusionary	   abuses).	   According	   to	   Protocol	   No	   27	  
attached	  to	  the	  TFEU	  and	  the	  Treaty	  on	  European	  Union	  (‘TEU’),	   the	  EU	  strives	   for	  an	   internal	  market	  
with	  undistorted	  competition.340	  The	  Protocol	  mirrors	  the	  former	  Article	  3(1)(g)	  of	  the	  EC	  Treaty.	  The	  ECJ	  
often	   referred	   to	   this	   latter	   provision	   as	   a	   key	   principle	   to	   be	   observed	   in	   competition	   cases.341	   As	  
Protocols	  have	  the	  same	  legal	  standing	  as	  Treaty	  provisions,	  the	  basic	  principles	  embodied	  in	  early	  case	  
law	  on	  the	  abuse	  of	  dominance	  still	  hold.342	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
336	  Case	  C-­‐280/08	  P	  Deutsche	  Telekom	  v	  Commission	  [2010]	  ECR	  I-­‐9555,	  para	  182.	  
337	  Ibid.	  
338	  Michelin	  I,	  supra	  note	  334,	  para	  73.	  The	  case	  also	  provides	  an	  example	  of	  how	  the	  freedom	  is	  taken	  into	  
account	  of	  the	  market	  participants	  that	  somehow	  depend	  on	  the	  dominant	  firm.	  See,	  similarly,	  Case	  77/77	  BP	  v	  
Commission	  [1978]	  ECR	  1513.	  At	  para	  32,	  the	  ECJ	  made	  a	  distinction	  between	  ‘traditional’	  and	  ‘occasional’	  
customers.	  In	  my	  perspective,	  the	  underlying	  rationale	  is	  that	  the	  former	  group	  is	  more	  dependent	  upon	  the	  
dominant	  firm	  than	  the	  latter.	  	  
339	  See	  T.	  Eilmansberger,	  ‘How	  to	  distinguish	  good	  from	  bad	  competition	  under	  Article	  82	  EC:	  In	  search	  of	  clearer	  
and	  more	  coherent	  standards	  for	  anti-­‐competitive	  abuses’,	  (2005)	  42	  CMLRev	  129,	  at	  133-­‐137.	  See	  also	  Whish	  
2009	  (supra	  note	  331,	  at	  192-­‐193),	  suggesting	  that	  efficiency	  (and	  therefore:	  consumer	  welfare)	  is	  the	  underlying	  
objective	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  
340	  Protocol	  (No	  27)	  to	  the	  TFEU	  and	  the	  TEU	  on	  the	  internal	  market	  and	  competition.	  	  
341	  See	  e.g.	  Case	  C-­‐95/04	  P	  British	  Airways	  v	  Commission	  [2007]	  ECR	  I-­‐2331,	  para	  106.	  
342	  See,	  for	  a	  different	  perspective,	  N.	  Petit	  &	  N.	  Neyrinck,	  ‘A	  Review	  of	  the	  Competition	  Law	  Implications	  of	  the	  
Treaty	  on	  the	  Functioning	  of	  the	  European	  Union’,	  available	  via	  https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com.	  	  
	   100	  
Another	   relevant	   aspect	   for	   the	   interpretation	   of	   Article	   102	   TFEU	   is	   its	   relationship	  with	   Article	   101	  
TFEU	   (as	   also	   examined	   in	   Section	   2	   of	   Chapter	   II).	   In	  Continental	   Can	   the	   ECJ	  made	   clear	   that	   both	  
provisions	  pursue	  the	  same	  aim	  of	  maintaining	  competition,	  albeit	  on	  a	  different	  level.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  
parallelism,	  the	  ECJ	  held	  that:	  ‘Articles	  [101	  TFEU]	  and	  [102	  TFEU]	  cannot	  be	  interpreted	  in	  such	  a	  way	  
that	   they	  contradict	  each	  other’.343	  The	  meta	  norm	  of	  both	  provisions	   therefore	   focuses	  against	   trade	  
practices	   that	   distort	   competition	   in	   the	   internal	   market.	   To	   achieve	   this	   goal	   both	   prohibitions	   are	  
designed	   to	   curtail	   the	   undesirable	   ramifications	   of	  market	   power;	  market	   power	   exercised	   either	   by	  
individual	  companies	  (Article	  102	  TFEU)344	  or	  by	  multiple	  companies	  that	  have	  agreed	  to	  group	  together	  
(Article	  101	  TFEU).	  	  
	  
2.2 The	  sliding	  scale	  of	  market	  power	  
	  
Article	  102	  TFEU	  has	  only	  two	  ways	  to	  define	  the	  position	  of	  an	  undertaking:	  it	  is	  either	  dominant	  or	  it	  is	  
not.	  However,	   it	   seems	  too	  simplistic	   to	   regard	   the	   legal	  consequences	  of	  dominance345	   in	  such	  black-­‐
and-­‐white	  terms.	  Dominance	  is	  a	  legal	  translation	  of	  the	  economic	  concept	  of	  market	  power,	  a	  concept	  
that	  exists	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  degree.346	  In	  my	  view	  this	  merits	  a	  ‘sliding	  scale’	  approach,	  in	  which	  the	  scope	  
of	  the	  special	  responsibility	  requirement	  depends	  on	  the	  level	  of	  dominance.	  Indeed,	  Advocate-­‐General	  
(‘AG’)	  Fennelly	  argued	  in	  Compagnie	  maritime	  belge	  that	  behaviour	  by	  an	  undertaking	  that	  approaches	  
a	   monopoly	   (also	   known	   as	   a	   ‘super-­‐dominant’	   firm)347	   merits	   particularly	   close	   scrutiny.348	   Such	   an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
343	  Case	  6/72	  Continental	  Can	  v	  Commission	  [1973]	  ECR	  215,	  para	  25.	  In	  my	  view,	  this	  precedent	  should	  still	  be	  
regarded	  as	  relevant	  as	  the	  ECJ	  has	  never	  vacated	  its	  position	  that	  Articles	  101	  and	  102	  TFEU	  must	  be	  interpreted	  
in	  light	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  undistorted	  competition.	  This	  principle	  is	  currently	  embodied	  by	  Protocol	  No	  27	  (supra	  
note	  340).	  
344	  Or,	  in	  case	  of	  a	  situation	  of	  collective	  dominance,	  by	  the	  group	  of	  undertakings	  that	  holds	  a	  dominant	  position.	  
345	  The	  legal	  consequences	  include	  e.g.	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  ‘special	  responsibility’	  incumbent	  upon	  a	  dominant	  firm.	  
346	  See	  J.	  Kavanagh,	  N.	  Marshall	  and	  G.	  Niels,	  'Reform	  of	  Article	  82	  EC	  –	  Can	  the	  Law	  and	  Economics	  be	  
Reconciled?',	  in:	  A.	  Ezrachi	  (ed.),	  Article	  82	  EC:	  Reflections	  on	  its	  Recent	  Evolution	  (Hart	  Publishing:	  Oxford	  and	  
Portland,	  Oregon,	  2009),	  at	  3.	  See	  also	  the	  succinct	  description	  in	  BBM	  by	  the	  Australian	  High	  Court,	  per	  Gleeson	  CJ	  
and	  Callinan	  J,	  at	  121:	  ‘[t]he	  essence	  of	  power	  is	  absence	  of	  constraint’.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  constraint	  is	  no	  black	  and	  
white	  concept	  either,	  but	  also	  exists	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  degree.	  
347	  Note	  that	  the	  ECJ	  has	  not	  often	  referred	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘super-­‐dominance’.	  	  An	  exception	  is	  Case	  C-­‐52/09	  
TeliaSonera	  [2011]	  ECR	  I-­‐527,	  para	  81.	  However,	  early	  case	  law	  already	  referred	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘quasi-­‐
monopoly’;	  see	  e.g.	  Hoffmann-­‐La	  Roche	  (supra	  note	  349,	  para	  39).	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approach	  can	  be	  reconciled	  with	  the	  ECJ’s	  classic	   formulation	  of	  a	   ‘dominant	  position’	   in	  Hoffmann-­‐La	  
Roche.349	  The	  judgment	  held	  that	  dominant	  undertakings	  are	  able,	  to	  an	  appreciable	  extent,	  to	  behave	  
independently	   of	   other	   market	   participants.350	   This	   formulation	   reflects	   the	   idea	   that	   competitive	  
constraints	   are	   insufficiently	   strong	   to	   keep	   a	   dominant	   undertaking	   in	   check.	   If	   the	   weakness	   of	  
competitive	  constraints	   is	   the	  underlying	   rationale	   for	  competition	   law	   intervention,	   there	  should	  also	  
be	  regard	  as	  to	  how	  weak	  these	  constraints	  actually	  are.	  If	  the	  position	  of	  the	  dominant	  undertaking	  is	  
virtually	   incontestable	   (for	   instance	   because	   of	   high	   entry	   barriers),	   its	   behaviour	   is	   more	   likely	   to	  
restrict	  competition.	  
	  
Undoubtedly,	   a	   sliding	   scale	   approach	   entails	   less	   ex	   ante	   legal	   certainty	   than	   a	   rigid	   application	   of	  
precisely	   the	   same	   rules	   irrespective	   of	   the	   degree	   of	   dominance.	   However,	   I	   prefer	   the	   law	   to	   be	  
sufficiently	  flexible	  in	  order	  to	  be	  applied	  in	  tune	  with	  the	  prevalent	  context.	  Taking	  due	  account	  of	  the	  
level	   of	   dominance	   also	   appeals	   to	   common	   sense.	   Just	   consider	   the	   hypothetical	   example	   of	   a	   fizzy	  
drinks	   producer	   that	   holds	   51%	   of	   the	   market.	   The	   firm	   can	   be	   presumed	   to	   be	   dominant,351	   even	  
though	   it	  may	   have	   a	   powerful	   adversary	  with	   a	  market	   share	   of	   49%.352	   This	   is	   a	  marked	   difference	  
from,	   say,	   a	   postal	   company	   that	   has	   a	   100%	  market	   share	   as	   it	   enjoys	   a	   statutory	  monopoly	   on	   the	  
collection	   and	  delivery	   of	   certain	   categories	   of	  mail.	   In	   the	   former	   case,	   it	   is	   likely	   that	   there	   are	   still	  
ample	   competitive	   constraints	   –	   and	   thus	   little	   need	   for	   competition	   enforcement.	   By	   contrast,	   the	  
absence	  of	  any	  competitive	  constraints	  in	  the	  second	  example	  means	  that	  the	  role	  for	  competition	  law	  
becomes	  much	  more	  obvious.	  
	  
The	   EU	   courts	   have	   been	   slightly	   ambiguous	   on	   the	   relevance	   of	   the	   degree	   of	   market	   power	   for	  
assessing	  whether	  conduct	  conforms	  to	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  Several	  judgments	  have	  indeed	  relied	  on	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
348	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Fennelly	  (para	  136)	  in	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐395/96	  P	  and	  C-­‐396/96	  P	  Compagnie	  maritime	  belge	  
transports	  and	  Others	  v	  Commission	  [2000]	  ECR	  I-­‐1365.	  See	  also	  Fennely	  J,	  at	  86,	  in	  the	  Irish	  Supreme	  Court	  
judgment	  in	  Irish	  League	  of	  Credit	  Unions	  [2005]	  No.	  077.	  	  
349	  Case	  85/76	  Hoffmann-­‐La	  Roche	  v	  Commission	  [1979]	  ECR	  461.	  	  
350	  Ibid.,	  para	  38-­‐39.	  	  
351	  Undertakings	  with	  a	  market	  share	  of	  more	  than	  50%	  can	  be	  presumed	  to	  be	  dominant;	  see	  Case	  C-­‐62/86	  AKZO	  
v	  Commission	  [1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐3359,	  para	  60.	  
352	  Of	  course	  an	  examination	  may	  reveal	  that,	  despite	  the	  market	  share	  of	  over	  50%,	  the	  undertaking	  does	  not	  hold	  
a	  dominant	  position.	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dominant	   undertaking’s	   particularly	   strong	  market	   position	   as	   part	   of	   the	   reasoning	  why	   the	   conduct	  
under	  review	  should	  be	  prohibited.353	  AG	  Mazák	  took	  a	  different	  stance	  in	  his	  Opinion	  in	  the	  TeliaSonera	  
case.	  Mazák	  held	  that	  ‘the	  degree	  of	  market	  power	  […]	  should	  not	  be	  decisive	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  
abuse’,	  arguing	  that	  ‘the	  concept	  of	  a	  dominant	  position	  arguably	  already	  implies	  a	  high	  threshold’.	   354	  
The	  subsequent	   judgment	  by	  the	  ECJ	   in	  TeliaSonera	  appears	  to	  take	  the	  middle	  ground.355	  On	  the	  one	  
hand,	   the	   judgment	   acknowledged	   that	   the	   undertaking’s	   market	   strength	   may	   be	   relevant	   while	  
assessing	   the	   compatibility	   of	   conduct	   with	   Article	   102	   TFEU.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   ECJ	   held	   that	  
market	  strength	  is	  generally	  speaking	  relevant	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  conduct,	  rather	  than	  the	  
question	  whether	  or	  not	  there	  has	  been	  an	  abuse.	  
	  
It	   is	   submitted	   that	   the	  ECJ	  has	  been	   too	  cautious	   in	  TeliaSonera	   in	   its	   consideration	  of	   the	  degree	  of	  
dominance.	   First,	   its	   distinction	   between	   an	   abuse	   as	   such	   and	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   conduct	   may	   be	  
difficult	  to	  make,	  especially	  if	  competition	  law	  takes	  an	  increasingly	  effects-­‐based	  approach.	  In	  addition,	  
the	   level	  of	  market	  power	  can	  provide	  a	  vital	  element	  of	  context	   to	  show	  whether	   there	  has	  been	  an	  
abuse	  or	  not.	  For	  example,	  Fox	  noted	  –	  based	  on	  the	  facts	  of	  Hugin	  –	  that	  a	  dominant	  undertaking	  has	  
more	  leeway	  in	  an	  intensely	  and	  increasingly	  competitive	  market.356	  I	  agree	  with	  the	  suggestion	  by	  Fox.	  
There	   is	   ample	   case	   law	   confirming	   that	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   special	   responsibility	   depends	   on	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
353	  See	  e.g.	  Case	  T-­‐228/97	  Irish	  Sugar	  v	  Commission	  [1999]	  ECR	  II-­‐2969,	  para	  186.	  Case	  C-­‐333/94	  P	  Tetra	  Pak	  v	  
Commission	  (‘Tetra	  Pak	  II’)	  [1996]	  ECR	  I-­‐5951,	  paragraph	  31	  (referring	  to	  the	  ‘quasi-­‐monopoly	  enjoyed	  by	  Tetra	  
Pak’);	  Compagnie	  maritime	  belge,	  supra	  note	  348,	  para	  119	  (referring	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  liner	  conference	  at	  issue	  
had	  a	  market	  share	  of	  over	  90%	  and	  faced	  only	  1	  competitor).	  A	  narrow	  reading	  of	  these	  cases	  is	  that	  they	  simply	  
referred	  to	  the	  likelihood	  that	  the	  practice	  under	  review	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  restriction	  of	  competition.	  
354	  TeliaSonera	  (Opinion	  AG	  Mazák),	  supra	  note	  347,	  para	  41.	  I	  disagree	  with	  the	  position	  taken	  by	  Mazák,	  as	  the	  
50%	  market	  share	  (at	  which	  the	  presumption	  of	  dominance	  begins)	  is	  not	  such	  a	  high	  threshold.	  As	  said	  in	  the	  
main	  text,	  a	  firm	  may	  be	  presumed	  dominant	  with	  a	  51%	  market	  share	  even	  though	  it	  faces	  stiff	  competition	  from	  
a	  company	  that	  holds	  the	  other	  49%.	  Mazák	  further	  notes	  that	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  does	  not	  explicitly	  refer	  to	  ‘super-­‐
dominance’.	  I	  disagree	  with	  this	  argument,	  too,	  as	  there	  are	  many	  important	  elements	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  (such	  as	  
objective	  justification)	  that	  do	  not	  feature	  explicitly	  in	  the	  text.	  	  
355	  TeliaSonera,	  supra	  note	  347,	  para	  81.	  It	  noted	  the	  possible	  relevance	  of	  a	  situation	  where	  the	  undertaking	  holds	  
a	  position	  of	  super-­‐dominance	  or	  a	  quasi-­‐monopoly.	  
356	  See	  e.g.	  Case	  22/78	  Hugin	  v	  Commission	  [1979]	  ECR	  1869.	  Fox	  noted	  that	  ‘it	  is	  hard	  to	  imagine	  that	  Hugin	  lacked	  
an	  objective	  justification’.	  See	  Eleanor	  M.	  Fox,	  ‘Eastman	  Kodak	  Company	  v.	  Image	  Technical	  Services,	  Inc.	  –	  
Information	  Failure	  As	  Soul	  or	  Hook?’,	  (1993-­‐1994)	  62	  Antitrust	  Law	  Journal	  759,	  at	  766.	  
	   103	  
circumstances	  of	  the	  case	  –	  of	  which	  the	  degree	  of	  dominance	  is	  clearly	  part.357	  The	  likelihood	  of	  harm	  
to	  competition	  will	  depend	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  on	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  dominant	  firm’s	  market	  position	  and	  
the	  type	  of	  conduct	  that	  is	  under	  review.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  degree	  of	  market	  power	  may	  also	  feed	  into	  the	  
acceptability	  of	  an	  objective	  justification	  plea.	  For	  example,	  an	  efficiency	  plea	  may	  be	  less	  persuasive	  if	  
invoked	  by	  a	  firm	  with	  a	  (quasi-­‐)monopoly.358	  
	  
The	  previous	  paragraphs	  do	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  prevalent	  degree	  of	  market	  power	  will	  necessarily	  take	  
centre	   stage.	  One	   should	  examine	   to	  what	   extent	   there	   is	   a	   link	  of	   causality	  between	   the	   conduct	  or	  
justification	   under	   review	   and	   the	   firm’s	  market	   power.	   The	   case	   law	   does	   not	   always	   do	   so.	   In	   Irish	  
Sugar,	  the	  dominant	  firm	  attempted	  to	  justify	  its	  selective	  and	  differentiated	  rebates	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  its	  
insufficient	   financial	   resources.359	   The	   General	   Court	   rejected	   this	   plea	   partly	   based	   on	   Irish	   Sugar’s	  
particularly	  strong	  market	  position,	  having	  a	  market	  share	  of	  more	  than	  88%.360	  Although	  I	  understand	  
the	  Court’s	  overall	  wariness	  towards	  such	  a	  plea,	  I	  do	  think	  it	  should	  have	  explained	  in	  more	  detail	  why	  
Irish	  Sugar’s	  strong	  market	  position	  automatically	  disqualified	   its	  plea	  referring	  to	   insufficient	   financial	  
resources.	  Undertakings	  with	  a	  high	  market	  share	  do	  not	  necessarily	  have	  unlimited	  cash	  to	  burn.	  
	  
	  




This	  chapter	  examines	  the	  meaning	  of	  ‘objective	  justification’	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  
But	   before	   turning	   to	   the	   legal	   examination	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   objective	   justification,	   it	   seems	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
357	  See	  e.g.	  Case	  T-­‐83/91	  Tetra	  Pak	  v	  Commission	  ('Tetra	  Pak	  II')	  [1994]	  ECR	  II-­‐755,	  para	  115.	  The	  General	  Court	  
stated	  that	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  special	  responsibility	  imposed	  on	  a	  dominant	  firm	  depends	  on	  the	  specific	  
circumstances	  of	  the	  case.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  circumstances	  included	  the	  dominant	  firm’s	  ‘quasi-­‐monopoly’	  (see	  para	  
31).	  For	  confirmation	  of	  the	  General	  Court’s	  approach,	  see	  e.g.	  Tetra	  Pak	  II	  (ECJ),	  supra	  note	  353,	  para	  24;	  and	  
Compagnie	  maritime	  belge,	  supra	  note	  348,	  para	  114.	  See	  also	  Whish	  2009,	  supra	  note	  331,	  at	  184.	  
358	  Or,	  alternatively,	  more	  persuasive.	  In	  a	  market	  with	  particularly	  high	  fixed	  costs,	  having	  just	  a	  single	  firm	  on	  the	  
market	  may	  be	  beneficial	  to	  productive	  efficiency.	  
359	  Irish	  Sugar	  (General	  Court),	  supra	  note	  353.	  
360	  Ibid,	  para	  186.	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appropriate	   to	   spend	   a	   few	   words	   on	   its	   linguistic	   meaning.	   The	   Oxford	   Dictionary	   describes	  
‘justification’	  as	   ‘the	  action	  of	  showing	  something	  to	  be	  right	  or	   reasonable’.361	  Similarly,	   the	  Merriam	  
Webster	   Dictionary	   describes	   the	   verb	   ‘to	   justify’	   as	   an	   act	   ‘to	   prove	   or	   show	   to	   be	   just,	   right,	   or	  
reasonable’.362	  It	  may	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  showing	  ‘a	  sufficient	  legal	  reason’.	  363	  Another	  dictionary	  defines	  
justification	  as	  ‘a	  reason,	  fact,	  circumstance,	  or	  explanation	  that	  justifies	  or	  defends.’364	  Because	  of	  these	  
superior	  qualities,	  a	  justification	  can	  trump	  the	  finding	  that	  conduct	  under	  review	  is	  illegal.	  
	  
The	  other	  part	  of	   the	   concept	   examined	  by	   this	   PhD	   is	   ‘objective’,	   connoting	   that	   the	   concept	   is	   ‘not	  
influenced	  by	  personal	  feelings,	  interpretations,	  or	  prejudice’.365	  	  Accordingly,	  a	  justification	  will	  not	  be	  
accepted	  if	  it	  merely	  exists	  as	  a	  subjective	  intention	  by	  the	  firm;	  there	  must	  be	  some	  ‘objective’	  benefit.	  
This	   reasoning	   corresponds	   to	   the	   case	   law	   on	   Article	   102	   TFEU.	   As	   the	   abuse	   of	   dominance	   is	   an	  
objective	  concept,366	   it	  would	  be	  inconsistent	  to	  condone	  behaviour	  simply	  because	  the	  firm	  can	  show	  
that	  its	  conduct	  served	  a	  pro-­‐competitive	  intent.	  For	  all	  the	  dominant	  firm’s	  good	  intentions,	  there	  may	  
still	  be	  a	  restriction	  of	  competition.	  However,	  subjective	   intent	   is	  not	   irrelevant	  as	   it	  can	  be	  a	  relevant	  
factor	   in	   the	   overall	   assessment	   of	   a	   potential	   abuse.367	   Section	   4.5	   shall	   further	   examine	   the	   legal	  
significance	  of	  benign	  or	  pro-­‐competitive	  subjective	  intent.	  
	  
3.2 'Objective	  justification'	  and	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  
	  
Few	   legal	   rules	   are	   absolute.	   Almost	   every	   legal	   prohibition	   can,	   under	   certain	   circumstances,	   be	  
derogated	   from.	   Chapter	   II	   has	   examined	   such	   derogations	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   internal	   market	   rules,	   the	  
merger	  rules	  and	  Article	  101	  TFEU.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
361	  See	  http://oxforddictionaries.com/.	  
362	  See	  http://www.merriam-­‐webster.com/.	  
363	  Ibid.	  	  
364	  http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/justification.	  	  
365	  http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/objective?s=t.	  
366	  I.e.	  a	  finding	  of	  a	  prima	  facie	  abuse	  requires	  no	  anti-­‐competitive	  intent.	  Hoffmann-­‐La	  Roche,	  supra	  note	  349,	  
para	  91.	  
367	  The	  relevance	  of	  intent	  depends,	  inter	  alia,	  on	  the	  type	  of	  abuse	  that	  is	  under	  review.	  For	  instance,	  under	  EU	  
law,	  below-­‐cost	  prices	  between	  average	  variable	  costs	  and	  average	  total	  costs	  are	  only	  abusive	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  
evidence	  showing	  an	  anti-­‐competitive	  plan.	  See	  AKZO,	  supra	  note	  351.	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This	   chapter	   focuses	   on	   the	   available	   derogations	   within	   the	   framework	   of	   Article	   102	   TFEU.	   It	   will	  
examine	   EU	   case	   law	   on	   objective	   justification	   of	   behaviour	   that	   would	   otherwise	   be	   an	   abuse.	   An	  
‘abuse’	   can	   be	   considered	   as	   the	   use	   of	   dominance	   in	   a	   way	   that	   cannot	   be	   justified.368	   When	   an	  
objective	  justification	  is	  accepted,	  the	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  prohibition	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  the	  conduct	  under	  
review.	   The	   concept	   of	   ‘objective	   justification’	   thus	   makes	   a	   vital	   distinction	   between	   illegal	   and	  
permissible	  prima	  facie	  abusive	  behaviour	  under	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  	  
	  
It	  is	  true	  that	  ECJ	  case	  law	  has	  largely	  stayed	  clear	  of	  an	  in-­‐depth	  application	  of	  objective	  justification	  to	  
the	  facts	  of	  the	  cases	  before	  it.369	  To	  my	  mind,	  a	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  objective	  justification	  would	  have	  
several	  advantages.	  If	  the	  plea	  is	  interpreted	  in	  a	  consistent,	  well-­‐structured	  and	  practicable	  manner,	  it	  
can	  enhance	  legal	  certainty.370	  This	  means	  it	  serves	  as	  a	  compliance	  check	  for	  dominant	  firms.	  It	  is	  also	  a	  
quality	   check	   for	   (domestic)	   courts	   and	   competition	   authorities,	   as	   it	   is	   able	   to	   increase	   clarity	   and	  
coherence	  in	  abuse	  analysis.371	  
	  
In	   addition,	   the	   objective	   justification	   plea	   has	   the	   notable	   advantage	  of	   attaching	   due	  weight	   to	   the	  
prevalent	  context.	  Such	  a	  plea	  may	  provide	  invaluable	  information	  as	  to	  the	  precise	  background	  of	  the	  
conduct	   and	   the	   effects	   that	   it	   may	   have.372	   Taking	   in	   this	   context	   can	   contribute	   towards	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
368	  Cf.	  Australian	  competition	  law,	  which	  distinguishes	  between	  the	  ‘use’	  and	  the	  ‘misuse’	  of	  market	  power.	  See	  
also	  M.	  Dolmans	  &	  M.	  Bennett,	  ‘Refusal	  to	  Deal’,	  in:	  F.E.	  Gonzáles	  &	  R.	  Snelders	  2014	  (supra	  note	  331,	  at	  502):	  ‘The	  
possibility	  of	  a	  justification	  defence	  is	  inherent	  in	  the	  very	  notion	  of	  an	  “abuse”,	  which	  does	  not	  cover	  justified	  
use’.	  
369	  This	  has	  prompted	  Albors-­‐Llorens	  (supra	  note	  332,	  at	  1742)	  to	  observe	  that	  the	  examination	  of	  objective	  
justification	  ‘seemed	  to	  be	  a	  fairly	  notional	  exercise.’	  
370	  For	  the	  importance	  of	  legal	  certainty	  and	  legitimate	  expectations,	  see	  Østerud	  2010,	  supra	  note	  332,	  at	  14.	  He	  
refers	  e.g.	  to	  Case	  T-­‐51/89	  Tetra	  Pak	  Rausing	  v	  Commission	  ('Tetra	  Pak	  I')	  [1990]	  ECR	  II-­‐309,	  para	  36	  and	  to	  Case	  T-­‐
271/03	  Deutsche	  Telekom	  v	  Commission	  [2008]	  ECR	  II-­‐477,	  para	  192.	  
371	  Eilmansberger	  2005,	  supra	  note	  339,	  at	  131.	  
372	  Cf.	  the	  relevance	  attached	  to	  context	  in	  Article	  101	  TFEU.	  See	  e.g.	  Case	  C-­‐8/08	  T-­‐Mobile	  and	  Others	  v	  Raad	  van	  
Bestuur	  van	  de	  Nederlandse	  Mededingingsautoriteit	  [2009]	  ECR	  I-­‐4529,	  para	  27:	  ‘With	  regard	  to	  the	  assessment	  as	  
to	  whether	  a	  concerted	  practice	  is	  anti-­‐competitive,	  close	  regard	  must	  be	  paid	  in	  particular	  to	  the	  objectives	  which	  
it	  is	  intended	  to	  attain	  and	  to	  its	  economic	  and	  legal	  context	  [italics	  added	  by	  author]’.	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comprehensive	  examination	  of	  all	  relevant	  interests,373	  and	  thus	  substantially	  improve	  the	  competition	  
analysis.	  	  
	  
A	  contextual	  approach	  would	  be	  particularly	  helpful	  in	  areas	  where	  the	  Commission	  and	  the	  EU	  courts	  
have	   throughout	   the	   years	   relied	   on	   a	   rather	   formalistic	   reasoning	   –	   for	   instance	   in	   the	   fields	   of	  
predatory	   pricing,	   exclusive	   supply	   agreements	   and	   pricing	   practices	   having	   the	   same	   effect.374	   For	  
example,	  an	  objective	  justification	  plea	  may	  call	  for	  an	  examination	  of	  whether	  the	  practice	  has	  a	  pro-­‐
competitive	  effect	  –	  rather	  than	  simply	  denouncing	  a	  practice	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  its	  form.	  
	  
By	  emphasising	  the	  importance	  of	  context,	  objective	  justification	  can	  be	  used	  to	  reject	  the	  notion	  that	  
certain	  types	  of	  conduct	  are	  considered	  per	  se	  abusive	  under	  Article	  102	  TFEU.375	  A	  per	  se	  abuse	  implies	  
that	   the	   conduct	   can	  never	  be	   justified,	  whatever	   the	   countervailing	  arguments.	  A	  per	   se	   approach	   is	  
inconsistent	  with	  a	  proper	  competition	  analysis	  under	  Article	  102	  TFEU.376	  It	  pays	  insufficient	  attention	  
to	  context	  and	  relies	  excessively	  on	  assumptions	  that	  may	  be	  mistaken	  in	  the	  specific	  circumstances	  of	  
that	  case.	  For	  example,	  the	  conduct	  under	  review	  may	  boast	  some	  anti-­‐competitive	  elements,	  but	  can	  
still	  have	  a	  net	  pro-­‐competitive	  effect	  due	  to	  the	  particularities	  of	  the	  sector	  in	  which	  that	  conduct	  takes	  
place.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
373	  See	  e.g.	  Case	  127/73	  BRT	  v	  SABAM	  and	  Fonior	  [1974]	  ECR	  313,	  para	  8.	  The	  ECJ	  underlined	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  
balancing	  test	  taking	  ‘all	  the	  relevant	  interests’	  into	  account	  –	  suggesting	  that	  only	  a	  balancing	  test	  can	  determine	  
whether	  or	  not	  conduct	  should	  be	  prohibited.	  See,	  similarly,	  M.	  Dolmans	  &	  M.	  Bennett,	  ‘Refusal	  to	  Deal’,	  in:	  F.E.	  
Gonzáles	  &	  R.	  Snelders	  2014	  (supra	  note	  331)	  at	  504.	  
374	  D.	  Bailey,	  'Presumptions	  in	  EU	  Competition	  Law',	  (2010)	  31	  ECLR	  362,	  at	  365.	  Bailey	  refers	  to	  AKZO,	  supra	  note	  
351,	  para	  71	  and	  Hoffmann-­‐La	  Roche,	  supra	  note	  349,	  para	  89.	  
375	  Østerud	  (2010,	  supra	  note	  332,	  at	  247)	  argues	  that	  there	  should	  be	  no	  per	  se	  prohibitions	  under	  Article	  102	  
TFEU.	  See	  also	  AG	  Colomer	  in	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐468/06	  to	  C-­‐478/06	  Sot.	  Lélos	  kai	  Sia	  v	  GlaxoSmithKline	  [2008]	  ECR	  I-­‐
7139,	  paras	  62-­‐75.	  Colomer	  holds	  that	  there	  are	  both	  legal	  and	  economic	  reasons	  not	  to	  consider	  conduct	  per	  se	  
abusive.	  	  
376	  Even	  though	  some	  types	  of	  conduct	  will	  be	  easier	  to	  justify	  than	  others.	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The	   Commission	   has	   given	   various	   indications	   that	   it	   wishes	   to	   move	   away	   from	   a	   per	   se	   approach	  
towards	   certain	   abuses.377	   The	   Commission’s	   guidance	   on	   enforcement	   priorities	   clearly	   takes	   an	  
effects-­‐based	   approach,	   which	   is	   difficult	   to	   reconcile	   with	   a	   per	   se	   approach	   based	   on	   form.378	   The	  
Commission	  has	  already	  used	  this	  approach	  in	  practice.	  In	  its	  Intel	  decision,	  the	  Commission	  included	  an	  
economic	  analysis	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  alleged	  abuse	  next	  to	  its	  more	  traditional	  (and	  formalistic)	  abuse	  
analysis.379	  	  
	  
Moreover,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  ECJ’s	  case	  law.	  In	  Sot.	  Lélos,	  AG	  Colomer	  opined	  that	  Article	  
102	  TFEU	  provides	  no	  basis	   for	   the	  existence	  of	  per	   se	   abuses.380	  The	  ECJ	   seems	   to	  have	   followed	  his	  
advice.	   The	   Post	   Danmark	   judgment	  makes	   clear	   that	   a	   dominant	   undertaking	   can	   rely	   on	   efficiency	  
benefits	  or	  objective	  necessity	   to	   justify	   its	  behaviour	  –	  even	   if	   such	  behaviour	  would	  previously	  have	  
been	  struck	  down	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  its	  form.381	  The	  ECJ’s	  attitude	  towards	  prices	  below	  Average	  Variable	  
Costs	  perhaps	  provides	  the	  clearest	   indication	  of	  the	  development	   in	  the	  case	   law.	  Whereas	  the	  AKZO	  
judgment	   held	   that	   such	   prices	   are	   abusive	   per	   se,382	   more	   recent	   case	   law	   merely	   considers	   them	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
377	  This	  is	  different	  from	  the	  Commission’s	  continued	  reliance	  on	  restrictions	  ‘by	  object’	  under	  Article	  101(1)	  TFEU.	  
It	  makes	  sense	  that	  the	  Commission	  still	  uses	  this	  concept,	  as	  it	  is	  clearly	  part	  of	  the	  provision.	  Note	  that	  
restrictions	  ‘by	  object’	  under	  Article	  101(1)	  TFEU	  differ	  from	  per	  se	  abuses	  under	  Article	  102	  TFEU,	  in	  the	  sense	  
that	  the	  former	  can	  still	  be	  condoned	  under	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU	  (see	  Case	  T-­‐17/93	  Matra	  Hachette	  v	  Commission	  
[1994]	  ECR	  II-­‐595,	  para	  85),	  whereas	  the	  latter	  connotes	  that	  no	  justification	  can	  be	  accepted.	  Also	  note	  the	  case	  
law	  that	  one	  must	  duly	  examine	  the	  economic	  and	  legal	  context	  of	  the	  relevant	  agreement	  before	  being	  able	  to	  
label	  it	  as	  a	  restriction	  ‘by	  object’.	  See	  e.g.	  Case	  C-­‐209/07	  Beef	  Industry	  Development	  Society	  and	  Barry	  Brothers	  
(‘BIDS’),	  [2008]	  ECR	  I-­‐	  8637,	  paras	  16	  and	  21.	  
378	  Commission	  guidance	  on	  Article	  [102]	  enforcement	  priorities,	  OJ	  [2009]	  C	  45/7.	  
379	  See	  e.g.	  Commission	  decision	  in	  Case	  COMP/C-­‐3/37.990	  Intel	  (13	  May	  2009),	  para	  1672;	  stating	  that	  ‘the	  
Commission	  has	  examined	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  conduct	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  the	  market’,	  ‘leaving	  aside	  that	  it	  is	  not	  
required	  under	  the	  case	  law	  to	  do	  so’.	  Some	  scholars	  argue	  that	  a	  type	  of	  per	  se	  abuses	  exists	  or	  ought	  to	  exist	  (see	  
e.g.	  Eilmansberger	  2005,	  supra	  note	  339,	  at	  147).	  
380	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Colomer,	  Sot.	  Lélos,	  supra	  note	  375,	  para	  76.	  
381	  Case	  C-­‐209/10	  Post	  Danmark	  v	  Konkurrencerådet	  [2012]	  nyr,	  para	  41.	  
382	  AKZO,	  supra	  note	  351,	  para	  71:	  such	  prices	  ‘must	  be	  regarded	  as	  abusive’.	  See	  also	  Bailey	  2010,	  supra	  note	  374,	  
at	  365.	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abusive	   ‘in	   principle’,	   thus	   allowing	   for	   a	   justification	   plea.383	   Section	   5.2	   discusses	   this	   shift	   in	   the	  
examination	  of	  predation	  cases	  in	  more	  detail.	  
	  
3.3 The	  use	  and	  role	  of	  ‘objective	  justification’	  within	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  
	  
The	  notion	  of	  objective	  justification	  has	  become	  an	  important	  part	  of	  the	  case	  law	  on	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  
The	  ECJ	  has	  referred	  to	  objective	  justification384	  in	  several	  of	  its	  early	  competition	  law	  judgments,385	  and	  
has	  regularly	  noted	  or	  hinted	  that	  an	  abuse	   implies	   the	  absence	  of	  an	  objective	   justification.386	  At	   the	  
same	  time,	  however,	  the	  ECJ	  held	  in	  Ahmed	  Saeed	  and	  Atlantic	  Container	  that	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  does	  not	  
allow	  for	  any	  exemptions	  to	  the	  prohibition	  it	   lays	  down.387	  Do	  these	  two	  judgments	  call	   into	  question	  
the	  relevance	  of	  objective	  justification	  under	  Article	  102	  TFEU?	  	  
	  
It	   is	   submitted	   they	  do	  not.	   I	  believe	   that	   these	   judgments	  merely	   show	   that,	   if	   an	  abuse	  has	  already	  
been	  established,	  it	  cannot	  be	  ‘saved’	  anymore	  by	  countervailing	  reasons.388	  This	  approach	  is	  in	  line	  with	  
the	  text	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU,	  which	  simply	  prohibits	  any	  abuse	  of	  a	  dominant	  position.	  However,	  this	  still	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
383	  Post	  Danmark,	  supra	  note	  381,	  para	  27.	  See	  also	  Case	  C-­‐202/07	  P	  France	  Télécom	  v	  Commission	  (‘Wanadoo’)	  
[2009]	  ECR	  I-­‐2369,	  para	  109.	  The	  English	  language	  version	  notes	  that	  such	  prices	  are	  prima	  facie	  abusive,	  while	  the	  
French	  language	  version	  notes	  that	  they	  are	  abusive	  ‘en	  principe’.	  
384	  Or	  similar	  concepts	  in	  different	  words,	  such	  as	  ‘objective	  necessity’	  or	  ‘objective	  economic	  justification’.	  See	  
also	  Østerud	  2010,	  supra	  note	  332,	  at	  245.	  
385	  E.g.	  Télémarketing,	  supra	  note	  331.	  
386	  Albors-­‐Llorens	  2007,	  supra	  note	  332,	  at	  1742.	  
387	  Case	  66/86	  Ahmed	  Saeed	  [1989]	  ECR	  803,	  para	  32.	  See	  also	  the	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Lenz	  in	  Ahmed	  Saeed,	  para	  41.	  
Lenz	  rejected	  an	  ‘exemption’,	  since	  ‘abuses	  cannot	  be	  approved’.	  See	  also	  Joined	  Cases	  T-­‐191/98,	  T-­‐212/98	  to	  T-­‐
214/98	  Atlantic	  Container	  Line	  and	  Others	  v	  Commission	  (‘TACA’)	  [2003]	  ECR	  II-­‐3275,	  para	  1112.	  The	  General	  Court	  
simply	  held	  that	  ‘Article	  [102]	  of	  the	  Treaty	  does	  not	  provide	  for	  any	  exemption’.	  However,	  this	  still	  does	  not	  make	  
clear	  what	  may	  constitute	  an	  abuse	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  
388	  Similarly,	  an	  agreement	  cannot	  escape	  the	  application	  of	  Article	  101(1)	  TFEU	  as	  soon	  as	  it	  has	  been	  found	  to	  
restrict	  competition	  by	  object	  –	  even	  if	  it	  seeks	  a	  benign	  objective	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  See	  Case	  C-­‐68/12	  
Protimonopolný	  úrad	  Slovenskej	  republiky	  v	  Slovenská	  sporiteľňa	  (‘Slovenská’)	  [2013]	  nyr.	  In	  my	  opinion,	  this	  does	  
not	  mean	  that	  a	  benign	  objective	  is	  irrelevant	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  Article	  101(1)	  TFEU	  –	  it	  merely	  means	  that	  such	  a	  
purpose	  should	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration	  as	  relevant	  context	  before	  labelling	  it	  as	  a	  restriction	  by	  object	  in	  the	  
first	  place.	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leaves	  open	  the	  possibility	  that	  conduct	  appears	  to	  be	  an	  abuse	  at	  first	  sight	  (i.e.	  a	  prima	  facie	  abuse),	  
can	  still	  be	  condoned	  upon	  closer	  inspection.	  
	  
The	  Ahmed	  Saeed	  and	  Atlantic	  Container	  cases	  also	  seem	  to	  reflect	  the	  differences	  between	  Articles	  101	  
and	  102	  TFEU,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  latter	  has	  no	  explicit	  ‘exemption’	  provision.	  This	  may	  have	  been	  the	  
underlying	   reason	  why,	   in	   the	  Syfait	   case,	  AG	   Jacobs	  described	   the	  distinction	  between	  abuse	  and	  an	  
objective	   justification	  as	   ‘somewhat	  artificial’.389	   I	  agree	  that	   it	   is	  difficult	  to	  draw	  a	  neat	   line	  as	  to	  the	  
types	  of	  arguments	  that	  relate	  to	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  prima	  facie	  prohibition	  and	  the	  justifications	  that	  may	  
be	   invoked.390	   Still,	   I	   believe	   that	   a	   finding	  of	  prima	   facie	   abuse	   is	   necessary	   as	   there	   is	   otherwise	  no	  
reason	  why	  a	   firm	  would	  need	   to	   justify	   its	  behaviour.	  Although	   the	   ‘special	   responsibility’	   can	  be	  an	  
onerous	   requirement,	   it	   does	   not	   cover	   every	   single	   activity	   by	   a	   dominant	   firm.	   An	   objective	  
justification	   should	   only	   enter	   the	   stage	   if	   conduct	   absent	   that	   justification	  would	   be	   prohibited	   (i.e.	  
when	  there	  is	  a	  prima	  facie	  abuse).	  I	  do	  not	  agree	  with	  the	  argument	  by	  Jacobs	  that	  the	  use	  of	  the	  word	  
‘abuse’	   necessarily	   connotes	   a	   negative	   conclusion	   has	   been	   reached,391	   as	   a	   finding	   of	   a	  prima	   facie	  
abuse	  merely	  indicates	  a	  provisional	  step	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  	  
	  
An	  early	  case	   law	   foundation	   in	   support	  of	  a	   two-­‐step	  approach	   is	   the	  1989	  Tournier	   ruling.	  This	   case	  
was	   essentially	   about	   the	   fees	   laid	   down	   by	   Sacem,	   the	   organization	   that	   held	   a	   monopoly	   on	   the	  
management	  of	  copyrights	   in	  France.	  The	  ECJ	  held	  that	   if	  Sacem’s	  tariffs	  were	  appreciably	  higher	  than	  
those	  charged	   in	  other	  Member	  States,	  such	  a	  difference	   is	   ‘indicative’	  of	  an	  abuse.	  392	  This	   indication	  
seems	  akin	  to	  a	  prima	  facie	  abuse.	  It	  is	  equally	  clear	  from	  Tournier	  that	  it	  is	  open	  for	  the	  dominant	  firm	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
389	  Opinion	  by	  AG	  Jacobs	  in	  Case	  C-­‐53/03	  Syfait	  v	  GlaxoSmithKline	  [2005]	  ECR	  I-­‐4609,	  para	  72.	  See	  also	  Mann	  J	  in	  
Purple	  Parking	  and	  Meteor	  Parking	  v	  Heathrow	  Airport	  [2011]	  EWHC	  987	  (Ch),	  who	  has	  ‘some	  sympathies’	  for	  the	  
one-­‐step	  approach	  apparently	  favoured	  by	  AG	  Jacobs.	  See	  also	  Albors-­‐Llorens	  2007	  (supra	  note	  332,	  at	  1733).	  She	  
argues	  that	  a	  successful	  objective	  justification	  plea	  removes	  the	  conduct	  from	  the	  ambit	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  In	  her	  
opinion,	  no	  two-­‐step	  approach	  is	  needed.	  She	  does	  not	  make	  clear,	  however,	  how	  in	  her	  model	  any	  a	  priori	  finding	  
of	  abuse	  (as	  she	  refers	  to	  it)	  can	  be	  made	  if	  the	  provision	  does	  not	  apply	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  
390	  See,	  similarly,	  the	  examination	  of	  Article	  101	  TFEU	  and	  the	  free	  movement	  rules	  in	  Chapter	  II.	  
391	  Ibid.	  However,	  if	  one	  does	  agree	  with	  Jacobs,	  I	  propose	  a	  different	  terminology:	  one	  examines	  whether	  the	  
undertaking	  has	  ‘used’	  its	  dominant	  position.	  If	  so,	  and	  if	  the	  dominant	  undertaking	  cannot	  offer	  a	  justification,	  
such	  use	  will	  be	  found	  to	  constitute	  an	  abuse.	  	  
392	  Case	  395/87	  Ministère	  Public	  v	  Tournier	  [1989]	  ECR	  2521,	  para	  38.	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to	  put	   forward	  an	  objective	   justification	  plea,	  such	  as	  differences	  between	  Member	  States	   in	  terms	  of	  
market	  demand.393	  
	  
Other	   case	   law	   seems	   to	   confirm	   the	   importance	   of	   a	   two-­‐step	   approach.	   In	  Microsoft,	   the	   General	  
Court	  held	  that	  it	  must	  first	  be	  examined	  whether	  the	  case	  exhibits	  ‘exceptional	  circumstances’	  that	  give	  
rise	  to	  a	  duty	  to	  supply.394	  Only	   if	  such	  circumstances	  have	  been	  established	  the	  objective	   justification	  
comes	   into	  play:	   ‘then	   [it	  must	  be	   considered]	  whether	   the	   justification	  put	   forward	  by	  Microsoft	   […]	  
might	  prevail	  over	  those	  exceptional	  circumstances.’395	  Recent	  case	   law	  on	  the	  efficiency	  plea,	  such	  as	  
British	   Airways	   and	   Post	   Danmark,396	   also	   provides	   authority	   for	   a	   bifurcated	   approach	   towards	  
justification.	   These	   cases	   suggest	   that	   the	   earlier	   reluctance	   to	   incorporate	   an	   Article	   101	   TFEU-­‐style	  
analysis397	   has	   apparently	   waned.	   Indeed,	   the	   legal	   test	   mentioned	   by	   Post	   Danmark	   appears	   highly	  
similar	  to	  that	  of	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU.398	  
	  
The	  observations	  above	  warrant	   the	   conclusion	   that	   there	   is,	   and	   should	  be,	   a	   conceptual	  bifurcation	  
between	   establishing	   a	   prima	   facie	   abuse	   and	   the	   possibility	   for	   firms	   to	   put	   forward	   an	   objective	  
justification.399	  An	  objective	   justification	  has	  the	  potential	   to	  counterbalance	  a	  finding	  of	  a	  prima	  facie	  
abuse	  based	  on	  relatively	  formal	  grounds	  (such	  as	  in	  Tournier)	  or	  where	  the	  effects-­‐analysis	  has	  not	  yet	  
incorporated	   all	   the	   efficiencies	   that	   the	   conduct	   under	   review	   may	   produce.	   Admittedly,	   it	   may	  
sometimes	  be	  difficult	   to	  know	  whether	  certain	  arguments	  should	  be	  subsumed	  under	   the	  scope	  of	  a	  
prima	   facie	   abuse,	   or	   rather	   under	   the	   scope	   of	   an	   objective	   justification	   (e.g.	  when	   labelling	   certain	  
conduct	  as	  ‘competition	  on	  the	  merits’,	  as	  discussed	  in	  further	  detail	  by	  section	  3.4.2).	  But	  even	  to	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
393	  Ibid.	  Such	  differentiation	  may	  be	  based	  on	  so-­‐called	  ‘objective	  dissimilarities’	  with	  other	  Member	  States.	  
394	  This	  test	  was	  used	  in	  the	  following	  cases:	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐241/91	  P	  and	  C-­‐242/91	  P,	  RTE	  and	  ITP	  v	  Commission	  
('Magill')	  [1995]	  ECR	  I-­‐743;	  Case	  C-­‐418	  IMS	  Health	  [2004]	  ECR	  I-­‐5039.	  
395	  Case	  T-­‐201/04	  Microsoft	  v	  Commission	  [2007]	  ECR	  II-­‐3601,	  para	  709.	  
396	  British	  Airways	  (ECJ),	  supra	  note	  341;	  Post	  Danmark,	  supra	  note	  381.	  
397	  See	  Ahmed	  Saeed,	  supra	  note	  387.	  
398	  Post	  Danmark,	  supra	  note	  381,	  para	  42.	  
399	  Odudu	  also	  seems	  to	  favour	  a	  bifurcated	  approach.	  See	  O.	  Odudu,	  ‘Annotation	  of	  Case	  C-­‐95/04	  P,	  British	  
Airways	  plc	  v.	  Commission,	  judgment	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  (Third	  Chamber)	  of	  15	  March	  2007’,	  (2007)	  44	  CMLRev	  
1781,	  at	  1809.	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extent	   that	   most	   such	   cases	   will	   simply	   fall	   outside	   a	   prima	   facie	   finding,	   the	   concept	   of	   objective	  
justification	  will	  still	  be	  useful	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  prohibition	  does	  not	  reach	  too	  far.	  
	  
For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  study,	  I	  shall	  use	  the	  expression	  ‘objective	  justification’	  for	  three	  reasons.	  First,	  
it	   is	   a	   concept	   used	   by	   the	   EU	   courts	   and	   the	   Commission.400	   Second,	   the	   expression	   is	   not	   all	   too	  
worrisome	  when	   one	   considers	   that	   there	   is	   a	   ‘special	   responsibility’	   on	   dominant	   firms.	   The	   special	  
responsibility	  means	   that	   such	   firms	   need	   to	   justify	   behaviour	   that	   amounts	   to	   a	   prima	   facie	   abuse.	  
Third,	   ‘objective	   justification’	   is	  a	  wide	  concept	   that	  does	  not	  a	  priori	  exclude	  any	  particular	  plea.	  The	  
case	   law	  does	  not,	   in	  my	  view,	  merit	   a	  narrow	   interpretation	  of	   this	   topic.	   Finally,	   I	  prefer	   to	  use	   the	  
term	   ‘plea’	   rather	   than	   ‘defense’,	   since	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   prima	   facie	   abuse	   does	   not	   yet	   indicate	  
whether	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  has	  been	  violated.401	  	  
	  
3.4 Three	  types	  of	  objective	  justification	  
	  
3.4.1 The	  various	  types	  of	  objective	  justification	  
Having	   explained	   the	   role	   and	   use	   of	   objective	   justification,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   delve	   into	   the	   possible	  
sources	  of	  this	  concept.	  Philip	  Lowe,	  former	  Director	  General	  of	  DG	  Competition,	  distinguished	  between	  
three	  types	  of	  ‘objective	  justification’.402	  He	  proposed	  a	  list	  of	  three	  possible	  sources	  of	  justification:	  (i)	  
legitimate	  business	  behaviour;	  (ii)	  efficiency	  considerations	  and	  (iii)	  legitimate	  public	  interest	  objectives.	  
	  
I	   believe	   that	   the	   enumeration	   is	   a	   valuable	   starting	   point	   that	   aptly	   reflects	   the	   (desirable)	   scope	   of	  
objective	  justification.	  Critics	  who	  favour	  a	  more	  narrow	  approach	  towards	  the	  concept	  may	  refer	  to	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
400	  See	  e.g.	  the	  transparent	  way	  in	  which	  the	  General	  Court	  devoted	  a	  separate	  chapter	  on	  objective	  justification	  in	  
Hilti.	  See	  Case	  T-­‐30/89	  Hilti	  v	  Commission	  [1990]	  ECR	  II-­‐163,	  para	  102	  et	  seq.	  
401	  See	  e.g.	  British	  Airways	  (ECJ)	  (supra	  note	  341)	  and	  Microsoft	  (supra	  note	  395).	  Albors-­‐Llorens	  (2007,	  supra	  note	  
332,	  at	  1747)	  also	  avoids	  the	  label	  of	  ‘defense’.	  Note	  that	  Whish	  (2009,	  supra	  note	  331,	  at	  206)	  and	  Loewenthal	  
(2005,	  supra	  note	  332,	  at	  455)	  do	  refer	  to	  it	  as	  a	  defense.	  However,	  see	  R.	  Nazzini,	  ‘The	  Wood	  Began	  to	  Move:	  An	  
Essay	  on	  Consumer	  Welfare,	  Evidence	  and	  Burden	  of	  Proof	  in	  Article	  82	  Cases’	  (2006)	  31	  ELRev	  518.	  Nazzini	  argues	  
that	  the	  term	  ‘defense’	  is	  incorrect.	  
402	  P.	  Lowe,	  ‘DG	  Competition’s	  Review	  of	  the	  Policy	  on	  Abuse	  of	  Dominance’,	  in:	  Hawk	  (ed.),	  International	  Antitrust	  
&	  Policy,	  Annual	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  Fordham	  Corporate	  Law	  Institute	  2003	  (Juris	  Publishing:	  New	  York	  2004),	  at	  
170-­‐171.	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2012	  Post	  Danmark	   judgment.403	  The	  ECJ	  held	   that	  a	  dominant	  undertaking	  may	  demonstrate	   that	   its	  
conduct	  is	  objectively	  necessary404	  or	  has	  a	  net	  beneficial	  effect	  on	  efficiency.405	  The	  judgment	  seems	  to	  
have	  been	  inspired	  by	  the	  Commission’s	  2008	  guidance	  paper,	  which	  also	  referred	  solely	  to	  these	  two	  
elements	  of	  justification.406	  
	  
Indeed,	   efficiencies	   and	   objective	   necessity	   are	   important	   and	   shall	   be	   examined	   in	   the	   following	  
sections.	   However,	   ‘objective	   justification’	   is	   –	   and	   should	   be	   –	   a	   wider	   concept	   than	   that.	   First,	   a	  
dominant	  firm	  should	  be	  allowed	  a	  degree	  of	  commercial	  freedom	  to	  engage	  in	  ‘reasonable’	  behaviour,	  
as	  is	  clear	  from	  the	  United	  Brands	  strand	  of	  case	  law.407	  This	  shall	  be	  examined	  in	  section	  3.4.2.	  Second,	  
there	  are	  ample	   reasons	  why	  public	   interest	  can	  and	  should	  be	  able	   to	  provide	  a	   justification	  as	  well.	  
This	   shall	   be	   discussed	   in	   section	   3.4.6.	   In	   sum,	   I	   think	   that	   the	   justifications	   mentioned	   by	   the	  
Commission’s	  guidance	  document	  and	  the	  Post	  Danmark	   judgment	  embody	  only	  a	  partial	  reception	  of	  
the	  objective	  justification	  concept.	  	  
	  
The	   subsequent	   Sections	   will	   make	   clear	   why	   I	   prefer	   Lowe’s	   wide	   interpretation	   of	   objective	  
justification.	  The	  Sections	  will	  make	  use	  of	  a	  conceptual	  sub-­‐division	  as	  indicated	  in	  the	  following	  table:	  
Objective	  justification	  
Legitimate	  commercial	  conduct/business	  behaviour	   Efficiency	   Public	  interest	  
Commercial	  freedom	  	   Objective	  necessity	  
Competition	  on	  the	  merits	   Force	  majeure;	  State	  action	   Positive	  welfare	  effect	   Public	  interest	  gain	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
403	  Post	  Danmark,	  supra	  note	  381,	  para	  41.	  
404	  The	  ECJ	  refers	  to	  Télémarketing,	  supra	  note	  331,	  para	  27.	  In	  the	  following	  Section,	  I	  will	  show	  why	  
Télémarketing	  should	  not	  be	  read	  as	  offering	  a	  justification	  only	  in	  the	  event	  that	  the	  dominant	  undertaking	  had	  
no	  available	  alternatives.	  	  
405	  The	  ECJ	  refers	  to	  British	  Airways	  (ECJ),	  supra	  note	  341,	  paragraph	  86,	  and	  TeliaSonera,	  supra	  note	  347,	  
paragraph	  76.	  
406	  Commission	  guidance	  on	  enforcement	  priorities,	  supra	  note	  378,	  para	  28.	  For	  an	  analysis,	  see	  M.	  Gravengaard	  
&	  N.	  Kjaersgaard,	  ‘The	  EU	  Commission	  guidance	  on	  exclusionary	  abuse	  of	  dominance	  -­‐	  and	  its	  consequences	  in	  
practice’,	  (2010)	  ECLR	  285.	  
407	  Perhaps	  one	  could	  say	  that	  such	  conduct	  is	  not	  prima	  facie	  abusive	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  However,	  in	  practice	  it	  can	  
be	  difficult	  to	  separate	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  prohibition	  and	  the	  scope	  of	  objective	  justification	  in	  a	  meaningful	  way.	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3.4.2 Legitimate	  business	  behaviour	  –	  commercial	  freedom	  
Legitimate	  business	   behaviour	   is,	   in	  my	   view,	   a	   broad	   category	  of	   conduct	   that	   should	  be	   considered	  
reasonable	   within	   the	   specific	   circumstances	   of	   the	   case.	   Importantly,	   the	   category	   encompasses	  
competition	   on	   the	  merits	   by	   the	   dominant	   undertaking.408	   There	   is	   no	   reason	  why	   Article	   102	   TFEU	  
should	   prohibit	   such	   behaviour.	   Judgments	   such	   as	   BPB	   and	  Deutsche	   Telekom	   have	   confirmed	   that	  
firms	  abuse	  their	  dominant	  position	  only	  if	  they	  take	  recourse	  to	  conduct	  other	  than	  competition	  on	  the	  
merits.409	  	  
	  
One	  can	  consider	  competition	  on	  the	  merits	   in	  two	  distinct	  ways.410	   If	  an	  effects	  analysis	  has	  revealed	  
that	   the	   conduct	   under	   review	   has	   a	   net	   beneficial	   effect	   on	   efficiency,	   the	   conduct	   can	   ex	   post	   be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
408	  Loewenthal	  2005,	  supra	  note	  332,	  p.	  459.	  Some	  academics	  don’t	  seem	  to	  agree	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘competition	  on	  
the	  merits’	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  See	  Eilmansberger	  2005,	  supra	  note	  339,	  at	  
133.	  See	  also	  H.W.	  Friederiszick	  and	  L.	  Gratzà,	  ‘Dominant	  and	  Efficient	  –	  On	  the	  Relevance	  of	  Efficiencies	  in	  Abuse	  
of	  Dominance	  Cases’,	  in:	  OECD	  Policy	  Roundtables,	  The	  Role	  of	  Efficiency	  Claims	  in	  Antitrust	  Proceedings	  2012	  
(DAF/COMP(2012)23),	  at	  38.	  Although	  they	  do	  not	  consider	  competition	  on	  the	  merits	  as	  a	  justification	  (as	  will	  be	  
explained	  below),	  they	  do	  consider	  that	  a	  competition	  case	  only	  arises	  ‘when	  the	  eliminatory	  conduct	  is	  not	  based	  
on	  the	  merits’.	  
409	  Case	  T-­‐65/89	  BPB	  Industries	  and	  British	  Gypsum	  v	  Commission	  [1993]	  ECR	  II-­‐389	  para	  94:	  ‘Article	  [102]	  of	  the	  
Treaty	  prohibits	  a	  dominant	  undertaking	  from	  strengthening	  its	  position	  by	  having	  recourse	  to	  means	  other	  than	  
those	  falling	  within	  competition	  based	  on	  merits’.	  In	  other	  words,	  a	  dominant	  undertaking	  may	  indeed	  strengthen	  
its	  own	  position	  if	  it	  competes	  on	  the	  merits.	  See	  also	  Deutsche	  Telekom,	  supra	  note	  336,	  para	  177,	  allowing	  a	  
dominant	  undertaking	  to	  invoke	  such	  a	  plea	  even	  if	  its	  conduct	  has	  an	  exclusionary	  effect.	  A	  link	  between	  objective	  
justification	  and	  competition	  on	  the	  merits	  was	  suggested	  in	  AstraZeneca,	  supra	  note	  331,	  para	  130.	  The	  
TeliaSonera	  judgment	  (supra	  note	  347,	  para	  24)	  suggests	  a	  narrower	  approach,	  as	  it	  simply	  holds	  that	  Article	  102	  
TFEU	  ‘does	  not	  prohibit	  an	  undertaking	  from	  acquiring,	  on	  its	  own	  merits,	  the	  dominant	  position	  in	  a	  market	  
[italics	  added	  by	  author]’.	  It	  would	  be	  a	  bizarre	  interpretation	  that	  an	  undertaking,	  as	  soon	  as	  it	  has	  acquired	  
market	  power,	  can	  no	  longer	  compete	  on	  the	  merits.	  Indeed,	  it	  would	  also	  be	  difficult	  to	  reconcile	  with	  the	  
structure	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  that	  only	  covers	  conduct	  by	  undertakings	  after	  they	  have	  acquired	  a	  dominant	  
position.	  
410	  TeliaSonera	  (supra	  note	  347,	  para	  88)	  appears	  to	  refer	  to	  both	  possibilities,	  linking	  ‘the	  absence	  of	  any	  other	  
economic	  and	  objective	  justification’	  with	  ‘using	  means	  other	  than	  reliance	  on	  its	  own	  merits’.	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considered	  as	  competition	  on	  the	  merits.411	  Another	  possibility,	  which	   I	  will	  examine	   in	  this	  Section,	   is	  
where	   the	   dominant	   undertaking	   competes	   on	   the	  merits	   by	   remaining	   within	   the	   boundaries	   of	   its	  
commercial	  freedom.	  The	  Hoffmann-­‐La	  Roche	  judgment	  makes	  clear	  that	  any	  such	  ‘normal’	  competitive	  
behaviour	  should	  be	  condoned.412	  Such	  a	  finding	  does	  not	  require	  an	  examination	  of	  effects.	  Instead,	  it	  
calls	   for	   a	   contextual	   analysis	   of	   what	   should	   be	   considered	   ‘normal’	   competition	   in	   the	   specific	  
circumstances	  of	  that	  case.413	  	  
	  
This	  may	   require	  an	  examination	  of	   the	   link	  between	   the	  dominant	  position	  and	   the	  behaviour	  under	  
review.	  The	  absence	  of	   such	  a	   connection	   strongly	   suggests	   that	  an	  undertaking	   is	   simply	  engaging	   in	  
normal	   competition	   that	   is	   perfectly	   acceptable	   within	   its	   business	   sector.414	   For	   example,	   the	  
Commission	  considered	  in	  British	  Midland	  v	  Aer	  Lingus	   that	  a	  dominant	  airline	  may	  refuse	  to	  continue	  
an	   interlining	   agreement	   if	   there	   are	   ‘problems	   with	   currency	   convertibility	   or	   doubts	   about	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
411	  TeliaSonera,	  supra	  note	  347,	  and	  Post	  Danmark,	  supra	  note	  381.	  
412	  Hoffmann-­‐La	  Roche,	  supra	  note	  349,	  para	  91.	  See	  also	  Akzo,	  supra	  note	  351,	  para	  70.	  The	  ECJ	  held	  that	  Article	  
102	  TFEU	  prohibits	  a	  dominant	  undertaking	  from	  ‘strengthening	  its	  position	  by	  using	  methods	  other	  than	  those	  
which	  come	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  competition	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  quality’.	  Do	  note	  that	  Akzo	  is	  overly	  formalistic	  to	  the	  
extent	  that	  it	  suggests	  that	  the	  dominant	  undertaking	  will	  transgress	  its	  commercial	  freedom	  if	  its	  conduct	  leads	  to	  
the	  elimination	  of	  a	  competitor.	  To	  my	  mind,	  a	  competitor	  may	  be	  forced	  to	  exit	  a	  market	  due	  to	  a	  plethora	  of	  
reasons	  other	  than	  an	  abuse	  by	  the	  dominant	  undertaking.	  See,	  further,	  BPB	  (General	  Court),	  supra	  note	  409,	  para	  
94,	  noting	  that	  it	  is	  ‘a	  matter	  of	  normal	  commercial	  policy’	  ‘to	  lay	  down	  criteria	  for	  according	  priority	  in	  meeting	  
orders’	  ‘	  in	  times	  of	  shortage’;	  even	  though	  such	  ‘criteria	  must	  be	  objective	  and	  must	  not	  be	  discriminatory	  in	  any	  
way’.	  According	  to	  some	  commentators,	  however,	  the	  fact	  that	  certain	  conduct	  is	  deemed	  to	  be	  ‘normal	  business	  
behaviour’	  does	  not	  necessarily	  exclude	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  practice	  is	  abusive.	  See	  Eilmansberger	  2005,	  supra	  
note	  339,	  at	  132.	  It	  is	  submitted	  that	  prohibiting	  dominant	  firms	  from	  entering	  into	  normal	  behaviour	  comes	  
dangerously	  close	  to	  prohibiting	  dominance	  as	  such.	  
413	  For	  the	  importance	  of	  context	  while	  determining	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  ‘special	  responsibility’	  imposed	  on	  a	  
dominant	  undertaking,	  see	  Compagnie	  maritime	  belge,	  supra	  note	  348,	  para	  114;	  Tetra	  Pak	  II,	  supra	  note	  353,	  
para	  24.	  
414	  Obviously,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  a	  dominant	  undertaking	  can	  do	  everything	  that	  it	  could	  have	  done	  if	  it	  was	  
not	  dominant.	  See	  e.g.	  Case	  T-­‐111/96	  ITT	  Promedia	  v	  Commission	  [1998]	  ECR	  II-­‐2937,	  paras	  139-­‐140;	  Michelin	  I,	  
supra	  note	  334,	  para	  57;	  Tetra	  Pak	  I,	  supra	  note	  370,	  para	  23.	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creditworthiness	   of	   the	   beneficiary	   airline’.415	   Such	   a	   refusal	  would	   not	   amount	   to	   an	   abuse,	   as	   non-­‐
dominant	  firms	  would	  also	  have	  rejected	  such	  an	  agreement.	  
	  
Another	  possibility	  is	  that	  a	  dominant	  undertaking	  is	  simply	  taking	  reasonable	  and	  proportionate	  steps	  
to	  protect	  its	  commercial	  interests.416	  Such	  steps	  include	  a	  competitive	  response	  to	  behaviour	  by	  other	  
market	  participants.	  In	  United	  Brands,	  the	  Court	  confirmed	  that	  ‘[t]he	  fact	  [that]	  an	  undertaking	  is	  in	  a	  
dominant	   position	   cannot	   disentitle	   it	   from	   protecting	   its	   own	   commercial	   interests	   if	   they	   are	  
attacked’.417	   The	   judgment	   reflects	   the	   idea	   that	   a	   dominant	   firm,	   notwithstanding	   its	   ‘special	  
responsibility’,	  is	  still	  entitled	  to	  a	  degree	  of	  commercial	  freedom.418	  It	  attaches	  legal	  significance	  to	  the	  
statement	   that	   being	   in	   a	   dominant	   position	   is	   not	   abusive	   as	   such.419	   Importantly,	   United	   Brands	  
suggests	   that	  an	  undertaking	   is	  entitled	   to	   take	   the	  steps	   that	   it	  deems	  necessary	  while	  protecting	   its	  
commercial	   interests.420	   This	   implies	   that,	   in	   principle,	   it	   is	   up	   to	   the	  dominant	   firm	   to	  determine	   the	  
appropriate	  course	  of	  action.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
415	  Commission	  decision	  in	  Case	  IV/33.544	  British	  Midland	  v	  Aer	  Lingus	  [1992]	  OJ	  L	  96/34,	  paras.	  25-­‐26.	  
Interestingly,	  the	  Commission	  seems	  to	  have	  had	  regard	  to	  normal	  business	  conduct	  in	  that	  specific	  sector,	  noting	  
that	  interlining	  ‘has	  for	  many	  years	  been	  accepted	  industry	  practice’.	  
416	  Albors-­‐Llorens	  2007,	  supra	  note	  332,	  at	  1741.	  The	  countermeasures	  taken	  must	  be	  'fair'	  and	  'proportionate'.	  
See	  e.g.	  Sot.	  Lélos,	  supra	  note	  375,	  para	  69.	  See	  also	  Case	  T-­‐219/99	  British	  Airways	  v	  Commission	  [2003]	  ECR	  II-­‐
5917,	  para	  243,	  referring	  to	  ‘reasonable	  steps’.	  The	  dominant	  undertaking	  may	  be	  led	  by	  quality	  considerations:	  
AKZO,	  supra	  note	  351,	  para	  70;	  Case	  T-­‐229/94	  Deutsche	  Bahn	  v	  Commission	  [1997]	  ECR	  II-­‐1689,	  para	  78.	  See	  also	  
BPB	  (General	  Court),	  supra	  note	  409,	  para	  117;	  Irish	  Sugar	  (General	  Court),	  supra	  note	  353,	  para	  112	  and	  189.See	  
also	  Commission	  decision	  in	  Case	  IV/32.279	  BBI/Boosey	  &	  Hawkes	  [1987]	  OJ	  L	  286/36,	  para	  19.	  The	  Commission	  
noted	  that	  measures	  by	  the	  dominant	  firm	  ‘must	  be	  fair	  and	  proportional	  to	  the	  threat’.	  
417	  Case	  27/76	  United	  Brands	  v	  Commission	  [1978]	  ECR	  207,	  para	  189.	  	  
418	  See	  e.g.	  Case	  T-­‐5/97	  Industrie	  des	  Poudres	  Sphériques	  [2000]	  ECR	  II-­‐3759,	  para	  77.	  The	  General	  Court	  held	  that	  
the	  dominant	  firm	  does	  not	  need	  to	  act	  according	  to	  all	  the	  wishes	  of	  its	  customers.	  The	  Court	  held	  that	  ‘[a]	  firm	  is	  
not	  committed	  to	  adapt	  its	  production	  to	  satisfy	  specific	  customers’	  needs’.	  
419	  See	  e.g.	  Michelin	  I,	  supra	  note	  334,	  para	  57:	  ‘[a]	  finding	  that	  an	  undertaking	  has	  a	  dominant	  position	  is	  not	  in	  
itself	  a	  recrimination’.	  
420	  United	  Brands,	  supra	  note	  417,	  para	  189.	  This	  indicates	  that	  there	  is	  no	  strict	  necessity	  test;	  otherwise	  the	  
dominant	  firm	  would	  only	  have	  the	  option	  to	  opt	  for	  the	  course	  of	  action	  that	  would	  restrict	  competition	  the	  least.	  
For	  the	  relevance	  of	  defensive	  measures,	  see	  AKZO,	  supra	  note	  351,	  para	  156.	  See,	  however,	  Irish	  Sugar	  (General	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However,	  various	  judgments	  by	  the	  General	  Court	  have	  adopted	  a	  much	  narrower	  conception	  of	  what	  
dominant	   firms	   are	   still	   allowed	   to	   do	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   commercial	   freedom.	   The	   General	   Court	  
suggested	   in	   British	   Airways	   and	   Solvay	   that	   a	   dominant	   firm	   cannot	   justify	   a	   countermeasure	   that	  
strengthens	   its	  dominant	  position.421	  The	  General	  Court’s	  BPB	   judgment	  also	  upholds	  a	  narrow	  idea	  of	  
what	   a	   dominant	   firm	   can	   justify	   under	   its	   commercial	   freedom,	   suggesting	   that	   conduct	   cannot	   be	  
justified	  if	  it	  is	  ‘intended	  or	  likely	  to	  affect	  the	  structure	  of	  a	  market’.422	  	  
	  
I	  believe	  that	  these	  judgments	  by	  the	  General	  Court	  offer	  too	  little	  room	  for	  the	  commercial	  freedom	  of	  
dominant	  firms.	  If	  taken	  literally,	  the	  judgments	  would	  render	  illusory	  the	  important	  right	  of	  dominant	  
firms	   to	   defend	   their	   own	   interests.423	   Any	   successful	   protection	   of	   their	   commercial	   position	   could	  
theoretically	   be	   viewed	   as	   a	   strengthening	   of	   their	  market	   position.	   Such	   a	   rigorous	  wing	   clipping	   of	  
dominant	   firms	   would	   come	   close	   to	   prohibiting	   the	   dominant	   position	   itself	   –	   even	   though	   well-­‐
established	  case	  law	  clearly	  holds	  that	  such	  a	  position	  is	  not	  unlawful	  in	  itself.424	  There	  is	  simply	  no	  basis	  
to	   prohibit	   dominant	   firms	   from	   competing	   vigorously	   on	   the	  merits.425	   Indeed,	   such	   a	   prohibition	   is	  
likely	   to	   chill	   competition	   and	   reduce	   consumer	  welfare.	   For	   example,	   the	   dominant	   undertaking	   has	  
less	  incentive	  to	  develop	  innovative	  technologies	  that	  may	  have	  a	  disruptive	  effect.	  Another	  risk	  is	  that	  it	  
may	  facilitate	  oligopolistic	  behaviour.	  As	  the	  smaller	  firms	  know	  that	  the	  biggest	  company	  on	  the	  market	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Court),	  supra	  note	  353,	  para	  187:	  ‘the	  defensive	  nature	  of	  the	  practice	  complained	  of	  in	  this	  case	  [a	  discriminatory	  
rebate,	  TvdV]	  cannot	  alter	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  constitutes	  an	  abuse’.	  
421	  See	  British	  Airways	  (General	  Court),	  supra	  note	  416,	  para	  243;	  and	  Case	  T-­‐57/01	  Solvay	  v	  Commission	  [2009]	  
ECR	  II-­‐4621,	  para	  315.	  The	  General	  Court	  held	  that	  ‘such	  behaviour	  cannot	  be	  allowed	  if	  its	  purpose	  is	  to	  
strengthen	  that	  dominant	  position	  and	  thereby	  abuse	  it.’	  The	  word	  ‘thereby’	  could	  be	  interpreted	  as	  meaning	  that	  
the	  abuse	  will	  follow	  directly	  from	  the	  strengthening	  of	  the	  dominant	  position.	  The	  case	  is	  currently	  pending	  for	  an	  
appeal	  at	  the	  ECJ,	  Case	  C-­‐109/10.	  
422	  BPB	  (General	  Court),	  supra	  note	  409,	  paras	  117-­‐118.	  See,	  for	  a	  similarly	  stringent	  approach,	  Case	  T-­‐203/01	  
Michelin	  v	  Commission	  (‘Michelin	  II’)	  [2003]	  ECR	  II-­‐4071,	  paras	  239-­‐241.	  
423	  Albors-­‐Llorens	  2007,	  supra	  note	  332,	  at	  1744-­‐1745.	  At	  1745,	  Albors-­‐Llorens	  interprets	  the	  consequences	  of	  BPB	  
(supra	  note	  409)	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  a	  dominant	  company	  is	  only	  nominally	  entitled	  to	  protect	  its	  commercial	  
interests’.	  At	  1745,	  Albors-­‐Llorens	  notes	  that	  ‘[t]his	  effectively	  rules	  out	  the	  success	  of	  a	  ‘meeting	  competition’	  line	  
of	  justification’.	  
424	  Michelin	  I,	  supra	  note	  334,	  para	  57;	  TeliaSonera,	  supra	  note	  347,	  para	  24.	  
425	  See	  e.g.	  Deutsche	  Telekom,	  supra	  note	  336,	  para	  177.	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has	  been	  put	  in	  a	  straightjacket,	  there	  is	  much	  less	  uncertainty	  about	  what	  competitive	  behaviour	  it	  will	  
exhibit	  –	  even	  though	  such	  uncertainty	  is	  key	  to	  healthy	  competition.426	  Finally,	  the	  formalistic	  approach	  
in	   the	   judgments	   above	   is	   difficult	   to	   reconcile	   with	   the	   importance	   attached	   to	   an	   effects-­‐based	  
approach	  (as	  examined	  by	  section	  4.6).427	  In	  sum,	  I	  do	  not	  think	  that	  the	  weakened	  competition	  on	  the	  
market	  will	  necessarily	  be	  resolved	  by	  restricting	  the	  dominant	  firm’s	  commercial	  freedom	  to	  compete	  
on	  the	  merits.	  Instead,	  I	  prefer	  the	  approach	  by	  United	  Brands	  that	  clearly	  shows	  that	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  
will	  not	  be	  violated	  merely	  because	  of	  the	  strengthening	  of	  a	  dominant	  position.	  There	  must	  also	  be	  an	  
abuse.428	  If	  a	  dominant	  firm	  protects	  its	  commercial	  interests	  and	  its	  market	  share	  simultaneously	  goes	  
up,	  it	  should	  not	  ipso	  facto	  lead	  to	  a	  finding	  of	  an	  abuse.	  	  
	  
In	  an	  OECD	  policy	  document,	  Friederiszick	  and	  Gratzà	  question	  whether	  competition	  on	  the	  merits	  can	  
be	   an	   objective	   justification.429	   Their	   argument	   seems	   to	   be	   that	   competition	   on	   the	   merits	   cannot	  
constitute	   a	  prima	   facie	   abuse,	   and	   –	   accordingly	   –	   does	   not	   reach	   the	   stage	   of	   justification.430	   Their	  
position	  is	  compelling	  if	  one	  can	  clearly	  separate	  reasons	  that	  remove	  the	  conduct	  from	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  
prima	   facie	  prohibition,	  and	   reasons	   that	  provide	  a	   justification.	  As	  noted	  before,	   such	  a	  distinction	   is	  
often	  difficult	  to	  make.431	  An	  example	  is	  where	  a	  dominant	  undertaking	  engages	  in	  price	  differentiation	  
–	  its	  reasons	  for	  doing	  so	  can	  equally	  be	  directed	  towards	  a	  finding	  of	  a	  prima	  facie	  abuse	  as	  well	  as	  a	  
justification	   plea.	   The	   suggestion	   by	   Friederiszick	   and	  Gratzà	  may	   also	   entail	   difficulties	   to	   the	   extent	  
that	   a	   jurisdiction	   relies	   on	   a	   formalistic	   approach	   for	   a	   prima	   facie	   finding	   of	   abuse.432	   In	   such	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
426	  See	  e.g.	  Case	  C-­‐8/08	  T-­‐Mobile	  [2009]	  ECR	  I-­‐4529,	  para	  35.	  
427	  See	  e.g.	  Post	  Danmark,	  supra	  note	  381;	  British	  Airways,	  supra	  note	  341.	  
428	  United	  Brands,	  supra	  note	  417,	  para	  189.	  An	  objective	  justification	  will	  not	  be	  accepted	  if	  the	  ‘actual	  purpose’	  of	  
the	  dominant	  firm	  is	  to	  strengthen	  its	  dominant	  position	  and	  abuse	  it.	  
429	  Friederiszick	  and	  Gratzà	  2012,	  supra	  note	  408.	  
430	  Ibid.,	  at	  36.	  
431	  See	  e.g.	  prima	  facie	  abusive	  price	  discrimination,	  which	  may	  follow	  from	  price	  differentiation	  relatively	  easily.	  
The	  justification	  plea	  then	  allows	  an	  examination	  of	  relevant	  cost	  differences	  or	  other	  reasons	  for	  the	  
differentiation.	  See	  e.g.	  Tournier,	  supra	  note	  392,	  para	  42;	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Warner	  in	  BP,	  supra	  note	  338,	  at	  1534.	  
See	  also,	  for	  examples	  in	  other	  areas,	  the	  examination	  of	  case	  law	  on	  the	  internal	  market	  and	  Article	  101	  TFEU,	  in	  
Chapter	  II.	  	  
432	  Notwithstanding	  the	  ‘more	  economic’	  approach,	  there	  are	  still	  many	  remnants	  of	  a	  form-­‐based	  approach	  in	  EU	  
competition	  law.	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framework,	  a	  prima	  facie	  abuse	  may	  be	  found	  relatively	  easily,	  leaving	  only	  the	  justification	  stage	  to	  put	  
the	  conduct	  under	  review	  into	  context.	   In	  sum,	  although	   it	  may	  be	  that	  competition	  on	  the	  merits	   (as	  
any	  legitimate	  business	  behaviour)	  may	  often	  fall	  outside	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  a	  prima	  facie	  abuse	  altogether,	  
there	  can	  also	  be	  instances	  where	  the	  objective	  justification	  concept	  is	  useful	  to	  cover	  any	  conduct	  that	  
passes	  the	  prima	  facie	  stage	  even	  though	  it	  is	  perfectly	  legitimate.	  
	  
3.4.3 Legitimate	  business	  behaviour	  –	  objective	  necessity	  
Conduct	   may	   also	   be	   considered	   legitimate	   business	   behaviour	   if	   the	   surrounding	   context	   leads	   the	  
dominant	   firm	   to	   act	   in	   a	   particular	   way,	   often	   referred	   to	   as	   ‘objective	   necessity’.433	   Such	   objective	  
necessity	  can	  be	  an	  objective	  justification	  to	  the	  extent	  that	   it	  explains	  why	  the	  dominant	  undertaking	  
entered	  into	  a	  prima	  facie	  abuse.	  Objective	  necessity	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  degree.	  A	  situation	  of	  force	  majeure	  
or	  State	  compulsion	  may	  exist	  if	  it	  leaves	  the	  dominant	  undertaking	  no	  alternative	  other	  than	  to	  enter	  a	  
prima	   facie	   abuse.	   A	   lighter	   degree	   of	   objective	   necessity	   may	   exist	   if	   the	   dominant	   undertaking	   is	  
compelled	   to	   act	   in	   a	   particular	   way	   due	   to	   technical	   or	   commercial	   considerations.434	   This	   lighter	  
version	  may	   sometimes	   be	   difficult	   to	   distinguish	   from	   the	   ‘commercial	   freedom’	   category	   examined	  
above	  in	  Section	  3.4.2.	  Technical	  and	  commercial	  reasons	  will	  often	  provide	  important	  input	  as	  to	  when	  
competition	  should	  be	  considered	  as	  ‘normal’.	  So	  why	  is	  it	  useful	  to	  make	  a	  distinction	  nonetheless?	  To	  
my	  mind,	  the	  underlying	  reason	  to	  maintain	  a	  distinction	  is	  as	  follows:	  commercial	  freedom	  implies	  that	  
the	   dominant	   undertaking	   still	   has	   a	   degree	   of	   leeway	   in	   its	   business	   behaviour,	   whereas	   objective	  
necessity	  implies	  that	  the	  firm	  could	  not	  reasonably	  have	  acted	  otherwise.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
433	  See	  the	  Commission	  guidance	  on	  enforcement	  priorities,	  supra	  note	  378,	  para	  28.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  ‘objective	  
necessity’	  refers	  to	  State	  compulsion	  it	  is	  true	  that,	  following	  from	  the	  primacy	  of	  EU	  law	  over	  domestic	  law,	  NCAs	  
are	  required	  to	  disapply	  national	  law	  that	  infringes	  EU	  (competition)	  law.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  NCAs	  may	  not	  impose	  
penalties	  in	  respect	  of	  conduct	  required	  by	  national	  law.	  NCAs	  may,	  however,	  impose	  penalties	  where	  national	  law	  
merely	  ‘facilitated	  or	  encouraged’	  the	  conduct.	  See	  Case	  C-­‐198/01	  CIF	  [2003]	  ECR	  I-­‐8055,	  para	  58.	  For	  an	  analysis	  
of	  compulsion	  by	  a	  foreign	  State,	  see	  M.	  Martyniszyn,	  ‘A	  Comparative	  Look	  at	  Foreign	  State	  Compulsion	  as	  a	  
Defence	  in	  Antitrust	  Litigation’,	  (2012)	  8	  The	  Competition	  Law	  Review	  143.	  
434	  Télémarketing,	  supra	  note	  331,	  paras	  26-­‐27.	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The	  Télémarketing	  case	  was	  an	  early	  acknowledgment	  that	  technical	  and	  commercial	  reasons	  can	  offer	  
an	  objective	  necessity	  for	  prima	  facie	  abusive	  conduct.435	  Such	  reasons	  could	  thus	  provide	  a	  reason	  for	  a	  
dominant	   undertaking	   to	   reserve	   to	   itself	   an	   ancillary	   activity	   on	   a	   neighbouring	  market	   on	   which	   it	  
holds	  a	  dominant	  position.436	  Technical	  and	  commercial	  constraints	  may	  be	  particularly	  relevant	   in	  the	  
examination	  of	  a	  possible	  objective	  justification	  in	  a	  refusal	  to	  deal	  case.437	  There	  may,	  for	  example,	  be	  
physical	   limitations.	   An	   example	   is	   the	   Commission	   decision	   in	   Port	   of	   Rødby.438	   The	   Commission	  
observed	  that	  an	  undertaking	  that	  owns	  or	  manages	  an	  essential	  port	  facility	  from	  which	  it	  provides	  a	  
maritime	   transport	   service	   may	   not,	   without	   objective	   justification,	   refuse	   to	   grant	   access	   to	   a	  
competitor.439	  The	  Commission	  examined	  whether	  there	  were	  technical	  constraints,	  such	  as	  insufficient	  
capacity,	   that	   prevented	   the	   competitor	   from	   entering	   the	   market.440	   On	   the	   facts,	   the	   Commission	  
found	  no	  such	  constraints.	  	  
	  
The	  surrounding	  circumstances	  may	  also	  be	  pressing	  to	  such	  an	  extent,	  as	  to	  lead	  to	  a	  situation	  of	  force	  
majeure.	  Such	  a	  situation	  arises	  if	  external	  factors	  leave	  the	  dominant	  undertaking	  with	  no	  possibility	  to	  
act	  otherwise.	  The	  underlying	  rationale	  is	  that	  an	  abuse	  implies	  autonomous	  conduct	  that	  undertakings	  
engage	   in	   on	   their	   own	   initiative	   (the	   following	   Section	   on	   State	   compulsion	   examines	   autonomy	   in	  
more	   detail).	   441	   An	   example	   of	   force	   majeure	   is	   the	   UK	   Aberdeen	   Journals	   case,	   where	   the	   OFT	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
435	  Télémarketing	  (ibid.),	  para	  26.	  For	  a	  more	  elaborate	  explanation,	  see	  Østerud	  2010,	  supra	  note	  332,	  at	  254-­‐255.	  
The	  Télémarketing	  case	  is	  still	  standing	  case	  law,	  see	  e.g.	  the	  reference	  in	  Post	  Danmark,	  supra	  note	  381,	  para	  41.	  
436	  Case	  18/88	  RTT	  v	  GB-­‐Inno-­‐BM	  [1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐5941,	  para	  18.	  
437	  Objective	  justification	  is	  a	  necessary	  step	  in	  the	  examination	  of	  such	  cases,	  see	  IMS	  Health,	  supra	  note	  394,	  
paras	  51-­‐52.	  
438	  Commission	  decision	  94/119/EC,	  Port	  of	  Rødby,	  OJ	  [1994]	  L	  55/52.	  
439	  Ibid.,	  para	  12.	  
440	  Ibid.,	  para	  15.	  
441	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐359/95	  P	  and	  C-­‐379/95	  P	  Commission	  and	  France	  v	  Ladbroke	  Racing	  [1997]	  ECR	  I-­‐6265,	  	  para	  33.	  
Joined	  Cases	  40/73	  to	  48/73,	  50/73,	  54/73	  to	  56/73,111/73,	  113/73	  and	  114/73	  Suiker	  Unie	  and	  Others	  v	  
Commission	  [1975]	  ECR	  1663,	  paras	  65,	  66,	  71	  and	  72.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  ECJ	  held	  that	  the	  Commission	  insufficiently	  
took	  into	  account	  government	  measures	  that	  greatly	  narrowed	  the	  competitive	  scope	  of	  the	  undertakings.	  The	  ECJ	  
concluded	  that	  the	  conduct	  could	  not	  appreciably	  impede	  competition.	  See	  also	  the	  case	  law	  cited	  in	  infra	  note	  
451.	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investigated	   below-­‐cost	   pricing	   of	   advertising	   space.442	   Although	   Aberdeen	   Journal’s	   prices	   were	   at	  
some	  point	  below	  average	  variable	  costs,443	  the	  OFT	  did	  accept	  an	  objective	  justification	  for	  the	  period	  
in	  which	   Aberdeen	   Journals	   incurred	   high	   costs	   due	   to	   a	   threat	   of	   industrial	   action.444	   The	   seemingly	  
predatory	  prices	  were	  caused	  by	  exceptionally	  high	  costs,	  rather	  than	   low	  prices	  targeted	  at	  excluding	  
competition.	   There	   is	   a	   sound	   reason	   to	   condone	   prices	   below	   average	   variable	   costs	   if	   it	   was	   truly	  
impossible	   for	   the	   dominant	   firm	   to	   prevent	   such	   prices.	   This	   could	   be	   through	   the	   application	   of	   a	  
justification,	  as	  happened	  in	  Aberdeen	  Journals,	  or	  through	  a	  finding	  that	  there	  was	  no	  prima	  facie	  abuse	  
in	  the	  first	  place,	  as	  the	  conduct	  was	  unable	  to	  exclude	  competitors.445	  
	  
Objective	   necessity	   may	   also	   arise	   from	   compulsion	   by	   the	   State.	   A	   national	   measure	   may	   draw	   a	  
dominant	   undertaking	   into	   a	  prima	   facie	   abuse.446	   The	   plea	  will	   not	   succeed	   if	   the	   conduct	   is	   simply	  
brought	  about	  or	  encouraged	  by	  national	  law.447	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  requires	  undertakings	  to	  make	  full	  use	  
of	  the	  leeway	  that	  they	  have	  to	  prevent	  a	  restriction	  of	  competition.448	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
442	  See	  the	  OFT	  decision	  of	  25	  September	  2002,	  Aberdeen	  Journals	  (remitted	  case),	  Case	  CA98/14/2002,	  upheld	  by	  
the	  CAT	  in	  Aberdeen	  Journals	  v	  Director	  General	  of	  Fair	  Trading	  [2003]	  CAT	  11.	  
443	  The	  OFT	  presumes	  this	  conduct	  to	  be	  abusive	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  AKZO	  test,	  supra	  note	  351.	  See	  the	  OFT	  
Decision	  of	  25	  September	  2002	  (ibid),	  paras.	  175-­‐180.	  
444	  Ibid.,	  para	  205.	  
445	  The	  route	  will	  depend	  on	  how	  formalistic	  a	  jurisdiction	  approaches	  the	  issue	  of	  prima	  facie	  abuse.	  	  
446	  This	  paragraph	  refers	  equally	  to	  cases	  on	  Article	  101	  and	  102	  TFEU,	  but	  I	  will	  simply	  refer	  to	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  
447	  Note	  that,	  in	  such	  a	  case,	  there	  is	  no	  necessary	  conflict	  between	  EU	  law	  and	  domestic	  law.	  See	  Télémarketing,	  
supra	  note	  331,	  para	  16.	  See	  also	  Case	  26/75	  General	  Motors	  v	  Commission	  [1975]	  ECR	  1367;	  Case	  13/77	  Inno	  v	  
Atab	  [1977]	  ECR	  2115;	  Case	  41/83	  Italy	  v	  Commission	  [1985]	  ECR	  873.	  The	  regulatory	  framework	  may,	  however,	  
provide	  a	  mitigating	  factor	  in	  determining	  the	  level	  of	  the	  fine.	  See	  e.g.	  Case	  C-­‐198/01	  CIF	  [2003]	  ECR	  I-­‐8055,	  para	  
57.	  See	  also	  Suiker	  Unie,	  supra	  note	  441,	  para	  620.	  
448	  Indeed,	  many	  of	  the	  key	  cases	  on	  the	  matter	  showed	  that	  there	  was	  still	  a	  degree	  of	  competitive	  leeway	  left.	  
See	  e.g.	  CIF	  (ibid),	  para	  68	  and	  73;	  Case	  123/83	  BNIC	  v	  Clair	  [1985]	  ECR	  391,	  para	  22	  (on	  a	  minimum	  price	  for	  a	  
product);	  Case	  T-­‐271/03	  Deutsche	  Telekom	  v	  Commission	  [2008]	  ECR	  II-­‐477,	  para	  107	  and	  121	  (noting	  that	  DT	  had	  
sufficient	  scope	  to	  set	  its	  prices	  at	  a	  level	  that	  would	  have	  enabled	  it	  to	  end	  or	  reduce	  the	  margin	  squeeze	  at	  
issue).	  See	  also	  Joined	  Cases	  209/78	  to	  215/78	  and	  218/78	  Van	  Landewyck	  v	  Commission	  [1980]	  ECR	  3125,	  
paragraphs	  130-­‐131	  (noting	  that	  there	  was	  still	  some	  scope	  for	  competition,	  even	  though	  the	  competitors	  could	  
exert	  little	  influence	  on	  the	  level	  of	  the	  retail	  selling	  price);	  Joined	  Cases	  240/82	  to	  242/82,	  261/82,	  262/82,	  268/82	  
and	  269/82	  Stichting	  Sigarettenindustrie	  and	  Others	  v	  Commission	  [1985]	  ECR	  3831,	  paragraphs	  27	  -­‐29	  (noting	  that	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The	  situation	  is	  different	  if	  the	  national	  measure	  allows	  no	  scope	  for	  autonomous	  conduct,449	  and	  is	  not	  
obviously	  incompatible	  with	  EU	  law	  (which	  I	  shall	  assume	  in	  the	  following	  paragraphs).450	  There	  is	  ample	  
case	  law	  that	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  applies	  only	  to	  anti-­‐competitive	  conduct	  engaged	  in	  by	  undertakings	  on	  
their	  own	   initiative,	   not	   to	  measures	   that	   required	  by	   the	  State.451	  According	   to	  Ladbroke,	  Article	  102	  
TFEU	  does	  not	  apply	   if	  national	   legislation	  completely	  bars	  any	  possibility	  of	  competition.452	  There	  are	  
two	   solid	   reasons	   for	   this	   approach:453	   First,	  Article	  102	  TFEU	   implicitly	   requires	   that	   the	   restriction	   is	  
attributable	   to	   the	   autonomous	   conduct	   of	   the	   undertaking	   –	   which	   is	   absent	   in	   the	   case	   of	   State	  
compulsion.454	  Second,	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  clearly	  targets	  conduct	  of	  undertakings,	  rather	  than	  measures	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the	  State	  measures	  laid	  down	  a	  maximum	  price,	  which	  still	  allowed	  lower	  prices).	  See	  also	  Ladbroke	  Racing,	  supra	  
note	  441,	  para	  34-­‐35	  and	  Case	  T-­‐513/93	  Consiglio	  nazionale	  degli	  spedizionieri	  doganali	  v	  Commission	  ECR	  II-­‐1810,	  
para	  61.	  
449	  See,	  a	  contrario,	  CIF	  (ibid),	  para	  56.	  Deutsche	  Telekom,	  supra	  note	  336,	  para	  81;	  E.	  Blomme,	  ‘State	  Action	  as	  a	  
Defence	  Against	  81	  and	  82	  EC’,	  (2007)	  30	  World	  Competition	  243.	  See	  also	  Whish	  2009,	  supra	  note	  331,	  p.	  135.	  
450	  Cf	  footnote	  43	  by	  AG	  Cosmas	  in	  Ladbroke	  Racing,	  supra	  note	  441.	  Cosmas	  noted	  that:	  ‘[i]f	  […]	  the	  national	  
legislation	  is	  obviously	  contrary	  to	  [EU]	  law,	  a	  fact	  of	  which	  the	  undertaking	  is	  aware,	  I	  see	  no	  reason	  why	  the	  latter	  
should	  be	  shielded	  by	  the	  State	  measure	  and	  thus	  avoid	  the	  sanctions	  of	  Article	  [101	  TFEU]’.	  This	  position	  is	  based	  
on	  the	  fact	  that	  primary	  EU	  law,	  including	  Article	  102	  TFEU,	  has	  primacy	  over	  domestic	  legislation.	  See	  Case	  6/64	  
Costa	  v	  ENEL	  [1964]	  ECR	  585.	  This	  hierarchy	  of	  norms	  explains	  why	  ‘[t]he	  Commission	  cannot	  be	  bound	  by	  a	  
decision	  taken	  by	  a	  national	  body	  pursuant	  to	  Article	  [102	  TFEU]’,	  see	  Deutsche	  Telekom	  (General	  Court),	  supra	  
note	  448,	  para	  120.	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  an	  ex	  ante	  assessment	  of	  compatibility	  with	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  is	  rarely	  
unambiguous,	  providing	  an	  obvious	  dilemma	  for	  a	  dominant	  undertaking	  on	  how	  to	  act.	  	  
451	  Case	  267/86	  Van	  Eycke	  v	  Aspa	  [1988]	  ECR	  4769,	  para	  16;	  RTT	  v	  GB-­‐Inno-­‐BM,	  supra	  note	  436,	  para	  20;	  Case	  C-­‐
320/91	  Corbeau	  [1993]	  ECR	  I-­‐2533,	  para	  10.	  Case	  C-­‐202/88	  France	  v	  Commission	  [1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐1223,	  para	  55	  
(noting	  that	  ‘anti-­‐competitive	  conduct	  engaged	  in	  by	  undertakings	  on	  their	  own	  initiative	  can	  be	  called	  in	  question	  
only	  by	  individual	  decisions	  adopted	  under	  Articles	  [101]	  and	  [102]	  of	  the	  Treaty’	  [italics	  added	  by	  author]);	  Case	  
41/83	  Italy	  v	  Commission	  [1985]	  ECR	  873,	  paras	  18	  to	  20;	  Ladbroke	  Racing,	  supra	  note	  441,	  para	  33.	  
452	  Ladbroke	  Racing,	  supra	  note	  441,	  paras	  33-­‐34.	  
453	  Note	  that,	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  hierarchy	  of	  norms,	  it	  is	  counterintuitive	  to	  consider	  that	  national	  law	  
may	  limit	  the	  application	  of	  EU	  law.	  However,	  it	  should	  be	  remembered	  that	  potential	  conflicts	  often	  involve	  a	  very	  
specific	  obligation	  under	  national	  law	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  relatively	  vague	  prohibition	  in	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  	  
454	  Ladbroke	  Racing,	  supra	  note	  441,	  para	  33.	  See	  also	  Suiker	  Unie,	  supra	  note	  441,	  paras	  65,	  66,	  71	  and	  72.	  In	  
Suiker	  Unie,	  the	  ECJ	  held	  that	  the	  Commission	  insufficiently	  took	  into	  account	  government	  measures	  that	  greatly	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by	  Member	  States.455	  Member	  States	  are	  bound	  by	  separate	  Treaty	  requirements,	  such	  as	  Article	  106(1)	  
TFEU.456	  This	  provision	  prohibits	  Member	  States	  from	  placing	  public	  undertakings	  and	  undertakings	  with	  
exclusive	  rights	  in	  a	  position	  in	  which	  they	  would	  necessarily	  infringe	  Article	  102	  TFEU.457	  In	  sum,	  if	  the	  
State	  leaves	  no	  room	  for	  an	  undertaking	  to	  act	  in	  compliance	  with	  Article	  102	  TFEU,	  its	  conduct	  should	  
be	  considered	  objectively	  justified.	  Only	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  dominant	  undertaking	  can	  be	  certain	  that	  
the	  national	  measure	  is	  contrary	  to	  EU	  law	  (for	  example:	  if	  an	  NCA	  has	  disapplied	  the	  relevant	  measure	  
on	  the	  basis	  of	  CIF),	  should	  the	  possibility	  of	  liability	  reappear.458	  
	  
However,	  the	  case	  law	  also	  provides	  various	  indications	  suggesting	  a	  different	  approach.	  Apart	  from	  the	  
prohibition	   laid	   down	   in	   Article	   106(1)	   TFEU,	   the	   case	   law	   has	   developed	   a	  more	   general	   rule	   that	   a	  
Member	   State	   is	   not	   allowed	   to	   introduce	   or	   maintain	   measures	   that	   may	   render	   ineffective	   the	  
competition	   rules	   applicable	   to	   undertakings.459	   Such	   measures	   may	   lead	   to	   an	   infringement	   of	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
narrowed	  the	  competitive	  scope	  of	  the	  undertakings.	  The	  ECJ	  concluded	  that	  the	  conduct	  could	  not	  appreciably	  
impede	  competition.	  
455	  See	  e.g.	  Case	  C-­‐1/12	  Ordem	  dos	  Técnicos	  Oficias	  de	  Contas	  v	  Autoridade	  da	  Concorrência	  [2013]	  nyr,	  para	  54:	  
‘when	  a	  Member	  State	  grants	  regulatory	  powers	  to	  a	  professional	  association,	  whilst	  defining	  the	  public-­‐interest	  
criteria	  and	  the	  essential	  principles	  with	  which	  its	  rules	  must	  comply	  and	  retaining	  its	  power	  to	  adopt	  decisions	  in	  
the	  last	  resort,	  the	  rules	  adopted	  by	  the	  professional	  association	  remain	  State	  measures	  and	  are	  not	  covered	  by	  
the	  Treaty	  rules	  applicable	  to	  undertakings’.	  
456	  Note	  that	  undertakings	  entrusted	  with	  a	  service	  of	  general	  economic	  interest	  are	  exempted	  from	  the	  
application	  of	  the	  competition	  rules	  in	  so	  far	  as	  necessary	  for	  those	  services.	  See	  Article	  106(2)	  TFEU;	  Case	  C-­‐
393/92	  Gemeente	  Almelo	  and	  Others	  v	  Energiebedrijf	  IJsselmij	  [1994]	  ECR	  I-­‐1477,	  para	  46.	  Corbeau,	  supra	  note	  
451,	  paras	  13-­‐14.	  
457	  RTT,	  supra	  note	  436,	  paras	  20-­‐21;	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐271,	  281	  and	  289/90	  Spain,	  Belgium	  and	  Italy	  v	  Commission	  
[1992]	  ECR	  I-­‐5833,	  para	  36.	  
458	  See	  e.g.	  P.-­‐J.	  Slot	  &	  A.	  Johnston,	  An	  Introduction	  to	  Competition	  Law	  (Hart	  Publishing:	  Oxford	  and	  Portland,	  
Oregon	  2006),	  at	  275.	  See	  e.g.	  the	  CIF	  case,	  supra	  note	  447,	  para	  51.	  If	  a	  National	  Competition	  Authority	  disapplies	  
a	  national	  measure	  as	  it	  infringes	  the	  EU	  competition	  rules,	  the	  dominant	  undertaking	  can	  no	  longer	  rely	  on	  the	  
Ladbroke	  Racing	  rule	  (supra	  note	  441).	  
459	  CIF,	  supra	  note	  447,	  para	  45.	  See	  also	  Case	  13/77	  GB-­‐Inno-­‐BM	  [1977]	  ECR	  2115,	  para	  31;	  Van	  Eycke,	  supra	  note	  
451,	  para	  16;	  Case	  C-­‐185/91	  Reiff	  [1993]	  ECR	  I-­‐5801,	  para	  14;	  Case	  C-­‐153/93	  Delta	  Schiffahrts-­‐	  und	  
Speditionsgesellschaft	  [1994]	  ECR	  I-­‐2517,	  para	  14;	  Case	  C-­‐96/94	  Centro	  Servizi	  Spediporto	  [1995]	  ECR	  I-­‐2883,	  para	  
20;	  and	  Case	  C-­‐35/99	  Arduino	  [2002]	  ECR	  I-­‐1529,	  para	  34.	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combination	  of	  provisions:	  Article	  102	  TFEU,460	  the	  objective	  of	  undistorted	  competition	  (Protocol	  27),461	  
and	  the	  duty	  of	  loyal	  cooperation	  (Article	  4(3)	  TEU).462	  Crucially,	  this	  line	  of	  reasoning	  suggests	  that	  such	  
conduct	  cannot	  be	   imputed	   to	   the	  dominant	   firm,463	  but	   is	   still	   considered	   to	  be	  an	  abuse.464	  Perhaps	  
the	   ECJ	   considered	   that	   it	   could	   only	   hold	   a	   Member	   State	   accountable	   if	   there	   was	   an	   underlying	  
infringement	  of	  the	  competition	  rules.	  
	  
The	  second	  approach,	  although	  technically	  perhaps	  more	  ‘pure’,	  has	  considerable	  drawbacks	  when	  one	  
considers	   the	   implications	   for	   a	   private	   law	   action.	   Article	   16(1)	   of	   Regulation	   1/2003	   provides	   that	  
national	   courts	   cannot	   take	   decisions	   running	   counter	   to	   a	   decision	   already	   adopted	   by	   the	  
Commission.465	  In	  the	  context	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU,	  this	  should	  normally	  mean	  that	  a	  national	  court,	  in	  a	  
private	   follow-­‐on	   action,	   should	   follow	   the	   finding	   of	   an	   abuse.	   Although	   the	   abuse	   may	   not	   be	  
imputable	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  EU	  public	  enforcement,	   I	  doubt	  whether	  this	  conclusion	  on	  imputability	  
can	  be	  transposed	  just	  as	  easily	  to	  a	  private	  enforcement	  setting.	  Given	  the	  absence	  of	  detailed	  EU	  law	  
on	  the	  matter,	  Member	  States	  still	  have	  ample	  freedom	  to	  decide	  on	  the	  rules	  on	  imputability	  in	  private	  
law	  actions	  –	  466	  as	  long	  as	  they	  conform	  to	  the	  principles	  of	  ‘equivalence’467	  and	  ‘effectiveness’.468	  It	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
460	  Or,	  depending	  on	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  case,	  Article	  101	  TFEU.	  
461	  The	  former	  Article	  3(1)(g)	  EC.	  See	  also	  CIF,	  supra	  note	  447,	  para	  47.	  In	  CIF,	  the	  ECJ	  also	  noted	  that	  Member	  
States	  have	  agreed	  to	  observe	  the	  principle	  of	  an	  open	  market	  economy	  with	  free	  competition.	  
462	  Van	  Eycke,	  supra	  note	  451,	  para	  16.	  
463	  CIF,	  supra	  note	  447,	  para	  51.	  See	  also	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Cosmas	  in	  Ladbroke	  Racing,	  supra	  note	  441,	  para	  63.	  
464	  It	  is	  theoretically	  possible	  to	  subsume	  under	  this	  heading	  the	  case	  law	  that	  approval	  by	  a	  public	  authority	  of	  a	  
certain	  course	  of	  action	  does	  not	  absolve	  the	  obligations	  under	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  See	  e.g.	  Deutsche	  Telekom	  
(General	  Court),	  supra	  note	  370,	  para	  107	  and	  Masterfoods,	  supra	  note	  331,	  para	  48;	  Case	  123/83	  BNIC	  v	  Clair	  
[1985]	  ECR	  391,	  para	  22-­‐23.	  However,	  I	  prefer	  to	  read	  this	  case	  law	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  still	  left	  a	  possibility	  for	  
conduct	  that	  was	  in	  conformity	  with	  EU	  law	  (note	  that	  that	  the	  request	  for	  approval	  embodies	  a	  degree	  of	  
autonomy).	  	  
465	  Regulation	  No	  1/2003,	  [2003]	  OJ	  L	  1/1.	  
466	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐295/04	  to	  C-­‐298/04	  Manfredi	  [2006]	  ECR	  I-­‐6619,	  para	  64:	  ‘In	  the	  absence	  of	  [EU]	  rules	  governing	  
the	  matter,	  it	  is	  for	  the	  domestic	  legal	  system	  of	  each	  Member	  State	  to	  prescribe	  the	  detailed	  rules	  governing	  the	  
exercise	  of	  that	  right’.	  Member	  States	  may	  also	  have	  a	  foreseeability	  criterion	  in	  their	  private	  law,	  which	  raises	  
another	  complicating	  factor	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  imputability.	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by	   no	   means	   evident	   that	   all	   EU	   Member	   States,	   in	   their	   private	   laws,	   would	   automatically	   reject	  
imputability	  in	  a	  situation	  of	  State	  compulsion.	  	  
	  
In	  sum,	  the	  second	  approach	  would	  still	  be	  able	  to	  expose	  dominant	  undertakings	  to	  an	  unfavourable	  
private	   law	   ruling,	   contrary	   to	   the	   holding	   in	  CIF	   that	   State	   compulsion	   should	   be	   able	   to	   shield	   ‘the	  
undertakings	  concerned	   from	  all	   the	  consequences	  of	  an	   infringement	  of	  Articles	   [101	  TFEU]	  and	   [102	  
TFEU]’,	  applying	  to	  ‘both	  public	  authorities	  and	  other	  economic	  operators‘	  [italics	  added	  by	  author]’.469	  If	  
the	   ECJ	   wants	   to	   ensure	   that	   State	   compulsion	   does	   not	   have	   any	   consequences	   in	   the	   private	   law	  
sphere,	  it	  should	  rather	  decide	  that	  there	  is	  no	  abuse	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Member	  States	  could	  still	  be	  held	  
accountable,	  by	  holding	   that	   there	   is	  a	  prima	   facie	   abuse	  whose	  only	  objective	   justification	   lies	   in	   the	  
compulsion	  by	  the	  State.	  It	  is	  submitted	  that	  such	  a	  justification	  plea	  could	  be	  brought	  by	  the	  dominant	  
undertaking,	  but	  not	  by	  the	  State	  itself	  –	  it	  would	  be	  absurd	  if	  the	  State	  could	  avoid	  the	  application	  of	  a	  
Treaty	  prohibition	  by	  referring	  to	  legislation	  that	  it	  has	  itself	  enacted.	  	  
	  
3.4.4 Legitimate	  business	  behaviour	  –	  The	  BP	  judgment	  
The	  sections	  above	  have	  shown	  various	  perspectives	  of	  legitimate	  business	  behaviour.	  Of	  course	  there	  
are	   no	   clear	   boundaries.	   Rather,	   the	   categories	   offer	   different	   points	   of	   view	   that	   are	   useful	   to	  
understand	   the	   relevant	   context.	   The	  BP	   judgment	   offers	   a	   fine	   example.470	   The	   case	   concerned	  BP’s	  
decision,	   in	   the	  wake	  of	   the	  oil	   crisis	   in	   the	  early	  1970s,	   to	   reduce	   its	   supplies	  of	  petrol	  products	   to	  a	  
distributor	  named	  ABG.	  The	  Commission	  held	  that	  BP’s	  reduction	  of	  supplies	  to	  ABG	  was	  much	  greater	  
degree	  compared	  to	  the	  supplies	  to	  other	  customers,	  and	  that	  BP	  had	  been	  unable	  to	  provide	  objective	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
467	  I.e.	  the	  domestic	  rules	  applicable	  to	  EU	  law	  may	  not	  be	  not	  less	  favourable	  than	  those	  governing	  similar	  
domestic	  actions.	  Case	  C-­‐453/99	  Courage	  v	  Bernard	  Crehan	  [2001]	  ECR	  I-­‐6297,	  para	  29.	  Manfredi	  (ibid.),	  para	  62	  
and	  77.	  
468	  I.e.	  the	  domestic	  rules	  that	  they	  do	  not	  render	  practically	  impossible	  or	  excessively	  difficult	  the	  exercise	  of	  
rights	  conferred	  by	  EU	  law.	  Courage	  (ibid.),	  para	  29;	  Manfredi,	  supra	  note	  466,	  para	  62	  and	  77.	  
469	  CIF,	  supra	  note	  447,	  para	  54.	  Do	  note	  that	  CIF	  seemed	  to	  support	  the	  second	  approach,	  which	  depends	  on	  an	  
infringement	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  
470	  BP,	  supra	  note	  338.	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reasons	  for	  this.471	  Disagreeing	  with	  the	  Commission,	  the	  AG’s	  Opinion	  and	  the	  ECJ’s	  judgment	  provide	  
several	  reasons	  why	  there	  was	  no	  abuse,	  after	  all.472	  	  
	  
First,	   the	  case	   involves	  an	  element	  of	  State	   intervention.	  AG	  Warner	  considered	  the	   intervention	  by	  a	  
government	  agency	  –	  even	  though	  not	  compulsory	  –	  may	  have	  created	  doubts	  as	  to	  whether	  BP	  should	  
honour	   its	   contractual	  obligations.473	   Furthermore,	   there	  was	  an	  element	  of	   force	  majeure.	   The	  wider	  
context	  was	   the	  shortage	  of	  oil	  products,474	   forcing	  BP	  to	  choose	  how	  to	  allocate	   its	  supplies.	  The	  ECJ	  
held	   that	   BP	   could	   indeed	   differentiate	   between	   ‘traditional’	   and	   ‘occasional’	   customers.	   If	   BP	   had	  
reduced	   its	   supplies	   to	   ABG	   only	   to	   a	   limited	   amount,	   it	   would	   have	   had	   to	   considerably	   lower	   its	  
deliveries	  to	  its	  traditional	  customers.475	  The	  ECJ	  also	  noted	  that	  ABG	  would	  not	  be	  greatly	  affected,	  as	  it	  
had	  various	  alternative	  sources	  of	  supply	  through	  the	  intermediary	  of	  a	  government	  agency.476	  Finally,	  
the	  differentiation	  also	  contained	  an	  element	  of	  commercial	  freedom.	  AG	  Warner	  suggested	  customers	  
may	  indeed	  be	  given	  priority	  if	  they	  had	  been	  prepared	  to	  pay	  higher	  prices	  in	  normal	  times	  –	  with	  the	  
aim	  to	  obtain	  an	  assured	  supply	  in	  times	  of	  scarcity.477	  The	  BP	  case	  thus	  shows	  how	  various	  perspectives	  
can	  put	  the	  conduct	  under	  review	  in	  its	  proper	  context,	  and	  how	  a	  conclusion	  may	  follow	  that	  there	  has	  
been	  no	  abuse.	  
	  
3.4.5 Efficiency	  
An	   efficiency	   plea	   provides	   another	   type	   of	   objective	   justification.478	   The	   plea	   is	   based	   on	   the	   link	  
between	  economic	   efficiency	   and	   consumer	  welfare,	  which	   some	   commentators	   argue	   should	  be	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
471	  Ibid.,	  para	  19.	  
472	  Ibid.,	  para	  43.	  See	  also	  the	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Warner	  in	  the	  same	  Case.	  
473	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Warner	  in	  BP	  (ibid.)	  supra	  note	  338,	  at	  1540	  
474	  As	  well	  as	  the	  ‘regrouping	  of	  BP’s	  operational	  activities	  following	  the	  nationalization	  of	  a	  large	  part	  of	  the	  
company’s	  production	  activities’.	  See	  BP	  (ibid.),	  para	  28.	  
475	  Ibid.,	  para	  33.	  
476	  Ibid.,	  para	  39.	  
477	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Warner	  in	  BP	  (ibid),	  at	  1534.	  
478	  See	  Whish	  (2008,	  supra	  note	  331,	  at	  208),	  who	  argues	  that	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU	  serves	  as	  a	  useful	  template	  to	  
consider	  an	  efficiency	  plea	  under	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	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key	   objective	   of	   competition	   law.479	   In	   essence	   the	   efficiency	   criterion	   requires	   the	   dominant	   firm	   to	  
show	  that	  the	  prima	  facie	  abuse	  has	  no	  net	  harm	  effect	  on	  consumer	  welfare.480	  The	  efficiency	  plea	  is	  
likely	   to	   gain	  more	   ground	   following	   the	   Commission’s	   2009	   guidance	   paper	   that	   pushes	   for	   a	  more	  
economic	  approach	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  abuse	  cases.481	  
	  
Several	   early	   ECJ	   judgments	   show	   the	   relevance	   of	   efficiency	   considerations	  within	   Article	   102	   TFEU.	  
Examples	  include	  Hoffmann-­‐La	  Roche,482	  Michelin	  I483	  and	  Michelin	  II.484	  A	  more	  formal	  acknowledgment	  
of	  the	  efficiency	  plea	  came	  in	  British	  Airways.	  The	  case	  shows	  that	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  can	  accommodate	  
an	  efficiency-­‐based	  balancing	  act.485	  The	  ECJ	  held	   that,	  even	  where	   there	   is	  an	   ‘exclusionary	  effect’,486	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
479	  L.	  Lovdahl	  Gormsen,	  ‘How	  well	  does	  the	  European	  Legal	  Test	  for	  Predation	  go	  with	  an	  Economic	  Approach	  to	  
Article	  102	  TFEU?’,	  (2010)	  37	  Legal	  Issues	  of	  Economic	  Integration	  294	  (‘Gormsen	  2010’).	  She	  notes	  that	  it	  is	  
‘debatable’	  whether	  consumer	  welfare	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  case	  law	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  See,	  further,	  L.	  Lovdahl	  
Gormsen,	  A	  Principled	  Approach	  to	  Abuse	  of	  Dominance	  in	  European	  Competition	  Law	  (Cambridge	  University	  
Press:	  Cambridge	  2010).	  
480	  See	  Commission	  guidance	  on	  enforcement	  priorities,	  supra	  note	  378,	  para	  30.	  See	  also	  Irish	  Sugar	  (General	  
Court),	  supra	  note	  353,	  para	  187-­‐189.	  The	  General	  Court	  held	  that	  dominant	  undertakings	  are	  allow	  to	  take	  
measures	  of	  a	  defensive	  nature	  if	  they	  are	  based	  on	  criteria	  of	  economic	  efficiency,	  provided	  it	  is	  consistent	  with	  
the	  interests	  of	  consumers.	  More	  recent	  case	  law,	  as	  shall	  be	  examined	  below,	  seemingly	  expanded	  the	  
possibilities	  for	  dominant	  firms	  to	  invoke	  efficiency	  benefits.	  
481	  In	  its	  guidance	  document,	  the	  Commission	  repeatedly	  emphasized	  the	  importance	  of	  an	  effects-­‐based	  approach	  
instead	  of	  a	  form-­‐based	  approach.	  See	  the	  Commission	  guidance	  on	  enforcement	  priorities,	  supra	  note	  378.	  For	  a	  
view	  supporting	  the	  effects-­‐based	  approach,	  see	  e.g.	  Competition	  Law	  Forum	  Article	  82	  Review	  Group,	  ‘The	  
Reform	  of	  Article	  82:	  Recommendations	  on	  Key	  Policy	  Objectives’,	  (2005)	  European	  Competition	  Journal	  179,	  at	  
180-­‐182.	  
482	  Hoffmann-­‐La	  Roche,	  supra	  note	  349,	  para	  90.	  
483	  Michelin	  I	  (ECJ)	  supra	  note	  334,	  para	  85.	  
484	  Michelin	  II	  (General	  Court)	  supra	  note	  422,	  para	  59.	  
485	  British	  Airways	  (ECJ),	  supra	  note	  341,	  para	  69.	  Interestingly,	  in	  the	  Atlantic	  Container	  ruling	  the	  General	  Court	  
held	  that	  efficiencies	  cannot	  constitute	  and	  objective	  justification	  under	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  See	  Joined	  Cases	  T-­‐
191/98,	  T-­‐212/98	  to	  T-­‐214/98	  Atlantic	  Container	  Line	  and	  Others	  v	  Commission	  [2003]	  ECR	  II-­‐3275,	  para	  1112.	  Only	  
months	  later,	  however,	  the	  General	  Court	  confirmed	  in	  British	  Airways	  that	  the	  efficiency	  plea	  exists	  after	  all.	  See	  
British	  Airways	  (General	  Court),	  supra	  note	  416,	  para	  280.	  It	  seems	  there	  has	  been	  extensive	  debate	  between	  the	  
judges,	  which	  has	  finally	  been	  settled	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  pro-­‐efficiency	  side.	  
486	  In	  sum,	  there	  was	  thus	  a	  prima	  facie	  abuse.	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such	  an	  effect	  ‘may	  be	  counterbalanced,	  or	  outweighed,	  by	  advantages	  in	  terms	  of	  efficiency	  which	  also	  
benefit	   the	   consumer.’487	   Conduct	   that	   meets	   this	   criterion	   should,	   ex	   post	   facto,	   be	   considered	   as	  
competition	  on	  the	  merits.488	  It	  reflects	  the	  idea	  that	  competition	  law	  should	  not	  intervene	  if	  a	  dominant	  
firm	  is	  able	  to	  outperform	  its	  competitors	  simply	  as	  a	  result	  of	  superior	  efficiency.	  
	  
Building	   upon	  British	   Airways,	   the	   2012	  Post	   Danmark	   judgment	   offers	   a	   clear	   framework	   as	   how	   to	  
perform	  such	  an	  efficiency-­‐balancing	  test.489	  The	  ECJ	  held	  that:490	  
	  
‘it	   is	   for	   the	   dominant	   undertaking	   to	   show	   that	   the	   efficiency	   gains	   likely	   to	   result	   from	   the	  
conduct	   under	   consideration	   counteract	   any	   likely	   negative	   effects	   on	   competition	   and	  
consumer	   welfare	   in	   the	   affected	   markets,	   that	   those	   gains	   have	   been,	   or	   are	   likely	   to	   be,	  
brought	  about	  as	  a	  result	  of	  that	  conduct,	  that	  such	  conduct	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  achievement	  of	  
those	  gains	  in	  efficiency	  and	  that	  it	  does	  not	  eliminate	  effective	  competition,	  by	  removing	  all	  or	  
most	  existing	  sources	  of	  actual	  or	  potential	  competition’.	  
	  
The	  Post	  Danmark	  judgment	  thus	  calls	  for	  a	  weighing	  exercise	  of	  positive	  and	  negative	  effects	  that	  arise	  
from	   the	   conduct;	   not	   only	   effects	   in	   terms	   of	   consumer	   welfare	   (that	   is	   often	   equated	   with	   an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
487	  British	  Airways	  (ECJ),	  supra	  note	  341,	  para	  69.	  Cf.	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Kokott	  in	  British	  Airways	  (ibid),	  para	  59.	  The	  
General	  Court's	  ruling	  in	  British	  Airways	  (supra	  note	  416,	  para	  280)	  referred	  explicitly	  to	  ‘economic	  efficiency’.	  An	  
earlier	  relevant	  judgment	  was	  Irish	  Sugar	  (General	  Court),	  supra	  note	  353,	  para	  189.	  In	  Irish	  Sugar,	  the	  General	  
Court	  held	  that	  protection	  of	  the	  commercial	  position	  of	  an	  undertaking	  must	  be	  based	  on	  criteria	  of	  economic	  
efficiency	  and	  be	  consistent	  with	  the	  interests	  of	  consumers.	  
488	  TeliaSonera,	  supra	  note	  347,	  paras	  24	  and	  43.	  At	  para	  88,	  the	  ECJ	  appeared	  to	  sketch	  a	  link	  between	  the	  
dominant	  firm’s	  ‘reliance	  on	  its	  own	  merits’	  and	  ‘the	  absence	  of	  any	  […]	  economic	  and	  objective	  justification’.	  See	  
also	  Post	  Danmark,	  supra	  note	  381,	  at	  paras	  21	  and	  22.	  In	  the	  latter	  paragraph	  the	  ECJ	  held	  that	  ‘not	  every	  
exclusionary	  effect	  is	  necessarily	  detrimental	  to	  competition’,	  explaining	  that	  competition	  on	  the	  merits	  may	  well	  
lead	  to	  the	  exit	  of	  competitors	  from	  the	  market.	  Note	  that	  this	  is	  slightly	  different	  from	  the	  ‘competition	  on	  the	  
merits’	  discussed	  in	  section	  3.4.2	  above,	  which	  concerns	  conduct	  that	  takes	  place	  within	  the	  commercial	  freedom	  
afforded	  to	  the	  dominant	  undertaking.	  
489	  Post	  Danmark,	  supra	  note	  381,	  paras	  41-­‐42;	  British	  Airways,	  supra	  note	  341,	  para	  86,	  and	  TeliaSonera,	  supra	  
note	  347,	  para	  76;	  Also	  note	  that	  some	  recent	  cases	  have	  remained	  relatively	  traditional;	  Case	  C-­‐549/10	  P	  Tomra	  
Systems	  ASA	  and	  Others	  v	  Commission	  [2012]	  nyr.	  
490	  Post	  Danmark,	  supra	  note	  381,	  para	  42.	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efficiency	  standard),	  but	  in	  terms	  of	  competition,	  more	  broadly,	  as	  well.	  The	  test	  is	  strikingly	  similar	  to	  
the	  conditions	  of	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU.491	  Some	  commentators	  have	  argued	  that	  such	  a	   transposition	   is	  
inappropriate.492	  However,	  Post	  Danmark	  is	  not	  that	  surprising	  considering	  the	  widespread	  call	  for,	  and	  
the	   ECJ’s	   apparent	  wish	   to	   follow,	   a	  more	   effects-­‐based	   approach.493	   The	   conditions	   of	   Article	   101(3)	  
TFEU	  simply	  provided	  a	  tried	  and	  tested	  framework	  that	  the	  ECJ	  is	  familiar	  with.	  The	  transposition	  also	  
has	  the	  benefit	  of	  bringing	  more	  consistency	  in	  the	  application	  of	  Articles	  101	  and	  102	  TFEU.494	  	  
	  
Efficiency	   is	  not	  a	  unitary	  concept,	  but	  can	  be	  viewed	   from	  different	  perspectives.	  These	  perspectives	  
include	   allocative	   efficiency	   (output	   maximization),	   productive	   efficiency	   (cost	   minimization)	   and	  
dynamic	  efficiency	  (innovation	  maximization).	  There	  is	  no	  sound	  basis	  to	  prefer,	  in	  abstracto,	  one	  type	  
of	   efficiency	   to	   the	   other.495	   Only	   a	   balancing	   act	   of	   the	   various,	   and	   often	   opposing,	   effects	   can	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
491	  See	  Post	  Danmark,	  supra	  note	  381,	  para	  41-­‐42.	  The	  dominant	  undertaking	  must	  show	  that	  the	  likely	  efficiency	  
gains	  must	  ‘counteract	  any	  likely	  negative	  effects	  on	  competition	  and	  consumer	  welfare	  in	  the	  affected	  markets,	  
that	  those	  gains	  have	  been,	  or	  are	  likely	  to	  be,	  brought	  about	  as	  a	  result	  of	  that	  conduct,	  that	  such	  conduct	  is	  
necessary	  for	  the	  achievement	  of	  those	  gains	  in	  efficiency	  and	  that	  it	  does	  not	  eliminate	  effective	  competition,	  by	  
removing	  all	  or	  most	  existing	  sources	  of	  actual	  or	  potential	  competition’.	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU,	  for	  its	  part,	  notes	  
that	  a	  restrictive	  agreement	  will	  not	  be	  prohibited	  if	  it	  ‘contributes	  to	  improving	  the	  production	  or	  distribution	  of	  
goods	  or	  to	  promoting	  technical	  or	  economic	  progress,	  while	  allowing	  consumers	  a	  fair	  share	  of	  the	  resulting	  
benefit,	  and	  which	  does	  not:	  (a)	  impose	  on	  the	  undertakings	  concerned	  restrictions	  which	  are	  not	  indispensable	  to	  
the	  attainment	  of	  these	  objectives;	  (b)	  afford	  such	  undertakings	  the	  possibility	  of	  eliminating	  competition	  in	  
respect	  of	  a	  substantial	  part	  of	  the	  products	  in	  question’.	  
492	  J.	  Temple	  Lang,	  ‘Judicial	  review	  of	  competition	  decisions	  under	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  and	  
the	  importance	  of	  the	  EFTA	  court:	  the	  Norway	  Post	  judgment’,	  (2012)	  38	  European	  Law	  Review	  464,	  at	  487.	  For	  
another	  criticism,	  see	  Friederiszick	  and	  Gratzà	  2012,	  supra	  note	  408,	  at	  38.	  They	  note	  that	  ‘copying	  the	  conditions	  
from	  art.	  [101](3)	  of	  the	  Treaty	  to	  art.	  [102]	  may	  contribute	  to	  the	  illusionary	  character	  of	  efficiency	  defence’.	  Of	  
course,	  this	  position	  assumes	  that	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU	  cannot	  adequately	  accommodate	  for	  an	  efficiency	  plea.	  	  
493	  D.	  Geradin,	  ‘Limiting	  the	  Scope	  of	  Article	  82	  EC:	  What	  Can	  the	  EU	  Learn	  From	  the	  U.S.	  Supreme	  Court’s	  
Judgment	  in	  Trinko	  in	  the	  Wake	  of	  Microsoft,	  IMS	  and	  Deutsche	  Telekom?’,	  (2004)	  41	  Common	  Market	  Law	  Review	  
1527.	  
494	  See	  e.g.	  Continental	  Can,	  supra	  note	  343,	  para	  25.	  See	  also	  section	  3.2.1	  in	  chapter	  II.	  
495	  Allocative	  efficiency	  is	  strongly	  associated	  with	  the	  model	  of	  price	  equilibrium,	  which	  many	  commentators	  
argue	  should	  be	  the	  basis	  for	  competition	  policy.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  productive	  efficiencies	  could	  be	  preferred	  as	  it	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determine	  whether	  conduct	  has	  a	  net	  beneficial	  effect	  on	  efficiency.	  In	  practice,	  a	  prima	  facie	  abuse	  will	  
usually	  entail	  a	  net	  loss	  in	  allocative	  efficiency,	  raising	  the	  question	  whether	  the	  loss	  can	  be	  outweighed	  
by	  productive	  or	  dynamic	  efficiencies.	  For	  example,	  the	  General	  Court	  examined	  productive	  efficiencies	  
in	   British	   Airways	   (focusing	   on	   possible	   cost	   savings	   of	   the	   scheme	   under	   review)496	   and	   dynamic	  
efficiencies	   in	  Microsoft	   (focusing	   on	   the	   incentives	   to	   innovate).497	   Another	   example	   is	   a	   refusal	   to	  
license	  an	  IP	  right.	  Such	  a	  refusal	  may	  reduce	  allocative	  efficiency	  (as	  it	  likely	  to	  lower	  output	  and	  raise	  
prices),	   but	   at	   the	   same	   time	   strengthens	   the	   incentive	   to	   invest,	   thus	   strengthening	   dynamic	  
efficiency.498	  	  
	  
Although	   an	   efficiency-­‐balancing	   test	   is	   relatively	   straightforward	   in	   theory,	   in	   practice	   it	   is	   anything	  
but.499	   It	   is,	  generally	  speaking,	  difficult	  to	  quantify	  the	  various	  effects	   in	  a	  precise	  and	  reliable	  way.500	  
This	  is	  particularly	  the	  case	  for	  dynamic	  efficiencies,	  which	  usually	  entail	  highly	  uncertain	  benefits	  in	  the	  
future.	  By	   comparison,	  productive	  efficiencies	  are	  often	   less	  difficult	   to	  quantify.	  A	   system	   that	   solely	  
takes	   into	   account	   effects	   that	   can	   be	   quantified	   in	   a	   reliable	  manner	   is	   thus	   likely	   to	   have	   a	   bias	   in	  
favour	  of	  productive	  efficiencies;	  even	  though	  dynamic	  efficiencies	  can	  have	  a	  much	  greater	  long-­‐term	  
influence	  on	  consumer	  welfare.501	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
is	  often	  the	  easiest	  to	  accurately	  measure	  (Friederiszick	  and	  Gratzà	  2012,	  supra	  note	  408,	  at	  36).	  Finally,	  dynamic	  
efficiencies	  have	  the	  benefit	  of	  taking	  into	  account	  long-­‐term	  benefits,	  but	  are	  particularly	  difficult	  to	  assess.	  
496	  British	  Airways	  (General	  Court),	  supra	  note	  87,	  paras	  267	  and	  284-­‐285.	  
497	  Microsoft,	  supra	  note	  395,	  para	  709.	  	  
498	  See	  also	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Jacobs	  in	  Case	  C-­‐7/97	  Bronner	  [1998]	  ECR	  I-­‐7791,	  para	  57.	  Jacobs	  holds	  that	  ‘interfering	  
with	  a	  dominant	  undertaking's	  freedom	  to	  contract	  often	  requires	  a	  careful	  balancing	  of	  conflicting	  
considerations’,	  referring	  in	  particular	  to	  the	  opposing	  effects	  on	  short	  term	  and	  long	  term	  competition.	  See	  also	  
Opinion	  of	  AG	  Poiares	  Maduro	  in	  KPN	  v	  OPTA,	  supra	  note	  331,	  para	  53:	  ‘a	  duty	  under	  Article	  [102	  TFEU]	  for	  a	  
dominant	  undertaking	  to	  aid	  its	  competitors	  should	  not	  be	  assumed	  too	  lightly’.	  Poiares	  Maduro	  also	  notes	  that	  
‘[a]	  balance	  should	  be	  kept	  between	  the	  interest	  in	  preserving	  or	  creating	  free	  competition	  in	  a	  particular	  market	  
and	  the	  interest	  in	  not	  deterring	  investment	  and	  innovation	  by	  demanding	  that	  the	  fruits	  of	  commercial	  success	  be	  
shared	  with	  competitors’.	  
499	  See	  also	  the	  difficulties	  noted	  by	  K.	  Tosza,	  ‘Efficiencies	  in	  Art.	  82	  EU:	  An	  illusionary	  defence?’,	  (2009)	  
Concurrences:	  Law	  &	  Economics	  35,	  at	  35-­‐36.	  
500	  Ibid.	  
501	  Note	  also	  the	  criticism	  on	  the	  Commission’s	  approach	  towards	  dynamic	  efficiencies,	  putting	  more	  faith	  in	  
‘follow-­‐on	  incremental	  innovation’	  rather	  than	  ‘breakthrough	  competition	  for	  the	  market’.	  See	  Friederiszick	  and	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In	  practice,	  the	  efficiency	  plea	  should	  attempt	  to	  approximate	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  conduct.	  	  There	  should	  
be	  a	  balance	  between	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  effects	  and	  the	  likelihood	  with	  which	  they	  are	  to	  arise.	  Such	  
an	  approach	  removes	   the	  bias	   towards	  any	   type	  of	  efficiency:	  although	  dynamic	  efficiencies	  are	  often	  
much	   less	  certain,	  they	  may	  represent	  substantial	  efficiency	  gains.	  An	  approximation	  of	  effects,	  rather	  
than	   an	   intricate	   quantification,	   may	   sound	   as	   a	   wobbly	   basis	   for	   an	   efficiency	   analysis.	   However,	  
assessments	  whether	  conduct	  tends	  to	  be	  pro-­‐competitive	  or	  not	  have	  been	  used	  within	  the	  framework	  
of	   Article	   101	   TFEU	   for	   many	   years.	   Usually,	   once	   can	   find	   proxies	   to	   what	   extent	   conduct	   can	   be	  
expected	  to	  be	  efficient.	  For	  example,	  if	  the	  conduct	  is	  simply	  a	  continuation	  of	  a	  practice	  that	  the	  firm	  
already	  engaged	  in	  before	  attaining	  dominance,	  it	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  pro-­‐competitive.	  
	  
An	  efficiency	  examination	  should,	  in	  my	  view,	  also	  consider	  the	  degree	  of	  dominance	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  
it	  has	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  conduct	  under	  review.	  In	  its	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  guidance	  paper,	  the	  
Commission	  stated	  that	  exclusionary	  conduct	  of	  a	  super-­‐dominant	  firm	  ‘can	  normally	  not	  be	  justified’	  on	  
efficiency	   grounds.502	   The	   Commission’s	   cautious	   choice	   of	   words	   indicates	   that	   not	   even	   a	   super-­‐
dominant	  firm	  is	  barred	   in	  toto	   from	  invoking	  an	  efficiency	  plea.503	   	  Nevertheless,	  such	  an	  undertaking	  
will	  find	  it	  more	  difficult	  to	  invoke	  an	  objective	  justification	  than	  a	  firm	  that	  barely	  meets	  the	  criteria	  for	  
dominance.	  This	  seems	  a	  reasonable	  stance.	  As	  was	  argued	  in	  paragraph	  2.2,	  the	  higher	  the	  degree	  of	  
market	   power,	   the	   less	   likely	   prima	   facie	   abusive	   conduct	   will	   exhibit	   redeeming	   features	   that	   are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Gratzà	  2012,	  supra	  note	  408,	  at	  39.	  They	  refer	  e.g.	  to	  D.	  F.	  Spulber,	  ‘Competition	  Policy	  and	  the	  Incentive	  to	  
Innovate:	  The	  Dynamic	  Effects	  of	  Microsoft	  v.	  Commission’,	  (2008)	  25	  Yale	  Journal	  on	  Regulation	  300.	  
502	  Commission	  guidance	  on	  enforcement	  priorities,	  supra	  note	  378,	  para	  30.	  
503	  The	  Commission	  does	  not	  mention	  what	  I	  consider	  to	  be	  the	  other	  sources	  of	  objective	  justification,	  i.e.	  public	  
interest	  considerations	  and	  legitimate	  business	  practice.	  There	  seems	  to	  be	  no	  reason	  why	  super-­‐dominant	  firms	  
should,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  principle,	  not	  be	  allowed	  to	  invoke	  these	  sources.	  Whether	  they	  can	  be	  accepted	  is	  of	  course	  
a	  different	  matter.	  See	  also	  DG	  Competition’s	  discussion	  paper	  on	  the	  application	  of	  Article	  [102]	  of	  the	  Treaty	  to	  
exclusionary	  abuses	  of	  December	  2005,	  available	  at	  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf.	  At	  paras	  90-­‐91,	  the	  Commission	  holds	  that	  it	  
is	  highly	  unlikely	  that	  a	  dominant	  undertaking	  can	  successfully	  invoke	  efficiencies	  if	  its	  conduct	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  
monopoly.	  I	  think	  that	  this	  statement	  is	  too	  restrictive,	  as	  it	  would	  bar	  an	  efficiency	  plea	  in	  sectors	  where	  
competition	  is	  for	  the	  market	  –	  sectors,	  in	  other	  words,	  that	  tend	  towards	  (temporary)	  monopolies	  even	  under	  
perfectly	  legitimate	  competition.	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sufficient	   to	   compensate	   for	   its	   anti-­‐competitive	   features.	   The	   TeliaSonera	   judgment	   is	   somewhat	  
ambivalent	   on	   this	   issue.	   Although	   it	   held	   that	   ‘the	   degree	   of	   market	   strength	   is,	   as	   a	   general	   rule,	  
significant	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  conduct’,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case	  ‘to	  the	  question	  of	  
whether	  the	  abuse	  as	  such	  exists’.504	  To	  my	  mind,	  the	  second	  quote	  is	  mistaken,	  as	   it	  suggests	  that	  an	  
examination	  of	  the	  extent	  of	  effects	  is	  irrelevant	  for	  a	  finding	  of	  an	  abuse	  –	  contrary	  to	  the	  reliance	  on	  
an	  effects-­‐based	  approach	  in	  the	  same	  judgment.505	  
	  
Admittedly,	  the	  difficulty	  with	  the	  quantification	  of	  effects	  may	  lead	  to	  challenges	  for	  legal	  certainty.506	  
If	  the	  test	  can	  only	  produce	  results	  with	  hindsight,	  it	  may	  leave	  dominant	  undertakings	  with	  insufficient	  
possibility	  to	  adapt	  their	  behaviour	  beforehand.507	  According	  to	  Temple	  Lang,	  ‘[t]here	  should	  be	  a	  test	  of	  
exclusionary	   foreclosure	   that	   dominant	   companies	   can	   apply	   before	   they	   begin	   the	   conduct	   in	  
question’.508	  A	  dominant	  undertaking	  can	  formulate	  ex	  ante	  what	  efficiency	  gains	  it	  considers	  applicable	  
and,	   importantly,	   how	   they	   benefit	   consumers.	   Another	   useful	   examination	   is	   asking	   whether	   the	  
conduct	   is	   truly	   necessary	   for	   the	   efficiencies	   to	   arise	   –	   this	   test	   will	   often	   prove	   to	   be	   the	   most	  
formidable	  hurdle	  for	  an	  efficiency	  plea.	  However,	  there	  is	  no	  single	  ex	  ante	  test	  that	  can	  provide	  100%	  
reliability	   on	   an	   examination	   of	   effects	   –	   if	   only	   because	   the	   conduct	   may	   have	   unexpected	  
consequences,	   either	   pro-­‐	   or	   anti-­‐competitive.	   It	   appears	   that	   an	   effects-­‐based	   approach	   entails	   a	  
degree	   of	   uncertainty	   that	   we	   will	   simply	   have	   to	   live	   with.	   At	   the	   end	   of	   the	   day,	   I	   believe	   it	   is	  
preferable	  to	  opt	  for	  an	  effects-­‐based	  approach	  that	  contains	  slightly	  more	  uncertain	  rules,	  instead	  of	  a	  
form-­‐based	   approach	   that	   is	   fully	   predictable	   but	   also	   bans	   many	   practices	   that	   are	   actually	   pro-­‐
competitive.	  	  
	  
As	  a	  final	  comment,	   I	  should	  note	  the	  ambiguity	  as	  to	  the	  precise	  relation	  between	  the	  efficiency	  plea	  
and	   objective	   justification.	   Rousseva	   has	   argued	   that	   the	   efficiency	   plea	   should	   not	   form	   part	   of	  
objective	   justification.509	   Her	   point	   raises	   an	   important	   question:	  why	  would	   a	   dominant	   undertaking	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
504	  TeliaSonera,	  supra	  note	  347,	  para	  81.	  
505	  Ibid.,	  para	  76	  
506	  According	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  legal	  certainty,	  dominant	  firms	  must	  be	  able	  to	  know	  whether	  conduct	  is	  
prohibited	  or	  not.	  See	  Deutsche	  Telekom,	  supra	  note	  336,	  para	  202;	  TeliaSonera,	  supra	  note	  347,	  para	  44.	  
507	  Temple	  Lang	  2012,	  supra	  note	  492,	  at	  469-­‐470.	  
508	  Ibid.	  
509	  Rousseva	  2010,	  supra	  note	  332,	  at	  380-­‐387.	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have	  to	   justify	  efficient	  behaviour?	  Why	  is	  such	  conduct	  not	   legitimate	   in	  and	  of	   itself?	   It	   is	  submitted	  
that	  the	  answer	   lies	   in	  the	  opposing	  effects	  that	  conduct	  may	  have.	  The	  need	  to	  proffer	  a	   justification	  
arises	   precisely	   because	   the	   conduct	   has	   some	   anti-­‐competitive	   characteristic,	   such	   as	   an	   adverse	  
impact	   on	   allocative	   efficiency.510	   The	   net	   effect	   can	   only	   be	   found	   by	   weighing	   the	   pro-­‐competitive	  
effects	  as	  well.	  The	  same	  approach	  applies	  to	  merger	  control.	  A	  merger	  filing	  may	  require	  an	  efficiency	  
defence	  for	  a	  merger	  that	  –	  if	  the	  defence	  proves	  successful	  –	  transpires	  to	  have	  a	  net	  efficient	  effect.	  
	  
3.4.6 Public	  interest	  	  
Public	   interest	   objectives	   may	   serve	   as	   another	   type	   of	   objective	   justification.	   It	   is	   submitted	   that	   a	  
dominant	  undertaking	  should	  not	  be	  a	  priori	  precluded	   from	  taking	  public	   interest	   into	  account	  when	  
determining	   its	   course	  of	   action.	   Sometimes	  public	   interest	   is	   equated	  with	   ‘non-­‐economic’	   values.	   In	  
my	  view,	  a	  sharp	  distinction	  between	  ‘economic’	  and	  ‘non-­‐economic’	  values	  can	  be	  deceptive.	  At	  least	  
in	  theory,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  valuate,	  in	  economic	  terms,	  values	  that	  we	  would	  otherwise	  think	  of	  as	  ‘non-­‐
economic’.511	   An	   example	   is	   where	   the	   production	   of	   a	   certain	   good	   has	   negative	   effects	   on	   the	  
environment.	   If	   perfect	   information	   were	   available,	   it	   would	   be	   possible	   to	   calculate	   all	   its	   negative	  
externalities	  and	  compare	  it	  to	  the	  benefits	  of	  continuing	  production.	  If	  the	  benefits	  are	  greater	  than	  the	  
costs,	  the	  polluter	  could	  theoretically	  negotiate	  full	  compensation	  for	  the	  harm	  it	  inflicts	  upon	  others.512	  
In	  this	  way,	  public	  interest	  values	  can	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  be	  considered	  in	  terms	  of	  efficiencies,	  as	  they	  call	  
for	  a	  weighing	  exercise	  of	  beneficial	  and	  harmful	  welfare	  effects.	  
	  
Indeed,	   the	   issue	   is	   not	   that	   public	   interest	   values	   can	   never	   viewed	   in	   economic	   terms	   (because,	  
theoretically,	  they	  often	  can),	  but	  that	  they	  are	  often	  exceedingly	  difficult	  to	  quantify	  in	  actual	  practice.	  
For	   example,	   a	   comprehensive	   examination	   of	   harm	   to	   the	   environment	   should	   not	   only	   assess	   the	  
current	  effects,	  but	  its	  impact	  in	  the	  future	  as	  well.	  But	  how	  do	  we	  valuate	  the	  burden	  that	  we	  put	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
510	  An	  ‘exclusionary	  effect’,	  in	  the	  words	  of	  British	  Airways	  (ECJ),	  supra	  note	  341,	  para	  68-­‐70.	  
511	  For	  several	  examples	  of	  how	  we	  can	  make	  difficult	  societal	  choices	  (such	  as	  the	  decision	  in	  which	  municipality	  
to	  build	  a	  prison)	  through	  market	  mechanisms,	  see	  e.g.	  R.F.	  Frank,	  The	  Darwin	  Economy:	  Liberty,	  Competition	  and	  
the	  Common	  Good	  (Princeton	  University	  Press:	  Princeton,	  New	  Jersey	  2011).	  Of	  course,	  it	  is	  a	  different	  matter	  
whether	  this	  is	  always	  desirable	  or	  practicable.	  
512	  Do	  note	  that	  this	  implies	  that	  those	  receiving	  compensation	  are	  representative	  for	  the	  full	  extent	  of	  the	  
relevant	  harm.	  Alas,	  this	  does	  not	  seem	  likely.	  For	  example,	  people	  not	  yet	  born	  are	  unlikely	  to	  be	  compensated,	  
even	  though	  they	  may	  well	  be	  affected	  (see	  Townley	  2011,	  infra	  note	  513).	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future	   generations	   by,	   say,	   burning	   irreplaceable	   fossil	   fuels	   or	   by	   contributing	   to	   irreversible	   climate	  
change?513	  	  
	  
There	  is	  simply	  no	  sufficiently	  reliable	  and	  precise	  data	  available	  that	  provides	  a	  solid	  basis	  to	  make	  an	  
all-­‐inclusive	   balancing	   exercise.	   Indeed,	   there	   may	   be	   an	   undesirable	   bias	   in	   favour	   of	   present-­‐day	  
benefits	   as	   they	   are	   relatively	   easy	   to	   quantify,	   compared	   to	   future	   adverse	   effects	   that	   are	   more	  
uncertain	  –	  even	   though	   those	   future	  adverse	  effects	   can	  be	  much	  greater	   than	   the	   current	  benefits.	  
And	  even	   if	  we	  do	   succeed	   in	  quantifying	   all	   the	   relevant	   effects,	   there	  may	   still	   be	   a	  market	   failure.	  
Coming	  back	  to	  the	  previous	  example,	  people	  not	  yet	  born	  can	  simply	  not	  claim	  compensation	  for	  the	  
harm	  to	  them	  by	  previous	  generations	  –	  leaving	  current	  generations	  largely	  free	  to	  neglect	  the	  extensive	  
harm	  that	  their	  conduct	  may	  inflict	  on	  future	  generations.	  
	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  point	  raised	  above,	  there	  may	  also	  be	  values	  that,	  from	  an	  ethical	  perspective,	  we	  do	  
not	  wish	  to	  translate	  into	  economic	  terms.	  Welfare	  maximisation	  is	  not	  the	  only	  value	  we	  care	  about.514	  
That	   is	  why	  competition	   law	  should	  not	  a	  priori	   bar	  a	  dominant	  undertaking	   from	  bringing	   its	   actions	  
more	  in	  line	  with	  the	  interests	  of	  society	  at	  large.	  The	  mere	  fact	  that	  an	  interest	  is	  difficult	  to	  properly	  
express	   in	   economic	   terms,	   does	   not	  mean	   that	   it	   should	   be	   neglected.	   Although	   competition	   law	   is	  
obviously	  not	   the	  primary	  means	   to	  pursue	  public	   interest	  goals,	   it	   is	   submitted	   that	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  
should	  not,	  by	  definition,	  reject	  such	  considerations	  as	  irrelevant.515	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
513	  For	  a	  further	  analysis,	  see	  C.	  Townley,	  ‘Inter-­‐Generational	  Impacts	  in	  Competition	  Analysis:	  remembering	  those	  
not	  yet	  born’,	  (2011)	  11	  European	  Competition	  Law	  Review	  580.	  
514	  See	  e.g.	  C.	  Townley,	  ‘Is	  Anything	  more	  Important	  than	  Consumer	  Welfare	  (in	  Article	  81	  EC)?:	  reflections	  of	  a	  
Community	  lawyer’,	  (2007-­‐2008)	  10	  Cambridge	  Yearbook	  of	  European	  Legal	  Studies	  345.	  See	  also	  the	  discussion	  
between	  Dworkin	  and	  Posner	  on	  whether	  ‘wealth’	  itself	  can	  be	  considered	  a	  value:	  R.M.	  Dworking,	  ‘Is	  Wealth	  A	  
Value?’,	  (1980)	  9	  J.	  Legal	  Stud.	  191;	  R.A.	  Posner,	  ‘The	  Value	  of	  Wealth:	  A	  Comment	  on	  Dworkin	  and	  Kronman’,	  
(1980)	  9	  J.	  Legal	  Stud.	  243.	  
515	  Note	  that	  not	  all	  commentators	  seem	  to	  agree	  with	  this	  separate	  category	  of	  ‘objective	  justification’.	  For	  
example,	  Kingston	  seems	  to	  argue	  that	  environmental	  concerns	  should	  be	  subsumed	  under	  the	  heading	  of	  
‘objective	  necessity’.	  See	  S.	  Kingston,	  The	  Role	  of	  Environmental	  Protection	  in	  EC	  Competition	  Law	  and	  Policy	  
(dissertation	  Leiden	  2009),	  at	  211.	  I	  that	  Kingston’s	  approach	  has	  the	  risk	  of	  focusing	  too	  much	  on	  the	  alleged	  
impossibility	  for	  a	  dominant	  firm	  to	  act	  otherwise	  –	  even	  though	  the	  real	  crux	  is	  raised	  when	  a	  dominant	  firm	  has	  
chosen	  environmentally-­‐friendly	  behaviour	  out	  of	  free	  will,	  namely:	  do	  we	  accept	  a	  diminuation	  of	  the	  level	  of	  
competition	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  more	  effective	  protection	  of	  the	  environment?	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In	  my	  view,	  EU	  competition	   law	  provides	  ample	  room	  to	  accommodate	  public	   interest	  considerations.	  
The	  ECJ	  has	  consistently	  held	   that	   the	  competition	   rules	  must	  be	   interpreted	   in	   light	  of	   the	  principles	  
and	  objectives	  of	  the	  EU.516	   Indeed,	  the	  ECJ	  has	  noted	  that	  the	  competition	  rules	  are	  ‘essential	  for	  the	  
accomplishment	  of	  the	  tasks	  entrusted	  to	  the	  [EU]’’.517	  These	  tasks	  clearly	  go	  beyond	  the	  economic	  well	  
being	   of	   consumers,518	   and	   include	   many	   objectives	   that	   can	   easily	   be	   associated	   with	   the	   public	  
interest.	   Article	   9	   TFEU	   provides	   that,	   in	   defining	   and	   implementing	   its	   policies	   and	   activities,	   the	   EU	  
shall	   take	   into	  account	   requirements	   linked	  e.g.	   to	   the	  promotion	  of	   a	  high	   level	  of	   employment,	   the	  
guarantee	  of	  adequate	  social	  protection,	  and	  a	  high	  level	  of	  protection	  of	  human	  health.	  Article	  3(3)	  TEU	  
provides	   that	   the	  EU	  shall	  work	   for,	   inter	  alia,	   ‘sustainable	  development’,	   ‘social	  progress’	  and	   ‘a	  high	  
level	  of	  protection	  and	   improvement	  of	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  environment’.	  These	  objectives	  can	  have	  an	  
ample	   influence	  on	  the	  application	  of	   the	  competition	  rules.519	  An	  example	   is	  Preussen	  Elektra,	  where	  
the	   ECJ	   held	   that	   ‘environmental	   protection	   requirements	  must	   be	   integrated	   into	   the	   definition	   and	  
implementation	   of	   other	   [EU]	   policies’.520	   The	   Kanal	   5	   judgment	   offers	   another	   confirmation	   of	   the	  
relevance	  of	  public	  interests:	  the	  ECJ	  held	  that	  an	  objective	  justification	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  Art.	  102	  
TFEU	  ‘may	  arise,	  in	  particular,	  from	  the	  task	  and	  method	  of	  financing	  public	  service	  undertakings’.521	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
516	  See	  e.g.	  Continental	  Can,	  supra	  note	  343,	  para	  25.	  See	  also	  Kingston	  2009	  (ibid.,	  at	  209-­‐210),	  who	  –	  in	  my	  view,	  
rightly	  –	  concludes	  that	  environmental	  concerns	  	  could	  thus	  be	  relevant	  in	  the	  interpretation	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  
517	  See,	  on	  Article	  101	  TFEU	  but	  clearly	  transposable	  to	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  as	  well,	  Courage,	  supra	  note	  467,	  para	  20	  
and	  Case	  C-­‐126/97	  Eco	  Swiss	  [1999]	  ECR	  I-­‐3055,	  para	  36.	  
518	  Indeed,	  one	  could	  question	  to	  what	  extent	  a	  competition	  policy	  that	  is	  solely	  based	  on	  consumer	  welfare	  finds	  a	  
basis	  in	  the	  Treaties.	  One	  basis	  that	  seems	  to	  get	  closest	  is	  Article	  3(1)	  TEU,	  which	  provides	  that	  the	  EU	  aims	  to	  
promote	  e.g.	  ‘the	  well-­‐being	  of	  its	  peoples’.	  The	  concept	  of	  ‘well-­‐being’	  is	  much	  broader	  than	  simply	  (monetary)	  
‘welfare’.	  
519	  Note	  that	  Article	  7	  TFEU	  provides	  that	  the	  EU	  shall	  ensure	  consistency	  between	  its	  policies	  and	  activities,	  
reflecting	  the	  link	  between	  various	  policy	  areas	  and	  objectives.	  
520	  Case	  C-­‐379/98	  PreussenElektra	  [2001]	  ECR	  I-­‐2099,	  para	  76.	  	  
521	  Case	  C-­‐52/07	  Kanal	  5	  and	  TV	  4	  v	  STIM	  [2008]	  ECR	  I-­‐9275,	  para	  47.	  Unfortunately,	  the	  ECJ	  provided	  no	  further	  
explanation.	  The	  funding	  of	  a	  public	  service	  obligation	  may,	  alternatively,	  be	  considered	  as	  ‘objective	  necessity’.	  I	  
prefer,	  however,	  to	  categorise	  it	  under	  public	  interest,	  because	  it	  is	  a	  deliberate	  choice	  to	  pursue	  a	  specific	  policy	  
objective,	  rather	  than	  a	  situation	  akin	  to	  force	  majeure.	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I	  agree	  with	  the	  consideration	  of	  wider	  public	  interest	  objectives	  laid	  down	  by	  the	  EU	  Treaties,	  as	  those	  
objectives	  would	  become	  hollow	  statements	   if	   they	   cannot	  make	  a	  difference	   in	  EU	  policies.	  A	  public	  
interest	  plea	   is	  particularly	  persuasive	   if	   the	   relevant	  conduct	  protects	  a	  vital	  public	   interest	  goal,	  and	  
presents	   only	   a	   limited	   issue	   for	   competition.	   Such	   may	   be	   the	   case	   if	   a	   dominant	   firm	   expects	   its	  
business	  partners	  from	  abiding	  by	  minimum	  Corporate	  Social	  Responsibility	  (CSR)	  criteria.522	  In	  my	  view,	  
Article	  102	  TFEU	  should	  not	  a	  priori	  preclude	  a	  dominant	  firm	  refusing	  to	  buy	  from	  upstream	  suppliers	  
that,	  say,	  make	  use	  of	  child	  labour,523	  or	  that	  supply	  wood	  from	  uncertified	  forests.524	  
	  
Another	   reason	   in	   favour	   of	   considering	   public	   interest	   is	   the	   role	   they	   can	   play	   within	   Article	   101	  
TFEU.525	   Townley	  has	   aptly	   shown	  why	  public	   interest	   goals	   should	   be	   taken	   into	   consideration	  while	  
analysing	   an	   agreement	   under	  Article	   101	   TFEU.526	   Considering	   the	   parallelism	   that	   should	   be	   upheld	  
while	   interpreting	   Articles	   101	   and	   102	   TFEU	   (see	   section	   3.2.1	   in	   chapter	   II	   above),	   there	   is	   ample	  
reason	  to	  give	  due	  consideration	  to	  public	  interest	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  as	  well.	  
	  
Two	  well-­‐known	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  cases	  where	  the	  litigating	  parties	  invoked	  public	  interest	  are	  Hilti	  and	  
Tetra	   Pak	   II.527	   In	   Hilti,	   the	   Court	   examined	   a	   justification	   plea	   that	   an	   exclusionary	   practice	   was	  
necessary	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  public	  health	  and	  safety.	  Hilti	  argued	  that	  it	  disallowed	  the	  compatibility	  
of	   its	   own	   products	   with	   products	  made	   by	   other	   companies	   for	   public	   health	   reasons.	   The	   General	  
Court	  rejected	  this	  claim	  because	  public	  health	  in	  this	  area	  was	  already	  protected	  by	  a	  government	  body	  
and	  by	  various	  regulations.	  The	  General	  Court	  observed	  that,	  under	  such	  circumstances,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  task	  
of	  the	  dominant	  undertaking	  to	  ‘take	  steps	  on	  its	  own	  initiative	  to	  eliminate	  products	  which,	  rightly	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
522	  On	  the	  connection	  between	  CSR	  and	  competition	  law,	  see	  e.g.	  T.R.	  Ottervanger,	  Maatschappelijk	  verantwoord	  
concurreren:	  mededingingsrecht	  in	  een	  veranderende	  wereld	  [‘socially	  reponsible	  competition:	  competition	  law	  in	  
a	  changing	  world’]	  (inaugural	  address	  19	  March	  2010,	  Leiden	  University).	  
523	  Article	  3(3)	  and	  (5)	  TEU	  provide	  that	  the	  EU	  shall	  promote	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  child.	  	  
524	  Article	  3(3)	  TEU	  provides	  that	  the	  EU	  aims	  for	  a	  high	  level	  of	  environmental	  protection,	  while	  Article	  3(5)	  TEU	  
provides	  that	  the	  EU	  shall	  contribute	  to	  the	  sustainable	  development	  of	  the	  Earth.	  	  
525	  Case	  C-­‐309/99	  Wouters	  [2002]	  ECR	  I-­‐1577.	  See	  also	  Commission	  decision	  in	  Case	  COMP.F.1/37.894	  CECED	  
[2000]	  OJ	  L	  187/47.	  	  
526	  C.	  Townley,	  Article	  81	  EC	  and	  Public	  Policy	  (Hart	  Publishing:	  Oxford	  and	  Portland,	  Oregon	  2009).	  See,	  differently,	  
O.	  Odudu,	  The	  Boundaries	  of	  EC	  Competition	  Law:	  The	  Scope	  of	  Article	  81	  (OUP:	  Oxford	  2006).	  
527	  Hilti	  (General	  Court),	  supra	  note	  400;	  Tetra	  Pak	  II	  (General	  Court),	  supra	  note	  357.	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wrongly,	   it	   regards	   as	   dangerous	   or	   at	   least	   as	   inferior	   in	   quality	   to	   its	   own	   products.’528	   Similarly,	   in	  
Tetra	   Pak	   II	   the	   General	   Court	   did	   not	   agree	   with	   the	   dominant	   firm’s	   submission	   that	   allowing	  
interoperability	   would	   entail	   health	   and	   safety	   risks	   and	   would	   therefore	   be	   contrary	   to	   the	   public	  
interest.529	  	  
	  
Crucially,	  Hilti	  and	  Tetra	  Pak	  II	  rejected	  the	  public	  interest	  on	  the	  facts,	  but	  not	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  law.530	  The	  
facts	  of	  the	  cases	  do	  not	  indicate	  any	  particular	  weakness	  in	  the	  applicable	  legal	  framework	  protecting	  
health	  and	  safety,	  and	  accordingly	  no	  reason	  why	  the	  dominant	  undertaking	  should	  have	  gone	  beyond	  
its	   formal	   legal	   requirements.	  The	  facts	  also	  showed	   little	  sign	  that	   the	  safety	  concerns	  were	  genuine.	  
For	  example,	  in	  Hilti,	  the	  dominant	  undertaking	  did	  not	  pro-­‐actively	  approach	  the	  competent	  authorities	  
for	  a	  ruling	  that	  the	  use	  of	  non-­‐Hilti	  nails	  was,	  in	  fact,	  dangerous.531	  There	  was	  clearly	  an	  alternative	  that	  
Hilti	  should	  have	  taken	  up.	  
	  
I	   doubt	   whether	   it	   follows	   from	  Hilti	   and	   Tetra	   Pak	   II	   the	   mere	   existence	   of	   government	   rules	   and	  
institutions	  should,	  by	  definition,	  preclude	  dominant	  firms	  from	  ever	  going	  beyond	  the	  health	  and	  safety	  
requirements	  formally	  required	  by	  law.	  This	  issue	  becomes	  particularly	  relevant	  in	  a	  situation	  where	  the	  
relevant	   rules	   are,	   for	   whatever	   reason,	   ineffective	   to	   ensure	   health	   and	   safety	   standards	   –	   such	   a	  
situation	  would	  not	  be	  covered	  by	  the	  reasoning	  in	  Hilti	  and	  Tetra	  Pak	  II,	  as	  that	  reasoning	  depends	  on	  
the	  assumption	  that	  the	  relevant	  objective	  is	  already	  sufficiently	  protected.	  The	  most	  important	  hurdle	  
for	  a	  dominant	  undertaking	  will	  be	  to	  show	  why	  its	  conduct	  is	  necessary	  to	  achieve	  the	  desired	  goal.	  For	  
example,	  in	  RTT	  v	  GB-­‐Inno-­‐BM,	  the	  dominant	  undertaking	  relied	  in	  its	  approval	  of	  telephone	  equipment	  
on	   ‘the	   safety	   of	   users,	   the	   safety	   of	   those	   operating	   the	   network	   and	   the	   protection	   of	   public	  
telecommunications	   networks	   against	   damage	   of	   any	   kind’.	   532	   The	   ECJ	   did	   not	   hold	   that	   these	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
528	  Hilti	  (ibid.),	  para	  118.	  For	  the	  ECJ	  appeal,	  see	  Case	  C-­‐53/92	  P	  Hilti	  v	  Commission	  [1994]	  ECR	  I-­‐667.	  The	  ECJ	  appeal	  
focused	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  evidence	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  submitted	  to	  the	  EU	  courts.	  
529	  Tetra	  Pak	  II	  (General	  Court),	  supra	  note	  357.	  
530	  See,	  similarly,	  Case	  T-­‐151/01	  DSD	  v	  Commission	  [2007]	  ECR	  II-­‐1607.	  	  
531	  Hilti	  (General	  Court),	  supra	  note	  400,	  para	  115.	  
532	  RTT	  v	  GB-­‐Inno-­‐BM,	  supra	  note	  436,	  para	  22.	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considerations	  are	  irrelevant	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU,	  but	  rejected	  the	  plea	  as	  the	  dominant	  
undertaking	  could	  have	  resorted	  to	  less	  anti-­‐competitive	  alternatives.533	  
	  
The	   objective	   justification	   pleas	   seem	   to	   have	   been	   unsuccessful	   because	   the	   conduct	   went	   beyond	  
what	  is	  necessary	  to	  protect	  the	  stated	  public	  interest.	  I	  agree	  that	  there	  is	  no	  basis	  to	  accept	  a	  public	  
interest	  plea	   if	   less	  anti-­‐competitive	  measures	  would	  have	  been	  able	   to	  achieve	   the	  objective	  as	  well.	  
The	  rulings	  therefore	  merely	  show	  that	  the	  ECJ	  does	  not	  accept	  hollow	  references	  to	  public	   interest	  –	  
and	  rightfully	  so.	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  case	  law	  still	  allows	  dominant	  firms	  to	  uphold	  a	  public	  interest	  goal;	  
as	  long	  as	  they	  can	  show	  why	  that	  goal	  is	  relevant	  in	  the	  EU	  legal	  context;	  and	  how	  their	  conduct	  meets	  
the	  proportionality	  test	  (as	  examined	  below	  in	  Section	  4).	  
	  
Apart	  from	  the	  ECJ,	  the	  Commission	  has	  also	  dealt	  with	  public	  interest	  concerns	  in	  various	  cases.	  In	  the	  
decisions	   discussed	  below,	   the	  Commission	   showed	   that	   it	   is	   conceptually	   possible	   to	   consider	   public	  
interest	  issues	  in	  the	  abuse	  analysis.	  The	  Port	  of	  Genoa	  case	  concerned	  the	  differentiation	  of	  tariffs	  for	  
piloting	   in	   the	   Port	   of	   Genoa.534	   The	   Commission	   found	   that	   pilots	   cannot	   favour	   certain	   shipping	  
companies	   to	   the	  detriment	  of	  others	  –	  unless	   there	   is	  an	  objective	  reason	  to	  do	  so.	  The	  Commission	  
noted	   that	   such	   objective	   reasons	   may	   include	   the	   ‘protection	   of	   the	   sea	   bed’	   –	   confirming	   that	  
environmental	  reasons	  may	  justify	  a	  prima	  facie	  abuse.535	  In	  Spanish	  Airports,	  the	  Commission	  objected	  
to	  a	   system	  of	  discounts	  on	   landing	   fees	   in	  use	  at	  Spanish	  airports.536	   It	  again	  held	   that	   there	  may	  be	  
‘objective	  reasons’	  for	  such	  behaviour,	  such	  as	  the	  ‘aim	  of	  reducing	  air	  traffic	  noise	  or	  air	  congestion’.537	  	  
	  
The	  finding	  of	  an	  abuse	  in	  both	  in	  Port	  of	  Genoa	  and	  Spanish	  Airports	  implies	  that	  no	  ‘objective	  reasons’	  
were	  applicable.538	  The	  Commission	  could	  –	  and	  should	  –	  have	  been	  more	  explicit	  as	  to	  why	  the	  relevant	  
public	  interests	  at	  play	  were	  unable	  to	  justify	  the	  prima	  facie	  abuse.	  It	  is	  unclear	  how	  the	  differentiation	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
533	  Ibid.	  The	  ECJ	  notes	  that	  it	  could	  have	  been	  sufficient	  to	  lay	  down	  specifications	  and	  to	  establish	  a	  procedure	  for	  
type-­‐approval	  to	  examine	  whether	  those	  specifications	  have	  been	  met.	  
534	  Commission	  decision	  in	  Case	  97/745/EF	  Port	  of	  Genoa	  [1997]	  OJ	  L	  301/27.	  
535	  Ibid.,	  para	  21.	  The	  Commission	  also	  referred	  to	  economies	  of	  scale.	  	  
536	  Commission	  decision	  in	  Case	  2000/521/EF	  Spanish	  Airports	  [2000]	  OJ	  L	  208/36.	  
537	  Ibid.,	  para	  52.	  As	  in	  Port	  of	  Genoa,	  the	  Commission	  referred	  to	  economies	  of	  scale	  as	  well.	  
538	  Even	  though,	  in	  Spanish	  Airports,	  the	  Commission	  does	  note	  why	  the	  conduct	  does	  not	  lead	  to	  any	  economies	  
of	  scale.	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under	   review	  truly	  contributed	  to	   the	  relevant	  public	   interest	  aims.	  For	  example,	  a	   justification	  would	  
have	  been	  much	  more	  persuasive	  in	  Spanish	  Aiports	  if	  the	  discounts	  had	  actually	  been	  linked	  to	  the	  level	  
of	  noise	  that	  a	  particular	  aircraft	  would	  create	  by	  landing	  there.	  	  
	  
In	  GVG/FS,	  the	  Commission	  examined	  a	  complaint	  from	  GVG,	  a	  German	  railway	  company.	  Ferrovie	  dello	  
Stato,	   the	   Italian	   national	   railway	   carrier,	   allegedly	   made	   it	   impossible	   for	   GVG	   to	   enter	   the	   Italian	  
market,	   for	  example	  by	   refusing	   to	  provide	   traction.539	  One	  of	   the	  arguments	   raised	  was	   that	   traction	  
could	   not	   be	   provided	   based	   on	   safety	   concerns.	   Although	   the	   Commission	   did	   not	   denounce	   the	  
importance	   of	   such	   safety	   reasons	   as	   a	   matter	   of	   law,	   it	   did	   reject	   the	   argument	   on	   the	   facts.	   The	  
Commission	   observed	   that	   GVG,	   before	   being	   able	   to	   offer	   passenger	   transport	   services,	   would	   first	  
have	  to	  obtain	  a	  safety	  certificate.	  As	  this	   is	   the	  responsibility	  by	  the	   infrastructure	  manager,	   ‘it	   is	  not	  
the	   responsibility	   of	   [Ferrovie	   dello	   Stato]	   to	   judge	   whether	   GVG	   fulfils	   the	   necessary	   safety	  
requirements’540	  –	  echoing	  the	  approach	  taken	  in	  Hilti.	  It	  seems	  reasonable	  that	  a	  general	  reference	  to	  
safety	  concerns	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  persuasive	  –	  especially	  if	  there	  specific	  regulations	  are	  in	  place	  dealing	  
with	  that	  specific	  concern.541	  	  
	  
A	  number	  of	  arguments	  can	  be	  raised	  against	  considering	  public	  interest	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  Article	  
102	  TFEU.542	  Some	  commentators	  have	  suggested	  that	  competition	  law	  should	  only	  consider	  efficiencies	  
and	   the	   effect	   of	   conduct	   on	   consumer	   welfare,543	   which	   seemingly	   takes	   public	   interest	   out	   of	   the	  
equation.	  To	  my	  mind,	  this	  position	  creates	  a	  false	  dichotomy.	  As	  said	  before,	  public	   interests	  have	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
539	  Commission	  decision	  in	  Case	  COMP/37.685	  GVG/FS	  [2004]	  OJ	  L	  11/17.	  
540	  Ibid.,	  para	  136.	  
541	  Provided	  that	  there	  are	  no	  strong	  reasons	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  regulations	  are	  inadequate.	  
542	  V.	  Brisimi,	  ‘Abuse	  of	  a	  Dominant	  Position	  and	  Public	  Policy	  Justifications:	  A	  Question	  of	  Attribution’,	  (2013)	  24	  
EBLR	  261.	  He	  argues,	  inter	  alia,	  that	  the	  right	  of	  undertakings	  to	  lobby	  is	  ‘the	  flip	  side	  of	  the	  cases	  that	  reject	  public	  
policy	  justifications	  under	  Article	  102	  TFEU’	  (at	  267).	  Although	  insightful,	  I	  believe	  that	  there	  can	  be	  situations	  in	  
which	  Brisimi’s	  birfucation	  is	  inadequate.	  For	  example,	  how	  would	  this	  system	  work	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  particularly	  
successful	  lobby,	  namely	  where	  the	  legislator	  gives	  the	  dominant	  firm	  leeway	  to	  achieve	  certain	  public	  interest	  
goals?	  
543	  See	  e.g.	  Odudu	  2006,	  supra	  note	  526.	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impact	  on	  (consumer)	  welfare	  just	  like	  more	  easily	  quantifiable	  interests.	  There	  is	  no	  solid	  foundation	  to	  
discard	  interests	  just	  because	  they	  are	  difficult	  to	  gauge.544	  
	  
Another	   argument	   is	   that	   the	   State,	   instead	   of	   private	   firms,	   should	   resolve	   issues	   related	   to	   public	  
interest.545	  The	  case	  law,	  such	  as	  Hilti	  and	  Tetra	  Pak	  II,	  seems	  to	  support	  this	  position.546	  In	  another	  case,	  
Sot.	   Lélos,	   the	   ECJ	   rejected	   a	   claim	   that	   restrictions	   to	   parallel	   imports	   were	   necessary	   to	   prevent	  
shortage	  of	  medicines	  on	  a	  given	  national	  market	  –	  according	  to	  the	  ECJ,	   it	  should	  be	  for	  the	  national	  
authorities	  to	  resolve	  the	  situation.547	  Although	   it	  makes	  sense	  that	   it	   is	  normally	  the	  role	  of	  States	  to	  
ensure	   the	   public	   interest,	   I	   consider	   it	   too	   simplistic	   to	   hold	   that	   State	   action	   always	   provides	   the	  
answer.	  As	  said	  earlier,	  State	   legislation	  may	  be	   ineffective	   to	   reach	   the	  desired	  goal	  or,	  alternatively,	  
may	  still	  be	  in	  the	  making.	  Another	  possibility	  is	  that	  the	  legislator	  has	  provided	  leeway	  for	  a	  dominant	  
undertaking	  to	  take	  public	   interests	   into	  account.548	  For	   instance,	  such	  a	   ‘delegation’	  of	  public	   interest	  
responsibilities	  may	  exist	  within	   the	   framework	  of	  a	  public	   service	  obligation,	  or	  may	  arise	  within	   the	  
activities	  of	  a	  public-­‐private	  partnership.549	  Another	  issue	  is	  that	  a	  national	  authority	  –	  or	  court	  –	  does	  
not	  necessarily	  protect	  EU	  interests	  at	  large,	  but	  may	  have	  a	  statutory	  duty	  to	  focus	  on	  certain	  domestic	  
interests.	  As	  a	   result,	   one	   cannot	   conclude	   that,	  by	  definition,	  national	   authorities	   sufficiently	  protect	  
the	   interests	   defined	  by	   the	   EU	  Treaties.	  Dominant	   undertakings	  may	   thus	  be	   confronted	  with	  public	  
interest	   issues,	   even	   though	   it	   does	   not	   seem	   their	   prerogative	   at	   first	   sight.	   In	   short,	   the	  distinction	  
between	   ‘public’	   and	   ‘private’	   is	   often	   not	   easy	   to	  make.	   Indeed,	   the	   Bosman	   judgment,	   an	   internal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
544	  Also	  consider	  that	  efficiency	  balancing	  tests	  themselves	  are	  often	  based	  on	  an	  approximation	  of	  effects,	  rather	  
than	  a	  precise	  quantification.	  
545	  See	  e.g.	  Brisimi	  2013,	  supra	  note	  542.	  
546	  Hilti	  (General	  Court),	  supra	  note	  400;	  Tetra	  Pak	  II	  (General	  Court),	  supra	  note	  357.	  See	  also	  the	  General	  Court	  
rulings	  in	  Irish	  Sugar,	  supra	  note	  353	  and	  Case	  T-­‐65/89	  BPB	  Industries	  and	  British	  Gypsum	  v	  Commission	  [1993]	  ECR	  
II-­‐389.	  	  
547	  Sot.	  Lélos,	  supra	  note	  375,	  para	  75.	  The	  authorities	  should	  do	  so	  ‘by	  taking	  appropriate	  and	  proportionate	  
steps’.	  
548	  Providing	  such	  leeway	  may	  improve	  the	  flexibility	  of	  legislation.	  A	  State	  may	  attach	  more	  relevance	  as	  to	  the	  
principles	  that	  are	  upheld,	  rather	  than	  the	  actual	  implementation	  of	  those	  principles.	  This	  may	  particularly	  be	  the	  
case	  for	  markets	  where	  technological	  developments	  make	  it	  difficult	  for	  the	  legislator	  to	  keep	  up.	  
549	  See	  Article	  106(2)	  TFEU.	  Cf,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Article	  101	  TFEU,	  the	  Wouters	  case,	  supra	  note	  525.	  Dutch	  law	  
gave	  the	  Bar	  Council	  ample	  leeway	  to	  work	  towards	  objectives	  such	  as	  the	  independence	  of	  lawyers.	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market	  case,	  confirmed	  that	  private	  actors	  may	  rely	  on	  the	  public	  interest	  contained	  in	  Article	  36	  TFEU:	  
‘[t]here	   is	   nothing	   to	   preclude	   individuals	   from	   relying	   on	   justifications	   on	   grounds	   of	   public	   policy,	  
public	   security	   or	   public	   health’.550	   Of	   course,	   this	   does	   not	   mean	   carte	   blanche	   for	   any	   type	   of	  
behaviour	  that	  would	  otherwise	  be	  prohibited.	  It	  simply	  means	  that	  we	  should	  not,	  by	  definition,	  turn	  a	  
blind	  eye	  to	  the	  relevance	  of	  public	  interest	  concerns	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  
	  
Yet	  another	  criticism	  may	  be	  that	  NCAs	  and	  courts	  are	  considered	  ill-­‐equipped	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  balancing	  
of	   competition	   and	   public	   interests.551	   The	   idea	   is	   that	   it	  would	   require	   them	   to	  weigh	   interests	   of	   a	  
completely	   different	   nature,	   also	   known	   as	   incommensurabilia.	   I	   doubt	   whether	   this	   argument	   is	  
sufficiently	  potent,	  as	  EU	  law	  often	  requires	  NCAs	  and	  courts	  to	  make	  such	  decisions.	  For	  example,	  how	  
to	  deal	  with	  agreements	   that	   appear	  pro-­‐competitive	  overall,	   but	   at	   the	   same	   time	   segment	  national	  
markets	   (and	   could	   thus	   harm	   the	   functioning	   of	   the	   internal	   market)?552	   Indeed,	   balancing	   various	  
interests	  that	  are	  difficult	  to	  compare	  is	  often	  at	  the	  core	  of	  what	  judges	  do	  –	  not	  just	  those	  applying	  EU	  
law.553	  
	  
A	   final	   critique	   is	   that	   introducing	   public	   interest	   concerns	   in	   competition	  matters	   lacks	   a	   democratic	  
basis;554	  such	  issues	  should	  more	  properly	  be	  examined	  in	  the	  political	  field.555	  Such	  criticism	  appears	  to	  
overlook	   that,	   because	   of	   the	   hierarchy	   of	   norms,	   the	   national	   and	   EU	   legislator556	   are	   incapable	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
550	  Case	  C-­‐415/93	  Bosman	  [1995]	  ECR	  I-­‐4921,	  para	  86.	  
551	  See	  e.g.	  Brisimi	  (supra	  note	  542,	  at	  270),	  who	  warns	  for	  a	  potential	  ‘distorted	  application	  of	  competition	  law’.	  
552	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐403/08	  and	  C-­‐429/08	  FAPL	  (‘Karen	  Murphy’)	  [2011]	  ECR	  I-­‐9083.	  
553	  It	  is	  interesting	  that	  commentators	  who	  argue	  in	  favour	  of	  an	  efficiency-­‐based	  approach	  appear	  to	  assume	  that	  
competition	  authorities	  and	  courts	  are	  perfectly	  capable	  of	  doing	  so	  –	  even	  though	  judging	  the	  soundness	  of	  an	  
economic	  effects	  analysis	  is	  not	  what	  courts	  normally	  do.	  
554	  This	  point	  is	  often	  raised	  by	  commentators	  who	  also	  argue	  that	  competition	  law	  should	  only	  involve	  an	  
efficiency	  analysis	  –	  a	  position	  that	  is	  itself	  questionable	  from	  a	  democratic	  legitimacy	  point	  of	  view.	  I	  doubt	  
whether	  the	  people	  representing	  the	  contracting	  parties,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  text	  of	  Article	  102	  
TFEU,	  were	  Chicago	  School	  adepts	  avant	  la	  lettre	  (the	  text	  has	  remained	  substantively	  unchanged	  from	  the	  very	  
beginning	  of	  the	  European	  Economic	  Community).	  See,	  differently,	  P.	  Akman,	  ‘Searching	  for	  the	  Long-­‐Lost	  Soul	  of	  
Article	  82	  EC’,	  (2009)	  29	  Oxford	  Journal	  of	  Legal	  Studies	  267.	  
555	  Brisimi	  argues	  that	  public	  interest	  isses	  should	  be	  resolved,	  inter	  alia,	  through	  appropriate	  legislation.	  See	  
Brisimi	  2013,	  supra	  note	  542,	  at	  264.	  
556	  I	  am	  referring	  to	  the	  EU	  institutions	  that	  make	  secondary	  EU	  legislation.	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introducing	  rules	  that	  set	  aside	  a	  Treaty	  provision	  such	  as	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  (see	  also	  section	  3.4.3).	  So,	  in	  
fact,	   allowing	   such	   considerations	   to	   influence	   the	   interpretation	   of	   Article	   102	   TFEU	   may	   actually	  
enhance	   the	   impact	   of	   democratically	   agreed-­‐upon	   public	   interest	   values.	   In	   this	   vein,	   one	   should	  
remember	  that	  the	  democratic	  legitimacy	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  is	  not	  greater	  –	  or	  smaller	  –	  than	  that	  of	  
the	  provisions	  in	  the	  EU	  Treaties	  that	  show	  concern	  for	  non-­‐competition	  interests.	  
	  
	  




It	  is	  useful	  to	  examine	  the	  requirements	  that	  any	  objective	  justification	  must	  meet.	  I	  shall	  examine	  the	  
use	  of	  the	  proportionality	  test;	  a	  key	  legal	  framework	  for	  many	  parts	  of	  EU	  law.	  It	  is	  frequently	  used	  by	  
the	  ECJ	  to	  examine	  whether	  a	  justification	  applies	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  conduct	  that	  would	  otherwise	  be	  considered	  
contrary	  to	  the	  Treaty,	  and	  is	  clearly	  relevant	  for	  EU	  competition	  law	  as	  well.557	  	  
	  
The	  proportionality	   test	   embodies	   a	   number	  of	   elements.558	   It	   first	   ascertains	  whether	   the	   aim	   relied	  
upon	   is	   legitimate	   and	   whether	   the	   conduct	   is	   suitable	   to	   achieve	   that	   aim.	   The	   necessity	   test	   then	  
requires	  an	  examination	  of	  whether	  the	  means	  were	  necessary	  to	  achieve	  the	  desired	  aim,	  i.e.	  whether	  
less	  anti-­‐competitive	  means	  could	  have	  obtained	  the	  stated	  objectives	  just	  as	  well.	  The	  necessity	  often	  
provides	  the	  crux	  of	  the	  legal	  analysis,	  as	  it	  is	  usually	  the	  most	  difficult	  condition	  to	  meet.	  Finally,	  there	  
may	  also	  be	  a	  proportionality	  test	  stricto	  sensu,	  which	  assesses	  whether	  the	  conduct	  under	  review	  does	  
not	   disproportionality	   advance	   the	   dominant	   firm’s	   interests	   in	   comparison	   to	   the	   interests	   of	   other	  
market	  participants.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
557	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Cosmas	  in	  Masterfoods,	  supra	  note	  331,	  para	  101:	  ‘the	  question	  of	  whether	  conduct	  is	  justified	  
or	  not	  is	  assessed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  proportionality’.	  See	  also	  the	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Kirschner	  in	  Tetra	  Pak	  
II	  (General	  Court),	  supra	  note	  357,	  paras	  68-­‐71,	  showing	  the	  relevance	  of	  the	  proportionality	  principle	  in	  several	  
important	  cases	  on	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  See,	  more	  recently,	  R.	  Snelders,	  A.	  Leyden	  &	  A.	  Lofaro,	  ‘Predatory	  Conduct’,	  
in:	  F.E.	  Gonzáles	  &	  R.	  Snelders	  2014	  (supra	  note	  331,	  at	  211):	  ‘All	  defences	  in	  the	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  context	  must	  
meet	  a	  proportionality	  test’.	  
558	  The	  European	  Commission’s	  discussion	  paper	  (supra	  note	  503,	  para	  81)	  notes	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  
proportionality	  test	  when	  assessing	  a	  ‘meeting	  competition	  defense’.	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After	  the	  examination	  of	  the	  proportionality	  test,	  I	  shall	  also	  deal	  with	  the	  relevance	  of	  anti-­‐competitive	  
intent	  and	  effects.	  All	  these	  elements	  provide	  insight	  into	  the	  main	  issues	  that	  are	  relevant	  in	  the	  legal	  
analysis	  of	  an	  objective	  justification.	  A	  red	  thread	  in	  my	  analysis	   is	  that	  the	  type	  of	  justification	  at	  play	  
largely	   determines	  what	   legal	   conditions	   can	   and	   should	  play	   a	   role.559	   The	   following	  paragraphs	   also	  
contain	  several	  references	  to	  the	  Post	  Danmark	  legal	  test	  that	  applies	  to	  an	  efficiency	  plea,	  as	  discussed	  
in	  Section	  3.4.5.	  
	  
4.2 Legitimate	  aim	  &	  suitability560	  
	  
It	  is	  unclear	  what	  kind	  of	  legitimate	  aims	  a	  dominant	  undertaking	  may	  invoke.	  An	  aim	  should	  in	  any	  case	  
be	  considered	  legitimate	  if	  it	  seeks	  to	  achieve	  a	  goal	  that	  is	  consistent	  with	  one	  of	  the	  objectives	  of	  EU	  
competition	   law	  –	  this	  will	  be	  an	  attractive	  route	  for	  a	  public	   interest	  plea,	  for	  example	   if	  the	  conduct	  
benefits	   environmental	   protection.561	   More	   generally,	   a	   legitimate	   aim	   should	   refer	   to	   benefits	   that	  
accrue	   wider	   than	   simply	   to	   the	   dominant	   firm	   itself.	   This	   is	   particularly	   the	   case	   in	   terms	   of	   the	  
justifications	  that	  call	  for	  a	  balancing	  test,	  namely	  the	  efficiency	  plea	  and	  the	  public	  interest	  plea.	  As	  the	  
finding	   of	   a	   prima	   facie	   abuse	   connotes	   that	   the	   conduct	   under	   review	   has	   the	   potential	   to	   harm	  
competition;	  a	  justification	  then	  requires	  a	  wider	  benefit	  to	  the	  market.562	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
559	  See,	  differently,	  R.	  Snelders,	  A.	  Leyden	  &	  A.	  Lofaro,	  ‘Predatory	  Conduct’,	  in:	  F.E.	  Gonzáles	  &	  R.	  Snelders	  2014	  
(supra	  note	  331,	  at	  215).	  They	  suggest	  that	  objective	  justification	  always	  requires	  a	  full	  examination	  of	  suitability,	  
necessity	  and	  proportionality.	  
560	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  relevance	  of	  'legitimate	  aim',	  reasonableness	  and	  proportionality,	  see	  Loewenthal	  2005,	  
supra	  note	  332,at	  465.	  
561	  See	  e.g	  the	  objectives	  mentioned	  in	  supra	  note	  523	  and	  524.	  See	  also	  Kingston	  (2009,	  supra	  note	  516,	  at	  210),	  
who	  argues	  that	  a	  dominant	  firm	  that	  relies	  on	  environmental	  benefits	  of	  its	  conduct	  should	  be	  able	  to	  meet	  the	  
suitability	  test.	  
562	  Case	  T-­‐66/01	  ICI	  v	  Commission	  [2010]	  ECR	  II-­‐2631,	  para	  306:	  ‘the	  desire	  to	  maintain	  or	  increase	  production	  
capacity	  is	  not	  an	  objective	  justification	  to	  allow	  an	  undertaking	  to	  act	  independently	  of	  Article	  [102	  TFEU]’.	  I	  
believe	  that	  the	  General	  Court	  could	  not	  have	  made	  such	  a	  sweeping	  statement	  if	  the	  dominant	  firm	  would	  have	  
relied	  more	  heavily	  on	  the	  wider	  efficiency	  benefits	  of	  its	  conduct.	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In	   my	   opinion,	   the	   condition	   of	   a	   legitimate	   aim	   should	   not	   be	   strictly	   enforced	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   legitimate	  
business	  conduct.	  Such	  a	  justification	  implies	  that	  the	  dominant	  undertaking	  is	  simply	  making	  use	  of	  its	  
commercial	   freedom.	  Within	   the	   boundaries	   of	   ‘legitimate	   business	   conduct’,	   the	   dominant	   firm	  may	  
indeed	   be	   led	   by	   a	  wish	   to	   pursue	   its	   own	   interests,563	   rather	   than	   a	  more	   ‘objective’	   benefit	   to	   the	  
market	   at	   large.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   such	   a	   plea	   is	   more	   likely	   to	   be	   persuasive	   if	   the	   dominant	   firm	  
succeeds	  in	  showing	  the	  wider	  benefits	  of	  its	  conduct:	  would	  markets	  be	  functioning	  better	  if	  all	  market	  
participants	  exhibit	   the	   same	  conduct?	  For	  example,	   consider	  a	  dominant	  undertaking	   that	   refuses	   to	  
deal	  with	  a	  purchaser	  that	  refuses	  to	  pay	  its	  bills.	  Although	  such	  a	  refusal	  obviously	  seeks	  to	  protect	  the	  
financial	   interests	   of	   the	   dominant	   undertaking,	   its	   beneficial	   ramifications	   are	  wider	   than	   that.	   If	   all	  
companies	  would	  pay	  their	  bills,	  the	  economy	  would	  be	  better	  off	  as	  a	  whole.	  
	  
As	   to	   a	   plea	   based	   on	   objective	   necessity,	   the	   circumstances	   will	   dictate	   to	   what	   extent	   it	   can	   be	  
subsumed	  under	   a	   legitimate	  aim.	  Compliance	  with	   legislative	   standards	   is	   clearly	   a	   legitimate	  aim.	   It	  
should	   then	   be	   examined	  whether	   the	   conduct	   is	   capable	   of	  meeting	   those	   standards.	   However,	   the	  
‘legitimate	   aim’	   criterion	   cannot	   be	   easily	   laid	   down	   on	   a	   situation	   of	   force	  majeure,	   as	   such	   a	   plea	  
connotes	   that	   the	   dominant	   undertaking	   acts	   out	   of	   necessity	   (which	   is	   considered	   justified	   ex	   post	  
facto),	  rather	  than	  a	  legitimate	  aim.	  
	  
Finally,	  an	  assessment	  of	  legitimate	  aim	  should	  also	  include	  a	  check	  whether	  the	  conduct	  is	  suitable	  to	  
achieve	  the	  professed	  legitimate	  aim.	  If	  the	  conduct	  is	  incapable	  of	  reaching	  the	  desired	  objective,	  there	  
is	  no	  reason	  to	  condone	  the	  behaviour	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  legitimate	  aim.	  In	  effect,	  the	  suitability	  test	  calls	  
for	  a	  ‘first	  glance’	  examination,	  and	  is	  accordingly	  a	  lighter	  version	  of	  the	  more	  important	  necessity	  test.	  
The	  necessity	  test	  shall	  be	  examined	  below.	  
	  
4.3 Necessity	  test	  
	  
Under	  the	  necessity	  test,	  sometimes	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  'indispensability'	  test,	  a	  dominant	  firm	  must	  use	  
the	   least	  anti-­‐competitive	  means	  to	  reach	   its	  professed	  goal.	  Various	  authors,	  such	  as	  Loewenthal	  and	  
Eilmansberger,	  appear	  to	  attach	  much	  weight	  to	  the	  necessity	  test.564	  The	  value	  of	  the	  necessity	  test	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
563	  Even	  though	  such	  conduct	  may	  have	  wider	  benefits.	  
564	  Loewenthal	  2005,	  supra	  note	  332,	  at	  466.	  See	  also	  Eilmansberger	  2005,	  supra	  note	  339,	  at	  172-­‐173.	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objective	   justification	   is	  not	  apparent	  from	  early	  case	   law	  such	  as	  United	  Brands.	  The	  ECJ	  held	  that,	   in	  
principle,	   the	   dominant	   firm	   is	   at	   liberty	   to	   decide	   what	   type	   of	   action	   it	   carries	   out	   as	   part	   of	   a	  
commercial	  ‘counter-­‐attack’	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  its	  competitors.565	  The	  judgment	  does	  not	  include	  a	  requirement	  to	  
choose	   the	   least	   anti-­‐competitive	   means.	   In	   addition,	   the	   ECJ	   seemed	   to	   create	   a	   link	   between	   the	  
principle	  of	  proportionality	  and	  ‘the	  economic	  strength	  of	  the	  undertakings	  confronting	  each	  other’.566	  
This	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  refer	  to	  a	  necessity	  test,	  but	  rather	  a	  requirement	  to	  abstain	  from	  certain	  conduct	  
depending	  on	  the	  degree	  of	  dominance.	  Such	  a	  test	  is	  compatible	  with	  a	  concept	  of	  dominance	  that	  is	  
not	  black	  and	  white	  but	  more	  akin	  to	  a	  sliding	  scale	  (as	  suggested	  in	  section	  2.2).	  	  
	  
However,	   the	   case	   law	   seems	   to	   have	  made	   a	   gradual	   shift	  with	   an	   increased	   focus	   on	   the	   necessity	  
test.567	  Tetra	  Pak	  II	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  an	  early	  indication	  that	  a	  necessity	  test	  should	  be	  performed.	  
In	   that	   case,	   the	  General	  Court	  was	  unconvinced	   that	   the	  protection	  of	  public	  health	  –	   the	  professed	  
goal	  of	  the	  prima	  facie	  abuse	  –	  could	  not	  be	  guaranteed	  by	  other	  means.568	  Later,	  in	  British	  Airways,	  the	  
ECJ	  established	  the	  necessity	  criterion	  more	   firmly:	   ‘If	   the	  exclusionary	  effect	  of	   [a	   rebate]	  system	  […]	  
goes	  beyond	  what	  is	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  attain	  [efficiency]	  advantages,	  that	  system	  must	  be	  regarded	  
as	  an	  abuse.’569	  	  The	  same	  emphasis	  on	  the	  necessity	  test	  is	  apparent	  from	  the	  Commission	  decision	  in	  
Microsoft.570	  For	   its	  part,	   the	  ECJ	   firmly	  established	  the	  necessity	  test	  as	  one	  of	  the	   legal	  conditions	   in	  
Post	  Danmark.571	  
	  
A	  way	  to	  reconcile	  British	  Airways,	  Microsoft	  and	  Post	  Danmark	  on	  the	  one	  hand;	  and	  United	  Brands	  on	  
the	  other	  hand	   is	  by	  considering	   the	  different	   types	  of	  objective	   justification	   that	  were	  at	  play.	   In	   the	  
former	   cases,	   the	   dominant	   firm	   invoked	   an	   efficiency	   plea.	   In	   such	   a	   balancing	   exercise	   it	   is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
565	  United	  Brands,	  supra	  note	  417,	  para	  189.	  
566	  Ibid.,	  para	  190.	  
567	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  ECJ	  has	  never	  overruled	  United	  Brands,	  but	  keeps	  referring	  to	  it.	  
568	  Tetra	  Pak	  II	  (General	  Court),	  supra	  note	  357,	  paras	  84	  and	  140.	  
569	  British	  Airways	  (ECJ),	  supra	  note	  341,	  para	  86.	  
570	  Commission	  decision	  in	  Case	  COMP/C-­‐3/37.792	  Microsoft	  (24	  March	  2004),	  recital	  970.	  
571	  Post	  Danmark,	  supra	  note	  381,	  para	  42.	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understandable	  that	  the	  conduct	  should	  be	  necessary	  for	  the	  professed	  pro-­‐competitive	  outcome.572	  In	  
terms	  of	  a	  public	  interest	  plea,	  there	  is	  –	  likewise	  –	  no	  need	  to	  condone	  prima	  facie	  abusive	  conduct	  if	  
the	   dominant	   undertaking	   had	   less	   anti-­‐competitive	   means	   available	   to	   work	   towards	   the	   relevant	  
public	  interest	  objective.573	  	  
	  
However,	  a	  necessity	  test	  makes	  less	  sense	  when	  the	  objective	  justification	  plea	  is	  based	  on	  legitimate	  
business	  behaviour.	  In	  such	  a	  case	  it	  is	  more	  difficult	  –	  and	  less	  desirable	  –	  for	  competition	  authorities	  
and	  courts	  to	  second-­‐guess	  the	  appropriate	  route	  for	  the	  dominant	  firm	  to	  take.	  A	  dominant	  firm	  may	  
therefore	  still	  have	  ample	  liberty	  to	  choose	  its	  preferred	  conduct,	  as	  was	  decided	  in	  United	  Brands.	  
	  
But	   how	   can	   one	   differentiate	   in	   the	   application	   of	   the	   necessity	   test,	   considering	   that	   it	   appears	   to	  
entail	   such	   a	   straightforward	   examination?	   The	   necessity	   test	   can	   indeed	   become	  more	   stringent,	   or	  
more	   lenient,	   depending	   on	   the	   context.	   Case	   law	   on	   the	   internal	  market574	   and	   Article	   101	   TFEU575	  
confirms	  this	  approach.	  For	  example,	  the	  Wouters	  case	  shows	  that	  a	  restrictive	  measure	  by	  the	  Dutch	  
Bar	  Council	  could	  be	  justified,	  even	  though	  the	  Bar	  Councils	  in	  several	  other	  Member	  States	  did	  not	  have	  
such	  restrictive	  measures.	  Transposed	  to	  Article	  102	  TFEU,	  it	  means	  that	  a	  dominant	  firm	  may	  still	  pas	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
572	  The	  analysis	  should	  be	  less	  stringent	  when	  it	  concerns	  dynamic	  efficiencies.	  Considering	  the	  uncertain	  nature	  of	  
such	  efficiencies,	  it	  will	  usually	  be	  impossible	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  conduct	  is	  truly	  necessary	  for	  those	  
efficiencies	  to	  materialize.	  
573	  See	  Tetra	  Pak	  II	  (General	  Court),	  supra	  note	  357,	  para	  115-­‐119.	  See	  also	  RTT	  v	  GB-­‐Inno-­‐BM,	  supra	  note	  436,	  
paras	  21-­‐22.	  The	  ECJ	  referred	  specifically	  to	  an	  alternative:	  ‘In	  order	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  equipment	  meets	  the	  
essential	  requirements	  of,	  in	  particular,	  the	  safety	  of	  users,	  the	  safety	  of	  those	  operating	  the	  network	  and	  the	  
protection	  of	  public	  telecommunications	  networks	  against	  damage	  of	  any	  kind,	  it	  is	  sufficient	  to	  lay	  down	  
specifications	  which	  the	  said	  equipment	  must	  meet	  and	  to	  establish	  a	  procedure	  for	  type-­‐approval	  to	  check	  
whether	  those	  specifications	  are	  met	  [italics	  added	  by	  author].’	  The	  dependence	  on	  other	  market	  participants	  may	  
also	  be	  relevant	  in	  a	  follow-­‐on	  private	  action	  based	  on	  Article	  101	  TFEU,	  see	  Courage,	  supra	  note	  467,	  paras	  32-­‐33.	  
See	  also	  Kingston	  (2009,	  supra	  note	  516,	  at	  210),	  who	  argues	  that	  a	  dominant	  firm	  that	  relies	  on	  environmental	  
benefits	  of	  its	  conduct	  should	  be	  able	  to	  meet	  the	  necessity	  test.	  See,	  similarly	  attaching	  weight	  to	  the	  necessity	  
test,	  T.	  Graf	  &	  D.R.	  Little,	  ‘Tying	  and	  Bundling’,	  in:	  F.E.	  Gonzáles	  &	  R.	  Snelders	  2014	  (supra	  note	  331)	  at	  553.	  	  
574	  See	  e.g.	  Case	  C-­‐157/96	  National	  Farmers'	  Union	  and	  Others	  [1998]	  ECR	  I-­‐2211,	  para	  63;	  Case	  C-­‐36/02	  Omega	  
[2004]	  ECR	  I-­‐9609,	  paras	  37;	  Case	  C-­‐333/08	  Commission	  v	  France	  [2010]	  I-­‐757,	  para	  105.	  
575	  See	  e.g.	  Wouters,	  supra	  note	  525,	  paras	  109-­‐110.	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the	  necessity	  test	  even	  if	  a	  comparable	  actor	  (for	  instance	  a	  dominant	  firm	  in	  the	  same	  product	  market,	  
but	  in	  a	  different	  geographic	  area)	  has	  achieved	  the	  same	  goals	  by	  ‘less’	  anti-­‐competitive	  conduct.	  
	  
4.4 Proportionality	  stricto	  sensu	  
	  
The	   proportionality	   test,	   stricto	   sensu,576	   essentially	   assesses	   whether	   there	   is	   an	   equitable	   balance	  
between	  the	  means	  to	  achieve	  a	  professed	  objective,	  and	  the	  (potential)	  impact	  on	  the	  market.577	  To	  my	  
mind,	  proportionality	  stricto	  sensu	  can	  be	  an	  important	  element	  in	  the	  context	  of	  ‘objective	  justification’	  
depending	  on	  the	  type	  of	  objective	  justification	  at	  play.578	  	  
	  
The	   role	   of	   proportionality	   stricto	   sensu	   is	   ambiguous	   as	   regards	   an	   efficiency	   plea.579	   Such	   an	  
examination	   should	   primarily	   delve	   into	   the	   question	   whether	   or	   not	   the	   pro-­‐competitive	   effects	  
outweigh	   the	  anti-­‐competitive	  effects;	   the	  extent	  to	  which	   it	  does	  so	  appears	  to	  be	   less	  relevant.	  This	  
approach	   is	  confirmed	  by	  the	  Post	  Danmark	   judgment,	  which	  comprises	  no	  proportionality	  test	  stricto	  
sensu.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   proportionality	   stricto	   sensu	   is	   not	   irrelevant	   here	   either;	   because	   even	  
efficient	  conduct	  may	  fail	  the	  Post	  Danmark	  test	  if	  it	  leads	  to	  the	  elimination	  of	  all	  competition.	  
	  
Similarly,	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   proportionality	   test	   stricto	   sensu	   may	   vary	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   an	   objective	  
necessity	   plea.	   The	   test	   has	   little	   use	   if	   it	   was	   truly	   impossible	   for	   the	   dominant	   undertaking	   to	   act	  
otherwise.	  However,	   to	   the	  extent	   that	   such	  a	   firm	   relies	  on	  a	   ‘lighter’	   version	  of	  objective	  necessity,	  
based	  on	  commercial	  or	  technical,	  there	  is	  more	  room	  for	  a	  balancing	  test	  of	  various	  interests.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
576	  Proportionality	  in	  the	  wider	  sense	  entails	  an	  examination	  of	  (i)	  legitimate	  aim	  and	  suitability;	  (ii)	  necessity	  and	  
(iii)	  proportionality	  stricto	  sensu.	  See	  also	  section	  4.1	  above.	  
577	  See,	  differently,	  Østerud	  2010,	  supra	  note	  332,	  at	  279.	  He	  argues	  that	  the	  proportionality	  test	  ‘requires	  a	  
determination	  of	  whether	  a	  conduct’s	  net	  effect	  for	  consumers	  is	  positive	  or	  negative’.	  In	  my	  view,	  this	  test	  should	  
be	  subsumed	  under	  the	  efficiency	  category	  rather	  than	  the	  proportionality	  criterion.	  
578	  This	  may	  not	  be	  surprising	  if	  one	  considers	  EU	  law	  more	  broadly.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  Albors-­‐Llorens	  (2007,	  supra	  
note	  332,	  at	  1729),	  ‘[o]bjective	  justification	  and	  proportionality	  have	  conditioned	  the	  development	  of	  key	  areas	  of	  
[EU]	  law’.	  
579	  Even	  though	  the	  idea	  of	  balancing	  various	  interests	  is	  of	  course	  similar	  to	  that	  in	  the	  examination	  of	  an	  
efficiency	  plea.	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Proportionality	   stricto	   sensu	   has	   a	   particularly	   prominent	   role	  when	   examining	   pleas	   based	   on	   public	  
interest	  and	  legitimate	  business	  behaviour.580	  In	  terms	  of	  public	  interest,	  the	  key	  examination	  is	  whether	  
a	   fair	   balance	   has	   been	   struck	   between	   competition	   and	   non-­‐competition	   interests	   –	   an	   assessment	  
clearly	  in	  tune	  with	  proportionality	  stricto	  sensu.	  As	  regards	  legitimate	  business	  behaviour,	  the	  ECJ	  held	  
in	  the	  United	  Brands	  ruling:	  	  
	  
‘Even	  if	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  counter-­‐attack	  [by	  the	  dominant	  firm]	  is	  acceptable	  that	  attack	  must	  
still	   be	   proportionate	   to	   the	   threat	   taking	   into	   account	   the	   economic	   strength	   of	   the	  
undertakings	  confronting	  each	  other.	  [italics	  added,	  TvdV]’	  581	  
	  	  
On	  the	  facts,	  the	  ECJ	  held	  that	  the	  refusal	  to	  supply	  by	  United	  Brands	  was	  a	  disproportionate	  response	  
to	  the	  actions	  by	  the	  purchaser.582	  Apart	  from	  proportionality	  stricto	  sensu,	  the	  United	  Brands	  judgment	  
also	  noted	  that	  a	  dominant	  firm	  may	  take	  steps	  insofar	  they	  are	  ‘reasonable’.583	  It	  appears	  that	  conduct	  
is	  considered	  reasonable	  if	  it	  conforms	  to	  a	  proportionality	  stricto	  sensu	  test.	  
	  
	  A	  dominant	  undertaking	  is	  free	  to	  act	  as	  it	  wishes,	  which	  may	  even	  entail	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  harm	  to	  
other	  market	   participants,	   until	   that	   harm	   is	   no	   longer	   proportionate	   to	   the	   objective	   sought	   by	   the	  
conduct.	  In	  Syfait,	  AG	  Jacobs	  opined	  that	  GlaxoSmithKline’s	  limitations	  on	  parallel	  exports	  were	  justified,	  
as	  they	  were	  ‘reasonable’	  within	  the	  specific	  context	  of	  the	  pharmaceutical	  sector.584	  The	  United	  Brands	  
judgment	  and	  the	  Opinion	  in	  Syfait	  aptly	  show	  that	  one	  cannot	  draw	  this	  boundary	  in	  the	  abstract,	  and	  
will	  always	  depend	  on	  an	  in-­‐depth	  examination	  of	  the	  relevant	  context.	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
580	  For	  an	  example,	  see	  e.g.	  Atlantic	  Container,	  supra	  note	  485,	  para	  1120.	  
581	  United	  Brands,	  supra	  note	  417,	  para	  190.	  
582	  Ibid.,	  para	  191.	  	  
583	  United	  Brands,	  supra	  note	  417,	  para	  189-­‐190.	  
584	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Jacobs	  in	  Syfait,	  supra	  note	  389,	  para	  100	  (stating	  that	  the	  conduct	  under	  review	  must	  be	  
‘reasonable’	  and	  ‘proportionate’).	  See,	  for	  a	  critical	  analysis	  of	  the	  Opinion	  (targeting	  in	  particular	  AG	  Jacob’s	  
reasoning	  on	  the	  internal	  market),	  C.	  Koenig	  and	  C.	  Englemann,	  ‘Parallel	  trade	  restrictions	  in	  the	  pharmaceuticals	  
sector	  on	  the	  test	  stand	  of	  Article	  82	  EC:	  Commentary	  on	  the	  Opinion	  of	  Advocate	  General	  Jacobs	  in	  the	  case	  
Syfait/GlaxoSmithKline’,	  (2006)	  26	  ECLR	  338.	  Do	  note	  that,	  on	  the	  facts,	  the	  ECJ	  finally	  took	  a	  different	  approach	  is	  
Sot.	  Lélos,	  supra	  note	  375.	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4.5 Intent	  
	  
Loewenthal	  has	   argued	   that	   single	   firm	  conduct	   cannot	  be	   justified	   if	   its	   ‘primary	  aim’	   is	   to	  eliminate	  
competitors,	   portraying	   a	   widely	   held	   view	   that	   the	   dominant	   firm’s	   intent	   is	   an	   important	  
consideration.585	   I	   see	   two	   main	   –	   and	   distinct	   –	   ways	   to	   use	   intent.586	   The	   first	   possibility	   is	   that	  
documents	   showing	   anti-­‐competitive	   intent	   may	   provide	   context,	   and	   can	   support	   the	   finding	   of	   an	  
abuse.587	  Such	  evidence	  is	  clearly	  relevant	  in	  cases	  involving	  selective	  price-­‐cutting588	  as	  well	  as	  refusal	  
to	   supply.589	   In	  addition,	  establishing	  an	  anti-­‐competitive	  purpose	   is	  a	  necessary	  condition	  before	  one	  
can	  label	  prices	  between	  Average	  Variable	  Costs	  and	  Average	  Total	  Costs	  as	  an	  abuse.590	  	  
	  
The	   second	  possibility	   is	   that	   anti-­‐competitive	   intent	   is,	  ex	  post	   facto,	   inferred	   from	   the	   finding	  of	   an	  
abuse.	  This	  may	  be	  because	  the	  conduct	  under	  review	  has	  an	  anti-­‐competitive	  effect,591	  or	  is	  considered	  
to	  have	  no	  other	  rationale	  other	  than	  an	  anti-­‐competitive	  purpose	  –	  such	  as	  the	  case	  for	  prices	  below	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
585	  Ibid.	  Similarly,	  Østerud	  (2010,	  supra	  note	  332,	  at	  249)	  emphasizes	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  ‘legitimate	  aim’	  by	  the	  
dominant	  firm.	  See	  also	  Eilmansberger	  2005,	  supra	  note	  339,	  at	  146	  et	  seq.	  
586	  Note	  also	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  anti-­‐competitive	  intent	  may	  be	  relevant.	  Negligence,	  which	  entails	  a	  lack	  of	  such	  
intent,	  may	  be	  a	  mitigating	  factor	  in	  determining	  the	  level	  of	  the	  fine,	  see	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  method	  of	  setting	  
fines	  imposed	  pursuant	  to	  Article	  23(2)(a)	  of	  Regulation	  No	  1/2003,	  OJ	  [2006]	  C	  210/2,	  para	  29.	  	  
587	  See	  e.g.	  the	  UK	  Aberdeen	  Journals	  case,	  where	  the	  OFT	  found	  overwhelming	  evidence	  of	  a	  carefully	  established	  
plan	  by	  the	  dominant	  firm	  to	  get	  rid	  of	  its	  main	  competitor.	  	  See	  also	  Commission	  guidance	  on	  enforcement	  
priorities,	  supra	  note	  378,	  para	  66	  (on	  predation):	  ‘[i]n	  some	  cases	  it	  will	  be	  possible	  to	  rely	  upon	  direct	  evidence	  
consisting	  of	  documents	  from	  the	  dominant	  undertaking	  which	  clearly	  show	  a	  predatory	  strategy’.	  See	  also	  United	  
Brands,	  supra	  note	  417,	  para	  189.	  This	  paragraph	  refers	  to	  the	  ‘purpose’	  of	  the	  conduct	  in	  question.	  For	  a	  clear	  
example	  of	  where	  the	  finding	  of	  abuse	  hinged	  on	  the	  motivation	  of	  the	  dominant	  undertaking,	  see	  BPB	  (General	  
Court),	  supra	  note	  409.	  
588	  A.	  Jones	  &	  B.	  Sufrin,	  EC	  Competition	  Law	  (OUP:	  Oxford	  2008),	  at	  325.	  See	  e.g.	  the	  following	  cases:	  Case	  C-­‐
497/99	  P	  Irish	  Sugar	  v	  Commission	  [2001]	  ECR	  I-­‐5333;	  Compagnie	  maritime	  belge,	  supra	  note	  348.	  See	  also	  R.	  
Snelders,	  A.	  Leyden	  &	  A.	  Lofaro,	  ‘Predatory	  Conduct’,	  in:	  F.E.	  Gonzáles	  &	  R.	  Snelders	  2014	  (supra	  note	  331,	  at	  214):	  
‘the	  defence	  [of	  prices	  below	  AVC/AAC]	  contains	  a	  strong	  intent	  element’.	  
589	  See	  e.g.	  the	  Opinion	  of	  Advocate-­‐General	  Jacobs	  in	  Syfait,	  supra	  note	  389,	  at	  para	  72.	  	  	  
590	  Indeed,	  according	  to	  AKZO	  (supra	  note	  351,	  para	  72),	  prices	  between	  Average	  Total	  Costs	  and	  Average	  Variable	  
Costs	  are	  abusive	  if	  they	  are	  part	  of	  a	  plan	  to	  eliminate	  a	  competitor.	  	  
591	  Michelin	  II,	  supra	  note	  334,	  para	  241.	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Average	  Variable	  Costs.592	  The	  application	  of	  unrebuttable	  presumptions	  can	  be	  highly	  problematic,	  as	  
they	  disregard	  the	  overall	  context	  –	   leaving	  no	  room	  for	  objective	   justification	  –	  and	  may	  well	   lead	  to	  
mistaken	  inferences	  (as	  shall	  be	  examined	  more	  closely	  in	  paragraph	  5.2).	  
	  
Most	  cases	  with	  considerations	  on	  intent	  somehow	  use	  it	  as	  an	  element	  in	  line	  with	  a	  finding	  of	  abuse.	  
Indeed,	  it	  appears	  far	  from	  easy	  to	  convince	  the	  courts	  that	  prima	  facie	  abusive	  conduct	  actually	  had	  a	  
‘benign’	  purpose.	  The	  courts	  may	  simply	  regard	  the	  justification	  plea	  as	  an	  ex	  post	  facto	  explanation	  of	  
conduct	  that	  ‘had	  never	  really	  occurred	  to	  anyone	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process’.593	  Still,	  the	  General	  
Motors	  judgment	  shows	  that	  a	  dominant	  firm	  will	  be	  able	  to	  stave	  off	  a	  finding	  of	  an	  abuse	  if	  it	  changes	  
its	  behaviour	  in	  accordance	  with	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  in	  a	  timely	  fashion	  (i.e.	  before	  any	  intervention	  by	  the	  
Commission).594	   The	  General	  Motors	   case	   seems	   to	   confirm	   that	   the	   circumstances	  may	   indeed	   show	  
benign	  intent,	  which	  may	  –	  in	  turn	  –	  set	  aside	  a	  finding	  of	  an	  abuse.	  
	  
Although	  intent	  can	  thus	  play	  an	  important	  role,	  its	  relevance	  should	  not	  be	  overstated	  either.	  First,	  the	  
abuse	  of	  dominance	   is	  an	  objective	  concept.595	  This	   suggests	   that	   the	   subjective	   intent	  of	  a	  dominant	  
firm	  is	  normally	  not	  a	  necessary	  condition	  to	  establish	  a	  breach	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU.596	   I	  take	  from	  this	  
that	  the	  lack	  of	  intent	  will	  usually	  not	  be	  sufficient	  to	  establish	  an	  objective	  justification.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
592	  See	  e.g.	  the	  seemingly	  unrebuttable	  presumption	  in	  AKZO	  (supra	  note	  351,	  para	  71)	  that	  prices	  below	  Average	  
Variable	  Costs	  reveal	  anti-­‐competitive	  intent:	  ‘[a]	  dominant	  undertaking	  has	  no	  interest	  in	  applying	  such	  prices	  
except	  that	  of	  eliminating	  competitors’.	  As	  discussed	  in	  section	  5.2	  below,	  this	  presumption	  may	  not	  always	  be	  
warranted.	  
593	  Mann	  J	  in	  Purple	  Parking	  and	  Meteor	  Parking	  v	  Heathrow	  Airport	  [2011]	  EWHC	  987	  (Ch),	  at	  204.	  
594	  General	  Motors	  v	  Commission,	  supra	  note	  447,	  paras	  20,	  22.	  
595	  See	  e.g.	  Eilmansberger	  2005,	  supra	  note	  339,	  at	  146.	  In	  the	  Deutsche	  Telekom	  ruling	  (supra	  note	  336,	  para	  124),	  
the	  ECJ	  observed	  that	  intent	  and	  negligence	  is	  in	  any	  case	  irrelevant	  if	  the	  firm	  ‘cannot	  be	  unaware	  of	  the	  anti-­‐
competitive	  nature	  of	  its	  conduct’.	  
596	  In	  addition,	  there	  is	  no	  ‘fault’	  criterion.	  See	  e.g.	  BPB,	  supra	  note	  409,	  para	  70.	  This	  reasoning	  is	  derived	  from	  the	  
fact	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  abuse	  is	  an	  objective	  one,	  see	  Hoffmann-­‐La	  Roche,	  supra	  note	  349,	  para	  91.	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Second,	   there	   is	   a	   risk	   of	   false	   positives:	  which	   firm	  would	  not	  want	   to	   eliminate	   its	   rivals?597	   As	   it	   is	  
difficult	  to	  know	  with	  certainty	  what	  a	  company’s	  ‘primary	  aim’	  is,598	  shaky	  legal	  presumptions	  need	  to	  
be	   introduced.	   It	   will	   also	   prove	   tricky	   to	   attach	   a	   unitary	   aim	   to	   a	   firm,	   especially	   if	   it	   is	   a	   large	  
multinational	  corporation.	  And	  what	  happens	  if	  there	  is	  a	  managerial	  struggle	  over	  the	  primary	  aim	  of	  
the	  firm,	  or	  if	  it	  shifts	  over	  time?	  Is	  the	  firm	  only	  in	  violation	  for	  the	  months	  during	  which	  bullish	  strategy	  
notes	  were	  created	  philosophizing	  about	  the	  elimination	  of	  rivals;	  and	  could	  it	  possibly	  end	  if	  the	  tone	  of	  
these	  documents	  turns	  more	  dovish?	  	  
	  
Third,	   anti-­‐competitive	   intent,	   even	  by	  a	  dominant	   firm,	  does	  not	  necessarily	   result	   in	   a	   restriction	  of	  
competition.	  This	  may	  depend	  in	  particular	  (i)	  on	  the	  type	  of	  practice	  engaged	  in	  and	  (ii)	  on	  the	  degree	  
of	  dominance.	  Firms	  that	  barely	  meet	  the	  dominance	  threshold	  may	  not	  be	  sufficiently	  potent	  to	  alter	  
the	  competitive	  landscape	  at	  will.	  In	  the	  Microsoft	  and	  British	  Airways	  rulings,	  the	  EU	  courts	  suggested	  
that	   conduct	   is	   only	   considered	   abusive	   if	   it	   is	   capable	   of	   restricting	   competition.599	   If	   a	   dominant	  
undertaking	   has	   an	   anti-­‐competitive	   intent,	   but	   engages	   in	   conduct	   that	   is	   incapable	   of	   restricting	  
competition,	   it	   is	  difficult	   to	  see	  how	  that	  criterion	  has	  been	  met.600	   In	  addition,	   the	  more	  Article	  102	  
TFEU	   is	   considered	   to	   focus	   on	   effects,	   the	   less	   value	   one	   can	   attach	   to	   the	   dominant	   undertaking’s	  
intent.	  
	  
A	   fourth	   argument	   that	   cautions	   against	   attaching	   too	  much	   relevance	   on	   intent,	   is	   discernable	   from	  
case	   law	   on	   Article	   101	   TFEU.	   The	  Matra	   Hachette	   ruling	   made	   clear	   that	   even	   an	   agreement	   that	  
restricts	   competition	   by	   object	   (the	   very	   concept	   that	   presupposes	   anti-­‐competitive	   intent)	   may	   be	  
exempted	   from	   the	   prohibition	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   Article	   101(3)	   TFEU.601	   Surely,	   such	   restrictions	   are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
597	  See	  AKZO	  (supra	  note	  351,	  para	  71),	  which	  laid	  down	  a	  seemingly	  unrebuttable	  presumption.	  By	  contrast,	  more	  
recent	  case	  law	  seems	  to	  have	  put	  forward	  a	  rebuttable	  presumption.	  See	  Wanadoo	  (ECJ),	  supra	  note	  597,	  para	  
110.	  See	  also	  Gormsen	  2010,	  supra	  note	  479,	  at	  297.	  
598	  This	  is	  the	  reason	  I	  have	  difficulty	  with	  the	  weight	  Albors-­‐Llorens	  attaches	  to	  the	  dominant	  firm’s	  ‘genuine	  
motivation’	  (2007,	  supra	  note	  332,	  1746).	  	  
599	  Microsoft,	  supra	  note	  395,	  para	  867.	  Østerud	  (2010,	  supra	  note	  332,	  at	  266	  et	  seq.),	  however,	  seems	  to	  regard	  
this	  criterion	  as	  part	  of	  the	  proportionality	  test.	  See	  also	  the	  ECJ	  ruling	  in	  British	  Airways,	  supra	  note	  341,	  para	  86.	  
600	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  see	  Commercial	  Solvents,	  supra	  note	  494,	  where	  the	  conduct	  was	  thought	  to	  entail	  a	  risk	  
that	  competition	  would	  be	  eliminated.	  In	  practice	  this	  comes	  close	  to	  a	  prohibition	  of	  an	  attempted	  abuse.	  
601	  Case	  T-­‐17/93	  Matra	  Hachette	  v	  Commission	  [1994]	  ECR	  II-­‐595.	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usually	   harmful	   to	   competition	   and	   therefore	   necessitate	   considerable	   countervailing	   benefits.	  
Nevertheless,	  the	  possibility	  remains	  open.602	  There	  is	  no	  good	  reason	  why	  such	  a	  possibility	  would	  exist	  
for	   restrictions	   by	   object	   under	   Article	   101	   TFEU,	   and	   not	   for	   similar	   restrictions	   that	   suggest	   anti-­‐
competitive	   ‘intent’	   under	   Article	   102	   TFEU.603	   This	   point	   is	   all	   the	   more	   relevant,	   as	   the	   legal	   test	  
mentioned	  by	  the	  ECJ	  in	  Post	  Danmark	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  is	  close	  to	  the	  examination	  
under	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU.604	  
	  
For	  the	  reasons	  set	  out	  above,	  I	  believe	  that	  intent	  is	  usually	  important	  for	  the	  overall	  context	  of	  a	  case,	  
but	  is	  not	  necessarily	  decisive.605	  I	  also	  think	  that	  the	  importance	  of	  intent	  should	  depend	  on	  the	  type	  of	  
objective	  justification	  that	  the	  dominant	  firm	  wishes	  to	  invoke.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  an	  efficiency	  plea,	  the	  
aim	  of	  the	  dominant	  firm	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  particularly	  important.	  Such	  a	  plea	  should	  fail	  or	  succeed	  
based	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  conduct,	  rather	  than	  the	  intent	  that	  the	  firm	  wishes	  to	  pursue.606	  	  
	  
As	  to	  legitimate	  commercial	  conduct,	  the	  case	  law	  has	  been	  slightly	  confusing.	  In	  United	  Brands,	  the	  ECJ	  
noted	   that	   a	   dominant	   undertaking	   is	   barred	   from	   protecting	   its	   commercial	   interests	   ‘if	   its	   actual	  
purpose	   is	   to	   strengthen	   this	   dominant	   position	   and	   abuse	   it’.607	   The	   General	   Court’s	  British	   Airways	  
judgment	  inserted	  one	  –	  seemingly	  crucial	  –	  word,	  making	  the	  final	  limb	  read	  ‘and	  thereby	  abuse	  it’.608	  
The	   insertion	  of	   ‘thereby’	  appears	   to	  be	  a	  considerable	  expansion	  of	   the	  scope	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	   It	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
602	  It	  is	  to	  be	  noted	  that	  scholars	  who	  argue	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  per	  se	  abuse	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  often	  
seem	  to	  believe	  that	  Article	  101	  TFEU	  also	  deploys	  per	  se	  illegality,	  much	  like	  the	  US	  approach	  to	  issues	  like	  price	  
fixing	  or	  market	  sharing.	  However,	  to	  my	  mind	  the	  Matra	  Hachette	  ruling	  (ibid.)	  has	  shown	  that	  this	  position	  is	  
incorrect.	  
603	  Also	  note	  that	  a	  finding	  of	  a	  restriction	  by	  object	  does	  not	  require	  evidence	  of	  the	  subjective	  intentions	  of	  the	  
parties.	  Rather,	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  agreement	  ‘as	  such’	  should	  be	  examined.	  Joined	  Cases	  29/83	  and	  30/83	  CRAM	  and	  
Rheinzink	  v	  Commission	  [1984]	  ECR	  1679,	  para	  26;	  Case	  C-­‐209/07	  BIDS	  and	  Barry	  Brothers	  [2008]	  ECR	  I-­‐8637,	  para	  
21.	  See,	  further,	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  application	  of	  Article	  [101](3)	  of	  the	  Treaty,	  OJ	  [2004]	  C	  101/97,	  para	  22.	  
604	  Post	  Danmark,	  supra	  note	  381,	  para	  42.	  In	  essence,	  both	  Article	  101(3)	  and	  the	  Post	  Danmark	  test	  seek	  to	  
assess	  whether	  the	  conduct	  has	  a	  net	  pro-­‐competitive	  effect	  –	  even	  though	  their	  wording	  may	  be	  slightly	  different.	  
605	  Cf	  T-­‐Mobile,	  supra	  note	  426,	  para	  27.	  Do	  note	  that	  this	  case	  is	  about	  Article	  101	  TFEU.	  
606	  Even	  though,	  admittedly,	  documents	  showing	  intent	  may	  be	  instructive	  to	  understand	  the	  effects	  that	  the	  
conduct	  has.	  
607	  United	  Brands,	  supra	  note	  417,	  para	  189-­‐190.	  	  
608	  British	  Airways	  (General	  Court),	  supra	  note	  416,	  para	  243.	  Emphasis	  added	  by	  author.	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suggests	   that	  a	   finding	  of	  an	  abuse	  will	  automatically	   follow	  where	  the	  dominant	  undertaking’s	  actual	  
purpose	  has	  been	  to	  strengthen	   its	  position.	   I	  disagree	  with	  this	  reading,	  as	  practically	  any	  conduct	  of	  
the	  dominant	  undertaking	  can	  be	  considered	   to	  affect	   the	  competitive	   structure	  of	   the	  market.609	  My	  
preferred	   reading	   is	   to	   look	   at	   what	   the	   case	   law	   seeks	   to	   prohibit:	   namely	   the	   exclusion	   of	   equally	  
efficient	  competitors	  by	  using	  means	  other	  than	  competition	  on	  the	  merits.610	  As	  long	  as	  the	  dominant	  
firm	  does	  not	  have	  such	  intent,	  it	  should	  not	  affect	  its	  ability	  to	  rely	  on	  an	  objective	  justification.	  
	  
Finally,	  the	  Court	  has	  appeared	  hesitant	  to	  accept	  a	  plea	  based	  on	  legitimate	  commercial	  conduct	  plea	  if	  
the	   practice	   at	   play	   is	   a	   marked	   change	   from	   historic	   conduct.611	   In	   cases	   ranging	   from	   Commercial	  
Solvents	   to	  Microsoft,	   the	   refusal	   to	   supply	  another	   firm	  was	  preceded	  by	  a	   (long)	  period	  of	  business	  
relations.	   The	   smoking	   gun	   is	   particularly	   apparent	   if	   the	   refusal	   to	   supply	  only	   came	  about	   after	   the	  
firm’s	  dominance	  was	   firmly	  established	  (see	  e.g.	  Microsoft)	  or	  after	   the	  dominant	   firm	   introduced	  an	  
entrant	   of	   its	   own	   on	   the	   downstream	  market	   (see	   e.g.	   Commercial	   Solvents).612	   I	   agree	   that	   such	   a	  
change	  can	  be	  an	   indicator	   for	  anti-­‐competitive	   intent,	  even	   though	   the	   relevant	  context	  may	  show	  a	  
wholly	  different	  (and	  indeed:	  benign)	  reason	  for	  the	  shift.613	  
	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
609	  Albors-­‐Llorens	  2007,	  supra	  note	  332,	  p.	  1746-­‐1747.	  
610	  AKZO,	  supra	  note	  351,	  para	  72.	  See	  also	  e.g.	  Deutsche	  Telekom,	  supra	  note	  336,	  para	  177.	  
611	  See,	  similarly,	  Commission	  decision	  in	  British	  Midland	  v	  Aer	  Lingus,	  supra	  note	  415,	  para	  26.	  The	  Commission	  
held	  that	  a	  refusal	  to	  continue	  an	  interlining	  agreement	  with	  an	  airline	  that	  starts	  competing	  with	  the	  dominant	  
undertaking	  on	  an	  important	  route.	  
612	  For	  a	  perspective	  from	  U.S.	  Antitrust	  Law,	  see	  e.g.	  U.S.	  Supreme	  Court,	  Aspen	  Skiing	  Co.	  v	  Aspen	  Highlands	  
Skiing	  Corp.,	  472	  U.S.	  585,	  601	  (1985).	  In	  this	  case	  the	  U.S.	  Supreme	  Court	  took	  into	  account	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  
conduct	  under	  review	  was	  different	  from	  what	  it	  had	  been	  in	  the	  past.	  
613	  See	  e.g.	  BP,	  supra	  note	  338,	  para	  28.	  One	  of	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  change	  was	  the	  nationalization	  of	  a	  part	  of	  BP’s	  
production	  capacity.	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4.6 Effect	  
	  
Before	   discussing	   the	   importance	   of	   effects,	   the	   first	   question	   is	   what	   kind	   of	   effects	   we	   are	   talking	  
about	   in	   the	   first	   place.614	   Early	   cases,	   such	   as	  Michelin	   I,	   often	   considered	   how	   the	   conduct	   under	  
review	  affected	  competitors	  or	  other	  market	  participants.615	  Many	  commentators	  have	  argued	  that	  this	  
approach	  is	  mistaken,	  stating	  that	  the	  ECJ	  should	  solely	  focus	  on	  the	  effects	  on	  consumer	  welfare.616	  	  
	  
Even	  though	  the	  ECJ	  has	  indeed	  put	  more	  emphasis	  on	  consumer	  welfare	  in	  recent	  case	  law,617	  it	  clearly	  
has	   regard	   to	   the	   broader	   interests	   of	   ‘competition	   as	   such’	   as	   well.618	   The	   efficiency-­‐focused	   Post	  
Danmark	   ruling	   referred	   to	   the	   effects	   on	   consumer	   welfare	   and	   the	   effects	   on	   competition.619	   It	  
appears	   that	   the	  broad	   term	   ‘effect	  on	  competition’	   is	  appropriate	   to	   reflect	   the	  case	   law	  by	   the	  ECJ,	  
including	  –	  but	  not	  limited	  to	  –	  the	  effects	  on	  consumer	  welfare.	  
	  
A	  practice	  will	  only	  be	  abusive	  if	  it	  has	  –	  at	  least	  –	  a	  potential	  effect	  on	  competition.	  However,	  no	  actual	  
effect	  needs	  to	  be	  shown.620	   	  So	   ‘[i]f	   it	   is	  shown	  that	  the	  object	  pursued	  by	  the	  conduct	  […]	   is	  to	   limit	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
614	  Although	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  requires	  an	  effect,	  actual	  or	  potential,	  on	  trade	  between	  EU	  Member	  States,	  I	  do	  not	  
examine	  it	  in	  this	  study.	  I	  consider	  this	  requirement	  to	  be	  a	  jurisdictional	  issue,	  rather	  than	  provide	  a	  possibility	  for	  
objective	  justification.	  
615	  Michelin	  I,	  supra	  note	  334,	  para	  85.	  The	  ECJ	  noted	  that	  discounts,	  such	  as	  the	  one	  under	  review,	  are	  liable	  to	  
restrict	  a	  customer’s	  freedom	  of	  choice	  and	  independence.	  	  
616	  See	  e.g.	  Odudu	  2006,	  supra	  note	  526.	  
617	  See	  e.g.	  Post	  Danmark,	  supra	  note	  381,	  paras	  41-­‐42.	  One	  could	  interpret	  TeliaSonera	  (supra	  note	  347,	  para	  24)	  
a	  contrario	  as	  holding	  that	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  only	  prohibits	  practices	  that	  cause	  damage	  to	  consumers,	  either	  
directly	  or	  indirectly.	  
618	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐501/06	  P,	  C-­‐513/06	  P,	  C-­‐515/06	  P	  and	  C-­‐519/06	  P	  GlaxoSmithKline	  Services	  v	  Commission	  [2009]	  
ECR	  I-­‐9291,	  para	  63:	  the	  Treaty’s	  competition	  rules	  aim	  ‘to	  protect	  not	  only	  the	  interests	  of	  competitors	  or	  of	  
consumers,	  but	  also	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  market	  and,	  in	  so	  doing,	  competition	  as	  such	  [italics	  added	  by	  author]’.	  
This	  means	  that,	  according	  to	  the	  Court,	  it	  is	  not	  necessary	  for	  final	  consumers	  to	  be	  deprived	  the	  advantages	  of	  
effective	  competition	  in	  terms	  of	  supply	  or	  price.	  For	  a	  recent	  confirmation	  of	  this	  line	  of	  reasoning,	  see	  Slovenská,	  
supra	  note	  388,	  para	  18.	  
619	  Post	  Danmark,	  supra	  note	  381,	  para	  42.	  
620	  See	  e.g.	  British	  Airways	  (ECJ),	  supra	  note	  341,	  para	  30;	  British	  Airways	  (General	  Court),	  supra	  note	  416,	  para	  
293;	  Michelin	  II,	  supra	  note	  422,	  paras	  238	  and	  239.	  These	  cases	  make	  clear	  that	  it	  is	  sufficient	  to	  show	  that	  the	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competition,	   that	   conduct	   will	   also	   be	   liable	   to	   have	   such	   an	   effect’.621	   As	   establishing	   the	   effect	   of	  
conduct	   under	   review	   is	   normally	   not	   a	   constituent	   part	   of	   the	   condition	   of	   a	   dominance	   abuse,	   its	  
absence	  will	  normally	  be	  insufficient	  to	  offer	  an	  objective	  justification.	  	  
	  
Nevertheless,	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  may	   require	  an	  analysis	  of	  effect.	  First,	   the	   relevant	  prima	   facie	   abuse	  
may	  hinge	  on	   its	   effects.	   For	   example,	   in	  Deutsche	  Telekom,	   the	   ECJ	  held	   that	   ‘in	   the	   absence	  of	   any	  
effect	  on	  the	  competitive	  situation	  of	  competitors’,	  the	  alleged	  margin	  squeeze	  ‘cannot	  be	  classified	  as	  
exclusionary	  if	   it	  does	  not	  make	  their	  market	  penetration	  any	  more	  difficult’.622	  Another	  example	  is	  an	  
exclusive	  purchasing	  practice	  by	  a	  dominant	  firm.	  The	  higher	  the	  degree	  of	  dominance,	  the	  more	  likely	  
the	  practice	  will	  have	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  competition.	  	  
	  
Second,	  certain	  types	  of	  objective	  justification	  require	  an	  examination	  of	  effect.	  This	  is	  particularly	  clear	  
if	   a	   dominant	   firm	   raises	   an	   efficiency	   plea.	   Such	   a	   plea	  will	   only	   be	   accepted	  when	   the	   exclusionary	  
effect	   is	   counterbalanced,	  or	  outweighed,	  by	  advantages	   in	   terms	  of	  efficiency	  which	  also	  benefit	   the	  
consumer.623	  Indeed,	  the	  Post	  Danmark	  judgment	  has	  made	  clear	  that	  one	  must	  examine	  the	  efficiency	  
gains	  that	  ‘have	  been,	  or	  are	  likely	  to	  be,	  brought	  about	  as	  a	  result	  of	  [the]	  conduct	  [under	  review]’.624	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
conduct	  under	  review	  ‘tends	  to	  restrict	  competition	  or,	  in	  other	  words,	  that	  the	  conduct	  is	  capable	  of	  having	  that	  
effect’.	  
621	  See	  e.g.	  Michelin	  II	  (General	  Court),	  supra	  note	  422,	  para	  241.	  The	  General	  Court	  held	  that	  ‘for	  the	  purposes	  of	  
applying	  Article	  82	  EC,	  establishing	  the	  anti-­‐competitive	  object	  and	  the	  anti-­‐competitive	  effect	  are	  one	  and	  the	  
same	  thing’,	  referring	  to	  Irish	  Sugar	  (General	  Court),	  supra	  note	  353,	  para	  170.	  The	  case	  law	  on	  exclusionary	  
rebates	  provides	  further	  guidance.	  The	  ECJ	  has	  held	  on	  various	  occasions	  that	  rebates	  that	  e.g.	  ‘tend	  to	  remove	  or	  
restrict	  the	  buyer's	  freedom	  to	  choose	  his	  sources	  of	  supply	  [italics	  added,	  TvdV]’	  may	  be	  found	  abusive.	  The	  use	  of	  
the	  word	  ‘tend’	  connotes	  that	  a	  potential	  effect	  could	  also	  be	  sufficient.	  See	  also	  Hoffmann-­‐La	  Roche,	  supra	  note	  
349,	  para	  90;	  Michelin	  I,	  supra	  note	  334,	  para	  73	  and	  Irish	  Sugar	  (General	  Court),	  supra	  note	  353,	  para	  114.	  In	  the	  
context	  of	  a	  margin	  squeeze	  case,	  see	  Deutsche	  Telekom,	  supra	  note	  336,	  para	  250.	  
622	  Deutsche	  Telekom	  (ibid),	  para	  254.	  Note	  the	  clear	  parallel	  with	  internal	  market	  case	  law	  that	  focuses	  on	  market	  
access,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Section	  2.4	  of	  chapter	  II.	  
623	  See	  British	  Airways	  (ECJ),	  supra	  note	  341,	  para	  86;	  Telia	  Sonera,	  supra	  note	  347,	  para	  76;	  Post	  Danmark,	  supra	  
note	  381,	  para	  42.	  
624	  Post	  Danmark	  (ibid.).	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Effect	  on	  competition	  may	  be	  less	  relevant	  if	  a	  party	  invokes	  a	  public	  interest	  plea.	  In	  such	  a	  case	  it	  is	  the	  
benefit	   to	   another	   goal	   that	   justifies	   the	   restriction	   of	   competition.	   However,	   the	   practice	   must	   be	  
capable	   of	   achieving	   the	   professed	   goal.625	   There	   is	   no	   reason	   why	   a	   court	   should	   accept	   a	   hollow	  
reference	  to	  public	  interest.	  Similarly,	  a	  plea	  based	  on	  legitimate	  business	  conduct	  does	  not	  call	  for	  an	  
analysis	  of	  effects,	  even	  though	  it	  usually	  concerns	  conduct	  that	  can	  be	  associated	  with	  pro-­‐competitive	  
effects.	   For	   example,	   charging	   higher	   interest	   rates	   to	   a	   customer	   that	   poses	   a	   substantial	   credit	   risk	  
makes	   perfect	   economic	   sense.	   Finally,	   there	   is	   little	   need	   to	   examine	   effects	   while	   assessing	   an	  
objective	   necessity	   plea.	   If	   such	   a	   plea	   is	   successful,	   and	   no	   less	   anti-­‐competitive	   alternatives	   were	  
available,	  the	  dominant	  firm	  could	  not	  have	  avoided	  the	  effects	  anyway.	  
	  
The	   observations	   above	   also	   have	   an	   impact	   on	   the	   question	   of	   causation.	   Eilmansberger	   raised	   the	  
question	   whether	   the	   lack	   of	   causation	   between	   the	   conduct	   and	   the	   effect	   can	   be	   an	   objective	  
justification.626	  I	  believe	  that	  this	  idea	  is	  not	  in	  line	  with	  the	  ECJ’s	  overall	  position	  on	  effect.	  Causation	  is	  
needed	  to	  establish	  a	   link	  between	  conduct	  and	  an	  end	  result	  that	  (potentially)	  violates	  a	  norm.	  But	   if	  
the	  end	  result	  (here:	  the	  effect	  on	  the	  market)	  is	  usually	  irrelevant	  in	  determining	  whether	  the	  norm	  has	  
been	   violated	  or	  not,	   it	   is	   not	   clear	  why	   the	   link	  between	  behaviour	   and	  effect	   should	  necessarily	   be	  
analysed.	  The	  exception	  to	  that	  observation	  may	  –	  yet	  again	  –	  be	  an	  efficiency	  plea.	  If	  there	  is	  no	  causal	  
link	  between	  the	  conduct	  and	  the	  efficiency	  that	  is	  being	  observed,	  the	  conduct	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  justified	  
as	  it	  does	  not	  meet	  the	  necessity	  test.	  
	  
As	   a	   final	   comment,	   an	   effects	   analysis	  may	   not	   only	   focus	   on	   the	   direct	   effects	   on	   competition,	   but	  
equally	  on	  the	  wider	  effects	  on	  residual	  competition.627	  The	   latter	   test	  examines	  whether	  the	  conduct	  
under	  review	  is	  liable	  to	  eliminate	  all	  effect	  competition	  on	  the	  market.	  The	  ECJ	  has	  referred	  to	  residual	  
competition	  in	  cases	  such	  as	  IMS	  Health	  and	  Post	  Danmark,628	  but	  their	  position	  in	  the	  analysis	  seems	  to	  
have	   been	   quite	   distinct.	   In	   IMS	   Health,	   the	   residual	   competition	   test	   was	   one	   of	   the	   separate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
625	  See	  e.g.	  Albors-­‐Llorens	  2007,	  supra	  note	  332,	  p.	  1758.	  She	  refers	  to	  it	  as	  the	  'suitability'	  test.	  
626	  Eilmansberger	  2005,	  supra	  note	  339,	  at	  140.	  
627	  A	  possible	  interpretation	  would	  be	  that	  no	  conduct	  should	  be	  allowed	  if	  it	  leads	  to	  a	  (quasi-­‐)monopoly.	  I	  
disagree,	  as	  this	  still	  leaves	  open	  the	  possibility	  for	  competition	  for	  the	  market	  –	  especially	  in	  sectors	  that	  depend	  
on	  competitors	  leap-­‐frogging	  over	  each	  other	  with	  disruptive	  innovations.	  Any	  other	  approach	  would	  take	  away	  
the	  possibility	  of	  competition	  for	  the	  market.	  
628	  IMS	  Health,	  supra	  note	  394,	  and	  Post	  Danmark,	  supra	  note	  381.	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conditions,	  apart	   from	  objective	   justification,	   to	   determine	  whether	   the	   dominant	   undertaking	   had	   a	  
duty	  to	  license	  its	  IP	  rights.629	  By	  contrast,	  in	  Post	  Danmark,	  the	  residual	  competition	  test	  was	  part	  of	  the	  
examination	   of	  whether	   pro-­‐competitive	   effects	   outweigh	   the	   anti-­‐competitive	   effects,	   and	   therefore	  
seemed	  to	  be	  part	  of	  the	  objective	  justification	  analysis	  itself.630	  I	  prefer	  the	  latter	  view,	  as	  it	  allows	  for	  a	  
more	  holistic	  examination	  of	  objective	  justification.	  Note	  that	  this	  test	  should	  not	  be	  equated	  with	  the	  
protection	  of	  competitors.	  Competition	  may	  thrive	  even	  if	  individual	  competitors	  are	  forced	  to	  exit	  the	  
market.	   Indeed,	  it	  may	  be	  a	  hallmark	  sign	  of	  healthy	  competition	  where	  the	  competitive	  process	  roots	  
out	  the	  ones	  least	  apt	  to	  survive.	  It	  is	  submitted	  that	  the	  test	  should	  be	  taken	  to	  mean	  that	  the	  conduct	  
under	   review	  may	  not	  eliminate	   the	  effective	  competitive	  constraints	  upon	  a	  dominant	  undertaking	  –	  
and	  that	  inefficient	  firms	  are	  unlikely	  to	  represent	  a	  notably	  competitive	  constraint	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  
	  
	  




The	   previous	   sections	   have	   noted	   on	   multiple	   occasions	   the	   importance	   of	   context.	   This	   obviously	  
includes	   the	   type	   of	   prima	   facie	   abuse	   that	   is	   under	   review.	   The	   following	   section	   examines	   how	  
objective	  justification	  relates	  to	  selected	  types	  of	  abuse.631	  The	  section	  deals	  with	  exclusionary	  abuses,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
629	  IMS	  Health	  (ibid.),	  para	  52:	  ‘the	  refusal	  is	  such	  as	  to	  reserve	  to	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  intellectual	  property	  right	  the	  
market	  for	  the	  supply	  of	  data	  on	  sales	  of	  pharmaceutical	  products	  in	  the	  Member	  State	  concerned	  by	  eliminating	  
all	  competition	  on	  that	  market’.	  
630	  Post	  Danmark,	  supra	  note	  381,	  para	  42.	  
631	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Colomer	  in	  Sot.	  Lélos,	  supra	  note	  375,	  para	  70.	  Colomer	  notes	  that	  ‘the	  option	  of	  accommodating	  
certain	  types	  of	  abuse	  under	  Article	  [102	  TFEU]	  by	  means	  of	  objective	  justification	  should	  remain	  open’.	  The	  
following	  chapter	  does	  not	  discuss	  tying	  and	  bundling	  practices,	  even	  though	  such	  practices	  may	  also	  involve	  
objective	  justification:	  T.	  Graf	  &	  D.R.	  Little,	  ‘Tying	  and	  Bundling’,	  in:	  F.E.	  Gonzáles	  &	  R.	  Snelders	  2014	  (supra	  note	  
331)	  at	  547.	  They	  note	  that	  ‘combining	  the	  sale	  of	  several	  products	  may	  generate	  a	  number	  of	  procompetitive	  
effects,	  creating	  economies	  of	  scope,	  and	  generating	  efficiencies	  in	  distribution	  or	  production’.	  
	   157	  





In	  its	  landmark	  AKZO	  judgment,	  the	  ECJ	  took	  a	  very	  strict	  line	  as	  regards	  below-­‐cost	  pricing,	  also	  known	  
as	   ‘predation’.	   The	   Court	   suggested	   that	   such	   conduct	   is	   abusive	   per	   se	   if	   the	   prices	   are	   lower	   than	  
average	   variable	   costs	   (AVC),633	   as	   a	   dominant	   undertaking	   could	   have	   no	   interest	   in	   such	   pricing	  
behaviour	  other	  than	  to	  seek	  the	  elimination	  of	  competitors.634	  	  
	  
I	   disagree	   that	   an	   unrebuttable	   presumption	   for	   pricing	   below	   AVC	   is	   the	   right	   approach.	   A	   blanket	  
prohibition	  has	  a	  notable	  problem	  of	  attaching	  too	   little	  weight	  to	  the	  surrounding	  context.	  There	  are	  
several	  circumstances	   in	  which	  such	  conduct	  should	  be	  justified	  nonetheless.	  The	  sale	  below	  AVC	  may	  
simply	   be	   a	   cost-­‐minimizing	   strategy,	   for	   example	   if	   the	   relevant	   goods	   lose	   their	   value	   (such	   as	  
perishable	   goods,	   news-­‐related	   content	   or	   obsolete	   products)	   or	   if	   they	   cause	   substantial	   running	  
expenses	  (such	  as	  storage	  costs).	  In	  addition,	  in	  two-­‐sided	  markets	  companies	  routinely	  sell	  one	  service	  
at	  a	  loss	  to	  make	  another	  service	  (more)	  attractive.	  The	  Google	  search	  engine	  is	  a	  case	  in	  point:	  it	  offers	  
a	   free	   and	  attractive	   service	   at	   no	   charge	   (so	  by	  definition	  below	  AVC),	   attracting	   advertisers	   to	   earn	  
money.	  	  
	  
There	  is	  no	  clear	  reason	  why	  competition	  law	  should	  a	  priori	  ban	  business	  models	  that	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  
pro-­‐competitive	   and	   enhance	   welfare.	   So	   even	   though	   the	   wording	   of	   AKZO	   suggests	   a	   per	   se	  
prohibition,	  it	  is	  preferable	  to	  allow	  the	  dominant	  firm	  to	  rebut	  the	  presumption	  of	  illegality	  if	  the	  prices	  
are	  not	  anti-­‐competitive	  after	  all;	  for	  instance	  because	  such	  prices	  do	  not	  have	  any	  exclusionary	  effect,	  
or	   because	   a	   justification	   applies.	   Although	   the	   EU	   Courts	   have	   regularly	   confirmed	   the	   precedent	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
632	  See	  e.g.	  Case	  40/70	  Sirena	  v	  Eda	  [1971]	  ECR	  69,	  para	  17.	  Particularly	  high	  prices	  can,	  under	  certain	  
circumstances,	  be	  justified	  by	  ‘objective	  criteria’.	  
633	  See,	  similarly,	  the	  approach	  by	  AG	  Colomer	  in	  Tetra	  Pak	  II	  (ECJ),	  supra	  note	  353.	  
634	  AKZO,	  supra	  note	  351,	  para	  71.	  Kingston	  (2009,	  supra	  note	  516,	  at	  214)	  notes	  that	  below-­‐cost	  pricing	  may	  also	  
follow	  from	  environmental	  concerns,	  for	  example	  if	  the	  dominant	  firm	  wishes	  to	  provide	  a	  price	  incentive	  for	  
customers	  to	  adopt	  a	  new	  and	  environmentally	  friendlier	  product.	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AKZO,635	  more	  recent	  cases	  do	  suggest	  a	  shift	   in	   the	  ECJ’s	  approach.636	   In	  Wanadoo,	   the	  ECJ	  held	  that	  
prices	  below	  AVC	  are	   ‘prima	  facie	  abusive’.637	   In	  Post	  Danmark,	   it	  observed	  that	  such	  prices	  should	   ‘in	  
principle,	  be	  regarded	  as	  abusive	  [italics	  added	  by	  author]’.638	  	  
	  
The	  Wanadoo	  and	  Post	  Danmark	  cases	  thus	  show	  that	  a	  dominant	  firm	  is	  indeed	  allowed	  to	  rebut	  the	  
presumption	  of	   illegality.	  The	  main	  challenge	  will	  be	   to	   show	   that	   the	  pricing	  policy	  had	  an	  economic	  
objective	  other	  than	   the	  elimination	  of	  competitors.639	  The	  Wanadoo	   judgment	  appears	  to	   leave	  open	  
the	   possibility	   of	   a	   justification	   if	   pricing	   below	   AVC	   is	   normal	   business	   practice	   in	   a	   sector	   (e.g.	   to	  
minimize	  losses),	  connoting	  that	  it	  is	  unlikely	  to	  exclude	  competitors.640	  The	  Post	  Danmark	  case	  appears	  
to	   add	   another	   possibility,	   namely	   where	   the	   practice	   has	   a	   net	   efficient	   effect	   that	   also	   benefits	  
consumers.641	  	  
	  
The	  paragraphs	  above	  have	  discussed	  to	  what	  extent	  a	  dominant	  firm	  can	  justify	  below-­‐cost	  pricing	   in	  
order	   to	   meet	   competition.	   Indeed,	   several	   cases	   have	   made	   clear	   that	   a	   dominant	   firm	   has	   some	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
635	  Tetra	  Pak	  II	  (ECJ),	  supra	  note	  353,	  para	  41.	  
636	  R.	  Snelders,	  A.	  Leyden	  &	  A.	  Lofaro,	  ‘Predatory	  Conduct’,	  in	  F.E.	  Gonzáles	  &	  R.	  Snelders	  2014	  (supra	  note	  331,	  at	  
210),	  state	  that	  ‘[i]t	  is	  now	  generally	  accepted	  that	  even	  prices	  below	  AVC/AAC	  can	  have	  an	  objective	  justification’.	  	  
637	  Wanadoo	  (ECJ),	  supra	  note	  597,	  para	  109.	  
638	  Post	  Danmark,	  supra	  note	  381,	  para	  27	  (italics	  added	  by	  author).	  The	  underlying	  rationale	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  only	  
pricing	  practices	  with	  an	  exclusionary	  effect	  are	  prohibited	  (ibid.,	  para	  25).	  The	  conduct	  can	  be	  condoned	  if	  no	  such	  
effect	  exists.	  Note	  that	  the	  ECJ	  thus	  seemed	  to	  depart	  from	  its	  bright-­‐line	  rule	  set	  in	  AKZO	  (supra	  note	  351),	  but	  did	  
refer	  to	  that	  case	  at	  para	  27.	  
639	  Wanadoo	  (ECJ),	  supra	  note	  597,	  para	  107-­‐109.	  R.	  Snelders,	  A.	  Leyden	  &	  A.	  Lofaro,	  ‘Predatory	  Conduct’,	  in:	  F.E.	  
Gonzáles	  &	  R.	  Snelders	  2014	  (supra	  note	  331,	  at	  215)	  note	  that	  the	  ‘meeting	  competition’	  plea	  also	  requires	  that	  
the	  ‘price	  cuts	  must	  be	  defensive	  in	  nature’,	  referring	  e.g.	  to	  United	  Brands.	  	  At	  216	  et	  seq,	  they	  specify	  why	  ‘the	  
dominant	  company	  must	  act	  in	  good	  faith’.	  	  
640	  Of	  course,	  one	  could	  also	  argue	  that,	  in	  such	  a	  case,	  there	  is	  no	  prima	  facie	  abuse.	  However,	  such	  an	  approach	  is	  
difficult	  to	  reconcile	  with	  the	  AKZO	  judgment,	  supra	  note	  351.	  In	  a	  2004	  submission	  to	  the	  OECD,	  the	  Commission	  
observed	  that	  prices	  should	  be	  justified	  if	  it	  could	  have	  no	  exclusionary	  effect.	  See	  OECD	  Policy	  Roundtable	  
document	  2004,	  Predatory	  Foreclosure,	  available	  at	  http://www.oecd.org/competition/abuse/34646189.pdf,	  at	  
237.	  
641	  Post	  Danmark,	  supra	  note	  381,	  para	  41.	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leeway	  to	  protect	  its	  commercial	  interests.642	  I	  do	  not	  think	  that	  this	  conclusion	  should	  be	  altered	  based	  
on	  the	  Wanadoo	  case,	  in	  which	  the	  ECJ	  held	  that	  there	  is	  no	  ‘absolute’	  or	  ‘unconditional’	  right	  to	  align	  
prices	  with	  those	  of	  competitors.643	  I	  am	  hard	  pressed	  to	  think	  of	  any	  defense	  in	  competition	  law	  that	  is	  
absolute	  or	  unconditional	  –	  Wanadoo	  simply	  shows	  that	  such	  a	  plea	  will	  not	  be	  automatically	  accepted	  
if	  the	  dominant	  undertaking	  is	  able	  to	  show	  that	  it	  has	  aligned	  its	  prices.644	  	  
	  
As	   a	   final	   remark,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   EU	   competition	   law	   does	   not	   require	   proof	   of	   recoupment	   in	   a	  
predation	  case.645	  As	  a	  consequence,	  the	  dominant	  undertaking	  will	  find	  little	  benefit	   in	  arguing	  that	  it	  
will	  not	  be	  able	   to	   recoup	   its	   losses.	  However,	   if	   the	  EU	  courts	  continue	  on	   their	  path	   to	  afford	  more	  
weight	  to	  efficiency,	  a	  dominant	  firm	  can	  perhaps	  couch	  the	  substance	  of	  that	  same	  plea	  in	  a	  different	  
framework.	   This	   would	   mean	   that	   the	   dominant	   undertaking	   shows	   that	   the	   below-­‐cost	   pricing	   is	  
beneficial	  to	  current	  consumer	  welfare,	  and	  is	  incapable	  of	  reducing	  future	  consumer	  welfare,	  as	  it	  has	  




Rebates	   by	   a	   dominant	   undertaking	   based	   on	   the	   volume	   of	   purchases,	   also	   known	   as	   ‘volume’	   or	  
‘quantity’	   rebates,646	   will	   normally	   be	   consistent	   with	   Article	   102	   TFEU.	   Such	   rebates	   are	   normally	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
642	  Irish	  Sugar	  (General	  Court),	  supra	  note	  353,	  paragraph	  189:	  ‘the	  protection	  of	  the	  commercial	  position	  of	  an	  
undertaking	  in	  a	  dominant	  position	  with	  the	  characteristics	  of	  that	  of	  the	  applicant	  at	  the	  time	  in	  question	  must,	  at	  
the	  very	  least,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  lawful,	  be	  based	  on	  criteria	  of	  economic	  efficiency	  and	  consistent	  with	  the	  interests	  of	  
consumers’.	  Note	  that	  this	  paragraph	  suggests	  that	  ‘commercial	  freedom’	  should	  only	  be	  seen	  in	  terms	  of	  
efficiencies.	  See	  also	  United	  Brands,	  supra	  note	  417,	  para	  189-­‐190.	  See	  also	  Commission	  guidance	  on	  enforcement	  
priorities,	  supra	  note	  378,	  paras.	  237-­‐238.	  The	  Commission	  noted	  that	  it	  would	  be	  justified	  to	  meet	  the	  prices	  of	  
one’s	  competitor	  in	  order	  to	  minimize	  short-­‐run	  losses.	  
643	  Wanadoo	  (ECJ),	  supra	  note	  597;	  confirmation	  of	  Case	  T-­‐340/03	  France	  Télécom	  v	  Commission	  (‘Wanadoo’)	  
[2007]	  ECR	  II-­‐107,	  para	  187.	  See,	  differently,	  Commission	  decision	  in	  Case	  IV/31.900	  BPB	  Industries	  [1989]	  L	  10/50,	  
para	  131-­‐134,	  in	  which	  it	  did	  accept	  a	  meeting	  competition	  defense.	  
644	  See	  also	  Wanadoo	  (General	  Court)	  (ibid.),	  para	  187;	  see	  also	  the	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Mazák	  in	  Wanadoo	  (ECJ)	  (ibid.),	  
paras	  47	  and	  95.	  See,	  similarly,	  R.	  Snelders,	  A.	  Leyden	  &	  A.	  Lofaro,	  ‘Predatory	  Conduct’,	  in:	  F.E.	  Gonzáles	  &	  R.	  
Snelders	  2014	  (supra	  note	  331,	  at	  213),	  
645	  Wanadoo	  (ECJ),	  supra	  note	  597,	  para	  110.	  
646	  For	  possible	  pro-­‐competitive	  effects	  of	  rebates,	  see	  e.g.	  Hoffmann-­‐La	  Roche,	  supra	  note	  349,	  para	  90.	  	  
	   160	  
deemed	  to	  reflect	  gains	   in	  efficiency	  and	  economies	  of	  scale	  made	  by	  the	  dominant	   firm.647	  However,	  
the	  scheme	  will	  not	  be	  accepted	  if	  the	  ‘criteria	  and	  rules	  for	  granting	  the	  rebate	  reveal	  that	  the	  system	  is	  
not	   based	   on	   an	   economically	   justified	   countervailing	   advantage	   but	   tends	   […]	   to	   prevent	   customers	  
from	   obtaining	   their	   supplies	   from	   competitors’.648	   In	   order	   to	   make	   the	   distinction	   between	  
competitive	  and	  abusive	  rebates,	  there	  should	  be	  an	  examination	  of	  ‘all	  the	  circumstances’.649	  
	  
Rebates	  can	  thus	  be	  condoned	  if	  they	  can	  be	  subsumed	  under	  an	  ‘objective	  economic	  justification’.650	  In	  
Irish	  Sugar,	  the	  General	  Court	  enunciated	  the	  broad	  nature	  of	  such	  a	  justification:	  it	  can	  apply	  based	  on	  
the	   ‘quantities	   purchased	   by	   the	   customer,	   marketing	   and	   transport	   costs	   or	   any	   promotional,	  
warehousing,	   servicing	  or	  other	   functions	  which	   the	   relevant	  customer	  might	  have	  performed’.651	   It	   is	  
only	  proper	   that	  a	  dominant	  undertaking	   is	  allowed	  to	  pass	  on	  cost	  benefits	   to	   its	  customers	   through	  
volume	  rebates.652	  	  
	  
The	  facts	  of	   Irish	  Sugar	  revealed	  that	  the	  rebates	  were	  solely	  based	  on	  the	  retailer’s	  place	  of	  business,	  
which	   the	   Court	   considered	   an	   insufficiently	   valid	   reason	   to	   provide	   a	   rebate.	   The	   Court’s	   approach	  
appears	   too	   straightforward,	   as	   it	   should	   have	   paid	   more	   attention	   as	   to	   whether	   the	   relevant	  
customers	  were	   indeed	  exposed	   to	  a	  higher	   level	  of	  competition	  compared	   to	  customers	   that	  did	  not	  
receive	  a	  rebate.653	   It	  would	  substantially	  hamstring	  dominant	  undertakings	   if	   they	  cannot	  adjust	  their	  
rebates	   to	   alternative	   offers	   or	   the	   price	   sensitivity	   of	   customers.	   The	   latter	   possibility	   is	   particularly	  
relevant:	  if	  a	  dominant	  firm	  cannot	  satisfy	  the	  needs	  of	  those	  customers,	  they	  may	  be	  priced	  out	  of	  the	  
market	  leading	  to	  a	  reduction	  of	  output.	  In	  sum,	  although	  one	  should	  obviously	  consider	  whether	  such	  
rebates	  simply	  are	  exclusionary,	  their	  potential	  pro-­‐competitive	  effect	  should	  also	  be	  examined.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
647	  ICI,	  supra	  note	  562,	  para	  298.	  
648	  ICI	  (ibid.),	  para	  299.	  See	  also	  Hoffmann-­‐La	  Roche	  (supra	  note	  349),	  para	  90,	  and	  Case	  T-­‐203/01	  Michelin	  v	  
Commission	  (‘Michelin	  II’)	  [2003]	  ECR	  II-­‐4071,	  para	  59.	  
649	  ICI	  (ibid.),	  para	  300.	  See	  also	  Hoffmann-­‐La	  Roche	  (ibid.),	  para	  90;	  Michelin	  II	  (ibid.),	  para	  60.	  	  
650	  Irish	  Sugar	  (General	  Court),	  supra	  note	  353,	  para	  173.	  
651	  Ibid.	  The	  General	  Court	  held,	  on	  the	  facts,	  that	  ‘[t]he	  border	  rebate	  was	  unrelated	  to	  objective	  economic	  factors	  
like	  the	  sales	  volume	  of	  the	  customers’.	  	  
652	  See	  also	  BPB	  (Commission	  Decision),	  supra	  note	  643,	  para	  131.	  The	  Commission	  found	  that	  certain	  discounts	  
were	  justified,	  as	  they	  reflected	  cost	  differences.	  
653	  Irish	  Sugar	  (General	  Court),	  supra	  note	  353,	  para	  188.	  




Many	  of	  the	  observations	   in	  the	  previous	  paragraph	  on	  rebates	  can	  also	  be	  transposed	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  
price	  discrimination.654	   It	   is	  clear	  that	  price	  differentiation,	  even	   if	   found	  prima	  facie	  abusive,655	   is	   ‘not	  
inherently	  harmful’.656	  Such	  conduct	  may	  be	   justified	  based	  on	  a	  number	  of	  reasons.	  For	  example,	  the	  
conduct	  may	  be	   subsumed	  under	   legitimate	  business	   conduct.657	   Such	  may	  be	   the	   case	   if	   a	   customer	  
continues	  to	  receives	  a	  favourable	  price	  as	  a	  reward	  for	  being	  an	  early	  adapter	  of	  a	  new	  technology	  by	  
the	  company	  that	  later	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  dominant.658	  Either	  way,	  the	  degree	  of	  differentiation	  should	  be	  
commensurate	  with	  the	  interest	  that	  it	  seeks	  to	  support.659	  	  
	  
Differentiation	   may	   also	   be	   justified	   in	   a	   situation	   of	   objective	   necessity.	   In	   BPB,	   the	   General	   Court	  
acknowledged	  that	  a	  shortage	  of	  resources	  should	  enable	  a	  dominant	  undertaking	  to	  ‘lay	  down	  criteria	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
654	  Note	  that	  I	  do	  use	  ‘discrimination’	  in	  a	  legally	  and	  morally	  neutral	  way.	  
655	  P.	  Akman,	  ‘To	  abuse,	  or	  not	  to	  abuse:	  discrimination	  between	  consumers’,	  (2007)	  32	  ELRev	  492,	  at	  495.	  Akman	  
seems	  to	  argue	  that	  ‘mere	  differential’	  pricing	  may	  already	  be	  prima	  facie	  abusive	  price	  discrimination.	  However,	  it	  
is	  submitted	  that	  it	  must	  also	  be	  established	  that	  the	  conduct	  may	  have	  an	  exclusionary	  effect.	  See,	  mutatis	  
mutandis,	  British	  Airways	  (ECJ),	  supra	  note	  341,	  paras	  58-­‐60.	  
656	  Odudu	  2007,	  supra	  note	  399,	  at	  1810.	  See	  also	  A.	  Layne-­‐Farrar,	  A.	  Setari	  &	  P.	  Stuart,	  ‘Abusive	  Discrimination’,	  
in:	  F.E.	  Gonzáles	  &	  R.	  Snelders	  2014	  (supra	  note	  331),	  at	  570.	  They	  specify:	  ‘while	  conceptually	  separate	  from	  the	  
determination	  of	  equivalence	  between	  two	  transactions,	  in	  practice,	  this	  assessment	  is	  generally	  carried	  out	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  the	  assessment	  of	  the	  equivalence	  between	  transactions	  and	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  same	  parameters’.	  
Their	  view	  confirms	  that	  there	  is	  less	  room	  for	  a	  justification	  if	  there	  has	  already	  been	  an	  in-­‐depth	  examination	  
when	  determining	  whether	  there	  has	  been	  a	  prima	  facie	  abuse.	  
657	  AG	  Kokott	  referred	  to	  the	  possibility	  to	  justify	  otherwise	  abusive	  price	  discrimination	  based	  on	  ‘legitimate	  
business	  considerations’.	  See	  also	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Kokott	  in	  British	  Airways,	  supra	  note	  341,	  para	  114.	  See	  also	  
Michelin	  I,	  supra	  note	  334,	  para	  90,	  referring	  to	  differences	  in	  treatment	  between	  different	  dealers	  that	  were,	  on	  
the	  facts,	  not	  based	  on	  ‘legitimate	  commercial	  reasons’.	  
658	  See	  e.g.	  the	  initial	  decision	  of	  28	  April	  2003	  as	  well	  as	  the	  administrative	  appeal	  decision	  of	  29	  June	  2005	  of	  the	  
Dutch	  NCA,	  currently	  named	  ACM,	  in	  Case	  2978/Superunie	  v	  Interpay.	  The	  ACM	  considered	  price	  differentiation	  to	  
be	  justified	  as	  an	  appropriate	  reward	  for	  risks	  taken.	  See,	  further,	  section	  3.2.3	  in	  chapter	  V.	  
659	  Irish	  Sugar	  (General	  Court),	  supra	  note	  353,	  para	  142-­‐143.	  The	  Court	  rejected	  the	  justification	  plea,	  holding	  that	  
the	  ‘justification	  does	  not	  match	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  discrimination	  impugned	  in	  the	  contested	  decision’.	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for	  according	  priority	   in	  meeting	  orders’	  as	  ‘a	  matter	  of	  normal	  commercial	  policy’.660	  Such	  criteria	  are	  
justified	  if	  they	  are	  objective	  and	  non-­‐discriminatory.661	  
	  
Differentiation	  can	  also	  be	  based	  on	  efficiencies.	  The	  same	  reasoning	  that	  applies	  to	  rebates	  should	  be	  
applied,	   providing	   room	   for	   differentiation	   that	   is	   based,	   inter	   alia,	   on	   cost	   benefits	   that	   arise	   from	  
economies	   of	   scale.	   This	   may	   be	   particularly	   relevant	   in	   network	   sectors,	   where	   variable	   costs	   are	  
relatively	  low.	  In	  addition,	  differentiated	  prices	  can	  improve	  welfare	  if	  price	  sensitive	  customers	  receive	  
lower	  prices,	  ensuring	  that	  they	  do	  not	  exit	  the	  market	  altogether.	  
	  
Finally,	   it	  appears	  to	  me	  that	  a	  dominant	  undertaking	  should	  have	  some	  leeway	  to	  differentiate	  prices	  
on	  non-­‐economic	  grounds.	  Just	  think	  of	  a	  dominant	  publisher	  that	  provides	  its	  content	  at	  lower	  prices	  to	  
not-­‐for-­‐profit	   customers.	   Even	   if	   some	   of	   these	   parties	  would	   have	   been	  willing	   and	   able	   to	   pay	   the	  
‘normal’	  price	  (i.e.	  there	  is	  no	  direct	  economic	  rationale	  to	  differentiate),662	  the	  dominant	  firm	  may	  still	  
agree	  to	  a	  lower	  price	  for	  these	  customers	  to	  reflect	  its	  corporate	  social	  responsibility	  policy.663	  	  
	  
Akman	  has	  argued	  that	  discrimination	  between	  consumers,	  instead	  of	  intermediate	  customers,	  can	  also	  
be	   contrary	   to	  Article	   102	  TFEU.664	  Although	   I	   acknowledge	   that	   this	   possibility	   cannot	  be	   rejected	  as	  
such,	   I	   do	   think	  decision	  makers	   should	  be	   reluctant	   in	   condemning	   such	  practices	  –	  especially	   if	   one	  
(like	   Akman)	   believes	   that	   one	   of	   the	   objectives	   of	   Article	   102	   TFEU	   is	   to	   strive	   towards	   consumer	  
welfare.665	  Think	  of	  the	  example	  where	  the	  domestic	  train	  incumbent	  has	  lower	  prices	  for	  the	  young	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
660	  BPB	  (General	  Court),	  supra	  note	  409,	  para	  94.	  
661	  Ibid.	  
662	  There	  may	  be	  an	  overlap	  with	  an	  efficiency	  analysis,	  are	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  customers	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  more	  price	  
sensitive	  than	  ‘regular’	  corporate	  clients.	  
663	  See	  e.g.	  Oxford	  Journal’s	  policy	  of	  granting	  free	  content	  access	  to	  organisations	  located	  in	  countries	  ranging	  
from	  Afghanistan	  to	  Zimbabwe,	  see	  a	  full	  list	  at	  
http://www.oxfordjournals.org/access_purchase/developing_countries_list.html.	  See,	  in	  terms	  of	  environmental	  
protection,	  Kingston	  2009,	  supra	  note	  516,	  at	  213.	  Kingston	  argues	  that	  ‘a	  dominant	  undertaking	  might	  
legitimately	  distinguish	  between	  prices	  granted	  to	  environmentally-­‐damaging	  undertakings	  and	  environmentally-­‐
friendlier	  undertakings,	  as	  long	  as	  this	  was	  done	  on	  an	  objective	  and	  proportionate	  basis’.	  
664	  Akman	  2007,	  supra	  note	  655.	  
665	  Ibid.,	  at	  503.	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the	  elderly.	  Such	  a	  pricing	  practice	  is	  likely	  to	  benefit	  consumer	  welfare	  in	  terms	  of	  allocative	  efficiency,	  
as	   output	   can	   be	   expanded	   to	   groups	   that	   can	   generally	   be	   described	   as	   price	   sensitive.	   The	   train	  
company	   may	   also	   differentiate	   in	   another	   way,	   offering	   lower	   prices	   for	   travel	   during	   the	   off-­‐peak	  
hours.	  Such	  differentiation	  may	  not	  only	  be	  beneficial	  to	  allocative	  efficiency,666	  but	  also	  to	  productive	  
efficiency	  as	  it	  encourages	  a	  more	  spread-­‐out	  use	  of	  capacity	  that	  is	  both	  scarce	  and	  costly.	  
	  
5.5 Refusal	  to	  deal	  
	  
Under	  EU	  law,	  a	  dominant	  undertaking	  is,	  in	  principle,	  free	  to	  deal	  with	  whom	  it	  wishes.	  However,	  there	  
may	  be	  ‘exceptional	  circumstances’	  under	  which	  a	  refusal	  to	  deal	  may	  be	  contrary	  to	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  
These	  types	  of	  cases	  should	  consider	  the	  degree	  of	  market	  power.	  In	  his	  Opinion	  in	  the	  IMS	  Health	  case,	  
AG	  Jacobs	  noted	  that	  the	  relevant	  facility	  must	  provide	  the	  dominant	  firm	  with	  a	  ‘genuine	  stranglehold’	  
on	  the	  market,	  rather	  than	  give	  it	  a	  ‘competitive	  advantage’.667	  The	  Magill	  judgment,	  a	  case	  on	  IP	  rights,	  
stipulated	   the	   conditions	   for	   an	   abusive	   refusal	   to	   deal:	   the	   input	  must	   be	   indispensable,	   the	   refusal	  
prevents	   the	   emergence	  of	   a	   new	  product	   for	  which	   there	  was	   potential	   consumer	   demand	   and	   it	   is	  
likely	   to	  exclude	  all	   competition	   in	   the	  downstream	  market.668	   Importantly,	   the	  dominant	  undertaking	  
may	   also	   invoke	   that	   the	   refusal	   ‘was	   not	   justified	   by	   objective	   considerations’.669	   From	   Bronner	   it	  
appears	   that	   the	   same	  conditions	  apply	   to	   access	   issues	   to	  property	   rights	  other	   than	   IP	   rights,	   apart	  
from	  the	  ‘new	  product’	  criterion.670	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
666	  Again,	  price	  sensitive	  consumers	  are	  able	  to	  benefit	  from	  lower	  prices,	  especially	  if	  their	  trip	  is	  not	  time	  critical.	  
667	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Jacobs	  in	  Bronner,	  supra	  note	  498,	  para	  65.	  
668	  Magill,	  supra	  note	  394,	  paras	  53-­‐56.	  See	  also	  the	  ECJ	  judgment	  in	  Bronner	  (ibid.),	  para	  40.	  
669	  Magill	  (ibid.),	  para	  55.	  See	  also	  IMS	  Health,	  supra	  note	  394,	  para	  52.	  
670	  See	  e.g.	  the	  ECJ	  judgment	  in	  Bronner,	  supra	  note	  498,	  para	  41.	  See	  also	  D.	  Geradin,	  ‘Limiting	  the	  Scope	  of	  Article	  
82	  EC:	  What	  Can	  the	  EU	  Learn	  From	  the	  U.S.	  Supreme	  Court’s	  Judgment	  in	  Trinko	  in	  the	  Wake	  of	  Microsoft,	  IMS	  
and	  Deutsche	  Telekom?’,	  (2004)	  41	  Common	  Market	  Law	  Review	  1527.	  Geradin	  argues	  that	  there	  is	  no	  clear	  
reason	  for	  imposing	  the	  ‘new	  product’	  criterion.	  See	  also	  D.	  Ridyard,	  ‘Compulsory	  Access	  under	  EC	  Competition	  
Law	  –	  A	  New	  Doctrine	  of	  “Convenient	  Facilities”	  and	  the	  Case	  for	  Price	  Regulation’,	  (2004)	  11	  ECLR	  669.	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Although	  IMS	  Health	  suggests	  that	  the	  justification	  criterion	  requires	  a	  fact-­‐specific	  inquiry,671	  there	  are	  
–	   yet	   again	   –	   few	   indications	   in	   the	   case	   law	   of	  what	  may	   constitute	   justification.	   Documents	   by	   the	  
Commission	  provide	  some	  additional	  guidance,	  even	  though	  its	  views	  may	  not	  necessarily	  be	  shared	  by	  
the	   ECJ.	   In	   its	   notice	   related	   to	   the	   telecom	   sector,	   the	  Commission	  provided	   the	   following	   examples	  
where	  a	  refusal	  to	  provide	  access	  may	  be	  condoned:672	  
	  
‘[r]elevant	  justifications	  in	  this	  context	  could	  include	  an	  overriding	  difficulty	  of	  providing	  access	  
to	  the	  requesting	  company,	  or	   the	  need	  for	  a	   facility	  owner	  which	  has	  undertaken	   investment	  
aimed	  at	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  new	  product	  or	  service	  to	  have	  sufficient	  time	  and	  opportunity	  to	  
use	  the	  facility	  in	  order	  to	  place	  that	  new	  product	  or	  service	  on	  the	  market’.	  	  
	  
The	   Commission	   further	   notes	   that	   the	   competent	   authorities	  must	   examine	  whether	   the	   difficulties	  
associated	  with	   providing	   supply	   can	   outweigh	   the	   anti-­‐competitive	   effect,673	   showing	   the	   need	   for	   a	  
balancing	   test.	   Finally,	   the	   Commission	   notes	   that	   technical	   feasibility	  may	   also	   provide	   an	   objective	  
justification	  for	  a	  refusal	  to	  supply,	  for	  example	  if	  the	  technical	  standards	  are	  not	  compatible.674	  	  
	  
Although	   I	   agree	  with	   the	   examples	   given	   by	   the	   Commission,	   their	   inclusion	   in	   a	   document	  written	  
specifically	   for	   the	   telecom	   sector	   raises	   questions	   about	   their	   applicability	   in	   other	   situations.	   The	  
Commission	  should	  strive	  for	  a	  more	  holistic	  treatment	  of	  this	  topic	  in	  future	  guidance.	  A	  useful	  exercise	  
is	  to	  consider	  whether	  the	  dominant	  undertaking	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  refused	  supply	  if	  it	  would	  have	  lacked	  
market	  power.	  Such	  a	  thought	  experiment	  is	  likely	  to	  filter	  out	  cases	  where	  there	  is	  no	  link	  between	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
671	  IMS	  Health,	  supra	  note	  394,	  para	  51:	  ‘it	  is	  for	  the	  national	  court	  to	  examine,	  if	  appropriate,	  in	  light	  of	  the	  facts	  
before	  it,	  whether	  the	  refusal	  of	  the	  request	  for	  a	  licence	  is	  justified	  by	  objective	  considerations’.	  	  
672	  Notice	  on	  the	  application	  of	  the	  competition	  rules	  to	  access	  agreements	  in	  the	  telecommunications	  sector,	  OJ	  
[1998]	  C	  265/2,	  para	  86.	  At	  para	  85,	  the	  Notice	  refers	  to	  the	  possibility	  that	  a	  company	  requesting	  supply	  
represents	  a	  potential	  credit	  risk.	  
673	  Ibid.,	  para	  93.	  
674	  Ibid.,	  para	  96.	  The	  Commission	  also	  notes	  the	  possibility	  of	  capacity	  constraints.	  However,	  such	  constraints	  may	  
not	  prove	  to	  be	  a	  justification	  if	  the	  firm	  had	  reasonable	  alternatives	  to	  overcome	  those	  constraints.	  See,	  even	  
more	  strongly,	  M.	  Dolmans	  &	  M.	  Bennett,	  ‘Refusal	  to	  Deal’,	  in:	  F.E.	  Gonzáles	  &	  R.	  Snelders	  2014	  (supra	  note	  331,	  at	  
506).	  They	  hold	  that	  ‘[t]here	  are	  indications	  that	  a	  refusal	  to	  supply	  cannot	  be	  justified	  by	  lack	  of	  capacity	  if	  a	  non-­‐
dominant	  or	  non-­‐vertically-­‐integrated	  firm	  in	  the	  circumstances	  would	  have	  invested	  in	  expansion	  or	  capacity’.	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dominant	  position	  and	  the	  refusal,	  such	  as	  the	  case	  where	  a	  dominant	   firm	  refuses	  supply	  because	  of	  
credit	   risks,	   or	   because	   of	   genuine	   environmental	   concerns.675	   As	   said	   before,	   one	   should	   be	   very	  
hesitant	  to	  prohibit	  practices	  that	  have	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  market	  power.	  Such	  a	  stance	  would	  defeat	  
the	  very	  raison	  d’être	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU,	  that	  seeks	  precisely	  to	  ban	  certain	  practices	  that	  only	  make	  
sense,	  and	  are	  harmful,	  because	  of	  the	  dominant	  position	  enjoyed	  by	  one	  undertaking.	  
	  
As	  a	   final	  observation,	   the	  essential	   facilities	  doctrine	  may	   increasingly	  considered	  be	  as	  an	  efficiency-­‐
balancing	   test,	   as	   suggested	   by	   Geradin.676	   Basically,	   mandatory	   access	   is	   likely	   to	   enhance	   current	  
allocative	  efficiency,	  as	  it	  introduces	  more	  competition	  on	  the	  downstream	  level.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  such	  
access	  is	  likely	  to	  harm	  dynamic	  efficiency,	  as	  it	  reduces	  the	  financial	  rewards	  of	  investments.677	  Geradin	  
is	  critical	  on	  whether	  NCAs	  and	  courts	  are	  able	  to	  actually	  make	  such	  a	  balancing	  test,	  arguing	  that	  the	  
risk	   of	   mistaken	   decisions	   is	   particularly	   high.678	   I	   consider	   the	   issue	   to	   be	   less	   grave	   than	   Geradin	  
suggests.	  Remember	  that	  even	  a	  dominant	  firm	  is	  able	  to	  deal	  with	  whom	  it	  wants,	  save	  for	  exceptional	  
circumstances.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  mandatory	  supply	   is	  truly	  reserved	   in	  a	   limited	  number	  of	  cases,	  EU	  
competition	   law	   could	   be	   said	   to	   have	   a	   bias	   in	   favour	   of	   non-­‐intervention	   and	   towards	   protecting	  
investments.	  The	   law	  only	   risks	  becoming	   too	   interventionist	   if	  a	  prima	   facie	   abuse	   is	   found	   relatively	  
easily	  and	  if	  dynamic	  efficiencies	  are	  awarded	  too	  little	  weight.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
675	  See	  e.g.	  Kingston	  2009,	  supra	  note	  516,	  at	  213.	  Kingston	  argues	  that	  ‘a	  dominant	  undertaking	  might	  legitimately	  
refuse	  to	  supply,	  or	  to	  grant	  access	  to	  an	  essential	  facility,	  to	  an	  undertaking	  whose	  practices	  are	  objectively	  
extremely	  environmentally	  dangerous.	  Alternatively,	  a	  dominant	  undertaking	  might	  refuse	  to	  grant	  access	  to	  an	  
essential	  facility,	  if	  a	  natural	  resource,	  or	  might	  cease	  supply	  of	  this	  resource	  to	  an	  existing	  customer,	  because	  it	  
would	  risk	  unsustainably	  exhausting	  or	  overusing	  this	  resource’.	  According	  to	  Kingston,	  such	  an	  interpretation	  is	  
consistent	  with	  Commercial	  Solvents	  and	  Bronner.	  
676	  Geradin	  2004,	  supra	  note	  670,	  at	  1539	  et	  seq.	  Geradin	  refers	  to	  the	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Jacobs	  in	  Bronner	  (supra	  note	  
667)	  as	  one	  of	  the	  few	  significant	  references	  to	  such	  a	  balancing	  exercise.	  
677	  The	  effects	  on	  productive	  efficiency	  will	  often	  be	  more	  difficult	  to	  gauge.	  If	  the	  facility	  is	  already	  used	  efficiently	  
and	  at	  full	  production	  capacity,	  allowing	  access	  is	  likely	  to	  raise	  costs	  and	  thus	  reduce	  productive	  efficiency.	  
However,	  if	  the	  facility	  runs	  (far)	  below	  full	  capacity,	  providing	  access	  is	  likely	  to	  enhance	  the	  utilisation	  rate,	  
thereby	  lowering	  costs	  and	  improving	  productive	  efficiency.	  
678	  Geradin	  2004,	  supra	  note	  670,	  at	  1542.	  Although	  I	  sympathize	  with	  his	  remark	  as	  such	  a	  balancing	  test	  is	  
undoubtedly	  difficult,	  I	  do	  think	  it	  is	  interesting	  that	  commentators	  who	  argue	  in	  favour	  of	  an	  effects-­‐based	  
approach	  often	  seem	  to	  be	  mistrustful	  of	  the	  capacity	  of	  courts	  or	  NCAs	  to	  properly	  exercise	  such	  a	  balancing	  act.	  
These	  two	  views	  seem	  difficult	  to	  reconcile.	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5.6 Margin	  squeeze	  
	  
A	   so-­‐called	   margin	   squeeze	   can	   occur	   if	   a	   vertically	   integrated	   dominant	   undertaking	   provides	   an	  
indispensable	  input	  at	  the	  wholesale	  level	  and	  also	  competes	  at	  the	  retail	   level.679	  The	  price	  difference	  
between	  the	  wholesale	  and	  retail	  price	  may	  leave	  insufficient	  margin	  for	  an	  equally	  efficient	  competitor	  
to	  viably	  compete,	  for	  example	  if	  the	  wholesale	  price	  is	  kept	  artificially	  high.680	  
	  
The	  EU	  Courts	  have	  accepted	  that	  a	  margin	  squeeze	  can	  have	  an	  exclusionary	  effect	  on	  equally	  efficient	  
competitors.681	  As	  a	  result,	  a	  margin	  squeeze	  is	  a	  separate	  abuse	  under	  Article	  102	  TFEU,682	  but	  only	  in	  
the	  absence	  of	  a	  justification.683	  The	  case	  law	  is	  unclear	  about	  what	  such	  justifications	  could	  entail.	  The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
679	  For	  the	  recognition	  that	  margin	  squeeze	  can	  be	  a	  separate	  abuse	  under	  Article	  102	  TFEU,	  see	  Deutsche	  
Telekom,	  supra	  note	  336,	  para	  183	  and	  TeliaSonera,	  supra	  note	  347,	  para	  31.	  By	  contrast,	  U.S.	  Federal	  Antitrust	  
law	  does	  not	  accept	  that	  margin	  squeeze	  is	  a	  separate	  type	  of	  conduct	  that	  should	  be	  prohibited	  under	  Section	  2	  
of	  the	  Sherman	  Act,	  see	  Pacific	  Bell	  Telephone	  v.	  linkLine	  Communications,	  555	  U.S.	  438	  (2009).	  According	  to	  the	  
U.S.	  Supreme	  Court,	  such	  conduct	  is	  only	  prohibited	  under	  the	  Sherman	  Act	  either	  if	  there	  is	  predation	  
downstream	  (under	  the	  standard	  of	  Brooke	  Group	  Ltd.	  v.	  Brown	  &	  Williamson	  Tobacco	  Corp.,	  509	  U.S.	  209	  (1993);	  
or	  if	  there	  is	  an	  illegal	  refusal	  to	  deal	  upstream	  (under	  the	  standard	  of	  Aspen	  Skiing	  Co.	  v.	  Aspen	  Highlands	  Skiing	  
Corp.,	  472	  U.S.	  585	  (1985).	  In	  its	  view,	  a	  margin	  squeeze	  would	  be	  an	  attempt	  to	  ‘amalgate’	  two	  complaints	  that	  
would	  otherwise	  fail.	  See	  also	  G.A.	  Hay	  &	  K.	  McMahon,	  ‘The	  Diverging	  Approach	  to	  Price	  Squeezes	  in	  the	  United	  
States	  and	  Europe’,	  (2012)	  8	  Journal	  of	  Competition	  Law	  &	  Economics	  259.	  
680	  See	  e.g.	  Case	  T-­‐336/07	  Telefónica	  v	  Commission	  [2012]	  nyr,	  para	  187	  (an	  appeal	  case	  is	  pending	  before	  the	  ECJ,	  
Case	  C-­‐295/12	  P).	  Note	  that	  this	  does	  not	  require	  the	  wholesale	  price	  to	  be	  excessive,	  see	  Deutsche	  Telekom,	  supra	  
note	  336.	  	  
681	  TeliaSonera,	  supra	  note	  347,	  para	  31	  and	  Deutsche	  Telekom,	  supra	  note	  336,	  para	  177.	  In	  the	  latter	  case,	  the	  
ECJ	  added	  that	  such	  practices	  ‘are	  capable	  of	  making	  market	  entry	  very	  difficult	  or	  impossible’	  for	  equally	  efficient	  
competitors.	  In	  order	  to	  test	  for	  equal	  efficiency,	  the	  costs	  and	  strategy	  of	  the	  dominant	  undertaking	  are	  used	  as	  a	  
benchmark	  (Deutsche	  Telekom	  (ibid.),	  para	  198).	  	  	  	  
682	  See	  e.g.	  Telefónica	  (General	  Court),	  supra	  note	  680,	  para	  187;	  Deutsche	  Telekom	  (ibid),	  para	  177-­‐178.	  
683	  TeliaSonera,	  supra	  note	  347,	  paras.	  31	  and	  88.	  Telefónica	  (General	  Court),	  supra	  note	  680,	  para	  187	  (just	  
mentioning	  ‘objective	  justification’).	  See	  also	  F.E.	  Gonzáles	  &	  J.	  Padilla,	  ‘Margin	  Squeeze’,	  in:	  F.E.	  Gonzáles	  &	  R.	  
Snelders	  2014	  (supra	  note	  331,	  at	  292):	  ‘There	  are	  indeed	  several	  reasons	  why	  a	  dominant	  firm	  might,	  at	  least	  
temporarily,	  price	  in	  a	  manner	  consistent	  with	  a	  margin	  squeeze’,	  referring	  to	  para	  89	  of	  the	  Commission’s	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TeliaSonera	  case	  suggests	  that	  a	  dominant	  undertaking	  may	  be	  able	  to	  show	  that	  the	  relevant	  conduct	  
was	  not	  anti-­‐competitive.684	  For	  example,	  the	  margin	  squeeze	  may	  have	  been	  a	  single	  occurrence	  only	  
lasting	  a	  short	  period	  of	  time:	  such	  an	  event	  is	  unlikely	  to	  exclude	  equally	  efficient	  competitors.	  	  
	  
To	   my	   mind,	   an	   objective	   justification	   should	   also	   exist	   if	   the	   margin	   squeeze	   is	   caused	   by	   factors	  
external	   to	   the	   dominant	   undertaking.	   An	   obvious	   example	   would	   be	   a	   situation	   where	   the	   State	  
dictates	  the	  relevant	  wholesale	  and	  retail	  prices.	  However,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  regulatory	  framework	  
still	  allows	  the	  dominant	  undertaking	  a	  degree	  of	  discretion	  to	  lower	  its	  wholesale	  prices,	  raise	  its	  retail	  






This	  chapter	  has	  shown	  that	  objective	  justification	  is	  an	  important	  topic	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  Article	  
102	  TFEU.	  There	  is	  only	  an	  abuse	  absent	  an	  objective	  justification.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  the	  scope	  of	  abuse	  
depends	   to	   a	   large	   extent	   on	   the	   scope	   of	   objective	   justification.	   Notwithstanding	   its	   importance,	  
however,	   the	   concept	   of	   objective	   justification	   has	   not	   received	   the	   attention	   that	   it	   deserves.	   This	  
chapter	   has	   sought	   to	   examine	   the	   most	   important	   feature	   of	   objective	   justification,	   and	   assess	   its	  
potential.	  To	  my	  mind,	  the	  potential	  of	  the	  concept	   lies,	   in	  particular,	   in	   its	  ability	  to	  consider	  a	  prima	  
facie	  abuse	   in	   its	  proper	  context.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  the	  concept	   is	  also	  able	  to	  draw	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  
away	   from	   a	   per	   se	   approach,	   and	   thus	   avoid	   the	   risk	   of	   mistaken	   inferences	   of	   anti-­‐competitive	  
behaviour.	  
	  
This	   chapter	   has	   distinguished	   between	   various	   types	   of	   objective	   justification.	   The	   first	   source	   of	  
objective	   justification	   is	   legitimate	   business	   behaviour.	   This	   category	   reflects	   that	   dominant	  
undertakings	  still	  have	  a	  degree	  of	  commercial	  freedom	  (for	  instance	  if	  they	  compete	  on	  the	  merits),	  or	  
that	   they	   could	   not	   have	   been	   expected	   to	   act	   differently	   (in	   the	   case	   of	   objective	   necessity).	   The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
guidance	  paper	  (supra	  note	  18).	  They	  hold	  that	  efficiencies	  and	  preserving	  the	  incentive	  to	  innovate	  should	  in	  any	  
case	  be	  accepted	  as	  a	  possible	  justification.	  
684	  TeliaSonera,	  supra	  note	  347,	  para	  88.	  
685	  Deutsche	  Telekom	  (supra	  note	  336).	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efficiency	  plea	  embodies	  a	  second	  type	  of	  objective	  justification.	  The	  plea	  succeeds	  if	  the	  conduct	  leads	  
to	  a	  net	  gain	  in	  welfare.	  This	  plea	  is	  likely	  to	  receive	  more	  attention	  in	  a	  more	  effects-­‐based	  approach	  of	  
competition	  law;	  I	  would,	  however,	  counsel	  against	  considering	  this	  to	  be	  the	  only	  relevant	  justification	  
plea.	  A	  third	  source	  of	  objective	  justification	  is	  public	  interest,	  where	  the	  attainment	  of	  a	  non-­‐efficiency	  
objective	  trumps	  the	  application	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  This	  type	  of	  justification	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  controversial	  
in	   the	   competition	   community,	   even	   though	   it	   seems	   clear	   from	   EU	   law	   that	   wider	   public	   interest	  
objectives	  may	  influence	  the	  interpretation	  of	  any	  policy	  areas,	  including	  competition	  law.	  
	  
Admittedly,	   it	  may	  be	  difficult	  to	  distinguish	  between	  these	  types	   in	  actual	  practice,	  as	  they	  may	  have	  
considerable	   overlaps.	   For	   instance,	   conduct	   may	   at	   the	   same	   time	   be	   subsumed	   under	   legitimate	  
business	  behaviour	  as	  well	  as	  under	  an	  efficiency	  heading.	  Hence,	  the	  subdivision	  should	  not	  be	  seen	  as	  
a	  watertight	  compartmentalisation,	  but	  rather	  as	  an	  analytical	  tool	  to	  help	  determine	  the	  proper	  scope	  
of	  objective	  justification	  and	  the	  applicable	  legal	  conditions.	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The	   proof	   of	   the	   pudding	   is	   in	   the	   eating.	   Believe	   it	   or	   not,	   but	  making	   pudding	   and	   establishing	   an	  
abuse	   of	   dominance	   have	   something	   in	   common.	  Despite	   careful	   preparation	   both	   can	   be	   shaky	   and	  
vulnerable	  to	  collapse.	  The	  proof	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  is	  not	  in	  the	  eating,	  however,	  but	  in	  its	  operation	  in	  
practice.	  This	  calls	  for	  an	  analysis	  of	  procedural	  elements	  that	  are	  crucial	  to	  the	  operation	  of	  any	  legal	  
prohibition	  –	  namely	  the	  applicable	  burden	  of	  proof,	  evidentiary	  burden	  and	  standard	  of	  proof.	  
	  
As	  was	  made	  clear	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  the	  EU	  courts	  have	  repeatedly	  confirmed	  that	  an	  objective	  
justification	   plea	   is	   available.686	   Although	   this	   case	   law	   has	   triggered	   a	   debate	   about	   the	   substantive	  
scope	  and	  meaning	  of	  objective	  justification,687	  the	  procedural	  issues	  have	  often	  been	  overlooked.	  This	  
chapter	   discusses	   key	   procedural	   concept	   and	   their	   significance	   in	   the	   context	   of	   an	   objective	  
justification	  plea.	  Paragraph	  2	  examines	  the	  legal	  burden	  of	  proof	  and	  the	  evidentiary	  burden	  that	  apply	  
if	   an	   undertaking	   invokes	   an	   objective	   justification.	   Paragraph	   3	   discusses	   the	   applicable	   standard	   of	  
proof.	  Paragraph	  4	  analyses	  the	  private	  law	  dimensions	  of	  the	  burden	  and	  standard.	  Paragraph	  5	  offers	  






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
*	  This	  Chapter	  is	  a	  revised	  version	  of	  T.	  van	  der	  Vijver,	  ‘Article	  102	  TFEU:	  How	  to	  Claim	  the	  Application	  of	  Objective	  
Justifications	  in	  the	  Case	  of	  prima	  facie	  Dominance	  Abuses?’,	  (2012)	  4	  Journal	  of	  European	  Competition	  Law	  &	  
Practice	  121.	  	  
686	  See	  e.g.	  Case	  27/76	  United	  Brands	  v	  Commission	  [1978]	  ECR	  207,	  para	  189	  and	  Case	  C-­‐95/04	  P	  British	  Airways	  v	  
Commission	  [2007]	  ECR	  I-­‐2331,	  paras	  85-­‐87.	  
687	  See	  e.g.	  A.	  Albors-­‐Llorens,	  ‘The	  Role	  of	  Objective	  Justification	  and	  Efficiencies	  in	  the	  Application	  of	  Article	  82	  
EC’,	  (2007)	  44	  CMLRev	  1727.	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The	  burden	  of	  proof	  is	  an	  important	  procedural	  matter.	  It	  focuses	  on	  the	  question	  which	  of	  the	  litigating	  
parties	   is	   required	   to	   prove	   a	   submission	   in	   order	   to	   satisfy	   the	   applicable	   standard	   of	   proof	   (the	  
standard	  of	  proof	  is	  examined	  in	  paragraph	  3).688	  The	  basic	  rule	  is	  that	  the	  party	  alleging	  an	  infringement	  
of	   the	   law	   bears	   the	   burden	   of	   proof	   and	   must	   thus	   adduce	   sufficient	   evidence.	   Within	   a	   public	  
competition	  enforcement	  procedure	  the	   legal	  burden	  of	  proof	   is	  borne	  by	  the	  competent	  competition	  
authority	   –	   in	   the	   EU	   context,	   the	   European	   Commission	   –	   and	   cannot	   shift	   to	   the	   defendant.689	   The	  
legal	  burden	  reflects	  the	  principle	  that	  undertakings	  are	  presumed	  to	  be	  innocent.	  The	  State	  may	  only	  
impose	  a	  punitive	  sanction	  if	  it	  adduces	  sufficient	  evidence	  that	  meets	  the	  requisite	  standard	  of	  proof	  –	  
a	  key	  value	  in	  countries	  governed	  by	  the	  rule	  of	  law.690	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
688	  See	  e.g.	  C.	  Graham,	  ‘Judicial	  Review	  of	  the	  Decisions	  of	  the	  Competition	  Authorities	  and	  the	  Economic	  
Regulators	  in	  the	  UK’,	  in:	  O.	  Essens,	  A.	  Gerbrandy	  and	  S.	  Lavrijssen	  (eds.),	  National	  Courts	  and	  the	  Standard	  of	  
Review	  in	  Competition	  Law	  and	  Economic	  Regulation	  (Europa	  Law	  Publishing:	  Groningen	  2009),	  p.	  244.	  See	  also	  E.	  
Paulis,	  ‘The	  Burden	  of	  Proof	  in	  Article	  82	  Cases’	  in:	  B.	  Hawk	  (ed.),	  Fordham	  Competition	  Law	  Institute:	  International	  
Antitrust	  Law	  and	  Policy	  2006	  (Juris	  Publishing:	  New	  York	  2007).	  
689	  See	  e.g.	  the	  speech	  of	  16	  September	  2006	  at	  the	  Fordham	  Conference	  by	  E.	  Paulis,	  available	  at	  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2006_014_en.pdf.	  The	  UK	  Competition	  Appeal	  Tribunal	  (‘CAT’)	  
confirmed	  that,	  just	  like	  in	  EU	  law,	  the	  allocation	  of	  the	  legal	  burden	  of	  proof	  does	  not	  ‘necessarily	  prevent	  the	  
operation	  of	  certain	  evidential	  presumptions’,	  see	  Napp	  Pharmaceutical	  Holdings	  Ltd	  v	  Director	  General	  of	  Fair	  
Trading	  [2002]	  CAT	  1,	  para	  95.	  The	  CAT	  gives	  the	  example	  that	  sales	  below	  average	  variable	  costs	  may,	  in	  the	  
absence	  of	  rebuttal,	  be	  presumed	  to	  be	  predatory.	  Cf.	  the	  Opinion	  of	  Advocate	  General	  Fennelly	  in	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐
395/96	  P	  and	  396/96	  P	  Compagnie	  maritime	  belge	  v	  Commission	  [2000]	  ECR	  I-­‐1442,	  para	  127.	  See	  also	  D.	  Bailey,	  
‘Presumptions	  in	  EU	  competition	  law’,	  (2010)	  31	  ECLR	  362.	  
690	  See,	  for	  example,	  the	  CAT	  judgment	  in	  JJB	  and	  Allsports	  v	  OFT	  [2004]	  CAT	  17,	  para	  204:	  ‘the	  evidence	  must	  be	  
sufficient	  to	  convince	  the	  Tribunal	  in	  the	  circumstances	  of	  the	  particular	  case,	  and	  to	  overcome	  the	  presumption	  of	  
innocence	  to	  which	  the	  undertaking	  is	  entitled’.	  The	  same	  standard	  is	  relevant	  as	  regards	  abuse	  of	  dominance	  
cases,	  see	  Burgess	  v	  OFT	  [2005]	  CAT	  25,	  paras	  115-­‐116.	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The	  legal	  burden	  must	  be	  distinguished	  from	  the	  evidentiary	  burden,	  which	  is	  more	  flexible	  in	  nature.691	  
In	   essence	   the	   evidentiary	   burden	   demands	   that	   he	   who	   makes	   an	   assertion	   must	   provide	   proof	  
thereof.692	  The	  evidentiary	  burden	  may	  thus	  be	  borne	  by	  any	  of	  the	  litigating	  parties	  depending	  on	  what	  
they	  have	  asserted.	  A	   flexible	  allocation	  of	   the	  evidentiary	  burden	  contributes	   to	   the	  expediency	  of	   a	  
trial.	  It	  requires	  proof	  from	  the	  party	  best	  positioned	  to	  provide	  it,	  and	  makes	  it	  unattractive	  for	  a	  party	  
to	  make	  assertions	  that	  it	  cannot	  substantiate.	  	  
	  
2.2 The	  establishment	  of	  a	  prima	  facie	  abuse	  
	  
Within	  the	  context	  of	  EU	  competition	  law,	  Article	  2	  of	  Regulation	  1/2003	  confirms	  that	  the	  legal	  burden	  
rests	  on	  the	  party	  or	  authority	  alleging	  an	  infringement.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  Commission	  bears	  the	  legal	  
burden	  to	  adduce	  sufficient	  evidence	  for	  the	  finding	  of	  a	  prima	  facie	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  infringement.	  In	  
practice	   it	   is	   often	   a	  difficult	   hurdle	   to	   establish	   such	   a	  prima	   facie	   abuse.693	   The	   level	   of	   difficulty	   to	  
discharge	  the	   legal	  burden	  will	  depend	   largely	  on	  the	  conduct’s	   impact	  and	  the	  context	  of	   the	  market	  
dynamics	  under	  review.	  	  
	  
For	  instance,	  fidelity	  rebates	  by	  a	  super-­‐dominant	  firm	  will	  satisfy	  the	  threshold	  for	  a	  prima	  facie	  abuse	  
more	  easily	  compared	  to	  discounts	  that	  have	  a	  more	  benign	  effect	  on	  competition.694	  In	  British	  Airways,	  
the	  ECJ	  observed	  that	  the	  Commission	  must	  show	  that	  a	  system	  of	  (non-­‐fidelity)	  discounts	  can	  produce	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
691	  See	  e.g.	  P.	  Hellström,	  ‘A	  Uniform	  Standard	  of	  Proof	  in	  EU	  Competition	  Proceedings’,	  in	  C.-­‐D.	  Ehlermann	  and	  M.	  
Marquis	  (eds),	  European	  Competition	  Law	  Annual	  2009:	  The	  Evaluation	  of	  Evidence	  and	  its	  Judicial	  Review	  in	  
Competition	  Cases	  (Hart	  Publishing:	  Oxford	  and	  Portland,	  Oregon	  2011),	  p.	  147;	  P.	  Lowe,	  ‘Taking	  Sound	  Decisions	  
on	  the	  Basis	  of	  Available	  Evidence’,	  in:	  Ehlermann	  and	  Marquis	  2011	  (ibid.),	  p.	  163;	  A.	  Ó	  Caoimh,	  ‘Standard	  of	  
Proof,	  Burden	  of	  Proof,	  Standards	  of	  Review	  and	  Evaluation	  of	  Evidence	  in	  Antitrust	  and	  Merger	  Cases:	  Perspective	  
of	  Court	  of	  Justice	  of	  the	  European	  Union’,	  in:	  Ehlermann	  and	  Marquis	  2011	  (ibid.),	  p.	  276.	  
692	  For	  a	  clear	  description	  of	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  and	  the	  evidentiary	  burden,	  see	  e.g.	  The	  Racecourse	  Association	  v	  
Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading	  [2005]	  CAT	  29,	  paras	  130-­‐134.	  
693	  Sometimes	  evidential	  presumptions	  will	  facilitate	  the	  Commission	  to	  establish	  a	  prima	  facie	  abuse,	  such	  as	  in	  
the	  event	  that	  a	  dominant	  firm	  charges	  prices	  below	  average	  variable	  costs.	  
694	  Case	  T-­‐57/01	  Solvay	  v	  Commission	  [2009]	  ECR	  II-­‐4621,	  para	  334.	  See	  also	  Case	  T-­‐203/01	  Michelin	  v	  Commission	  
(‘Michelin	  II’)	  [2003]	  ECR	  II-­‐4071,	  paras	  107-­‐109.	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exclusionary	  effects.695	  In	  terms	  of	  price	  discrimination,	  Article	  102(2)(c)	  TFEU	  explicitly	  states	  that	  there	  
can	  only	  be	  a	  prima	  facie	  abuse	   if	   the	  conduct	   leads	  to	  a	   ‘competitive	  disadvantage’.	   In	  the	  Michelin	   I	  
ruling	   the	   ECJ	   suggested	   that	   such	   a	   disadvantage	   follows	   from	   the	   application	  of	   unequal	   criteria,	   in	  
which	   similar	   cases	   are	   treated	   in	   a	   dissimilar	  way.696	   Similarly,	   in	  Post	  Danmark,	   the	   ECJ	   held	   that	   it	  
must	   be	   assessed	  whether	   a	   dominant	   firm’s	   pricing	   policy	   produces	   an	   actual	   or	   likely	   exclusionary	  
effect	   to	   the	  detriment	  of	  competition	  and	  consumers.697	  The	  more	  Article	  102	  TFEU	   is	   interpreted	  as	  
working	  towards	  consumer	  welfare,	  the	  stronger	  a	  prima	  facie	  abuse	  must	  be	  couched	  in	  terms	  that	  the	  
conduct	  has	  consequences	  harmful	  to	  consumer	  welfare.698	  
	  
2.3 Responding	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  prima	  facie	  abuse	  
	  
As	  soon	  as	   the	  Commission	  has	  put	   forward	   its	  case	   indicating	  a	  prima	  facie	  abuse	  the	  dominant	   firm	  
can	  raise	  two	  different	  shields,	  namely	  by	  (i)	  questioning	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  prima	  facie	  abuse	  or	  by	  
(ii)	  invoking	  an	  objective	  justification.	  	  
	  
As	   to	   the	   first	   shield,	   the	   dominant	   firm	   is	   likely	   to	   target	   the	   evidence	   used	   and	   the	   inferences	   the	  
Commission	   has	   drawn	   from	   it.	   In	   essence	   this	   argument	   contends	   that	   the	   Commission	   has	   not	  
discharged	  its	  legal	  burden,	  as	  it	  has	  failed	  to	  adduce	  sufficient	  evidence	  to	  meet	  the	  applicable	  standard	  
of	  proof.	  According	  to	  AG	  Kokott	  a	  dominant	  firm	  can	  successfully	  make	  such	  a	  claim	  if	  it	  is	  able	  to	  ‘show	  
in	  detail	  why	  the	  information	  used	  by	  the	  Commission	  is	  inaccurate,	  why	  it	  has	  no	  probative	  value	  […]	  or	  
why	   the	   conclusions	   drawn	   by	   the	   Commission	   are	   unsound’.699	   Kokott	   opines	   that	   this	   requirement	  
does	  not	  reverse	  the	  legal	  burden,	  but	  simply	  reflects	  ‘the	  normal	  operation	  of	  the	  respective	  burdens	  
of	  adducing	  evidence’.700	  Paragraph	  3.3	  discusses	  this	  subject	  in	  more	  detail.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
695	  British	  Airways,	  supra	  note	  686,	  para	  68.	  This	  rule	  applies	  if	  the	  discount	  system	  cannot	  be	  seen	  as	  fidelity	  
rebates	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  Case	  85/76	  Hoffmann-­‐La	  Roche	  v	  Commission	  [1979]	  ECR	  461.	  
696	  Case	  322/81	  Michelin	  v	  Commission	  (‘Michelin	  I’)	  [1983]	  ECR	  3461,	  para	  90.	  Here	  the	  ECJ	  refers	  to	  the	  possibility	  
to	  invoke	  ‘legitimate	  commercial	  reasons’	  for	  a	  prima	  facie	  discriminatory	  practice.	  
697	  Case	  C-­‐209/10	  Post	  Danmark	  v	  Konkurrencerådet	  [2012]	  ECR	  not	  yet	  published,	  para	  44.	  
698	  O.	  Odudu,	  ‘Annotation	  of	  Case	  C-­‐95/04	  P,	  British	  Airways	  plc	  v.	  Commission,	  judgment	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  
(Third	  Chamber)	  of	  15	  March	  2007’,	  (2007)	  44	  CML	  Rev	  1781,	  at	  1809.	  
699	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Kokott	  in	  Case	  C-­‐105/04	  P	  FEG	  v	  Commission	  [2006]	  ECR	  I-­‐8725,	  para	  74.	  
700	  Ibid.	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If	  a	  dominant	  firm	  wishes	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  second	  shield,	  the	  question	  arises	  which	  party	  bears	  the	  (initial)	  
evidentiary	  burden	  to	  provide	  proof:	  is	  it	  the	  Commission	  (to	  show	  the	  absence	  of	  objective	  justification)	  
or	   the	   dominant	   undertaking	   (to	   show	   the	   applicability	   of	   objective	   justification)?	   Some	   have	   argued	  
that	   Article	   2	   of	   Regulation	   1/2003	   requires	   the	   Commission	   to	   prove	   the	   absence	   of	   an	   objective	  
justification,	   as	   only	   in	   that	   case	   there	   will	   be	   an	   infringement	   of	   Article	   102	   TFEU.701	   The	   following	  
paragraph	   challenges	   the	   view	   that	   the	   initial	   evidentiary	   burden	   related	   to	   objective	   justification	   is	  
borne	  by	  the	  Commission.	  
	  
2.4 Proving	  (the	  absence	  of)	  an	  objective	  justification	  
	  
Regulation	   1/2003	   contains	   a	   preamble	   that	   offers	   guidance	   as	   to	   its	   interpretation.	   Recital	   5	   of	   the	  
preamble	  of	  Regulation	  1/2003	  provides	  that:	  ‘It	  should	  be	  for	  the	  undertaking	  […]	  invoking	  the	  benefit	  
of	  a	  defence	  against	  a	   finding	  of	  an	   infringement	   to	  demonstrate	   […]	   that	   the	  conditions	   for	  applying	  
such	  defence	  are	  satisfied.’	  	  
	  
At	  a	  first	  glance	  it	  appears	  to	  confirm	  that	  the	  dominant	  firm	  should	  demonstrate	  the	  applicability	  of	  an	  
objective	   justification.	   A	   possible	   counter-­‐argument	   is	   that	   objective	   justification	   should	   not	   be	  
considered	  a	  ‘defence’	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  Regulation	  1/2003.	  According	  to	  this	  line	  of	  reasoning	  the	  
acceptance	  of	  an	  objective	   justification	  means	  that	  there	  was	  no	  abuse	  to	  begin	  with	  –	  thus	  removing	  
the	  need	   for	  an	  undertaking	   to	  provide	  a	  defence.	   In	  my	  view,	   this	  argument	  erroneously	   ignores	   the	  
fact	  that	  there	  is	  only	  a	  need	  to	  raise	  an	  objective	  justification	  if	  the	  Commission	  succeeds	  in	  providing	  
ample	   proof	   of	   a	   prima	   facie	   abuse.	   In	   addition,	   the	   mere	   fact	   that	   an	   undertaking	   must	   provide	   a	  
‘defence’	  does	  not	  necessarily	  cast	  a	  negative	  subjective	  spell	  on	  its	  conduct.	  By	  comparison,	  in	  merger	  
control	   an	   efficiency	   plea	   is	   also	   referred	   as	   a	   ‘defence’,	   even	   though	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   completing	   an	  
efficient	  merger	  is	  in	  no	  way	  legally	  or	  morally	  reprehensible.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
701	  P.	  -­‐J.	  Loewenthal,	  ‘The	  Defence	  of	  “objective	  justification”	  in	  the	  application	  of	  Article	  82	  EC’,	  (2005)	  28	  World	  
Competition	  455.	  See,	  similarly,	  R.	  Nazzini,	  ‘The	  wood	  began	  to	  move:	  an	  essay	  on	  consumer	  welfare,	  evidence	  and	  
burden	  of	  proof	  in	  Article	  82	  EC	  cases’,	  (2006)	  31	  ELRev	  520,	  522.	  Albors-­‐Llorens	  2007,	  supra	  note	  687,	  at	  1747.	  
Albors-­‐Llorens	  argues	  that	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  requires	  a	  one-­‐step	  analysis	  which	  requires	  the	  Commission	  to	  
consider	  potential	  justifications	  within	  that	  analysis.	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Leaving	  this	  semantic	  issue	  aside,	  ECJ	  case	  law	  clearly	  requires	  the	  dominant	  firm	  to	  produce	  evidence	  
supporting	  an	  objective	   justification	  claim.	  Several	  early	   case	   law	  examples	  emanate	   from	  the	   field	  of	  
pricing	  abuses.	  In	  cases	  such	  as	  Metro,	  Tournier	  and	  Aéroports	  de	  Paris	  the	  ECJ	  expected	  the	  dominant	  
firm	   to	   provide	   evidence	   in	   order	   to	   justify	   a	   prima	   facie	   abusive	   pricing	   practice.702	   More	   recent	  
judgments	   –	   such	   as	   TeliaSonera,	   British	   Airways	   and	   France	   Télécom	   –	   show	   that	   the	   dominant	  
undertaking	  ought	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  a	  rebate	  system,	  notwithstanding	  its	  exclusionary	  effect,	  can	  be	  
‘economically’	   justified.703	   Yet	   it	   is	   the	  Microsoft	   ruling	   by	   the	   General	   Court	   that	   offers	   perhaps	   the	  
clearest	  evocation	  that	  the	  dominant	  firm	  bears	  the	  evidentiary	  burden	  as	  to	  objective	  justification:	  	  
	  
‘Although	   the	   burden	   of	   proof	   of	   the	   existence	   of	   the	   circumstances	   that	   constitute	   an	  
infringement	  of	  [Article	  102	  TFEU]	  is	  borne	  by	  the	  Commission,	  it	  is	  for	  the	  dominant	  undertaking	  
concerned	   […]	   to	   raise	   any	   plea	   of	   objective	   justification	   and	   to	   support	   it	  with	   arguments	   and	  
evidence.	  It	  then	  falls	  to	  the	  Commission	  […]	  to	  show	  that	  the	  arguments	  and	  evidence	  relied	  on	  
by	   the	  undertaking	  cannot	  prevail	  and,	  accordingly,	   that	   the	   justification	  put	   forward	  cannot	  be	  
accepted	  [italics	  added	  by	  author]’.704	  
	  
In	   sum,	   the	   Commission	   bears	   the	   burden	   to	   prove	   the	   existence	   of	   a	  prima	   facie	   infringement.	   The	  
dominant	   firm	   may	   raise	   an	   objective	   justification	   plea	   and	   bears	   the	   (initial)	   evidentiary	   burden	   to	  
provide	   the	   necessary	   arguments	   and	   proof.705	   If	   the	   dominant	   firm	   is	   unable	   to	   provide	   sufficient	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
702	  Case	  78/70	  Metro	  [1971]	  ECR	  487,	  para	  19	  and	  Case	  C-­‐395/87	  Ministère	  Public	  v	  Tournier	  [1989]	  ECR	  2521,	  para	  
38.	  See	  also	  Case	  T-­‐128/98	  Aéroports	  de	  Paris	  v	  Commission	  [2000]	  ECR	  II-­‐3929,	  paras	  201-­‐202	  (upheld	  by	  Case	  C-­‐
82/01	  P	  Aéroports	  de	  Paris	  v	  Commission	  [2002]	  ECR	  I-­‐9297).	  See,	  similarly,	  Case	  C-­‐163/99	  Portugal	  v	  Commission	  
[2001]	  ECR	  I-­‐2613,	  para	  52.	  
703	  Case	  C-­‐52/09	  TeliaSonera	  Sverige	  [2011]	  ECR	  I-­‐527,	  para	  75;	  British	  Airways,	  supra	  note	  686,	  paras	  69	  and	  86;	  
Case	  C-­‐202/07	  P	  France	  Télécom	  v	  Commission	  [2009]	  ECR	  I-­‐2369,	  para	  111.	  See	  also	  Case	  T-­‐57/01	  Solvay	  v	  
Commission	  [2009]	  ECR	  II-­‐4621,	  para	  334	  and	  Michelin	  II	  (General	  Court),	  supra	  note	  694,	  para	  107-­‐109.	  See,	  
similarly,	  Case	  E-­‐15/10	  Posten	  Norge	  v	  ESA	  [2012]	  EFTA	  Ct.	  Rep	  246,	  para	  206,	  in	  which	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  held	  that:	  ‘it	  
is	  for	  the	  applicant	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  its	  conduct	  is	  objectively	  necessary	  or	  produces	  efficiencies.’	  
704	  Case	  T-­‐201/04	  Microsoft	  v	  Commission	  [2007]	  ECR	  II-­‐3601,	  paras	  688	  and	  1144.	  	  
705	  In	  Microsoft	  (ibid.)	  the	  General	  Court	  states	  that	  it	  expects	  the	  objective	  justification	  plea	  to	  be	  invoked	  ‘before	  
the	  end	  of	  the	  administrative	  procedure’.	  This	  suggests	  that	  firms	  cannot	  invoke	  a	  justification	  in	  court	  that	  was	  
not	  raised	  during	  the	  administrative	  procedure.	  This	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  different	  approach	  than	  was	  taken	  by	  the	  CAT	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evidence,	  the	  ECJ	  may	  be	  satisfied	  that	  the	  prima	  facie	  abuse	  cannot	  be	  objectively	   justified,	  and	  thus	  
constitutes	   an	   infringement	   of	   Article	   102	   TFEU.706	   However,	   if	   the	   dominant	   firm	   does	   succeed	   in	  
proving	   that	   its	   conduct	   can	  be	  objectively	   justified,	   the	  evidentiary	  burden	   shifts	   to	   the	  Commission.	  
The	  Commission	  must	  then	  provide	  ample	  proof	  countering	  the	  firm’s	  objective	  justification	  claims.	  
	  
2.5 Examining	  the	  ECJ’s	  approach	  
	  
In	  my	  view,	  the	  ECJ	  has	  a	  perfectly	  sensible	  approach	  towards	  evidence	  related	  to	  objective	  justification.	  
As	   the	   UK	   Competition	   Appeal	   Tribunal	   (‘CAT’)	   held	   in	  Genzyme,	   it	   would	   be	   overly	   burdensome	   to	  
require	  competition	  authorities	  to	  comprehensively	  examine	  every	  conceivable	   justification	  and	  to	  ask	  
them	  to	  prove	  a	  negative.707	  The	  ECJ’s	  allocation	  of	  the	  burden	  ensures	  a	  focused	  debate	  on	  the	  types	  of	  
objective	  justification	  that	  really	  matter	  –	  resulting	  in	  a	  more	  effective	  and	  less	  intrusive	  procedure.	  
	  
In	  addition,	  the	  success	  of	  an	  objective	  justification	  plea	  will	  often	  depend	  on	  evidence	  that,	  by	  its	  very	  
nature,	   is	   only	   available	   to	   the	   dominant	   firm.	   The	   ECJ	   appears	   to	   take	   due	   account	   of	   such	  
circumstances.	   In	  AstraZeneca	   the	   General	   Court	   observed	   that:	   ‘the	   undertaking	   concerned	   is	   alone	  
aware	  of	   [the]	   objective	   justification	  or	   is	   naturally	   better	   placed	   than	   the	  Commission	   to	  disclose	   its	  
existence	  and	  demonstrate	  its	  relevance.’708	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
in	  Genzyme,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  dominant	  firm	  may	  raise	  ‘further’	  pleas	  of	  objective	  justification	  during	  the	  appeal	  
stage	  even	  though	  these	  have	  not	  been	  raised	  earlier.	  See	  Genzyme	  v	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading	  [2004]	  CAT	  4,	  para	  578.	  
706	  Cf.	  Nazzini	  2006,	  supra	  note	  701,	  at	  534.	  
707	  Cf.	  Genzyme,	  supra	  note	  705,	  para	  577.	  The	  CAT	  expects	  the	  OFT	  at	  the	  decision	  stage	  ‘to	  consider	  the	  issue	  of	  
objective	  justification,	  and	  in	  particular	  any	  arguments	  put	  forward	  by	  the	  dominant	  undertaking’	  (ibid.).	  See	  also	  
E.	  Østerud,	  Identifying	  Exclusionary	  Abuses	  by	  Dominant	  Undertakings	  under	  EU	  Competition	  Law:	  The	  Spectrum	  of	  
Tests	  (Alphen	  aan	  den	  Rijn:	  Kluwer	  Law	  International,	  2010),	  p.246-­‐247.	  See	  also	  P.	  Akman,	  ‘To	  abuse,	  or	  not	  to	  
abuse:	  discrimination	  between	  consumers’,	  (2007)	  32	  ELRev	  492,	  at	  497.	  Akman	  notes	  that	  to	  prove	  a	  negative	  is	  
against	  the	  general	  rules	  on	  the	  burden	  of	  proof,	  referring	  to	  Case	  T-­‐117/89	  Sens	  v	  Commission	  [1990]	  ECR	  II-­‐198,	  
para	  20.	  
708	  Case	  T-­‐321/05	  AstraZeneca	  v	  Commission	  [2010]	  ECR	  II-­‐2805,	  para	  686.	  The	  ECJ	  has	  put	  forward	  similar	  
observations	  in	  Article	  101	  TFEU	  cases,	  see	  e.g.	  Case	  C-­‐413/08	  P	  Lafarge	  v	  Commission	  [2010]	  ECR	  I-­‐5361,	  para	  30	  
and	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐204/00	  P,	  205/00	  P,	  211/00	  P,	  213/00	  P,	  217/00	  P	  &	  219/00	  P	  Aalborg	  Portland	  v	  Commission	  
[2004]	  ECR	  I-­‐123,	  para	  79.	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I	  believe	  this	  approach	  is	  the	  right	  one,	  and	  shall	  give	  two	  hypothetical	  examples	  demonstrating	  why	  the	  
dominant	   firm	   is	   often	   better	   equipped	   to	   show	   certain	   justifications.	   The	   first	   example	   concerns	   a	  
possible	   efficiency	   plea.	   A	   dominant	   firm	  may	   wish	   to	   show	   quantitative	   proof	   that	   certain	   conduct	  
creates	  a	  wealth	  of	  efficiencies,	  even	  though	  it	  risks	  excluding	  a	  third	  party	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  Although	  
such	  documents	  are	  not	  necessarily	  sufficient,	  they	  may	  be	  able	  to	  persuade	  a	  court.	  This	  is	  consistent	  
with	   merger	   control	   practice,	   where	   the	   party	   bears	   the	   evidentiary	   burden	   to	   successfully	   invoke	  
efficiency	  benefits	  arising	  from	  the	  proposed	  transaction.709	  
	  
The	   second	   example	   relates	   to	   an	  objective	   justification	  based	  on	  public	   interest.	   Just	   imagine	   that	   a	  
dominant	  wholesaler	  of	  goods	  refuses	  to	  deal	  with	  certain	  distribution	  companies.	  The	  Commission	  may	  
consider	   the	   refusal	   to	   be	   a	   prima	   facie	   abuse.	   The	   dominant	   firm	   could	   then	   invoke	   an	   objective	  
justification,	  for	  instance	  by	  stating	  that	  the	  refusal	  only	  applies	  to	  road	  haulers	  that	  do	  not	  make	  use	  of	  
environmentally	   friendly	   lorries.	   The	   Commission	   could	   respond	   by	   noting	   that	   the	   blanket	   refusal	   is	  
unnecessary	   for	   the	   professed	   goal,	   possibly	   because	   legislation	   already	   adequately	   addresses	   this	  
issue.710	  The	  dominant	  firm	  could	  subsequently	  perhaps	  refer	  to	  the	  lax	  government	  enforcement	  as	  to	  
the	  compliance	  with	  environmental	  rules,	  triggering	  the	  need	  for	  the	  firm	  to	  step	  up	  its	  own	  conditions.	  
Such	  a	  dialectic	  process711	  could	  prove	  lengthy,	  but	  provides	  the	  most	  appropriate	  manner	  to	  properly	  
examine	  a	  plea	  based	  on	  objective	  justification.	  	  
	  
	  
3 STANDARD	  OF	  PROOF	  
	  
3.1 Introduction	  	  
	  
Apart	  from	  the	  issue	  which	  of	  the	  litigating	  parties	  bears	  the	  burden	  of	  proof,	  it	  is	  also	  relevant	  to	  know	  
how	  high	  the	  evidentiary	  threshold	  is.	  The	  standard	  of	  proof	  consists	  of	  the	  requirements	  that	  must	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
709	  The	  general	  principles	  governing	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  are	  largely	  identical	  in	  antitrust	  and	  merger	  cases	  (Lowe	  
2011,	  see	  supra	  note	  691,	  p.165).	  
710	  Cf.	  Case	  T-­‐30/89	  Hilti	  v	  Commission	  [1991]	  ECR	  II-­‐1439,	  para	  118.	  
711	  See	  also	  the	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Colomer	  in	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐468/06	  to	  C-­‐478/06	  Sot.	  Lélos	  kai	  Sia	  and	  Others	  v	  
GlaxoSmithKline	  [2008]	  ECR	  I-­‐7139,	  para.	  70.	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satisfied	  for	  facts	  to	  be	  regarded	  as	  proven.712	  EU	  law	  provides	  no	  clear	  framework	  as	  to	  the	  applicable	  
standard	   of	   proof.713	   This	   is	   in	   line	  with	   the	   continental	   European	   legal	   tradition,	   in	  which	   no	   formal	  
standard	  of	  proof	  exists714	  –	  often	  to	  the	  great	  unease	  of	  common	  lawyers.715	  Basically	  the	  party	  bearing	  
the	   legal	   or	   the	   evidentiary	   burden	   must	   simply	   be	   able	   to	   persuade	   the	   court;	   connoting	   that	   the	  
judge’s	   personal	   conviction	   (also	   referred	   to	   as	   ‘intime	   conviction’)	   is	   key.716	   It	   should	   be	   noted,	  
however,	   that	   the	   focus	   on	   the	   judge’s	   personal	   conviction	  may,	   in	   practice,	   not	   be	   all	   that	   different	  
compared	  to	  a	  common	  law	  approach.	  In	  the	  English	  Purple	  Parking	  case,	  a	  private	  claim	  alleging	  abuse	  
of	   dominance	   by	   Heathrow	   Airport,	   Mann	   J	   observed	   that	   ‘[a]t	   the	   end	   of	   the	   day	   the	   question	   is	  
whether	  I	  am	  satisfied	  or	  not	  that	  the	  relevant	  matters	  have	  been	  proved’.717	  
	  
Notwithstanding	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  formal	  standard	  of	  proof	  in	  EU	  law,	  the	  ECJ	  has	  provided	  a	  number	  of	  
principles	   that	   indicate	   the	   level	   of	   the	   evidentiary	   threshold.	   The	   analysis	   below	  will	   examine	   these	  
principles.	   It	  will	  also	   touch	  upon	  the	  standard	  of	   judicial	   review	  exercised	  by	   the	  EU	  courts,	  as	   this	   is	  
closely	   interlinked	  with	   the	  applicable	   standard	  of	  proof.718	  The	  higher	   the	   standard	  of	   judicial	   review	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
712	  	  Hellström	  2011,	  see	  supra	  note	  691,	  p.	  147.	  See	  also	  supra	  note	  64	  of	  the	  Opinion	  by	  AG	  Kokott	  in	  Case	  C-­‐97/08	  
Akzo	  Nobel	  v	  Commission	  [2009]	  I-­‐8237.	  
713	  See,	  generally,	  H.	  Legal,	  ‘Standards	  of	  Proof	  and	  Standards	  of	  Judicial	  Review	  in	  EU	  Competition	  Law’	  in	  B.	  Hawk	  
(ed),	  International	  Antitrust	  Law	  &	  Policy:	  Annual	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  Fordham	  Corporate	  Law	  Institute	  2005	  (Juris	  
Publishing:	  New	  York	  2006).	  
714	  Gippini-­‐Fournier	  warns	  that	  this	  concept	  must	  be	  used	  with	  great	  caution,	  as	  it	  involves	  the	  use	  of	  ‘categories	  
which	  lose	  much	  of	  their	  sense	  outside	  the	  common	  law’.	  See	  E.	  Gippini-­‐Fournier,	  ‘The	  Elusive	  Standard	  of	  Proof	  in	  
EU	  Competition	  Cases’	  in	  Ehlermann	  &	  Marquis	  2011	  (see	  supra	  note	  691),	  p.	  296.	  
715	  See	  also	  I.	  Forrester,	  ‘A	  Bush	  in	  Need	  of	  Pruning:	  the	  Luxuriant	  Growth	  of	  “Light	  Judicial	  Review”’,	  in	  Ehlermann	  
&	  Marquis	  2011	  (see	  supra	  note	  691),	  p.	  419.	  
716	  See	  e.g.	   Joined	  Cases	  T-­‐185/96,	  T-­‐189/96	  and	  T-­‐190/96	  Riviera	  Auto	  Service	  and	  Others	  v	  Commission	   [1999]	  
ECR	  II-­‐93,	  para	  47	  and	  Case	  T-­‐62/98	  Volkswagen	  v	  Commission	  [2000]	  ECR	  II-­‐2707,	  para	  43.	  In	  the	  latter	  judgment	  
the	  Court	  held:	   ‘it	   is	  necessary	  to	  ascertain	  whether	  the	  Commission	  gathered	  sufficiently	  precise	  and	  consistent	  
evidence	  to	  give	  grounds	  for	  a	  firm	  conviction	  that	  the	  alleged	  infringement	  took	  place	  [italics	  added	  by	  author]’.	  
See	  also	  Gippini-­‐Fournier	  2011,	  supra	  note	  714,	  p.	  297-­‐298.	  	  
717	  Purple	  Parking	  [2011]	  EWHC	  987	  (Ch),	  at	  185.	  
718	  See	  e.g.	  Graham	  2011,	  supra	  note	  688,	  p.	  245	  and	  Hellström	  2011,	  supra	  note	  691,	  p.	  149.	  See	  also	  A.	  
Gerbrandy,	  Convergentie	  in	  het	  mededingingsrecht	  [Convergence	  in	  Competition	  Law]	  (Boom	  Juridische	  Uitgevers:	  	  
The	  Hague	  2009),	  Ch.4.	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vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  a	  finding	  of	  an	  infringement,	  the	  more	  difficult	  it	  will	  be	  for	  the	  party	  alleging	  that	  infringement	  
to	  provide	  sufficient	  evidence	   in	  order	  to	  meet	  the	  standard	  of	  proof.719	  As	  the	  standard	  of	  proof	  and	  
the	   standard	   of	   judicial	   review	   function	   much	   like	   two	   communicating	   vessels,	   they	   shall	   both	   be	  
discussed.	  
	  
3.2 The	  standard	  of	  proof	  &	  judicial	  review	  
	  
Primary	  EU	  law	  provides	  the	  legal	  basis	  for	  judicial	  review	  by	  the	  ECJ.	  Article	  261	  TFEU	  provides	  the	  ECJ	  
with	   ‘unlimited	   jurisdiction’	   in	   its	   assessment	   of	   penalties	   such	   as	   those	   imposed	   under	   Regulation	  
1/2003.720	  More	  broadly,	  Article	  263	  TFEU	  provides	  that	  the	  ECJ	  may	  review	  the	  legality	  of	  Commission	  
decisions.	  A	  legality	  review	  implies	  a	  degree	  of	  deference	  to	  the	  Commission	  decision	  and,	  accordingly,	  
is	   not	   as	   comprehensive	   as	   a	   full	   appeal	   on	   the	  merits.	   In	   particular,	   the	   ECJ	   shows	   deference	   to	   so-­‐
called	  ‘complex	  economic	  assessments’	  made	  by	  the	  Commission.721	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  even	  where	  the	  
Commission	  has	  a	  certain	  margin	  of	  discretion,	  the	  Court	  must	  still	  carry	  out	  an	  in-­‐depth	  review	  of	  the	  
law	  and	  of	  the	  facts.722	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
719	  The	  standard	  of	  judicial	  review	  is	  the	  standard	  ‘a	  reviewing	  tribunal	  or	  appellate	  court	  applies	  when	  reviewing	  
the	  legality	  of	  a	  decision	  or	  an	  administrative	  body	  or	  lower	  tribunal’	  (see	  Hellström	  2011,	  supra	  note	  691,	  p.	  149).	  
See	  also	  B.	  Vesterdorf,	  ‘Standard	  of	  Proof	  in	  Merger	  Cases:	  Reflections	  in	  the	  Light	  of	  Recent	  Case	  Law	  of	  the	  
Community	  Courts’	  (2005)	  1	  European	  Competition	  Journal	  7.	  For	  a	  critical	  analysis	  of	  this	  topic,	  see	  D.	  Geradin	  &	  
N.	  Petit,	  ‘Judicial	  Review	  in	  European	  Union	  Competition	  Law:	  A	  Quantitative	  and	  Qualitative	  Assessment’,	  TILEC	  
Discussion	  Paper	  No.	  2011-­‐008.	  
720	  As	  implemented	  by	  Article	  31	  of	  Regulation	  1/2003,	  which	  reads	  as	  follows:	  ‘The	  Court	  of	  Justice	  shall	  have	  
unlimited	  jurisdiction	  to	  review	  decisions	  whereby	  the	  Commission	  has	  fixed	  a	  fine	  or	  periodic	  penalty	  payment’.	  It	  
is	  unclear	  from	  this	  provision	  whether	  unlimited	  jurisdiction	  refers	  mainly	  to	  the	  power	  to	  adjust	  the	  fine	  or	  should	  
also	  entail	  the	  possibility	  to	  examine	  afresh	  all	  the	  underlying	  merits.	  
721	  Ibid.	  See	  also	  Aalborg	  Portland,	  supra	  note	  708,	  para	  279.	  See	  also	  Case	  T-­‐201/04	  Microsoft	  v	  Commission	  
[2007]	  ECR	  II-­‐3601,	  para	  88.	  
722	  See	  Case	  C-­‐272/09	  P	  KME	  Germany	  AG	  v	  European	  Commission	  [2011]	  ECR	  nyr.	  See	  also	  A.	  Meij,	  ‘Judicial	  
Review	  in	  the	  EC	  Courts:	  Tetra	  Laval	  and	  Beyond’	  in:	  O.	  Essens,	  A.	  Gerbrandy	  and	  S.	  Lavrijssen	  (eds.),	  National	  
Courts	  and	  the	  Standard	  of	  Review	  in	  Competition	  Law	  and	  Economic	  Regulation	  (Europa	  Law	  Publishing:	  
Groningen	  2009),	  p.	  15.	  See,	  similarly,	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  judgment	  in	  Posten	  Norge,	  supra	  note	  703,	  para	  99.	  The	  
EFTA	  Court	  held	  that	  the	  evidence	  relied	  on,	  even	  of	  an	  economic	  nature,	  must	  be	  accurate,	  reliable,	  and	  
complete,	  and	  support	  the	  conclusions	  drawn	  from	  it.	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Turning	  to	  the	  standard	  of	  proof,	  the	  ECJ	  has	  often	  held	  that	  the	  Commission	  needs	  to	  demonstrate	  its	  
case	  ‘according	  to	  the	  requisite	  legal	  standard’.723	  The	  ECJ	  has	  used	  different	  types	  of	  wording	  to	  express	  
its	   expectations	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   quality	   of	   evidence,	   namely	   that	   it	   ought	   to	   be	   ‘sufficiently	   precise	   and	  
coherent’,724	   ‘sufficiently	   precise	   and	   consistent’,725	   ‘sufficiently	   cogent	   and	   consistent’,726	   ‘convergent	  
and	  consistent’,727	  ‘convincing’,728	  ‘consistent’729	  or	  ‘cogent’.730	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  ECJ	  assesses	  whether	  
the	  body	  of	  evidence,	   taken	  as	  a	  whole,	   is	  sufficiently	  plausible	  to	  meet	  the	  requisite	  standard.731	  The	  
standard	  expressed	  by	  the	  ECJ	  thus	  seems	  to	  be	  relatively	  strict,	  even	  though	  it	  falls	  short	  of	  the	  ‘beyond	  
reasonable	  doubt’	  standard	  familiar	  from	  criminal	  law	  in	  common	  law	  jurisdictions.732	  
	  
3.3 The	  ECHR	  perspective	  
	  
For	  a	  long	  time	  now,	  commentators	  have	  debated	  whether	  the	  intensity	  by	  which	  the	  EU	  courts	  review	  
Commission	  decisions	  complies	  with	  Article	  6	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  of	  Human	  Rights	  (‘ECHR’).733,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
723	  Hellström	  2011,	  supra	  note	  691,	  p.	  151.	  See	  also	  Case	  C-­‐185/95	  P	  Baustahlgewebe	  v	  Commission	  [1998]	  ECR	  I-­‐
8471,	  para	  58.	  
724	  Joined	  Cases	  29/83	  and	  30/83	  CRAM	  and	  Rheinzink	  v	  Commission	  [1984]	  ECR	  1679,	  para	  20.	  
725	  Case	  T-­‐62/98	  Volkswagen	  v	  Commission	  [2000]	  ECR	  II-­‐2707,	  paras	  43	  and	  72;	  Joined	  Cases	  T-­‐67/00,	  T-­‐68/00,	  
T71/00	  and	  T-­‐78/00	  JFE	  Engineering	  and	  Others	  v	  Commission	  [2004]	  ECR	  II-­‐2501,	  para	  179.	  
726	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐68/94	  and	  C-­‐30/95	  France	  v	  Commission	  [1998]	  ECR	  I-­‐1375,	  para	  228.	  
727	  Case	  T-­‐314/01	  Avebe	  v	  Commission	  [2006]	  ECR	  II-­‐3085,	  para	  97.	  
728	  Case	  T-­‐56/02	  Bayerische	  Hypo-­‐	  und	  Vereinsbank	  v	  Commission	  [2004]	  ECR	  II-­‐3495,	  para	  118-­‐119.	  
729	  Case	  C-­‐89/85	  Ahlström	  v	  Commission	  (‘Woodpulp	  II’)	  [1993]	  ECR	  I-­‐1307,	  para	  127.	  
730	  Case	  T-­‐305/94	  Limburgse	  Vinyl	  Maatschappij	  a.o.	  v	  Commission	  [1999]	  ECR	  II-­‐931,	  para	  644.	  
731	  JFE	  Engineering,	  supra	  note	  725,	  para	  180.	  
732	  Case	  T-­‐53/03	  BPB	  v	  Commission	  [2008]	  ECR	  II-­‐1333,	  para	  64.	  	  
733	  Article	  6(3)	  of	  the	  Treaty	  on	  European	  Union	  provides	  that	  fundamental	  rights,	  as	  protected	  by	  the	  ECHR,	  
constitute	  general	  principles	  of	  EU	  law.	  According	  to	  Article	  52(3)	  of	  the	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights,	  the	  
Charter	  rights	  corresponding	  to	  those	  in	  the	  ECHR	  will	  have	  at	  least	  the	  meaning	  and	  scope	  of	  those	  rights	  under	  
the	  ECHR.	  See,	  also,	  ECJ	  case	  law	  dating	  back	  to	  the	  1970s	  that	  already	  confirms	  that	  the	  EU	  is	  bound	  by	  
fundamental	  rights.	  See	  e.g.	  Case	  11/70	  Internationale	  Handelsgesellschaft	  [1970]	  ECR	  1125	  and	  Case	  36/75	  Rutili	  
[1975]	  ECR	  1219.	  Currently,	  the	  EU	  is	  negotiating	  to	  become	  a	  contracting	  party	  to	  the	  ECHR.	  The	  relevant	  legal	  
bases	  are	  Protocol	  14	  to	  the	  ECHR	  and	  Article	  6(2)	  TEU	  respectively.	  See	  e.g.	  the	  document	  of	  10	  June	  2013	  at	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734	  This	  provision	  requires	  a	  fair	  and	  public	  hearing	  by	  an	  independent	  and	  impartial	  tribunal	  if	  a	  person	  
–	  natural	  or	   legal	  –	   is	   subject	   to	  a	   ‘criminal	   charge’.	   Such	  a	   tribunal	  must	  also	  have	   full	   jurisdiction	   to	  
examine	  all	  matters	  of	   law	  and	   fact	   relevant	   to	   the	  case	  before	   it;735	   seemingly	   requiring	  more	  than	  a	  
legality	  review.	  
	  
But	  how	  does	  Article	  6	  ECHR	  relate	  to	  the	  field	  of	  competition	  law?	  The	  ECJ	  has	  suggested,	  on	  the	  basis	  
of	   ECtHR	   case	   law,	   that	   competition	   proceedings	   are	   ‘criminal’	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   Article	   6	   ECHR.736	  
Indeed,	   in	  Jussila,	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  (‘ECtHR’)	  explicitly	  referred	  to	  competition	  law	  
as	  one	  of	  the	  areas	  in	  which	  fines	  may	  fall	  under	  the	  scope	  of	  a	  criminal	  charge.737	  However,	  the	  ECtHR	  
did	  add	  the	  important	  nuance	  that	  the	  guarantees	  of	  Article	  6	  ECHR	  do	  not	  apply	  in	  its	  full	  stringency	  to	  
sanctions	  that	  do	  not	  carry	  any	  significant	  degree	  of	  stigma,	  as	  opposed	  to	  so-­‐called	  hard-­‐core	  criminal	  
law	  cases.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/Accession/Meeting_reports/47_1(2013)008rev2_EN.pdf.	  
There	  is	  still	  a	  long	  way	  to	  go:	  the	  ECJ	  still	  has	  to	  give	  its	  opinion,	  and	  the	  Council	  of	  the	  EU	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Council	  of	  
Europe	  representatives	  will	  have	  to	  ratify	  the	  final	  agreement.	  
734	  See	  e.g.	  M.	  Bronckers	  &	  A.	  Vallery,	  ‘Fair	  and	  effective	  competition	  policy	  in	  the	  EU:	  which	  role	  for	  authorities	  
and	  which	  role	  for	  the	  courts	  after	  Menarini’,	  (2012)	  8	  European	  Competition	  Journal	  283;	  J.	  Venit,	  ‘Human	  All	  Too	  
Human:	  The	  Gathering	  and	  Assessment	  of	  Evidence	  and	  the	  Appropriate	  Standard	  of	  Proof	  and	  Judicial	  Review	  in	  
Commission	  Enforcement	  Proceedings	  Applying	  Articles	  81	  and	  82’,	  in	  Ehlermann	  &	  Marquis	  2011	  (supra	  note	  
691),	  p.	  241.	  
735	  See	  e.g.	  Menarini,	  infra	  note	  738,	  paras	  59	  and	  61.	  ECtHR	  judgment	  of	  13	  February	  2003,	  Chevrol	  v	  France	  (appl.	  
no.	  49636/99),	  para	  77.	  
736	  See	  e.g.	  Case	  C-­‐235/92	  P	  Montecatini	  v	  Commission	  [1999]	  ECR	  I-­‐4575,	  paras	  175	  and	  176.	  The	  judgment	  
considers	  the	  presumption	  of	  innocence	  to	  be	  applicable,	  as	  found	  in	  Article	  6(2)	  ECHR.	  Note	  that	  this	  provision	  
only	  applies	  to	  cases	  that	  involve	  a	  ‘criminal	  offence’.	  
737	  ECtHR	  judgment	  of	  23	  November	  2006,	  Jussila	  v	  Finland	  (appl.	  no.	  73053/01).	  The	  mere	  fact	  that	  Article	  23(5)	  of	  
Regulation	  1/2003	  states	  that	  fining	  decisions	  ‘shall	  not	  be	  of	  a	  criminal	  law	  nature’	  is	  not	  decisive	  for	  the	  purposes	  
of	  the	  ECHR,	  as	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘criminal	  charge’	  is	  an	  autonomous	  concept	  under	  the	  ECHR.	  See	  e.g.	  ECtHR	  judgment	  
of	  21	  February	  1984,	  Öztürk	  v	  Germany	  (appl.	  no.	  8544/79),	  para.	  49-­‐50.	  See	  also	  B.	  Vesterdorf,	  ‘Article	  102	  TFEU	  
and	  sanctions:	  appropriate	  when?’,	  (2011)	  28	  ECLR	  573.	  At	  574,	  he	  notes	  that	  in	  Hüls	  the	  ECJ	  came	  very	  close	  to	  
admitting	  that	  the	  proceedings	  and	  sanctions	  under	  EU	  competition	  law	  are	  of	  a	  criminal	  law	  nature.	  See	  Case	  C-­‐
199/92	  P	  Hüls	  v	  Commission	  [1999]	  ECR	  I-­‐4287,	  para.	  150,	  referring	  to	  ‘the	  nature	  of	  the	  infringements	  in	  question	  
and	  the	  nature	  and	  degree	  of	  severity	  of	  the	  ensuing	  penalties’.	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In	  the	  Menarini	  case,	  the	  ECtHR	  held	  that	  a	  fine	  imposed	  by	  the	  Italian	  competition	  authority	  amounted	  
to	   a	   criminal	   charge.738	   The	   ECtHR	   reiterated	   standing	   case	   law	   that	   an	   administrative	   authority	  may	  
impose	  such	  a	  fine,	  as	  long	  as	  it	  is	  subject	  to	  the	  review	  by	  a	  court	  with	  full	  jurisdiction	  –	  on	  matters	  of	  
law	  and	  on	  the	  facts.739	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  ECtHR	  found	  that	  the	  Italian	  administrative	  appeal	  system	  was	  
adequate	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  requirements	  of	  Article	  6	  ECHR.740	  
	  
Although	  I	  agree	  with	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  Menarini	  case,	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  ECtHR	  placed	  
too	  much	  emphasis	  on	  the	  system	  of	  administrative	  review	  exercised	  by	  the	  Council	  of	  State,	  instead	  of	  
focusing	  primarily	  on	  what	  the	  Council	  of	  State	  had	  actually	  done	  in	  this	  particular	  case.	  I	  agree	  with	  the	  
concurring	   opinion	   of	   Judge	   Sajó,	   in	   which	   he	   finds	   that	   the	   Council	   had,	   in	   this	   case,	   sufficiently	  
reviewed	   the	   merits	   of	   the	   case	   to	   comply	   with	   Article	   6(1)	   ECHR.741	   He	   aptly	   shows	   that	   the	   most	  
important	  thing	  is	  to	  examine	  what	  the	  court	  is	  actually	  doing	  in	  its	  review	  –	  rather	  than	  to	  focus	  on	  its	  
use	  of	  terminology	  indicating	  either	  a	  full	  review	  or	  a	  legality	  test.	  	  
	  
I	   believe	   that	   the	   competition	   community	   should	   move	   beyond	   the	   abstract	   question	   whether	   the	  
current	   EU	   competition	   law	   enforcement	   system	   is,	   as	   such,	   compliant	  with	   the	   ECHR	   or	   not.	  Only	   a	  
case-­‐by-­‐case	  analysis	  can	  show	  if	  the	  Commission	  and	  the	  subsequent	  review	  by	  the	  ECJ	  have	  –	  in	  that	  
particular	  case	  –	  complied	  with	  the	  ECHR.742	  In	  my	  view	  the	  crucial	  matter	  is	  not	  what	  the	  ECJ	  says	  it’s	  
doing	  when	   reviewing	   a	   Commission	  decision,	   but	  what	   it	   actually	   does.	   Indeed,	   even	   though	   the	   EU	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
738	  ECtHR	  judgment	  of	  27	  September	  2011,	  Menarini	  v	  Italy	   (appl.	  no.	  43509/08),	  para	  28-­‐45.	  See,	  similarly	  EFTA	  
Court,	  Posten	  Norge,	  supra	  note	  703,	  para.	  90.	  
739	  Menarini	  (ibid.),	  para	  59.	  An	  appeal	  was	  open	  to	  an	  administrative	  court,	  and	  subsequently	  to	  the	  Italian	  Council	  
of	  State	  (‘Consiglio	  di	  Stato’).	  	  
740	  This	  position	  seems	  to	  be	  mirrored	  by	  EU	  case	  law.	  See	  e.g.	  Case	  T-­‐348/94	  Enso	  Española	  v	  Commission	  [1998]	  
ECR	  II-­‐1875,	  paras	  55-­‐65	  and	  Case	  T-­‐156/94	  Aristain	  v	  Commission	  [1999]	  ECR	  II-­‐645,	  paras	  27-­‐30.	  See	  also	  Opinion	  
of	  AG	  Sharpston	  in	  KME,	  supra	  note	  722.	  See,	  however,	  the	  dissenting	  opinion	  by	  Judge	  Pinto	  de	  Albuquerque	  in	  
Menarini	  (ibid.),	  arguing	  that	  there	  had	  indeed	  been	  a	  violation	  of	  Article	  6(1)	  ECHR.	  	  
741	  Concurring	  opinion	  by	  Judge	  Sajó	  in	  Menarini	  (ibid.),	  para	  6.	  
742	  See	  also	  the	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Sharpston	  in	  KME,	  supra	  note	  722,	  para	  73-­‐83.	  Advocate	  General	  Sharpston	  also	  
emphasised	  the	  importance	  of	  what	  kind	  of	  review	  the	  Court	  has	  conducted	  in	  actual	  fact,	  rather	  than	  what	  type	  
of	  reviw	  the	  Courts	  says	  it	  has	  conducted.	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courts	   frequently	   refer	   to	   the	   Commission’s	   margin	   of	   discretion,	   they	   normally	   still	   carry	   out	   an	   in-­‐
depth	  review	  of	   the	   law	  and	  the	  facts.743	  This	  entails	  an	  analysis	  of	  whether	   ‘the	  evidence	  relied	  on	   is	  
factually	  accurate,	  reliable	  and	  consistent’	  and	  also	  ‘whether	  that	  evidence	  contains	  all	  the	  [necessary]	  
information	  […]	  and	  whether	  it	  is	  capable	  of	  substantiating	  the	  conclusions	  drawn	  from	  it’.744	  In	  my	  view,	  
as	  long	  as	  these	  principles	  are	  genuinely	  upheld,	  the	  ECJ’s	  review	  does	  not	  infringe	  the	  requirements	  set	  
by	  the	  ECtHR	  in	  Menarini.	  	  
	  
Returning	  once	  more	  to	  the	  standard	  of	  proof,	  it	  is	  by	  no	  means	  evident	  that	  the	  ECtHR	  requires	  use	  of	  
the	   ‘beyond	  reasonable	  doubt’	  standard	   in	  competition	  cases.745	   Indeed,	   in	  Napp,	   the	  UK	  Competition	  
Appeals	   Tribunal	   (‘CAT’)	  made	   clear	   why	   the	   use	   of	   the	   civil	   standard	   is	   ECHR	   compliant.746	   The	   civil	  
standard	   calls	   for	   a	   balance	   of	   probabilities,	   implying	   that	   it	   is	   more	   probable	   than	   not	   that	   the	  
infringement	  has	  occurred.	  Considering	  the	  seriousness	  of	  competition	  law	  penalties,	  however,	  the	  CAT	  
does	   require	   ‘strong	   and	   convincing’	   evidence.747	   I	   think	   that	   this	   approach	   is	   sound	   and	   ECHR	  
compliant,748	  as	  long	  as	  the	  courts	  comply	  are	  genuinely	  critical	  in	  their	  assessment	  of	  evidence	  and	  go	  
beyond	  a	  mere	  legality	  review.749	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
743	  M.	  Jaeger,	  ‘The	  Standard	  of	  Review	  in	  Competition	  Cases	  Involving	  Complex	  Economic	  Assessments:	  Towards	  
the	  Marginalisation	  of	  the	  Marginal	  Review?’,	  (2011)	  2	  Journal	  of	  European	  Competition	  Law	  &	  Practice	  295.	  
744	  Case	  T-­‐210/01	  General	  Electric	  v	  Commission	  [2005]	  ECR	  II-­‐	  5575,	  paras	  62	  and	  63;	  Case	  C-­‐12/03	  P	  Commission	  v	  
Tetra	  Laval	  [2005]	  ECR	  I-­‐987,	  para	  39	  and	  Case	  T-­‐201/04	  Microsoft	  v	  Commission	  [2007]	  ECR	  II-­‐3601,	  paras	  87,	  88	  
and	  89.	  	  
745	  See,	  by	  implication,	  Jussila	  (supra	  note	  737).	  
746	  Napp	  v	  Director	  General	  of	  Fair	  Trading	  [2002]	  CAT	  1,	  paras	  102	  and	  104.	  
747	  Ibid.,	  paras	  108-­‐110.	  The	  CAT	  also	  refers	  to	  the	  same	  standard	  as	  ‘strong	  and	  compelling	  evidence’.	  The	  CAT	  
adds	  that	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  the	  use	  of	  the	  criminal	  standard	  would	  lead	  to	  different	  results	  in	  competition	  cases.	  In	  
a	  private	  enforcement	  action	  setting,	  see	  the	  judgment	  by	  Rimer	  J	  in	  Chester	  City	  Council	  v	  Arriva	  [2007]	  UKCLR	  
1582,	  para.	  10.	  	  
748	  In	  my	  view,	  this	  conclusion	  is	  not	  altered	  by	  the	  EFTA	  Court’s	  judgment	  in	  Posten	  Norge	  that	  it	  had	  ‘no	  doubt’	  
that	  there	  was	  an	  abuse.	  In	  my	  reading,	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  was	  simply	  convinced	  of	  an	  infringement	  based	  on	  the	  
facts	  of	  the	  case,	  but	  that	  does	  not	  mean	  it	  had	  upheld	  a	  ‘beyond	  reasonable	  doubt’	  standard.	  See	  Posten	  Norge,	  
supra	  note	  703,	  paras	  162	  and	  180.	  This	  is	  confirmed	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  although	  the	  applicant	  invokes	  the	  ‘beyond	  
reasonable	  doubt’	  standard,	  it	  is	  not	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  Court’s	  own	  findings.	  
749	  In	  the	  word	  of	  the	  KME	  judgment,	  if	  the	  court	  engages	  into	  an	  in-­‐depth	  review	  of	  the	  law	  and	  of	  the	  facts.	  See	  
KME,	  supra	  note	  722,	  para.	  102.	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3.4 Responding	  to	  the	  Commission	  establishing	  a	  prima	  facie	  abuse	  
	  
An	  applicant	  has	  two	  main	  options	  to	  challenge	  a	  Commission	  infringement	  decision.	  It	  may	  (i)	  counter	  
the	   establishment	   of	   a	   prima	   facie	   abuse	   and/or	   (ii)	   invoke	   an	   objective	   justification.	   As	   to	   the	   first	  
possibility,	   the	   applicant	   is	   required	   ‘to	   identify	   the	   impugned	  elements	   of	   the	   contested	  decision,	   to	  
formulate	   grounds	   of	   challenge	   in	   that	   regard	   and	   to	   adduce	   evidence	   […]	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   its	  
objections	  are	  well	  founded’.750	  The	  defendant	  must	  cast	  sufficient	  doubt	  on	  the	  Commission’s	  body	  of	  
evidence	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  no	  longer	  satisfies	  the	  requisite	  standard	  of	  proof.751	  If	  the	  Commission’s	  
evidence	  is	  particularly	  consistent	  and	  convincing,	  it	  will	  thus	  be	  commensurately	  more	  difficult	  for	  the	  
dominant	  firm	  to	  set	  aside	  a	  finding	  of	  a	  prima	  facie	  infringement.752	  The	  following	  paragraph	  discusses	  
the	   second	  possibility,	  examining	  how	  difficult	   it	  will	  be	   for	  a	  dominant	   firm	   to	   successfully	   invoke	  an	  
objective	  justification.	  	  
	  
3.5 The	  standard	  of	  proof	  related	  to	  the	  various	  types	  of	  objective	  justification	  
	  
3.5.1 Introduction	  
There	  is	  little	  basis	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  standard	  of	  proof	  pertaining	  to	  objective	  justification	  should,	  as	  
a	  matter	  of	  principle,	  be	  different	  from	  the	  standard	  applicable	  to	  a	  finding	  of	  a	  prima	  facie	  abuse.	  The	  
Commission’s	  2009	  guidance	  paper	  suggests	   that	  an	  objective	   justification	  plea	  requires	  evidence	  that	  
possesses	  ‘a	  sufficient	  degree	  of	  probability’	  and	  is	  equally	  based	  on	  ‘verifiable	  evidence’.753	  In	  terms	  of	  
case	   law,	   the	  ECJ	  held	   in	  Solvay	   that	   if	   the	  dominant	   firm	  must	  produce	  sufficiently	   ‘firm	  evidence’,754	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
750	  Case	  C-­‐386/10	  P	  Chalkor	  v	  Commission	  [2011]	  nyr,	  para	  65.	  
751	  See	  also	  Chalkor	  (ibid.),	  para	  64.	  The	  ECJ	  held	  that	  ‘it	  is	  for	  the	  applicant	  to	  raise	  pleas	  in	  law	  against	  [the	  
Commission’s]	  decision	  and	  to	  adduce	  evidence	  in	  support	  of	  those	  pleas.’	  
752	  Ó	  Caoimh	  2011,	  supra	  note	  691,	  p.	  273.	  
753	   Communication	   from	   the	   Commission	  —	   Guidance	   on	   the	   Commission's	   enforcement	   priorities	   in	   applying	  
Article	  [102	  TFEU]	  to	  abusive	  exclusionary	  conduct	  by	  dominant	  undertakings	  [2009]	  OJ	  C45/7,	  para	  30.	  
754	  Case	  T-­‐57/01	  Solvay	  v	  Commission	  [2009]	  ECR	  II-­‐4621,	  para	  334.	  See	  also	  Portugal	  v	  Commission,	  supra	  note	  
702,	  para	  56.	  In	  Michelin	  II	  the	  General	  Court	  held	  that	  the	  evidence	  provided	  by	  the	  applicant	  was	  insufficiently	  
specific.	  See	  Michelin	  II	  (General	  Court),	  supra	  note	  694,	  paras	  107-­‐108,	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which	  must	   be	   assessed	   ‘on	   the	   basis	   of	   all	   the	   circumstances	   of	   the	   case.’755	   Evidence	   is	   unlikely	   to	  
meet	   this	   standard	   if	   it	   is	   inconsistent	  with	   the	   facts,	   and	   thus	   appears	   to	   be	   solely	   an	   ex	   post	   facto	  
attempt	   by	   the	   dominant	   firm	   to	   justify	   its	   conduct.756	   Another	   judgment	   of	   note	   is	  GlaxoSmithKline	  
Services.	  The	  General	  Court	  held,	  and	  the	  ECJ	  confirmed,	  that	  the	  examination	  should	  focus	  on	  whether	  
it	  is	  more	  likely	  or	  not	  than	  the	  alleged	  advantages	  would	  be	  achieved.757	  
	  
Although	   GlaxoSmithKline	   Services	   concerned	   alleged	   benefits	   that	   would	   arise	   in	   the	   future	   (thus	  
requiring	  a	  ‘prospective	  analysis’),	   I	  do	  think	  that	  the	  same	  reasoning	  can	  be	  transposed	  to	  Article	  102	  
TFEU.	  This	  would	  mean	  that	  the	  dominant	  firm	  will	  have	  to	  show	  that	  it	  is	  more	  probable	  than	  not	  that	  
an	  objective	  justification	  applies.	  In	  practice,	  the	  difficulty	  in	  establishing	  an	  objective	  justification	  plea	  
will	  vary	  depending	  on	  the	  conduct’s	  effects	  and	  on	  the	  type	  of	  objective	  justification	  that	  the	  dominant	  
firm	  wishes	  to	  invoke.	  As	  I	  have	  argued	  in	  the	  previous	  Chapter,	  objective	  justification	  pleas	  can	  roughly	  
be	  subdivided	  in	  three	  main	  categories.	  They	  can	  be	  based	  on	  considerations	  of	  (i)	   legitimate	  business	  
behaviour,	   (ii)	  efficiency	  or	  (iii)	  public	   interest.	  The	  following	  paragraphs	  examine	  how	  the	  difficulty	  to	  
meet	  the	  standard	  of	  proof	  may	  differ	  depending	  on	  these	  three	  categories.	  
	  
3.5.2 Legitimate	  business	  behaviour	  
The	  plea	  based	  on	  legitimate	  business	  behaviour	  can	  be	  divided	  in	  ‘objective	  necessity’	  and	  ‘competition	  
on	   the	   merits’.	   In	   the	   context	   of	   ‘objective	   necessity’	   the	   dominant	   firm	   ought	   to	   show	   it	   had	   no	  
alternative	  way	   to	   act.	   This	  will	   not	   be	   easy	   to	   prove,	   as	   alternatives	   courses	   of	   action	  will	   often	   be	  
imaginable.758	   The	   standard	  will	   be	   easily	   satisfied,	   however,	   if	   the	   lack	   of	   alternatives	   follows	   clearly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
755	  TeliaSonera,	  supra	  note	  703,	  para	  76.	  Although	  the	  ECJ	  refers	  to	  Michelin	  I	  as	  a	  precedent,	  that	  ruling	  appears	  
to	  refer	  to	  the	  assessment	  of	  the	  abuse	  as	  a	  whole	  rather	  than	  the	  assessment	  of	  a	  justification	  as	  such.	  See	  Case	  
322/81	  Michelin	  v	  Commission	  (‘Michelin	  I’)	  [1983]	  ECR	  3461,	  para	  73.	  
756	  Case	  T-­‐228/97	  Irish	  Sugar	  v	  Commission	  [1999]	  ECR	  II-­‐2969,	  para	  150.	  
757	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐501/06	  P,	  C-­‐513/06	  P,	  C-­‐515/06	  P	  and	  C-­‐519/06	  P	  GlaxoSmithKline	  Services	  and	  Others	  v	  
Commission	  [2009]	  ECR	  I-­‐9291,	  para	  94.	  
758	  See	  e.g.	  Case	  C-­‐280/08	  P	  Deutsche	  Telekom	  v	  Commission	  [2010]	  ECR	  I-­‐9555,	  upholding	  the	  General	  Court	  ruling	  
in	  Case	  T-­‐271/03	  Deutsche	  Telekom	  v	  Commission	  [2008]	  ECR	  II-­‐477.	  Although	  this	  case	  concerned	  a	  highly	  
regulated	  (wholesale)	  market,	  Deutsche	  Telekom	  was	  still	  in	  the	  position	  to	  avoid	  the	  margin	  squeeze	  under	  
review,	  for	  instance	  by	  raising	  the	  relevant	  downstream	  price.	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from	   the	   available	   evidence	   –	   for	   instance	   that	   the	   dominant	   firm’s	   conduct	   was	   prescribed	   by	   law.	  
Under	  these	  circumstances	  the	  undertaking’s	  actions	  should	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  legitimate.759	  
	  
A	  plea	  based	  on	  competition	  on	  the	  merits	  will	  often	  be	  less	  straightforward	  and	  will	  require	  an	  intricate	  
balancing	  test.	   In	   the	  refusal	   to	  deal	  CBEM	  case	  the	  ECJ	  mentioned	  the	  possibility	   to	   invoke	   ‘technical	  
[and]	   commercial	   requirements’	   relating	   to	   the	  nature	  of	   the	  market	  on	  which	   the	  dominant	  position	  
was	   held.760	   The	   ECJ	   subsumed	   this	   plea	   under	   the	   heading	   of	   ‘objective	   necessity’.761	   However,	  
substantively	  it	  appears	  to	  reflect	  the	  notion	  that	  a	  dominant	  firm	  can	  justify	  its	  conduct	  not	  because	  it	  
has	   no	   alternatives,	   but	   because	   it	   has	   sound	   business	   reasons	   for	   its	   conduct.	   Such	   reasoning	   also	  
appears	   in	  United	   Brands,	   which	   suggests	   that	   a	   dominant	   firm	   has	   –	   in	   principle	   –	   a	   relatively	  wide	  
margin	  on	  what	  type	  of	  activity	  it	  engages	  in	  to	  protect	  its	  commercial	  interests.762	  The	  defendant’s	  main	  
challenge	  will	  be	  to	  show	  that	  its	  conduct	  was	  proportionate	  to	  protect	  its	  interests.763	  In	  my	  view	  this	  
approach	   is	  perfectly	  reasonable.	  The	  starting	  point	  of	  competition	   law	  should	  be	  that	  even	  dominant	  
undertakings	   may	   fully	   take	   part	   in	   the	   competitive	   process:	   despite	   the	   ‘special	   responsibility’	  
incumbent	  upon	  such	  undertakings,	  regulatory	  intervention	  should	  still	  be	  the	  exception	  rather	  than	  the	  
rule.	  
	  
By	  way	  of	  example,	  consider	  an	  airline	  company	  that	  is	  dominant	  on	  a	  particular	  route.	  An	  efficient	  low-­‐
cost	  airline	  enters	  the	  market	  and	  introduces	  very	   low	  fares.	  The	  dominant	  firm	  immediately	  drops	   its	  
prices	   to	   match	   those	   of	   its	   competitor	   –	   to	   a	   level	   below	   its	   costs.	   It	   then	   slashes	   its	   costs	   in	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
759	  If	  the	  objective	  necessity	  refers	  to	  compulsion	  by	  the	  State,	  such	  conduct	  is	  only	  legitimate	  if	  the	  domestic	  
legislation	  itself	  is	  not	  contrary	  to	  EU	  competition	  law,	  see	  e.g.	  Case	  C-­‐198/01	  Consorzio	  Industrie	  Fiammiferi	  v	  
Autorità	  Garante	  della	  Concorrenza	  e	  del	  Mercato	  (‘CIF’)	  [2003]	  I-­‐8055.	  
760	  Case	  311/84	  CBEM	  v	  CLT	  (‘Télémarketing’)	  [1985]	  ECR	  3261,	  para	  26.	  	  
761	  Ibid.,	  para	  27.	  
762	  Case	  27/76	  United	  Brands	  v	  Commission	  [1978]	  ECR	  207,	  para	  189.	  
763	  See	  e.g.	  United	  Brands	  (ibid.),	  para	  190.	  See	  also	  British	  Airways,	  supra	  note	  686,	  para	  86.	  For	  an	  example	  
outside	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU,	  see	  Joined	  Cases	  T-­‐191/98	  and	  T-­‐212/98	  to	  T-­‐214/98	  Atlantic	  Container	  Line	  and	  
Others	  v	  Commission	  (‘TACA’)	  [2003]	  ECR	  II-­‐3298,	  para	  1120.	  Here,	  the	  General	  Court	  examined	  the	  proportionality	  
of	  the	  alleged	  need	  invoked	  by	  the	  parties	  to	  ensure	  equality	  between	  shippers	  and	  to	  improve	  administrative	  
efficiency.	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comprehensive	   three-­‐month	   restructuring	  of	   its	  business,	   lowering	   its	  average	   total	   costs	   to	  below	   its	  
new	  fares.	  	  
	  
Assuming	  a	  potential	  exclusionary	  effect,	  competition	  law	  may	  view	  such	  pricing	  behaviour	  (before	  the	  
completion	   of	   the	   restructuring)	   as	   a	   prima	   facie	   abuse	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   predation.764	   However,	   the	  
dominant	   firm’s	   response	   is	   exactly	   the	   type	   of	   conduct	   that	   competition	   law	   seeks	   to	   promote;	  
resulting	  in	  lower	  prices	  and	  more	  choice	  for	  consumers.	  In	  my	  view,	  it’s	  not	  particularly	  relevant	  that	  a	  
dominant	  firm	  has	  charged	  below-­‐cost	  prices	  for	  a	  short	  period	  of	  time	  –	  especially	   if	  the	  exclusionary	  
effect	  remains	  theoretical	  and	  does	  not	  lead	  to	  an	  exit	  of	  the	  new	  entrant.	  Indeed,	  the	  rationale	  of	  the	  
abuse	  prohibition	  is	  underpinned	  by	  the	  belief	  that	  firms	  with	  market	  power	  are	  usually	  inefficient	  and	  
therefore	  have	  high	  costs.	   It	   should	  be	  applauded	   that	  a	  price	  maverick	   forces	  a	  dominant	   firm	   to	  be	  
more	   efficient.	   It	   is	   fully	   consistent	   with	   the	   overall	   purpose	   of	   competition	   law	   to	   consider	   such	  
competition	   on	   the	  merits	   to	   be	   justified.	   Finally,	   the	   example	   above	   shows	   that	   competition	   on	   the	  
merits	  will	  normally	  involve	  conduct	  that	  is	  strongly	  associated	  with	  efficient	  behaviour,	  and	  could	  thus	  
also	  be	  considered	  under	  an	  efficiency	  plea.	  In	  my	  view,	  however,	  I	  think	  that	  the	  conduct	  is	  so	  clearly	  
within	  the	  realm	  of	  pro-­‐competitive	  behaviour	  that	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  enter	  into	  the	  balancing	  test	  that	  
an	  efficiency	  plea	  would	  require.	  
	  
3.5.3 Efficiency	  
EU	  case	  law	  allows	  the	  dominant	  firm	  to	  provide	  evidence	  that	  the	  exclusionary	  effects	  arising	  from	  an	  
exclusionary	  pricing	  practice	  are	  counterbalanced,	  or	  outweighed,	  by	  advantages	  in	  terms	  of	  efficiency	  
that	   also	   benefit	   the	   consumer.765	   In	   practice	   the	   standard	   seems	   difficult	   to	   meet	   due	   to	   the	  
assumption	   that	   a	  prima	   facie	   abuse	  of	  dominance	  entails	  harmful	  welfare	  effects.766	   The	  greater	   the	  
anti-­‐competitive	  effects	  of	  the	  conduct,	  the	  more	  difficult	   it	  will	  be	  to	  meet	  the	  requisite	  standard.	  By	  
contrast	  low-­‐impact	  conduct	  will	  meet	  the	  standard	  much	  more	  easily.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
764	  AKZO,	  supra	  note	  693,	  para	  146.	  If	  a	  dominant	  firm	  charges	  prices	  between	  average	  variable	  costs	  and	  average	  
total	  costs,	  the	  Commission	  must	  be	  able	  to	  show	  anti-­‐competitive	  intent.	  
765	  British	  Airways,	  supra	  note	  686,	  para	  86;	  TeliaSonera,	  supra	  note	  703,	  para	  76.	  
766	  This	  is	  partly	  because	  the	  very	  presence	  of	  a	  dominant	  firm	  already	  restricts	  competition,	  which	  is	  a	  key	  
rationale	  for	  the	  ‘special	  responsibility’	  incumbent	  upon	  such	  firms.	  See	  e.g.	  Case	  322/81	  Michelin	  v	  Commission	  
(‘Michelin	  I’)	  [1983]	  ECR	  3461,	  para	  57	  and	  BPB,	  supra	  note	  732,	  para	  67.	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An	   underlying	   requirement	   is	   that	   the	   evidence	   invoked	   by	   the	   dominant	   firm	   must	   be	   sufficiently	  
precise.	  In	  Michelin	  II,	  the	  ECJ	  declined	  to	  uphold	  that	  a	  loyalty-­‐inducing	  rebate	  system	  was	  justified,	  as	  
Michelin's	  plea	  was	  ‘too	  general’	  and	  ‘insufficient	  to	  provide	  economic	  reasons	  to	  explain	  specifically	  the	  
discount	  rates	  chosen’.767	  Thus	  the	  dominant	  firm	  cannot	  rely	  on	  a	  general	  reference	  to	  pro-­‐competitive	  
effects,	  but	  must	  establish	  inter	  alia	  that	  its	  quantity	  rebates	  are	  based	  on	  ‘actual	  cost	  savings’.768	  
	  
In	  British	  Airways	  and	  TeliaSonera	  the	  ECJ	  held	  that	  the	  exclusionary	  effect	  must	  bear	  a	  relation	  to	  the	  
stated	   benefits	   and	  may	  not	   go	   beyond	  what	   it	   necessary	   to	   attain	   such	   advantages.769	   This	   suggests	  
that	   the	   anti-­‐competitive	   effects	   must	   be	   an	   unavoidable	   result	   of	   the	   conduct	   that	   has	   a	   net	   pro-­‐
competitive	  effect.	  In	  Post	  Danmark	  the	  ECJ	  introduced	  an	  additional	  criterion,	  namely	  that	  the	  conduct	  
in	  question	  may	  not	  eliminate	  effective	   competition.770	   The	   introduction	  of	   this	   requirement	   suggests	  
that	  the	  ECJ	  is	  bringing	  the	  interpretation	  of	  objective	  justification	  under	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  more	  into	  line	  
with	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU	  where	  this	  criterion	  is	  also	  one	  of	  the	  necessary	  elements.771	  	  
	  
Not	   only	  must	   the	   beneficial	   effects	   be	   sufficiently	   great	   to	   offset	   any	   disadvantageous	   effects,	   they	  
must	  also	  be	  sufficiently	  certain	  to	  materialize.772	  	  In	  Post	  Danmark	  the	  ECJ	  held	  that	  the	  relevant	  gains	  
either	  must	  have	  been,	  or	  are	  likely	  to	  be,	  brought	  about	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  conduct	  under	  review.773	  Any	  
pro-­‐	  and	  anti-­‐competitive	  effects	  ‘likely’	  to	  result	  from	  the	  conduct	  under	  examination	  must	  accordingly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
767	  Michelin	  II	  (General	  Court),	  supra	  note	  694,	  para	  109.	  See	  also	  Portugal	  v	  Commission,	  supra	  note	  702,	  para	  56.	  
In	  the	  latter	  case,	  the	  Court	  attached	  great	  importance	  to	  the	  context	  of	  the	  case,	  which	  involved	  airports	  with	  a	  
natural	  monopoly	  for	  most	  of	  their	  activities.	  The	  Court	  took	  this	  high	  level	  of	  dominance	  into	  account	  when	  it	  
ruled	  that	  the	  rebates	  under	  investigation	  were	  prima	  facie	  abusive	  and	  could	  not	  be	  justified.	  
768	  See	  e.g.	  the	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Mischo	  in	  Portugal	  v	  Commission,	  supra	  note	  702,	  para	  118.	  According	  to	  the	  AG,	  the	  
applicant	  failed	  to	  show	  that	  ‘the	  discounts	  in	  question	  represent	  genuinely	  and	  specifically	  lower	  costs	  for	  the	  
airports’	  operator’.	  
769	  British	  Airways,	  supra	  note	  686,	  para	  86;	  TeliaSonera,	  supra	  note	  703,	  para	  76.	  
770	  Post	  Danmark,	  supra	  note	  697,	  para	  42.	  
771	  An	  earlier	  guidance	  document	  by	  the	  Commission	  clearly	  aims	  to	  do	  the	  same,	  see	  the	  Communication	  from	  the	  
Commission	  —	  Guidance	  on	  the	  Commission's	  enforcement	  priorities	  in	  applying	  Article	  [102	  TFEU]	  to	  abusive	  
exclusionary	  conduct	  by	  dominant	  undertakings	  [2009]	  OJ	  C	  45/7,	  para	  30.	  
772	  Ibid.,	  para	  30.	  The	  guidance	  states	  that	  the	  evidence	  must	  possess	  ‘a	  sufficient	  degree	  of	  probability’.	  
773	  Post	  Danmark,	  supra	  note	  697,	  para	  42.	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be	  balanced	  out	  with	  each	  other.774	  In	  my	  view	  the	  case	  law	  thus	  leaves	  room	  for	  a	  combined	  analysis	  of	  
the	  extent	  of	  the	  effects	  and	  the	  likelihood	  with	  which	  they	  are	  thought	  to	  arise.	  This	  enables	  a	  balanced	  
approach	  which	  could	  allow	  small	  but	  certain	  effects	  to	  outweigh	  effects	  that	  may	  be	  larger	  but	  much	  
more	  doubtful	  to	  arise.	  	  
	  
By	  way	  of	  example	  of	  an	  efficiency	  plea,	  consider	  a	  telecoms	  company	  that	  has	  a	  51%	  market	  share	  in	  
the	  market	   for	   fibre	  optic	   connections	   to	  household	   consumers.	   The	   firm	   starts	   construction	  only	   if	   a	  
sufficient	   percentage	   of	   a	   group	   of	   households	   opts	   for	   such	   a	   connection.	   The	   telecoms	   company	  
chooses	  the	  construction	  company	  performing	  the	  works	  and	  passes	  on	  the	  construction	  costs	  as	  a	  lump	  
sum	  payment	  to	  the	  newly	  connected	  households.	  This	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  form	  of	  tying,	  as	  the	  consumer	  
cannot	  opt	   for	  any	  other	  construction	   firm	   if	   it	   chooses	   the	   fibre	  optic	  connection	   from	  the	  dominant	  
firm.	   However,	   the	   choice	   to	   only	   deal	   with	   a	   single	   construction	   company	   is	   likely	   to	   have	   overall	  
efficient	  effects,	  with	  benefits	  trickling	  down	  to	  consumers,	  as	  fixed	  costs	  are	  spread	  out	  over	  a	   larger	  
number	  of	  customers.	  
	  
3.5.4 Public	  interest	  
A	   public	   interest	   plea	   requires	   a	   balancing	   test	   of	   various	   norms	   that	   normally	   cannot	   be	   easily	  
quantified.775	   It	   requires	   a	   qualitative	   assessment	   of	   why	   the	   practice	   is	   beneficial	   to	   a	   stated	   public	  
interest	  and	  why	   the	   interest	  at	   stake	  should	   trump	  the	  application	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  The	  Hilti	   and	  
Tetra	  Pak	   II	   rulings	  give	   little	   insight	   in	   the	  way	  the	  ECJ	  would	  weigh	  potential	  public	   interest	  benefits	  
with	   anti-­‐competitive	   effects.776	   However,	   if	   the	   ECJ	   does	   engage	   in	   a	   balancing	   exercise	   it	   would	  
logically	  follow	  that	  the	  slighter	  the	  anti-­‐competitive	  effects	  of	  the	  conduct	  and	  the	  higher	  the	  perceived	  
value	  of	  the	  public	  interest	  norm,	  the	  easier	  it	  is	  to	  condone	  the	  behaviour	  under	  examination.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
774	  Ibid.	  
775	  An	  exception	  is	  the	  CECED	  case,	  concerning	  an	  agreement	  by	  producers	  to	  phase	  out	  less	  efficient	  washing	  
machines.	  In	  CECED	  the	  Commission	  considered	  not	  only	  the	  benefits	  for	  individual	  consumers	  (partly	  due	  to	  lower	  
electricity	  bills),	  but	  also	  attempted	  to	  quantify	  the	  added	  value	  arising	  from	  environmental	  protection.	  See	  the	  
Commission	  decision	  of	  24	  January	  1999,	  [2000]	  OJ	  L	  187/47.	  It	  could	  be	  questioned,	  however,	  to	  what	  extent	  this	  
precedent	  is	  still	  relevant,	  as	  the	  CECED	  approach	  has	  not	  been	  followed	  in	  any	  recent	  Commission	  decisions.	  
776	  See	  the	  rulings	  in	  Case	  T-­‐30/89	  Hilti	  v	  Commission	  [1991]	  ECR	  II-­‐1439	  (upheld	  on	  appeal	  in	  Case	  C-­‐53/92	  P	  Hilti	  v	  
Commission	  [1994]	  ECR	  I-­‐667)	  and	  Case	  T-­‐83/91	  Tetra	  Pak	  International	  v	  Commission	  (‘Tetra	  Pak	  II’)	  [1994]	  ECR	  II-­‐
755	  (upheld	  on	  appeal	  in	  Case	  C-­‐333/94	  P	  Tetra	  Pak	  International	  v	  Commission	  (‘Tetra	  Pak	  II’)	  [1996]	  ECR	  I-­‐5951).	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For	   instance,	   imagine	   that	   a	   company	   that	   is	   dominant	   in	   the	  wholesale	   procurement	   of	   furniture.	   It	  
wishes	  to	  purchase	  wooden	  chairs	  only	  from	  suppliers	  that	  do	  not	  make	  use	  of	  child	  labour.	  Under	  the	  
assumption	  that	  the	  refusal	  does	  not	  entail	  great	  harm	  to	  consumer	  welfare,	  while	  it	  does	  serve	  a	  key	  
public	  interest,	  such	  conduct	  should	  be	  objectively	  justified.	  
	  
	  




The	   analysis	   above	   dealt	   with	   the	   burden	   and	   standard	   of	   proof	   within	   the	   framework	   of	   an	  
administrative	  procedure.	  However,	  competition	  law	  litigation	  may	  also	  take	  place	  between	  two	  private	  
parties,	   which	   equally	   raises	   questions	   as	   to	   the	   applicable	   burden	   and	   standard	   of	   proof.	   Litigation	  
between	  private	  parties	  based	  on	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  may	  involve	  e.g.	  an	  injunction	  to	  require	  a	  dominant	  
firm	  to	  supply	  a	  third	  party	  or	  to	  alter	  its	  wholesale	  prices	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  a	  margin	  squeeze.	  It	  could	  
also	  include	  an	  action	  for	  damages.	  For	  instance,	  a	  firm	  may	  have	  lost	  sales	  if	   it	  has	  procured	  an	  input	  
from	  a	  dominant	  undertaking	  at	  a	  price	  that	  later	  transpires	  to	  be	  excessive.	  	  
	  
The	  ECJ	  has	  made	  clear	  that	  aggrieved	  parties	  are	  entitled	  to	  a	  damages	  claim	  following	  a	  violation	  of	  
the	  EU	  competition	  rules.777	  Such	   litigation	   inevitably	   takes	  place	   in	   the	  arena	  of	  domestic	  private	   law	  
courts.	   National	   rules	   of	   procedure	   thus	   primarily	   determine	   the	   burden	   and	   standard	   of	   proof	   in	   a	  
private	   law	  action.778	  EU	  law	  does	  require,	  however,	  that	  such	  domestic	  rules	  may	  not	   impinge	  on	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
777	  See	  the	  ‘trinity’	  of	  key	  cases	  on	  private	  enforcement	  of	  EU	  competition	  law:	  Case	  C-­‐344/98	  Masterfoods	  [2000]	  
ECR	  I-­‐11369;	  Case	  C-­‐453/99	  Courage	  v	  Crehan	  [2001]	  ECR	  I-­‐6297	  and	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐295/04	  to	  C-­‐298/04	  Manfredi	  
[2006]	  ECR	  I-­‐6619.	  Also	  note	  that	  the	  Commission	  has	  proposed	  a	  Directive	  to	  facilitate	  private	  enforcement	  
actions,	  see	  COM(2013)	  404,	  proposal	  of	  11	  June	  2013.	  
778	  As	  to	  the	  standard	  of	  proof,	  see	  e.g.	  recital	  5	  of	  the	  preamble	  of	  Regulation	  1/2003,	  which	  clearly	  states	  that	  the	  
Regulation	  affects	  neither	  ‘national	  rules	  on	  the	  standard	  of	  proof	  nor	  obligations	  of	  competition	  authorities	  and	  
courts	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  to	  ascertain	  the	  relevant	  facts	  of	  a	  case’.	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effet	   utile	   of	   the	   private	   enforcement	   rights	   bestowed	   upon	   litigants.779	   The	   following	   paragraphs	  
examine	  the	  implications	  for	  follow-­‐on	  and	  stand-­‐alone	  private	  actions	  respectively.	  
	  
4.2 Follow-­‐on	  private	  action	  
	  
The	  applicable	  burden	  and	  standard	  of	  proof	  seem	  to	  be	  relatively	  straightforward	  in	  an	  action	  following	  
on	  a	  Commission	  infringement	  decision.	   In	  such	  a	  case	  Article	  16	  of	  Regulation	  1/2003	  provides	  that	  a	  
national	  court	  judgment	  cannot	  run	  counter	  to	  the	  Commission	  decision.780	  In	  principle,	  national	  courts	  
are	  thus	  expected	  to	  follow	  the	  Commission’s	  finding	  of	  an	  infringement.	  A	  private	  claimant	  will	  be	  able	  
to	   satisfy	   the	   burden	   and	   standard	  of	   proof	   by	   showing	   how	   the	  Commission	  decision	   feeds	   into	   the	  
domestic	  requirements	  for	  civil	  liability.	  
	  
Of	   course	   the	  defendant	  has	  an	   incentive	   to	   show	  why	   the	   infringement	  decision	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  
should	  not	  lead	  to	  any	  civil	  liability.	  However,	  in	  my	  view	  there	  is	  little	  room	  for	  an	  objective	  justification	  
plea	   in	  a	   follow-­‐on	  action.	  The	  Commission	  decision	   (if	  upheld	  by	   the	  EU	  courts)	  presupposes	   that	  no	  
objective	  justification	  applies;	  otherwise	  there	  would	  have	  been	  no	  abuse.	  
	  
An	   effective	   line	   of	   defense	   is	   thus	   more	   likely	   to	   focus	   on	   the	   non-­‐applicability	   of	   the	   domestic	  
conditions	   for	   civil	   liability.	   For	   instance,	   domestic	   private	   law	  may	   require	   that	   the	   damage	   incurred	  
was	   a	   foreseeable	   consequence	   of	   the	   defendant’s	   conduct.	   As	   the	   foreseeability	   criterion	   is	   not	   a	  
constituent	  part	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU,	  a	  defendant	   is	  still	   free	  to	  argue	  that	  this	  condition	  has	  not	  been	  
met.	   In	  addition,	  a	  Commission	  decision	  does	  not	  normally	   include	  an	  elaborate	  quantum	  of	  damages	  
analysis	   suffered	   by	   private	   parties.	   A	   claimant	   thus	   needs	   to	   show	   the	   extent	   of	   the	   damages	   it	   has	  
suffered,781	  as	  well	  as	  causation	  between	  these	  damages	  and	  the	  dominant	  firm’s	  wrongful	  act.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
779	  See	  the	  Masterfoods,	  Courage	  and	  Manfredi	  rulings	  mentioned	  above	  in	  supra	  note	  777.	  The	  relevance	  of	  the	  
effet	  utile	  doctrine	  is	  also	  apparent	  from	  Case	  C-­‐126/97	  Eco	  Swiss	  [1999]	  I-­‐3055,	  para	  37.	  
780	  See	  also	  Masterfoods,	  supra	  note	  777,	  para	  60.	  Domestic	  competition	  law	  may	  set	  specific	  rules	  on	  the	  effects	  
of	  decisions	  by	  the	  NCA.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  UK,	  claimants	  may	  rely	  on	  a	  finding	  of	  infringement	  by	  the	  OFT.	  In	  
Germany,	  claimants	  may	  even	  rely	  on	  a	  finding	  of	  infringement	  by	  other	  NCAs	  in	  the	  EU.	  
781	  In	  order	  to	  help	  national	  courts	  to	  assess	  the	  quantum	  of	  damages,	  the	  Commission	  has	  issued	  a	  draft	  guidance	  
paper	  named	  ‘Quantifying	  harm	  in	  actions	  for	  damages	  based	  on	  breaches	  of	  Article	  101	  or	  102	  of	  the	  Treaty’,	  
available	  at	  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011_actions_damages/index_en.html.	  	  
	   191	  
	  
Still,	   objective	   justification	   is	   not	   completely	   irrelevant	   for	   a	   defendant	   in	   a	   follow-­‐on	   action.	   An	  
infringement	  decision	  cannot	  fully	  be	  detached	  from	  the	  context	  in	  which	  it	  was	  taken.	  This	  means	  that	  
an	   objective	   justification	   might	   still	   be	   available	   insofar	   the	   domestic	   situation	   can	   be	   differentiated	  
from	   the	   context	   assessed	   by	   the	   Commission.	   For	   instance,	   it	   may	   be	   that	   a	   practice	   had	   no	   net	  
beneficial	   welfare	   effect	   at	   the	   EU	   level	   (comparing	   the	   benefits	   and	   harm	   in	   all	   relevant	   Member	  
States),	  but	  did	  have	  a	  net	  pro-­‐competitive	  effect	  in	  one	  particular	  Member	  State.	  This	  could	  happen	  if	  
the	  market	   circumstances	   in	   one	  Member	   State	   are	  markedly	   different	   from	   those	   in	   other	  Member	  
States.	  In	  such	  a	  case,	  an	  efficiency	  plea	  may	  fail	  during	  the	  administrative	  proceedings	  at	  the	  EU	  level,	  
but	  may	  be	  able	  to	  succeed	  in	  the	  civil	  courts	  at	  the	  domestic	  level.	  
	  
4.3 Stand-­‐alone	  private	  action	  	  
	  
A	   more	   complex	   situation	   arises	   in	   the	   context	   of	   a	   ‘stand-­‐alone’	   private	   law	   action.	   There	   is	   little	  
lucidity	  on	  how	  national	  courts	  would	  allocate	  the	  evidentiary	  burden	  on	  objective	  justification	  in	  such	  
cases.	   In	   my	   view,	   a	   flexible	   approach	   by	   the	   courts	   will	   be	   paramount	   to	   ensure	   effective	   private	  
enforcement	   of	   competition	   law	   considering	   the	   (often)	   wide	   information	   asymmetries	   between	  
litigants.782	  	  
	  
National	   courts	   must	   allocate	   the	   burden	   of	   proof	   and	   the	   evidentiary	   burden	   in	   such	   a	   way	   that	  
safeguards	  the	  effet	  utile	  of	  private	  enforcement.	  As	  key	  evidence	  will	  often	  be	  in	  the	  sole	  possession	  of	  
the	  defendant,	  domestic	  courts	  should	  use	  the	  full	  extent	  of	  available	  domestic	  rules	  in	  order	  to	  require	  
the	  disclosure	  of	  such	  documents.	  Flexibility	  is	  also	  warranted	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  the	  evidentiary	  burden	  is	  
laid	  down.	  Some	  legal	  regimes	  explicitly	  allow	  for	  such	  flexibility.	  For	  example,	  Article	  150	  of	  the	  Dutch	  
Code	   on	   Civil	   Procedure	   (‘Wetboek	   van	   Burgerlijke	   Rechtsvordering’)	   states	   that	   although	   the	   party	  
invoking	  a	  fact	  must	  provide	  the	  necessary	  proof,	  the	  evidentiary	  burden	  may	  be	  reversed	  on	  grounds	  of	  
fairness	  or	  equity.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
782	  A.	  Komninos,	  EC	  Private	  Antitrust	  Enforcement:	  Decentralised	  Application	  of	  EC	  Competition	  Law	  by	  National	  
Courts	  (Hart	  Publishing:	  Oxford	  and	  Portland,	  Oregon	  2008),	  p.	  224.	  Also	  note	  that	  national	  law	  bestows	  certain	  
powers	  on	  public	  authorities	  to	  acquire	  information,	  whereas	  the	  powers	  of	  private	  claimants	  are	  usually	  much	  
more	  limited.	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The	  success	  of	  a	  defendant’s	  attempt	  to	  stave	  off	  civil	  liability	  is	  likely	  to	  hinge	  on	  the	  type	  of	  objective	  
justification	   that	   it	  wishes	   to	   invoke.	   Civil	   courts	  may	  have	   little	   trouble	   to	   entertain	   a	   plea	  based	  on	  
objective	  necessity,	  where	   the	  dominant	   firm	  had	  no	  alternative	  way	   to	  act.	   For	   instance,	   if	   the	  State	  
sets	  the	  prices	  for	  a	  product	  sold	  by	  the	  dominant	  firm,	  the	  pricing	  behaviour	  is	  unlikely	  be	  imputable	  to	  
the	  dominant	  firm,	  in	  which	  case	  its	  conduct	  will	  normally	  not	  lead	  to	  an	  award	  of	  a	  damages	  claim.	  	  
	  
It	  will	  be	  more	  difficult,	  however,	  for	  a	  defendant	  to	   justify	  a	  prima	  facie	  abuse	  based	  on	  efficiency	  or	  
public	   interest	  grounds.	  A	  civil	  court	   is	  normally	  used	  (or	  even	  required)	  to	  focus	  solely	  on	  the	  dispute	  
brought	  before	  it	  –	  and	  not	  enter	  into	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  wider	  ramifications	  of	  the	  conduct	  under	  
review.	  Consequently	  a	  court	  may	  not	  be	  willing	  or	  able	  to	  take	  into	  account	  whether	  the	  conduct	  has	  
lead	  to	  wider	  efficiency	  gains	  or	  has	  promoted	  certain	  public	  interest	  goals.	  	  
	  
Another	  difficulty	  for	  a	  domestic	  court	  in	  applying	  an	  objective	  justification	  may	  arise	  from	  EU	  law	  itself.	  
Article	  6	  of	  Regulation	  1/2003	  unequivocally	  states	  that	  national	  courts	  have	  the	  competence	  to	  apply	  
Article	  102	  TFEU.	  This	  suggests	  that	  domestic	  courts	  may	  issue,	   inter	  alia,	  a	  declaration	  that	  conduct	  is	  
objectively	  justified	  and	  hence	  not	  an	  abuse	  of	  dominance.	  But	  how	  should	  this	  be	  reconciled	  with	  the	  
recent	  Tele2	  Polska	  ruling?	  In	  that	  judgment	  the	  ECJ	  held	  that	  ‘the	  Commission	  alone	  is	  empowered	  to	  
make	  a	   finding	  that	  there	  has	  been	  no	  breach	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU’,783	  suggesting	  that	  domestic	  courts	  
are	  not	  allowed	  to	  determine	  that	  a	  prima	  facie	  abuse	  is	  objectively	  justified.	  	  
	  
I	  submit	  that	  this	  would	  be	  an	  erroneous	  reading	  of	  the	  case.	  The	  Tele2	  Polska	  ruling	  should	  be	  read	  as	  
an	  account	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  European	  Commission	  and	  national	  competition	  authorities;	  
and	   not	   between	   the	   European	   Commission	   and	   national	   courts.	   Indeed,	   in	   Tele2	   Polska	   the	   ECJ	  
emphasized	  that	  Article	  5	  of	  Regulation	  1/2003	  limits	  the	  powers	  bestowed	  upon	  national	  competition	  
authorities,	  whereas	  the	  Regulation	  contains	  no	  such	  restriction	   for	  domestic	  courts.784	  Additionally,	   if	  
domestic	  courts	  would	  be	  impeded	  from	  applying	  an	  objective	  justification	  in	  a	  private	  law	  action,	  this	  
would	   run	   counter	   to	   the	   notion	   that	   public	   enforcement	   is	   not	   hierarchically	   superior	   to	   private	  
enforcement,	  as	  recently	  confirmed	  in	  Pfleiderer.785	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
783	  Case	  C-­‐375/09	  Tele2	  Polska	  [2011]	  ECR	  I-­‐3055,	  paras	  28	  and	  29.	  
784	  Ibid.,	  paras	  22	  and	  23.	  
785	  Case	  C-­‐360/09	  Pfleiderer	  v	  Bundeskartellamt	  [2011]	  ECR	  I-­‐5161.	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Be	   that	   as	   it	  may,	   the	   uncertainty	   left	   by	  Tele2	   Polska	   could	   impede	   domestic	   courts	   to	   declare	   that	  
certain	  conduct	  is	  objectively	  justified	  and,	  as	  a	  consequence,	  not	  abusive	  under	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  Time	  
will	   tell	   to	  what	  extent	  civil	   courts	  are	  prepared	   to	  explore	   the	  outer	   rims	  of	  domestic	  and	  EU	   law	  by	  





The	  burden	  of	  proof,	   the	  evidentiary	  burden	  and	   the	   standard	  of	  proof	   are	   key	   issues	   in	   competition	  
litigation.	  This	   chapter	  examines	  how	  these	  concepts	   relate	   to	   the	  objective	   justification	  plea	   in	   cases	  
based	  on	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  The	  Commission	  and	  NCAs	  clearly	  bear	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  in	  order	  to	  prove	  
an	   infringement	   of	   Article	   102	   TFEU.	   However,	   the	   evidentiary	   burden	   on	   objective	   justification	   will	  
initially	   be	   borne	   by	   the	   dominant	   firm.	   The	   evidentiary	   burden	   is	   then	   able	   to	   shift	   back	   and	   forth	  
depending	  on	  whether	  one	  of	  the	  parties	  has	  discharged	  its	  burden.	  
	  
It	   is	   submitted	   that	   the	   difficulty	   in	   meeting	   the	   standard	   of	   proof	   will	   vary	   according	   to	   the	  
circumstances	  of	  the	  case.	  The	  lower	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  firm’s	  conduct,	  the	  easier	  it	  will	  be	  to	  meet	  the	  
required	  standard	  for	  an	  objective	   justification	  plea.	   In	  my	  view,	  the	  difficulty	   in	  meeting	  the	  requisite	  
standard	  will	  also	  depend	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  on	  the	  type	  of	  objective	  justification	  that	  the	  dominant	  firm	  
wishes	  to	  invoke.	  	  
	  
It	  appears	  that	  the	  standard	  of	  proof	  will	  be	  relatively	  difficult	  to	  meet	  in	  a	  plea	  based	  on	  efficiency	  or	  
public	  interest.	  These	  types	  of	  justification	  require	  a	  difficult	  balancing	  test	  that	  cannot	  be	  taken	  lightly	  –	  
the	   loss	   in	   competition	   should	  be	  compensated	  either	  by	  clear	  efficiency	  gains	  or	  benefits	   to	  a	  public	  
interest	  goal.	  The	  standard	  of	  proof	  ought	  to	  be	  easier	  to	  meet	  if	  it	  concerns	  a	  plea	  based	  on	  legitimate	  
business	  conduct.	  This	  is	  especially	  clear	  if	  there	  is	  firm	  evidence	  that	  the	  conduct	  arises	  from	  objective	  
necessity,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  dominant	  firm	  had	  no	  alternative	  way	  to	  act.	  This	  makes	  perfect	  sense:	  
competition	   law	   should	   not	   require	   firms	   to	   do	   the	   impossible.	   In	   addition,	   dominant	   firms	   have	   the	  
possibility	   to	   show	   that	   their	   conduct	   should	   be	   considered	   to	   be	   legitimate	   even	   if	   it	   harms	   their	  
competitors.	   The	   defendant’s	   main	   challenge	   will	   be	   to	   show	   that	   its	   conduct	   was	   proportionate	   to	  
protect	  its	  interests.	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Matters	  become	  more	   complex	   in	   a	  private	   law	  context.	   In	   a	   stand-­‐alone	  action,	   the	   regular	   rules	  on	  
burden	   and	   standard	   of	   proof	   apply,	   even	   though	   these	  may	   not	   be	   interpreted	   in	   such	   a	   way	   that	  
would	  disable	  the	  effet	  utile	  of	  the	  private	  enforcement	  of	  EU	  competition	  law.	  In	  a	  follow-­‐on	  action,	  a	  
dominant	  firm	  will	   in	  principle	  no	  longer	  be	  able	  to	  invoke	  an	  objective	  justification.	  Its	  best	  chance	  to	  
escape	   civil	   liability	   is	   by	   invoking	   domestic	   legal	   conditions	   that	   are	   not	   part	   of	   the	   objective	  
justification	  plea,	  such	  as	  a	  lack	  of	  foreseeability.	  The	  only	  exception	  is	  where	  an	  objective	  justification	  
applies	   in	   the	  domestic	   context	  as	   it	   can	  be	  differentiated	   from	  the	  context	   in	  which	   the	  Commission	  
took	  its	  decision.	  	  
	  
This	   chapter	   has	   attempted	   to	   provide	   guidance	   as	   to	   the	   burden	   and	   standard	   of	   proof	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  
objective	   justification.	   Unfortunately	   no	   academic	  work	   can	   substitute	   for	   the	   law	   in	   action.	   The	   real	  
proof	  is	  in	  actual	  practice,	  just	  like	  the	  proof	  of	  the	  pudding	  is	  in	  the	  eating.	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The	   previous	   Chapter	   has	   focused	   mainly	   on	   Article	   102	   of	   the	   Treaty	   on	   the	   Functioning	   of	   the	  
European	  Union	  (‘TFEU’).	  However,	  EU	  Member	  States	  also	  prohibit	  the	  abuse	  of	  a	  dominant	  position	  in	  
their	   domestic	   legislation.	   The	   EU	   and	   domestic	   prohibitions	   both	   seek	   to	   ban	   anti-­‐competitive	  
unilateral	  conduct.786	  It	  is	  thus	  no	  surprise	  that	  National	  Competition	  Authorities	  (‘NCAs’)	  and	  domestic	  
courts	   in	   EU	   Member	   States	   use	   the	   interpretation	   of	   Article	   102	   TFEU	   as	   a	   key	   focal	   point	   in	   the	  
application	  of	  its	  national	  equivalent.	  
	  
As	  noted	  in	  the	  previous	  Chapter,	  an	  abuse	  of	  a	  dominant	  position	  implies	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  prima	  facie	  
abuse	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  objective	   justification.	  But	  even	  though	  there	   is	  a	  wealth	  of	   literature	  on	  
the	  concept	  of	  abuse,	  few	  publications	  examine	  justifications	  at	  the	  level	  of	  EU	  Member	  States.787	  The	  
absence	   of	   a	   cross-­‐border	   debate	   leaves	   this	   crucial	   part	   of	   dominance	   law	   in	   a	   rather	   benighted	  
condition.	   This	   obscurity	  may,	   in	   turn,	   entail	   risks	   for	   a	   consistent	   and	   high-­‐quality	   application	   of	   the	  
objective	  justification	  concept	  throughout	  the	  EU.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
*	  This	  chapter	  is	  a	  revised	  version	  of	  T.	  van	  der	  Vijver,	  ‘Benighted	  we	  stand:	  justifications	  of	  prima	  facie	  dominance	  
abuses	  in	  EU	  Member	  States’,	  (2013)	  9	  European	  Competition	  Journal	  465.	  
786	  See	  Recital	  9	  of	  Regulation	  1/2003.	  Of	  course	  there	  are	  lengthy	  debates	  on	  the	  prohibition’s	  precise	  objective	  –	  
and	  for	  that	  matter,	  the	  objectives	  of	  competition	  law	  as	  a	  whole.	  
787	  There	  have	  been	  several	  high-­‐quality	  publications	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  objective	  justification	  within	  the	  
framework	  of	  the	  abuse	  of	  dominance,	  but	  they	  focus	  on	  EU	  law	  rather	  than	  the	  Member	  State	  level.	  See	  e.g.	  P.-­‐J.	  
Loewenthal,	  ‘The	  Defence	  of	  “objective	  justification”	  in	  the	  application	  of	  Article	  82	  EC’,	  (2005)	  28	  World	  
Competition	  455;	  A.	  Albors-­‐Llorens,	  ‘The	  Role	  of	  Objective	  Justification	  and	  Efficiencies	  in	  the	  Application	  of	  Article	  
82	  EC’,	  (2007)	  44	  CMLRev	  1727;	  	  E.	  Rousseva,	  ‘The	  Concept	  of	  ‘Objective	  Justification’	  of	  an	  Abuse	  of	  a	  Dominant	  
Position:	  Can	  it	  help	  to	  Modernise	  the	  Analysis	  under	  Article	  82	  EC?’,	  (2006)	  2	  The	  Competition	  Law	  Review	  27;	  E.	  
Østerud,	  ‘The	  Concept	  of	  Objective	  Justification’	  in:	  E.	  Østerud,	  Identifying	  Exclusionary	  Abuses	  by	  Dominant	  
Undertakings	  under	  EU	  Competition	  Law:	  The	  Spectrum	  of	  Tests	  (Kluwer	  Law	  International:	  Alphen	  aan	  den	  Rijn	  
2010),	  at	  245.	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In	  an	  effort	  to	  illuminate	  the	  concept	  of	  objective	  justification	  and	  its	  application	  at	  the	  Member	  State	  
level,	  this	  chapter	  discusses	  competition	  law	  and	  practice	  in	  France,	  Germany,	  Ireland,	  Luxembourg,	  the	  
Netherlands,	   Spain	   and	   the	   United	   Kingdom.	   The	   analysis	   explores	   legislation,	   case	   law,	   as	   well	   as	  
guidance	   and	   decisional	   practice	   by	   NCAs.	   By	   discussing	   and	   comparing	   the	   available	   types	   of	  
justification	   and	   the	   applicable	   legal	   reasoning,	   this	   chapter	   seeks	   to	   contribute	   to	   a	   better	  
understanding	  of	  objective	   justification.	  A	  more	   thorough	  comprehension	  of	   the	  concept	  may	  provide	  
valuable	   input	   for	   a	   debate	   that	   can	   hopefully	   improve	   the	   quality	   and	   consistency	   of	   competition	  
practice	  on	  objective	  justification.	  
	  
Having	  said	  what	  I	  plan	  to	  do,	  I	  should	  also	  note	  what	  this	  chapter	  does	  not	  aspire	  to.	  It	  does	  not	  provide	  
a	   comprehensive	  overview	  of	   domestic	   competition	  practice	  on	  dominance	   abuses,	   but	   rather	  uses	   a	  
selection	  of	   cases	   to	   illustrate	   key	   findings	  on	  objective	   justification.	  Most	  of	   the	   selected	   cases	   arise	  
from	   public	   enforcement,	   as	   those	   proceedings	   are	   usually	   easier	   to	   find	   and	   compare	   than	   private	  
enforcement	   actions.	   Furthermore,	   the	   chapter	   does	   not	   examine	   domestic	   prohibitions	   of	   unilateral	  
conduct	   outside	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   prohibition	   of	   abuse	   within	   the	   meaning	   of	   Article	   102	   TFEU.788	  
Another	  caveat	   is	  that,	   in	  many	  of	  the	  cases	  under	  review,	  the	   issue	  of	  objective	   justification	  played	  a	  
relatively	  small	  role.	  Due	  to	  considerations	  of	  length,	  however,	  this	  study	  shall	  not	  discuss	  all	  legal	  and	  
factual	   intricacies.	   As	   a	   consequence,	   the	   Chapter	   does	   not	   display	   all	   the	   peculiarities	   found	   in	   the	  
domestic	  cases.	  The	  author	  hopes	  that	  readers	  will	  agree	  that,	  even	  in	  their	  simplified	  form,	  these	  cases	  
still	  have	  interesting	  lessons	  to	  offer.	  
	  	  
A	   final	   concern,	   as	   with	   any	   comparative	   analysis,	   is	   whether	   the	   study	   compares	   like	   with	   like.789	  
Although	  there	  is	  a	  risk	  of	  taking	  competition	  law	  cases	  outside	  of	  their	  context,	  as	  they	  are	  often	  highly	  
fact-­‐specific,	   I	  do	  believe	  that	   it	   is	  possible	  to	  make	  a	  meaningful	  comparison.	  The	  chapter	   focuses	  on	  
the	   available	   types	   of	   objective	   justification	   and	   the	   legal	   reasoning	   used,	   rather	   than	   the	   actual	  
decisions	  on	  the	  facts.	   In	  addition,	  the	  domestic	   laws	  on	  abuse	  are	  not	  that	  dissimilar	  as	  they	  all	  have	  
Article	  102	  TFEU	  (and	   its	   interpretation	  by	  the	  European	  Court	  of	   Justice,	  or	   ‘ECJ’)	  as	  a	  single	  point	  of	  
reference.	   Indeed,	  Member	   State	   competition	   law	   is	   usually	   interpreted,	   as	  much	   as	   possible,	   in	   line	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
788	  An	  example	  is	  the	  French	  prohibition	  of	  the	  abuse	  of	  so-­‐called	  ‘economic	  dependence’,	  where	  a	  dominant	  firm	  
may	  not	  take	  advantage	  of	  customers	  or	  suppliers	  dependent	  on	  it	  (see	  Article	  L.	  420-­‐2	  Code	  de	  Commerce).	  
789	  For	  a	  thorough	  analysis	  of	  the	  intricacies	  of	  comparative	  law,	  see	  M.	  Reimann	  &	  R.	  Zimmermann	  (ed),	  The	  
Oxford	  Handbook	  of	  Comparative	  Law	  (OUP:	  Oxford	  2006).	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with	  EU	  competition	  law.790	  Finally,	  not	  only	  do	  I	  believe	  that	  a	  comparative	  analysis	  can	  be	  made,	  I	  also	  
think	  it	  should	  be	  made.	  Only	  a	  comparison	  can	  reveal	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  of	  how	  Member	  States	  
interpret	   objective	   justification,	   and	   show	   to	   what	   extent	   there	   are	   inconsistencies	   that	   should	   be	  
considered.	  	  
	  
Section	   2	   discusses	  Member	   State	   legislation	   and	  NCA	   guidance	   relevant	   to	   the	   concept	   of	   objective	  
justification.	   Section	   3	   provides	   the	   bulk	   of	   the	   chapter,	   examining	   domestic	   case	   law	   and	   decisional	  
practice	   by	   NCAs	   that	   deal	   with	   objective	   justification.	   Section	   4	   analyses	   the	   legal	   conditions	   that	  
domestic	  courts	  and	  NCAs	  have	  applied	  to	  the	  various	  types	  of	  objective	  justification.	  Building	  upon	  the	  








All	  the	  countries	  under	  review	  prohibit	  the	  abuse	  of	  a	  dominant	  position	  in	  their	  domestic	  legislation.791	  
Similar	  to	  Article	  102	  TFEU,	  the	  legislative	  texts	  usually	  provide	  little	  insight	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  objective	  
justification.	  Even	  where	  domestic	  legislation	  does	  require	  the	  absence	  of	  objective	  justification	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  
particular	  examples	  of	  abuses,	  such	  as	  in	  Spain,	  it	  reveals	  neither	  the	  scope	  of	  such	  justifications	  nor	  the	  
applicable	  legal	  conditions.792	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
790	  An	  example	  is	  Section	  60(1)	  of	  the	  UK	  Competition	  Act	  1998.	  This	  provision	  demands	  –	  so	  far	  as	  is	  possible,	  
having	  regard	  to	  any	  relevant	  differences	  –	  interpretative	  consistency	  between	  EU	  and	  UK	  competition	  law.	  
791	  France:	  Article	  L.	  420-­‐2	  of	  the	  Code	  de	  Commerce;	  Germany:	  Article	  19(1)	  of	  the	  Gesetz	  gegen	  
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen;	  Ireland:	  Section	  5(1)	  of	  the	  Competition	  Act	  2002;	  Luxembourg:	  Article	  5	  of	  the	  Loi	  
du	  23	  octobre	  2011	  relative	  à	  la	  concurrence;	  Spain:	  Article	  6(1)(a)	  of	  the	  Ley	  de	  Defensa	  de	  la	  Competencia	  (‘LDC’);	  
the	  Netherlands:	  Article	  24	  of	  the	  Mededingingswet;	  UK:	  Section	  18	  of	  the	  Competition	  Act	  1998	  (‘CA’)	  (also	  
known	  as	  the	  ‘Chapter	  II’	  prohibition).	  
792	  See	  e.g.	  Spanish	  legislation,	  in	  particular	  subparagraphs	  ‘b’	  and	  ‘c’	  of	  Article	  6(2)	  LDC.	  These	  provisions	  prohibit	  
the	  limitation	  of	  production,	  distribution	  or	  technical	  development,	  to	  the	  unjustified	  prejudice	  of	  undertakings	  or	  
consumers;	  and	  the	  unjustifiable	  refusal	  to	  meet	  the	  demands	  to	  purchase	  products	  or	  services.	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Domestic	  legislation	  provides	  slightly	  more	  interpretative	  guidance	  insofar	  as	  it	  has	  codified	  elements	  of	  
the	  objective	   justification	  plea	   in	   separate	  provisions.	  For	  example,	  Schedule	  3	  of	   the	  UK	  Competition	  
Act	  1998	  provides	  a	  number	  of	  exclusions	  of	  the	  abuse	  prohibition.	  These	  exclusions	  apply,	  inter	  alia,	  if	  a	  
legal	  requirement	  is	  applicable	  (paragraph	  5(2)	  of	  Schedule	  3),	  or	  if	  exceptional	  and	  compelling	  reasons	  
of	   public	   policy	   are	   at	   stake	   (paragraph	   7(4)	   of	   Schedule	   3).	   Similarly,	   Section	   7(2)	   of	   the	   Irish	  
Competition	  Act	  permits	  conduct	  that	  seeks	  to	  comply	  with	  ‘a	  determination	  made	  or	  a	  direction	  given	  
by	  a	  statutory	  body’.	  Although	  these	  provisions	  do	  provide	  some	  clarity,	  Section	  3	  will	  show	  that	  cases	  in	  
the	  UK	  and	  Ireland	  have,	  in	  fact,	  acknowledged	  a	  much	  wider	  range	  of	  justifications.	  	  
	  
France	  appears	  to	  have	  the	  most	  holistic	  legislative	  treatment	  of	  objective	  justification.	  Article	  L.	  420-­‐4(I)	  
of	  the	  Code	  de	  Commerce	  (‘CdC’)	  provides	  two	  key	  exemptions.	  The	  first	  exemption	  applies	  to	  practices	  
that	   result	   from	   the	   application	   of	   a	   statutory	   provision	   or	   an	   implementing	   administrative	   text.	  
Resembling	   a	   State	   action	   defence,	   the	   provision	   is	   said	   to	   require	   restrictive	   interpretation.793	   The	  
second	   exemption	   applies	   if	   the	   dominant	   undertaking	   can	   show	   that	   its	   conduct	   ensured	   ‘economic	  
progress’,	  while	   allowing	   customers	   a	   fair	   share	  of	   the	   resulting	  benefit.	   The	  exemption	   also	   requires	  
that	  the	  conduct	  is	  indispensable	  to	  achieve	  the	  stated	  objective	  of	  economic	  progress	  and	  may	  not	  lead	  
to	  the	  elimination	  of	  competition.	  	  
	  
These	  conditions	  clearly	  mirror	  those	  of	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU,	  even	  though	  the	  latter	  provision	  does	  not	  
directly	  apply	  to	  dominance	  abuses.794	  The	  wide	  scope	  of	  the	  French	  codification	  reflects	  the	  notion	  that	  
no	   justification	   should	   be	   rejected	  a	  priori.795	   Landes	   suggests	   that	   the	   notion	  of	   ‘economic	   progress’	  
includes	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  elements	  such	  as	  the	  limitation	  of	  costs,	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  environment	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
793	  J.	  Maitland-­‐Walker	  (ed),	  Competition	  Laws	  of	  Europe	  (LexisNexis	  UK:	  London	  2003),	  p.	  125.	  
794	  However,	  see	  Case	  C-­‐209/10	  Post	  Danmark	  v	  Konkurrencerådet	  [2012]	  ECR	  nyr,	  para	  42.	  The	  ECJ	  transposed	  the	  
conditions	  of	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU	  to	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  an	  efficiency	  balancing	  test.	  
795	  Even	  though	  some	  commentators	  suggest	  that	  competition	  authorities	  are	  reluctant	  to	  take	  non-­‐competition	  
objectives	  into	  account	  for	  fear	  of	  ‘une	  perversion	  des	  règles	  de	  concurrence	  par	  des	  objectifs	  plus	  généraux’.	  See	  
M.-­‐C.	  Boutard	  Labarde,	  G.	  Canivet,	  E.	  Claudel,	  V.	  Michel-­‐Amsellem,	  J.	  Vialens,	  L’application	  en	  France	  du	  droit	  des	  
pratiques	  anticoncurrentielles	  (L.G.D.J.	  :	  Paris	  2008),	  p.	  286.	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even	  the	  creation	  and	  retention	  of	   jobs.796	  Although	   I	   support	  a	  wide	  notion	  of	   the	  potential	   scope	  of	  
justifications,	  one	  should	  be	  cautious	  that	  the	  justification	  does	  have	  a	  relevant	  nexus	  with	  the	  conduct	  
under	  review.	  A	  dominant	  firm	  should	  not	  be	  able	  to	  justify	  anti-­‐competitive	  conduct	  simply	  on	  the	  basis	  
of	  its	  bloated	  size,	  with	  the	  alleged	  benefits	  that	  this	  entails	  for	  the	  retention	  of	  jobs	  at	  that	  firm.	  
	  
2.2 NCA	  guidance	  
	  
Generally	   speaking,	   the	   NCAs	   have	   not	   published	   much	   guidance	   on	   objective	   justification.	   In	   the	  
author’s	   opinion,	   more	   guidance	   would	   be	   desirable.797	   This	   could	   strengthen	   legal	   certainty	   and	  
consistency	   of	   competition	   practice;	   especially	   if	   domestic	   courts	   consider	   the	   guidance	   to	   be	  
persuasive.	  The	  UK	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading	  (‘OFT’)	  has	  referred	  to	  objective	  justification	  several	  times.	  An	  
OFT	  guideline	  notes	   that	  a	   refusal	   to	  supply	  may	  be	   justified,	   inter	  alia,	  because	  of	  a	  customer’s	  poor	  
creditworthiness.798	   An	   answer	   by	   the	   OFT	   to	   a	   questionnaire	   from	   the	   International	   Competition	  
Network	   also	   mentions	   other	   examples	   of	   justifications,	   such	   as	   the	   possibility	   that	   an	   obligation	   to	  
supply	  would	  negatively	   affect	   innovation.799	   But	   even	   though	   the	  OFT	   guidelines	   are	  more	  elaborate	  
than	   those	   in	   other	   Member	   States,	   they	   too	   leave	   many	   questions	   unanswered	   as	   to	   the	   type	   of	  
justifications	  available	  as	  well	  as	  their	  scope	  and	  the	  applicable	  legal	  conditions.	  Considering	  the	  limited	  
amount	  of	  NCA	  guidance,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  we	  must	  turn	  to	  the	  examination	  of	  actual	  cases	  to	  understand	  
how	   justifications	   of	   prima	   facie	   abuses	   are	   interpreted	   and	   applied	   in	   Member	   State	   competition	  
practice.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
796	  V.	  Landes,	  ‘France’	  in:	  NautaDutilh	  (ed),	  Dealing	  With	  Dominance:	  The	  Experience	  of	  National	  Competition	  
Authorities	  (Kluwer	  Law	  International:	  Alphen	  aan	  den	  Rijn	  2004),	  p.	  39.	  This	  position	  is	  nuanced	  by	  M.-­‐C.	  Boutard	  
Labarde	  et	  al.	  2008	  (ibid.,	  at	  p.	  286),	  stating	  that	  ‘[l]es	  considerations	  sociales,	  telles	  que	  le	  maintain	  de	  l’emploi,	  
sont	  peu	  intégrées’.	  
797	  Especially	  guidance	  that	  would	  be	  coordinated	  through	  the	  European	  Competition	  Network,	  to	  ensure	  
consistency	  across	  EU	  Member	  States.	  
798	  OFT	  guideline	  of	  December	  2004,	  Abuse	  of	  a	  dominant	  position,	  para	  5.3,	  available	  at	  
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business_leaflets/ca98_guidelines/oft402.pdf.	  See	  also,	  inter	  alia,	  the	  OFT	  draft	  
competition	  law	  guideline	  for	  consultation	  of	  April	  2004,	  assessment	  of	  conduct,	  available	  at	  
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business_leaflets/competition_law/oft414a.pdf,	  para	  8.7.	  
799	  OFT	  questionnaire	  submitted	  to	  the	  International	  Competition	  Network,	  4	  November	  2009,	  available	  at	  
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/questionnaires/uc%20refusals/unitedkingdom.pdf.	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This	  Section	  examines	  relevant	  case	  law	  and	  decisional	  practice	  in	  the	  Member	  States	  under	  review.	  The	  
cases	  have	  been	  categorised	  according	  to	  three	  types	  of	  justifications.800	  The	  first	  is	  legitimate	  business	  
behaviour.	  This	  category	   includes	  a	  situation	  where	  the	  dominant	   firm	  simply	  competes	  on	  the	  merits	  
(‘commercial	   freedom’),	   or	   that	   the	   dominant	   firm	   is	   forced	   to	   act	   in	   a	   specific	   way	   due	   to	   reasons	  
external	  to	  it	  (‘objective	  necessity’).	  A	  second	  type	  of	  justification	  is	  applicable	  if	  the	  efficiency	  benefits	  
of	  the	  conduct	  under	  review	  outweigh	  its	  anti-­‐competitive	  effects.	  Under	  the	  third	  category,	  dominant	  
firms	  may	  rely	  on	  reasons	  of	  public	  interest	  to	  set	  aside	  a	  finding	  of	  abuse.	  Although	  this	  subdivision	  is	  
undoubtedly	  imperfect,801	  I	  do	  believe	  it	  can	  enhance	  understanding	  of	  this	  concept	  and	  also	  facilitates	  a	  
comparative	  study	  across	  Member	  States.	  	  
	  
3.2 Legitimate	  business	  behaviour	  
	  
3.2.1 Introduction	  
Justifications	   based	   on	   ‘legitimate	   business	   behaviour’	   should	   have	   a	   broad	   scope.	   They	   reflect	   the	  
notion	  that	  being	  in	  a	  dominant	  position	  is	  not	  abusive	  as	  such.	  Even	  dominant	  firms	  retain	  a	  degree	  of	  
commercial	  freedom,	  as	  long	  as	  they	  do	  not	  go	  beyond	  the	  limits	  imposed	  by	  the	  ‘special	  responsibility’	  
incumbent	   upon	   them.802	   These	   types	   of	   cases	   should	   examine	   the	   nexus	   between	   the	   dominant	  
position	  and	  the	  conduct	  under	  review.	  The	  weaker	  the	  link,	  the	  easier	  a	  justification	  can	  be	  condoned.	  
A	  weak	  causal	  link	  makes	  it	  likely	  that	  a	  firm	  would	  have	  engaged	  in	  that	  conduct	  even	  without	  being	  in	  
a	   dominant	   position,	   providing	   a	   strong	   indication	   that	   it	   competes	   on	   the	   merits.	   The	   following	  
paragraphs	  provide	  various	  examples.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
800	  For	  further	  explanation	  on	  this	  subdivision,	  see	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  
801	  Primarily	  because	  the	  precise	  delineation	  between	  these	  types	  may	  not	  always	  be	  clear.	  For	  example,	  there	  
may	  be	  considerable	  overlap	  between	  conduct	  that	  falls	  within	  the	  ‘commercial	  freedom’	  of	  a	  firm,	  and	  conduct	  
that	  is	  considered	  to	  have	  a	  net	  efficient	  effect.	  	  
802	  See	  e.g.	  Case	  322/82	  Michelin	  v	  Commission	  (‘Michelin	  I’)	  [1983]	  ECR	  3461,	  para	  57.	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3.2.2 Commercial	  freedom	  –	  General	  	  
Notwithstanding	  the	  traditional	  concern	  for	  the	  plight	  of	  competitors	  in	  German	  competition	  law,803	  the	  
Bundesgerichtshof	   (‘BGH’)	   has	   also	   relied	   on	   the	   dominant	   firm’s	   commercial	   freedom	   in	   several	  
cases.804	   In	   the	   Strom	   und	   Telefon	   judgments,	   the	   BGH	   found	   that	   local	   utilities	   did	   not	   abuse	   their	  
dominant	  position	  by	  providing	  a	  combined	  offer	  of	  electricity	  and	  telephony	  services	  to	  consumers	  at	  a	  
reduced	   basic	   fee.805	   The	   BGH	   held	   that	   the	   utilities	   had	   not	   transgressed	   their	   commercial	   freedom	  
(‘unternehmerischer	   Freiraum’),806	   noting	   that	   the	   dominant	   firms	   offered	   an	   attractively	   priced	  
product.807	  The	  BGH	  considered	  that	  the	  conduct	  did	  not	   impair	  market	  access	  and	  still	   left	  customers	  
with	  the	  option	  of	  buying	  electricity	  and	  telephony	  services	  separately.808	  Similarly,	  the	  Adidas	  judgment	  
suggests	   that	   a	   dominant	   firm	   may	   refuse	   to	   supply	   if	   the	   refusal	   follows	   from	   the	   introduction	   of	  
stricter	   distribution	   criteria,	   as	   long	   as	   these	   criteria	   are	   objective.809	   Finally,	   the	   Gemeinsamer	  
Anzeigenteil	   case	  suggests	  a	   rationalization	  scheme	  shall	  be	  easier	   to	   justify	   if	  customers	  benefit	   from	  
lower	  prices.810	  
	  
Upholding	  quality	  standards	  may	  provide	  a	  relevant	  justification,	  even	  if	  this	  could	  exclude	  parties	  that	  
are	   unable	   to	   meet	   those	   conditions.	   In	   the	   Armor	   Hélicoptère	   decision,	   the	   French	   NCA	   (currently	  
named	  Autorité	  de	   la	  concurrence,	  or	   ‘Autorité’),	   stressed	   that	  dominant	   firms	  are	  allowed	  to	   impose	  
quality	  standards	  on	  its	  suppliers.811	  Similarly,	  in	  Jaeger	  LeCoultre	  (a	  case	  on	  sales	  restrictions	  related	  to	  
spare	  parts	  of	  high-­‐end	  watches),	   the	  Autorité	  emphasised	  that	  dominant	   firms	  have,	   in	  principle,	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
803	  See	  e.g.	  A.	  Chiriţă,	  ‘The	  analysis	  of	  market	  dominance	  and	  restrictive	  practices	  under	  German	  antitrust	  law	  in	  
light	  of	  EC	  antitrust	  law’,	  available	  at	  http://dro.dur.ac.uk/9488/1/9488.	  
804	  See	  e.g.	  Bundesgerichtshof	  judgment	  of	  12	  November	  1991,	  Aktionsbeiträge,	  KZR	  2/90.	  This	  judgment	  confirms	  
that	  dominant	  firms	  are,	  in	  principle,	  free	  to	  decide	  with	  whom	  they	  deal.	  	  
805	  Bundesgerichtshof	  judgment	  of	  4	  November	  2003,	  Strom	  und	  Telefon	  I,	  KZR	  16/02;	  Bundesgerichtshof	  judgment	  
of	  4	  November	  2003,	  Strom	  und	  Telefon	  II,	  KZR	  38/02.	  	  
806	  Strom	  und	  Telefon	  I	  (ibid),	  p.	  8-­‐9;	  Strom	  und	  Telefon	  II	  (ibid),	  p.	  11-­‐12.	  
807	  Strom	  und	  Telefon	  II	  (ibid),	  p.	  11-­‐12.	  
808	  Strom	  und	  Telefon	  I,	  supra	  note	  805,	  p.	  13.	  
809	  Bundesgerichtshof	  judgment	  of	  30	  June	  1981,	  Adidas,	  KZR	  19/80.	  
810	  Bundesgerichtshof	  judgment	  of	  9	  November	  1982,	  Gemeinsamer	  Anzeigenteil,	  WuW	  BGH	  1965.	  
811	  Autorité	  decision	  of	  1	  March	  2000,	  Armor	  Hélicoptère,	  Case	  00-­‐D-­‐13.	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freedom	  to	  organise	  their	  distribution	  system	  according	  to	  their	  own	  wishes.812	  The	  Autorité	  noted	  that	  
the	  restrictions	  that	   Jaeger	  LeCoultre	   imposed	   in	  the	  sale	  of	  spare	  parts	  were	   justified,	  as	   it	  helped	  to	  
improve	   quality	   and	   promote	   the	   brand	   image.	   Similarly,	   the	   Spanish	   NCA	   (Comisión	   Nacional	   de	   la	  
Competencia,	   or	   ‘CNC’)	   found	   the	  maintenance	  of	   a	  brand	   image	   relevant	   in	   the	  Ryanair	   case.813	   The	  
CNC	   concluded	   that	   Ryanair’s	   decision	   to	   stop	   allowing	   the	   sale	   of	   its	   tickets	   by	   online	   agencies	  was	  
objectively	   justified,814	   as	   the	   agencies	   jeopardised	   Ryanair’s	   credibility	   as	   a	   low-­‐cost	   airline.	   In	  
particular,	  the	  resellers	  made	  it	  difficult	  for	  Ryanair	  to	  maintain	  its	  pledge	  to	  reimburse	  twice	  the	  price	  
difference	  with	  any	  cheaper	  ticket	  that	  its	  customers	  were	  able	  to	  find.815	  
	  
Another	   way	   to	   explore	   the	   boundaries	   of	   a	   dominant	   firm’s	   commercial	   freedom	   is	   by	   examining	  
whether	  its	  behaviour	  is	  consonant	  with	  the	  normal	  business	  practice	  in	  that	  sector.	  An	  example	  is	  the	  
UK	  Flybe	   case.816	  A	  complainant	  alleged	   that	  Flybe,	  an	  airline,	  had	  engaged	   in	  predatory	  behaviour	  by	  
unprofitably	   entering	   the	  Newquay	  –	   London	  Gatwick	   route	  and	   related	  markets.	   The	  OFT	   closed	   the	  
case	   on	   a	   number	   of	   grounds,	   inter	   alia	   because	   of	   a	   lack	   of	   dominance	   on	   the	   relevant	   route.	   In	  
addition,	  the	  OFT	  found	  no	  evidence	  that	  Flybe	  departed	  from	  normal,	  albeit	  robust,	  competition.817	  The	  
OFT	  rightfully	  took	  into	  account	  the	  wider	  context	  of	  the	  case,	   including	  the	  fact	  that	  Flybe	  was	  a	  new	  
entrant	   instead	  of	  the	  incumbent	  operator,	  distinguishing	  Flybe	   from	  EU	  case	  law	  on	  predation.818	  The	  
decision	  did	  not	  find	  that	  Flybe	  acted	  anti-­‐competitively,	  holding	  that	  the	  ‘initial	   losses	  experienced	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
812	  Autorité	  decision	  of	  28	  July	  2005,	  Jaeger	  LeCoultre,	  Case	  05-­‐D-­‐46.	  
813	  CNC	  decision	  of	  22	  June	  2009,	  Facua/Ryanair,	  Case	  S/0097/08.	  
814	  Ibid.,	  under	  the	  assumption	  that	  Ryanair	  held	  a	  dominant	  position.	  
815	  Ibid.,	  p.	  6-­‐7.	  
816	  OFT	  decision	  (undated),	  Flybe,	  Case	  MPINF-­‐PSWA001–04,	  available	  at	  
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/ca98_public_register/decisions/OFT1286.pdf.	  
817	  Ibid.,	  para	  3.13.	  
818	  Ibid.,	  para	  1.5.	  The	  OFT	  referred	  to	  AKZO	  (infra	  note	  894),	  Tetra	  Pak	  II	  (infra	  note	  894)	  and	  Wanadoo	  (infra	  note	  
891).	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entering	  a	  route	  are	  a	  result	  of	  normal	  commercial	  practice	  for	  an	  airline’.819	  The	  OFT	  considered	  such	  
initial	  losses	  reasonable	  ‘due	  to	  the	  need	  to	  stimulate	  market	  demand	  for	  the	  route’.820	  	  
	  
Although	  dominant	  firms	  are	  accordingly	  allowed	  to	  engage	  in	  ‘normal	  commercial	  practice’,	  they	  may	  
need	  to	  provide	  evidence	  that	  its	  actions	  were	  triggered	  by	  a	  competitive	  rationale	  rather	  than	  a	  wish	  to	  
exclude	   competitors.	   The	   UK	   Cardiff	   Bus	   case	   concerned	   a	   below-­‐cost	   ‘no	   frills’	   bus	   service	   that	   the	  
dominant	  firm	  introduced	  after	  the	  launch	  of	  a	  similar	  service	  by	  a	  new	  entrant.821	  The	  OFT	  rejected	  the	  
argument	   that	   Cardiff	   Bus	  was	   simply	  market	   testing	   a	   new	   service	   at	   prices	   below	   average	   variable	  
costs.	  The	  OFT	  observed	  that	  Cardiff	  Bus’s	  introduction	  of	  a	  service	  at	  below-­‐cost	  prices	  and	  on	  similar	  
routes	  and	   times	  as	  a	  new	  entrant	   showed	   its	  anti-­‐competitive	  purpose,	   rather	   than	  a	  wish	   to	   fulfil	   a	  
‘legitimate	   commercial	   strategy’.822	   According	   to	   the	   OFT,	   Cardiff	   Bus’s	   conduct	   showed	   no	   ‘genuine	  
attempt	   to	   market	   test	   new	   services’,823	   for	   example	   because	   it	   had	   not	   conducted	   ‘any	   predictive	  
assessment’	  on	  its	  profitability.824	  	  
	  
In	  several	  cases,	  the	  dominant	  firm	  attempted	  to	  justify	  its	  conduct	  by	  arguing	  that	  a	  third	  party	  had	  not	  
abided	  by	  regular	  business	  conduct.	  For	  example,	  a	  refusal	  to	  deal	  may	  be	  justified	  if	  the	  dominant	  firm	  
refuses	  supply	  if	  a	  customer	  has	  not	  paid	  its	  overdue	  bills,	  as	  the	  UK	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  acknowledged	  in	  
Leyland	  DAF.825	  In	  Lüsterbehangsteine,	  the	  German	  Bundesgerichtshof	  considered	  that	  a	  dominant	  firm	  
may	  cease	  supply	  if	  its	  customer	  has	  unlawfully	  copied	  its	  designs.826	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
819	  Ibid.,	  para	  6.98-­‐6.99.	  This	  finding	  was	  relatively	  novel.	  In	  an	  earlier	  judgment,	  the	  CAT	  held	  that	  there	  ‘are	  as	  yet	  
no	  decided	  cases	  as	  to	  whether	  a	  dominant	  undertaking	  may	  price	  below	  [AVC]	  for	  a	  period	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  
is	  launching	  a	  new	  product’.	  See	  Freeserve.com	  v	  Director	  General	  of	  Telecommunications	  [2003]	  CAT	  5,	  para	  220.	  	  	  
820	  Ibid.	  
821	  OFT	  decision	  of	  18	  November	  2008,	  Cardiff	  Bus,	  Case	  CE/5281/04.	  
822	  Ibid.,	  at	  1.14-­‐1.16,	  7.18	  and	  7.32.	  
823	  Ibid.,	  at	  7.23.	  
824	  Ibid.,	  at	  7.27-­‐7.31.	  
825	  See	  Leyland	  DAF	  v	  Automotive	  Products	  [1994]	  1	  BCLC	  245.	  The	  ruling	  affirmed	  Leyland	  DAF	  v	  Automotive	  
Products	  [1993]	  WL	  964480	  (Ch).	  
826	  Bundesgerichtshof	  judgment	  of	  25	  October	  1988,	  Lüsterbehangsteine,	  WuW/E	  2540.	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A	  refusal	  to	  deal	  may	  also	  be	  justified	  if	  the	  request	  itself	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  unreasonable.	  In	  CR	  Delta,	  
the	  Dutch	  NCA	   (currently	   named	  Autoriteit	   Consument	   en	  Markt,	   or	   ‘ACM’)827	   examined	   a	   complaint	  
alleging	   that	  a	   refusal	   to	   supply	   certain	  data	  electronically	  was	  an	  abuse,	  as	   it	   allegedly	   imposed	  high	  
costs	  on	  the	  complainant	  (as	  the	  complainant	  had	  to	  manually	  process	  the	  data).	  The	  ACM	  rejected	  the	  
complaint.	   It	   considered	   CR	   Delta’s	   refusal	   to	   be	   justified,828	   noting	   e.g.	   the	   unwillingness	   by	   the	  
complainant	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  additional	  costs	  that	  CR	  Delta	  said	  it	  would	  incur	  by	  such	  electronic	  supply.829	  
Similarly,	   in	  Association	  of	  British	  Travel	  Agents,	   the	  OFT	  rejected	  a	  complaint	  that	  British	  Airways	  had	  
abused	  its	  dominant	  position	  by	  reducing	  the	  booking	  payments	  it	  made	  to	  travel	  agents	  for	  short	  haul	  
flights.830	   BA’s	   ticket	   sales	   through	   its	   own	   website	   were	   considered	   as	   a	   more	   efficient	   way	   of	  
distribution.831	   The	  OFT	   found	   it	   reasonable	   to	   expect	   customers	   that	   choose	   to	   book	   through	   travel	  
agents	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  extra	  services	  that	  they	  receive.832	  	  
	  
A	  dominant	   firm’s	  plea	   referring	   to	  unreasonable	  conduct	  by	  a	   third	  party	   is	  not	  always	   successful.	   In	  
several	   cases	   such	   a	   plea	   failed	   on	   the	   facts.	   An	   example	   is	   the	  Burgess	   refusal	   to	   deal	   case.	   The	  UK	  
Competition	  Appeal	  Tribunal	  (‘CAT’)	  found	  no	  evidence	  that	  the	  company	  requesting	  access	  had	  acted	  in	  
a	  way	  that	  would	  have	  justified	  a	  refusal,	   for	   instance	  because	   it	  had	  been	  an	  unreliable	  payer	   ‘or	  the	  
like’.	   833	  Another	  example	   is	  Aberdeen	  Journals,	  where	  the	  CAT	  did	  not	  find	  predatory	  prices	   justifiable	  
on	   the	   basis	   that	   a	   new	   entrant	   (allegedly	   affected	   by	   Aberdeen	   Journal’s	   prices)	   was	   inefficient	   or	  
behaved	   like	   a	   ‘fireship’.834	   This	   refers	   to	   a	   company	   that	   would	   have	   been	   created	   simply	   to	  wreak	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
827	  Before	  1	  April	  2013,	  the	  ACM	  was	  named	  Nederlandse	  Mededingingsautoriteit,	  or	  ‘NMa’.	  
828	  ACM	  initial	  decision	  of	  28	  March	  2003,	  Case	  1205/FRHS	  v	  CR	  Delta,	  para	  53.	  
829	  The	  ACM	  did	  not	  alter	  its	  earlier	  findings	  (ibid.)	  in	  its	  administrative	  appeal	  decision	  of	  11	  October	  2004,	  Case	  
1205/FRHS	  v	  CR	  Delta.	  
830	  OFT	  decision	  of	  11	  December	  2002,	  The	  Association	  of	  British	  Travel	  Agents	  and	  British	  Airways,	  Case	  CE/1471-­‐
02,	  at	  46-­‐47.	  	  
831	  Ibid.,	  at	  44.	  
832	  Ibid.	  
833	  J.J.	  Burgess	  &	  Sons	  v	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading	  [2005]	  CAT	  25,	  para	  363.	  The	  CAT	  referred	  to	  Case	  27/76	  United	  
Brands	  v	  Commission	  [1978]	  ECR	  207.	  Although	  not	  mentioned	  by	  the	  CAT,	  a	  key	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  cases	  
seems	  to	  be	  that	  in	  United	  Brands	  the	  dominant	  firm	  invoked	  regular	  commercial	  practice	  referring	  to	  its	  own	  
conduct,	  whereas	  in	  Burgess	  the	  dominant	  firm	  referred	  to	  the	  supposed	  absence	  of	  regular	  commercial	  practice	  
on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  undertaking	  requesting	  access.	  
834	  Aberdeen	  Journals	  v	  Director	  General	  of	  Fair	  Trading	  [2003]	  CAT	  11,	  para	  450.	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havoc	   and	   force	   a	   sale	   to	   Aberdeen	   Journals.835	   Accordingly,	   the	   CAT	   appears	   to	   have	   left	   open	   the	  
possibility	   that	   such	   behaviour	   by	   a	   third	   party	   may	   be	   relevant	   while	   assessing	   a	   justification	   in	   a	  
predation	  case.836	  
	  
Similar	  pleas	  in	  other	  cases	  also	  failed	  because	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  evidence.	  In	  the	  ATOC	  decision,	  the	  Office	  of	  
Rail	   Regulation	   (‘ORR’)	   observed	   that	   the	   dominant	   firm	   had	   not	   provided	   evidence	   of	   past	   system	  
failures	   that	   could	  otherwise	  have	   justified	   its	   refusal	   to	   supply	   certain	   information.837	   In	  Eléctrica	  del	  
Llémana,	   the	   Spanish	   Competition	   Tribunal	   (‘Tribunal’)	   examined	   an	   energy	   incumbent’s	   refusal	   to	  
supply	  additional	  electricity	  to	  a	  downstream	  firm.838	  The	  dominant	  undertaking	  argued	  that	  the	  refusal	  
was	   caused	  by	   the	  downstream	   firm’s	  poor	  quality	  of	   service.	   The	  Tribunal	   rejected	   this	   view,	   stating	  
that	  the	  dominant	   firm	  had	  not	  provided	  concrete	  evidence	  of	   this	  claim.	  The	  Tribunal	  suggested	  that	  
any	  possible	  non-­‐compliance	  with	  contractual	  obligations	  should	  be	  dealt	  with	  by	  a	  private	   law	  court,	  
but	  cannot	  in	  itself	  serve	  as	  an	  objective	  justification	  for	  a	  refusal	  to	  supply.	  
	  
Finally,	   a	   dominant	   firm	   may	   also	   wish	   to	   dissociate	   itself	   from	   allegedly	   unlawful	   conduct	   by	   third	  
parties.	  A	  noteworthy	  problem	  here	   is	   that	  a	   finding	  of	   ‘illegality’	   is	   rarely	  a	  straightforward	  matter.	  A	  
case	  is	  point	  is	  the	  UK	  Floe	  case.	  Vodafone	  had	  disconnected	  SIM	  cards	  it	  had	  provided	  to	  Floe,	  arguing	  
that	   it	   sought	   to	  avoid	   the	  alleged	  unlicensed	  provision	  of	  mobile	  phone	  services	  by	  Floe	  –	  a	   criminal	  
offense	   under	   UK	   law.839	   Telecoms	   regulator	   Ofcom	   agreed	   with	   Vodafone	   and	   rejected	   Floe’s	  
complaint.840	  On	  appeal,	  the	  CAT	  agreed	  with	  Ofcom	  that	  competition	  law	  does	  not,	  and	  cannot,	  require	  
dominant	   undertakings	   to	   commit	   a	   criminal	   offence	   itself	   directly	   or	   indirectly	   by	   enabling	   another	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
835	  As	  argued	  by	  Aberdeen	  Journals	  (ibid.,	  para	  194	  et	  seq.).	  	  
836	  Also	  note	  that	  an	  objective	  justification	  was	  difficult	  to	  establish	  anyway	  considering	  the	  evidence	  of	  selective	  
price-­‐cutting	  (ibid.,	  para	  358).	  
837	  ORR	  non-­‐infringement	  decision	  of	  17	  November	  2009,	  Association	  of	  Train	  Operating	  Companies	  (‘ATOC’),	  at	  
166.	  Available	  at	  http://www.rail-­‐reg.gov.uk/upload/pdf/rtti-­‐decision-­‐011209.pdf.	  
838	  Tribunal	  de	  Defensa	  de	  la	  Competencia	  judgment	  of	  29	  September	  1999,	  Eléctrica	  del	  Llémana,	  Case	  442/98.	  
839	  Section	  1	  of	  the	  Wireless	  Telegraphy	  Act	  1949.	  I	  do	  not	  examine	  the	  possibility	  that	  Vodafone	  would	  itself	  have	  
acted	  illegally	  by	  not	  disconnecting	  the	  SIM	  cards.	  	  
840	  Ofcom	  decision	  of	  3	  November	  2003,	  Floe	  Telecom,	  paras	  49	  to	  52,	  and	  55	  to	  57.	  Available	  at	  
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/oftel/publications/mobile/2003/gsm1103.pdf.	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undertaking	   to	   commit	   a	   criminal	   offence	   (in	   this	   case,	   through	   the	   provision	   of	   telecom	   services).841	  
However,	  the	  CAT	  expressed	  doubts	  whether	  the	  law	  was	  sufficiently	  clear	  to	  state	  with	  certainty	  that	  
Floe	  had	  violated	  it,842	  and	  remitted	  the	  matter	  back	  to	  Ofcom	  for	  further	  examination.843	  In	  its	  second	  
decision,	  Ofcom	  reaffirmed	  that	  it	  considered	  Floe’s	  activities	  to	  be	  unlawful.844	  In	  a	  second	  appeal,	  the	  
CAT	   remained	  doubtful	  whether	  Vodafone	   truly	   believed	   at	   the	   time	  of	   the	  disconnection	   that	   Floe’s	  
conduct	  was	   illegal,845	   even	   though	   the	   case	  was	   finally	  decided	  on	  different	   grounds.846	  According	   to	  
the	  CAT,	  a	  legal	  requirement	  can	  only	  be	  relied	  upon	  if	  the	  dominant	  firm	  has	  relied	  ‘at	  the	  very	  least’	  on	  
‘clear	   legal	  advice	  that	   it	   is	  so	  precluded’.847	  Vodafone	  produced	  no	  evidence	  of	  such	  advice.848	   I	  agree	  
with	   the	   CAT’s	   minimum	   requirement:	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   any	   documentation	   examining	   the	   alleged	  
illegality,	  there	  is	  little	  reason	  to	  presume	  that	  its	  refusal	  indeed	  sought	  to	  achieve	  a	  benign	  objective.	  In	  
a	   regulated	   sector,	   an	   additional	   requirement	   should	   be	   that	   the	   dominant	   firm	   engaged	   with	   the	  
competent	   authorities	   about	   the	   alleged	   illegality849	   –	   even	   though,	   as	  Floe	   shows,	   agreement	  by	   the	  
competent	  regulator	  is	  not	  always	  sufficient,	  as	  the	  courts	  may	  disagree	  about	  the	  alleged	  illegality.	  
	  
In	  my	   view,	   if	   a	   dominant	   firm	   refuses	   to	   deal	  with	   a	   company	   that	   allegedly	   operates	   illegally,	   such	  
illegality	  should	  be	  a	  relevant	  consideration	  when	  determining	  whether	  the	  refusal	  violates	  Article	  102	  
TFEU.	   I	   believe	   this	   statement	   to	   be	   true	   even	   after	   the	   recent	   ECJ	   judgment	   in	   Slovenská.850	   The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
841	  See	  Floe	  Telecom	  v	  Ofcom	  [2004]	  CAT	  18,	  paras	  289	  and	  333.	  Although	  the	  CAT	  does	  not	  expand	  upon	  this	  
distinction,	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  former	  situation	  entails	  objective	  necessity;	  whereas	  the	  second	  situation	  is	  more	  
appropriately	  seen	  as	  legitimate	  business	  behaviour.	  	  	  
842	  Ibid.,	  para	  336.	  
843	  Ibid.,	  para	  338.	  
844	  Ofcom	  decision	  of	  28	  June	  2005,	  Floe	  (re-­‐investigation),	  Case:	  CW/00805/12/04,	  paras	  247	  and	  334.	  Ofcom	  
refers	  to	  this	  justification	  as	  ‘legitimate	  commercial	  interest’	  (para	  248).	  
845	  Floe	  Telecom	  v	  Ofcom	  [2006]	  CAT	  17,	  para	  367.	  
846	  Ibid.,	  paras	  352-­‐353.	  
847	  Ibid.,	  paras	  371-­‐372.	  
848	  A	  later	  judgment	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  partially	  set	  aside	  the	  CAT’s	  order,	  but	  did	  not	  rule	  upon	  the	  CAT’s	  
interpretation	  of	  objective	  justification.	  See	  Ofcom	  v	  Floe	  Telecom	  [2009]	  EWCA	  Civ	  47.	  
849	  In	  Floe,	  supra	  note	  841,	  the	  CAT	  noted	  at	  para	  333:	  ‘we	  accept	  that	  where	  the	  relevant	  authorities	  have	  
pronounced	  that	  an	  activity	  is	  illegal,	  competition	  law	  cannot	  and	  does	  not	  require	  the	  dominant	  undertaking	  to	  
participate	  in	  the	  furtherance	  of	  an	  illegal	  act’.	  	  	  
850	  Case	  C-­‐68/12	  Protimonopolný	  úrad	  Slovenskej	  republiky	  v	  Slovenská	  sporiteľňa	  (‘Slovenská’)	  [2013]	  ECR	  nyr.	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Slovenská	   case	   concerned	   three	   Slovakian	   banks	   that	   jointly	   terminated	   their	   business	   dealings	   with	  
Akcenta,	   a	   financial	   institution	   from	   the	   Czech	   Republic.	   The	   Slovakian	   NCA	   found	   that	   the	   bank’s	  
coordinated	  action	  violated	  Article	  101(1)	  TFEU.	  One	  of	  the	  banks	  appealed	  against	  this	  finding,	  arguing	  
that	  Akcenta	  was	  operating	  illegally	  as	  it	  allegedly	  did	  not	  have	  the	  required	  licences.	  The	  ECJ	  held	  in	  a	  
preliminary	   ruling	   that,	  when	  determining	  whether	  an	  agreement	   that	   restricts	   competition	  by	  object	  
infringes	  Article	  101(1)	  TFEU,	  it	  is	  irrelevant	  that	  a	  third	  party	  (such	  as	  Akcenta)	  was	  allegedly	  operating	  
illegally.851	  
	  
The	  Slovenská	  case	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  herald	  the	  end	  of	  the	  ‘illegality	  defence’	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  Article	  
102	  TFEU.	  Competition	  law	  is	  more	  benign	  towards	  refusals	  to	  deal	  under	  102	  TFEU	  than	  to	  restrictions	  
by	  object	  under	  Article	  101(1)	  TFEU.	  The	  first	   is	  an	  exception	  to	  the	  rule	  that	  even	  dominant	  firms	  are	  
free	  to	  decide	  with	  whom	  they	  deal	  or	  not,	  whereas	  the	  second	  type	  of	  conduct	  is	  considered	  ‘injurious’	  
to	  competition	  by	  its	  ‘very	  nature’.852	  In	  addition,	  the	  illegality	  of	  the	  conduct	  in	  Slovenská	  was	  anything	  
but	   evident,853	   and	   the	   ECJ	   took	   into	   account	   that	   none	   of	   the	   banks	   had	   challenged	   the	   legality	   of	  
Akcenta’s	   operations	   before	   they	   were	   investigated	   (suggesting	   that	   the	   outcome	   could	   have	   been	  
different	  if	  they	  had	  challenged	  the	  legality	  earlier).854	  Finally,	  even	  though	  the	  ECJ	  does	  not	  mention	  it	  
explicitly,	  the	  element	  of	  necessity	  also	  appears	  wanting:	  if	  the	  banks	  were	  so	  concerned	  with	  the	  third	  
party’s	  conduct,	  why	  did	  they	  need	  an	  agreement	  to	  withdraw	  their	  banking	  services	  and	  did	  not	  simply	  
do	  so	  individually?	  In	  sum,	  there	  is	  ample	  reason	  not	  to	  transpose	  the	  reasoning	  in	  Slovenská	  to	  refusal	  
to	  deal	  cases	  in	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  
	  
3.2.3 Commercial	  freedom	  –	  Legitimate	  differentiation	  	  
Several	   domestic	   cases	   examined	   whether	   a	   dominant	   firm’s	   differentiation	   of	   prices	   (or	   unequal	  
treatment	   otherwise)	   could	   be	   justified,	   and	   therefore	   does	   not	   constitute	   discrimination	   that	  would	  
amount	  to	  an	  abuse.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
851	  Ibid.,	  para	  19.	  	  
852	  See	  e.g.	  Case	  C-­‐226/11	  Expedia	  v	  Autorité	  de	  la	  concurrence	  [2013]	  ECR	  nyr,	  para	  36.	  	  
853	  Indeed,	  according	  to	  the	  Czech	  government,	  Akcenta	  did	  have	  the	  requisite	  licenses	  in	  the	  Czech	  Republic	  
(supra	  note	  850,	  para	  15).	  
854	  Ibid.,	  para	  19.	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Two	   telling	   examples	   emanate	   from	  Dutch	   competition	  practice.	   The	   first	   example	   is	   Interpay,	  where	  
retailer	  Superunie	  alleged	  that	  the	  price	  differentiation	  by	  debit	  card	  transaction	  company	  Interpay	  was	  
abusive.	  The	  ACM	  rejected	  the	  complaint,	  as	  it	  found	  the	  differentiation	  to	  be	  objectively	  justified.855	  At	  
a	   time	  when	   the	   success	   of	   Interpay’s	   transaction	   system	  was	   still	   uncertain,	   Superunie’s	   rival	   Ahold	  
committed	   to	   large-­‐scale	   investments	   and	   guaranteed	   that	   it	   would	   process	   a	   minimum	   number	   of	  
transactions.856	   The	  ACM	   thus	   considered	   the	   additional	   discounts	   (that	  were,	   at	   the	   time,	   offered	   to	  
other	   retailers	  as	  well)	   as	  an	  appropriate	   financial	   reward	   for	   the	   investments	  and	   risks;857	   and	  noted	  
that	   a	   strict	   application	   of	   the	   abuse	   prohibition	   –	   as	   proposed	   by	   the	   complainant	   –	   would	   be	  
detrimental	  to	  innovation.858	  
	  
A	   second	   example	   from	   the	   Netherlands	   is	   GasTerra,	   where	   a	   collective	   of	   greenhouse	   farmers	  
complained	   that	   gas	   wholesaler	   GasTerra	   charged	   discriminatory	   prices.859	   The	   ACM	   rejected	   the	  
complaint,	  holding	   that	  GasTerra’s	  differentiation	  of	  prices	  was	  not	  abusive	  as	   it	   reflected	   the	  varying	  
needs	  of	  wholesale	  customers.	  Lower	  prices	  will	  be	  available	   for	  customers	  willing	   to	  commit	   to	   long-­‐
term	  contracts	  with	  little	  flexibility	  in	  gas	  off-­‐take.860	  
	  
In	  the	  EPM/NMPP	  case,	  the	  French	  Autorité	  examined	  the	  alleged	  discriminatory	  nature	  of	  a	  new	  pricing	  
scheme	  of	  distributor	  NMPP.	  It	  found	  that	  the	  new	  differentiation	  was	  justified,	  as	  the	  pricing	  method	  
was	   transparent,	   objective	   and	   cost-­‐based.861	   It	   also	   took	   into	   account	   that	   the	   new	   scheme	   was	  
introduced	   gradually.	   The	   Paris	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   upheld	   the	   decision,862	   noting	   that	   the	   rates	   charged	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
855	  ACM	  initial	  decision	  of	  28	  April	  2003,	  Case	  2978/Superunie	  v	  Interpay,	  para	  40.	  In	  para	  39,	  the	  ACM	  provides	  
two	  examples	  of	  objective	  justification.	  First,	  a	  rebate	  could	  be	  justified	  because	  of	  ensuing	  cost	  benefits	  that	  are	  
proportional	  to	  the	  amount	  of	  the	  rebate.	  Second,	  if	  a	  purchaser	  has	  borne	  specific	  investment	  risks	  they	  could	  
provide	  an	  objective	  justification	  for	  special	  treatment	  by	  the	  dominant	  undertaking	  for	  a	  certain	  period	  of	  time.	  
856	  Ibid.,	  para	  41.	  
857	  Ibid.,	  para	  47.	  
858	  Ibid.,	  para	  50.	  The	  ACM	  confirmed	  the	  rejection	  of	  the	  complaint	  in	  its	  administrative	  appeal	  decision	  of	  29	  June	  
2005,	  Case	  2978/Superunie	  v	  Interpay.	  
859	  ACM	  initial	  decision	  of	  26	  June	  2009,	  Case	  5720/Productschap	  Tuinbouw	  v	  GasTerra.	  
860	  ACM	  administrative	  appeal	  decision	  of	  28	  April	  2011,	  Case	  5720/Productschap	  Tuinbouw	  v	  GasTerra,	  para	  113.	  
861	  Autorité	  decision	  of	  12	  July	  2007,	  EPM/NMPP,	  Case	  07-­‐D-­‐23.	  	  
862	  Paris	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  judgment	  of	  17	  September	  2008,	  Case	  2007/14904.	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were	   based	   on	   objective	   economic	   criteria.863	   The	   Court	   also	   observed	   that	   the	   introduction	   of	   new	  
prices	  had	  a	  legitimate	  aim,	  namely	  to	  correct	  for	  the	  unfair	  effects	  of	  the	  earlier	  pricing	  scheme.	  
	  
The	  UK	  EWS	  case	  is	  another	  price	  discrimination	  example,	  where	  the	  ORR	  held	  that	  rail	  company	  EWS	  
had	  abused	  its	  dominant	  position	  by	  foreclosing	  its	  rivals	  from	  the	  market	  for	  the	  supply	  of	  coal	  to	  UK	  
industrial	   users.864	   According	   to	   the	   ORR,	   EWS	   had	   used	   several	   means	   to	   achieve	   this	   aim,	   such	   as	  
charging	  discriminatory	  prices	  for	  access	  and	  providing	  selective	  price	  cuts	  to	  (potential)	  customers	  of	  its	  
competitors.	   The	   ORR	   found	   that	   EWS	   had	   advanced	   no	   credible	   objective	   justification,865	   stating:	  
‘business	   considerations	   that	   in	   reality	   amount	   to	   anti-­‐competitive	   behaviour	   cannot	   be	   used	   as	  
justification	   for	   unequal	   treatment’.866	   It	   rejected	   EWS’s	   reference	   to	   certain	   operational	   difficulties	  
encountered	  by	  ECSL	  (the	  company	  requesting	  access),	  as	  those	  issues	  were	  not	  purely	  ECSL’s	  fault	  and	  
would,	  in	  any	  case,	  not	  be	  remedied	  by	  price	  discrimination.867	  
	  
Finally,	  in	  Napp,	  the	  OFT	  held	  that	  pharmaceutical	  company	  Napp	  had	  abused	  its	  dominant	  position	  by	  
charging	   excessive	   prices	   for	   certain	   drugs	   to	   patients	   in	   the	   community	   segment	   (i.e.	   after	  
hospitalisation),	   after	   inducing	   doctors	   to	   prescribe	   these	   drugs	   at	   prices	   below	   costs	   while	   patients	  
were	  still	   in	  hospital.868	  After	  hospitalisation	  patients	  usually	  keep	  using	  the	  same	  drugs.	  The	  CAT	  held	  
that	  Napp	  produced	  no	  evidence	   that	   the	  selective	  discounts	  during	  hospitalisation	  were	  based	  on	  an	  
economic	   justification	   such	   as	   cost	   savings,869	   and	   concluded	   that	   Napp’s	   conduct	   could	   only	   be	  
explained	  by	  a	  wish	  to	  exclude	  competitors.870	  	  
	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
863	  Ibid.,	  page	  6.	  
864	  ORR	  Decision	  of	  December	  2006,	  EWS,	  available	  at	  http://www.rail-­‐reg.gov.uk/upload/pdf/ca98_decision_ews-­‐
dec06.pdf.	  
865	  Ibid.,	  at	  B100.	  
866	  Ibid.,	  at	  B12.	  The	  ORR	  refers	  to	  Advocate	  General	  Kokott	  in	  her	  Opinion	  of	  23	  February	  2006	  in	  Case	  C-­‐95/04	  P	  
British	  Airways	  v	  Commission	  [2007]	  ECR	  I-­‐2331,	  para	  114.	  
867	  Ibid.,	  at	  B134.	  
868	  OFT	  decision	  of	  30	  March	  2001,	  Napp,	  Case	  CA98/2/2001.	  
869	  Napp	  v	  Director	  General	  of	  Fair	  Trading	  [2002]	  CAT	  1,	  para	  341.	  
870	  Ibid.,	  para	  347.	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3.2.4 Commercial	  freedom	  –	  The	  recovery	  of	  costs	  
UK	   competition	   law	   seems	   to	   accept	   that	   the	   recovery	   of	   (sunk)	   costs	   may	   justify	   an	   otherwise	  
exclusionary	  practice.	  Examples	  include	  the	  National	  Grid	  and	  Welsh	  Water	  cases.	  In	  National	  Grid,	  UK	  
energy	   regulator	   Ofgem871	   found	   that	   National	   Grid,	   an	   energy	   network	   company,	   had	   abused	   its	  
dominant	   position	   in	   the	  market	   for	   the	   provision	   and	  maintenance	   of	   domestic-­‐sized	   gas	  meters.872	  
National	  Grid	  had	  entered	  into	  long-­‐term	  contracts	  that	  allegedly	  withheld	  competitors	  from	  replacing	  
its	   meters	   with	   less	   expensive	   and/or	   more	   technologically	   advanced	   meters.	   Ofgem	   held	   that	   such	  
arrangements	  may	  be	  justified	  to	  allow	  for	  the	  recovery	  of	  customer	  specific	  sunk	  costs,873	  but	  did	  not	  
accept	  that	  the	  contracts	  under	  review	  were	  necessary	  or	  proportionate.874	  The	  CAT	  dismissed	  National	  
Grid’s	   subsequent	  appeal,875	   laying	  particular	  emphasis	  on	   the	  disproportionate	  nature	  of	   the	  charges	  
that	   switchers	  would	   have	   to	   pay	   for	   not	   continuing	   their	   contract.876	   The	   CAT	   also	   noted	   that	   there	  
were	  alternative	  ways	  to	  cover	  sunk	  costs	  while	  still	  allowing	  replacement	  by	  competitors.877	  The	  Court	  
of	   Appeal	   rejected	   a	   further	   appeal,878	   even	   though	   it	   did	   criticize	   the	   CAT’s	   treatment	   of	   possible	  
consumer	   benefits	   within	   the	   assessment	   of	   anti-­‐competitive	   foreclosure,	   rather	   than	   under	   the	  
separate	  heading	  of	  objective	  justification.879	  
	  
A	  complaint	  by	  Albion	  Water	  triggered	  the	  Welsh	  Water	  case.	  UK	  water	  regulator	  Ofwat880	  investigated	  
the	  price	  that	  Dŵr	  Cymru	  (‘Welsh	  Water’)	  set	  for	  access	  to	  its	  network.881	  Ofwat	  found	  no	  evidence	  that	  
the	  prices	  under	   review	  were	  excessive,	  discriminatory	  or	  amounted	   to	  a	  margin	   squeeze.	  On	  appeal,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
871	  Technically	  the	  Gas	  and	  Electricity	  Markets	  Authority	  (‘GEMA’),	  but	  I	  shall	  refer	  to	  its	  more	  commonly	  used	  
name.	  
872	  GEMA	  decision	  of	  21	  February	  2008,	  National	  Grid,	  Case	  CA98/STG/06.	  
873	  Ibid.,	  at	  4.26	  and	  4.131.	  	  
874	  Ibid.,	  at	  4.132	  and	  4.186.	  
875	  Even	  though	  the	  CAT	  did	  lower	  the	  fine	  imposed	  on	  National	  Grid,	  see	  National	  Grid	  v	  GEMA	  [2009]	  CAT	  14.	  
876	  Ibid.,	  at	  93,	  98	  and	  200.	  
877	  Ibid.,	  at	  143.	  
878	  National	  Grid	  v	  GEMA	  [2010]	  EWCA	  Civ	  114.	  
879	  Ibid.,	  at	  86-­‐87.	  The	  CAT	  seems	  to	  have	  done	  so	  after	  litigants	  National	  Grid	  and	  Ofgem	  agreed	  that	  this	  was	  an	  
appropriate	  approach	  to	  follow	  (see	  the	  CAT’s	  judgment,	  supra	  note	  875,	  para	  94).	  
880	  Formerly	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  Director	  General	  of	  Water	  Services.	  
881	  Ofwat	  decision	  of	  26	  May	  2004,	  Dŵr	  Cymru,	  Case	  CA98/00/48.	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the	   CAT	   did	   not	   agree	   with	   Ofwat’s	   use	   of	   the	   Efficient	   Component	   Pricing	   Rule	   (‘ECPR’),	   a	   pricing	  
benchmark	  that	  takes	  the	  prevailing	  retail	  price	  and	  deducts	  the	  cost	  that	  the	  incumbent	  avoids	  by	  not	  
making	   the	   supply	   in	   question.882	   The	   CAT	   did	   consider	   the	   ‘recovery	   of	   infrastructure	   and	   common	  
costs’	   as	   ‘a	   reasonable	   objective’.	  However,	   the	  CAT	  did	   not	   agree	  with	   the	  use	  of	   a	   benchmark	   that	  
would	  have	  the	  effect	  of	  eliminating	  all	  existing	  competition	  (including	  Albion	  Water,	  the	  only	  entrant	  in	  
the	  UK	  water	   sector	  post-­‐liberalisation)	  and	  preventing	  virtually	   any	  new	  market	  entry.883	   In	  addition,	  
the	   CAT	   found	   that	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   margin	   between	   the	   wholesale	   and	   retail	   prices	   could	   not	   be	  
objectively	   justified,	   since	   the	   evidence	   strongly	   suggested	   that	   the	   level	   of	   the	   upstream	   price	   was	  
excessive.884	  The	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  rejected	  a	  subsequent	  appeal	  by	  Welsh	  Water.885	  
	  
3.2.5 Commercial	  freedom	  –	  Meeting	  competition	  
A	   number	   of	   domestic	   predation	   cases	   examined	   the	   availability	   of	   a	   meeting	   competition	   defence,	  
exploring	  the	  right	  for	  dominant	  firms	  to	  align	  their	  prices	  with	  those	  of	  their	  competitors.	  An	  example	  is	  
EWS,	  where	  the	  ORR	  acknowledged	  that	  a	  meeting	  competition	  plea	  may	  be	  available	  to	   justify	  prices	  
that	   are	   between	   average	   total	   costs	   and	   average	   variable	   costs,	   especially	   if	   the	   price	   cuts	   are	  
introduced	   ‘across	   the	   board’.886	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   ORR	   held	   that	   ‘a	   desire	   by	   a	   dominant	  
undertaking	  to	  win	  business	  by	  matching	  or	  beating	  the	  price	  of	  a	  competitor	  cannot	  in	  itself	  negate	  a	  
finding	   of	   abusive	   intent’.887	   The	   ORR	   seemed	   cognisant	   of	   the	   importance	   of	   context	   in	   order	   to	  
determine	   whether	   below-­‐cost	   prices	   that	   seek	   to	   meet	   competition	   are	   abusive	   or	   not.	   Relevant	  
context	   includes	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   market	   position	   of	   the	   dominant	   firm,	   the	   likely	   effects	   of	   the	  
conduct,	   the	  degree	  of	   selectivity	  of	   the	   relevant	  prices	  and	   the	   subjective	   intention	  of	   the	  dominant	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
882	  Albion	  Water	  v	  Water	  Services	  Regulation	  Authority	  [2006]	  CAT	  23,	  at	  44,	  48	  and	  941.	  
883	  Ibid.,	  at	  836.	  See	  also	  Albion	  Water	  v	  Water	  Services	  Regulation	  Authority	  [2006]	  CAT	  36,	  at	  308.	  
884	  Albion	  Water,	  supra	  note	  882,	  at	  874.	  
885	  Dŵr	  Cymru	  v	  Albion	  Water	  [2008]	  EWCA	  Civ	  536.	  The	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  noted	  that	  it	  considers	  objective	  
justification	  as	  a	  separate	  step	  from	  the	  margin	  squeeze	  test	  itself,	  at	  106.	  See,	  similarly,	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  ruling	  
in	  National	  Grid,	  supra	  note	  879,	  at	  86-­‐87.	  
886	  EWS,	  supra	  note	  864,	  at	  C202.	  
887	  Ibid.,	  at	  C203.	  Note	  that	  abusive	  intent	  is	  a	  requirement	  for	  prices	  between	  average	  total	  costs	  and	  average	  
variable	  costs	  to	  be	  considered	  contrary	  to	  Article	  102	  TFEU,	  see	  AKZO,	  infra	  note	  894,	  para	  146.	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firm.888	  On	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  case,	  the	  ORR	  concluded	  that	  EWS’s	  prices	  could	  not	  be	  objectively	  justified,	  
inter	  alia	  because	  they	  selectively	  targeted	  its	  rival’s	  largest	  customer.889	  	  
	  
By	   contrast,	   the	   French	  Autorité	  did	   accept	   a	  meeting	   competition	  defence	  on	   the	   facts	   in	  Bouygues.	  
Telecom	  company	  Bouygues	  requested	  the	  Autorité	  to	  impose	  interim	  measures	  in	  response	  to	  alleged	  
predatory	   pricing	   by	   France	   Télécom.	   The	   Autorité	   did	   not	   find	   an	   abuse,	   concluding	   that	   France	  
Télécom	   was	   simply	   aligning	   its	   prices	   to	   those	   of	   its	   rivals	   in	   the	   competitive	   mobile	   telephony	  
market.890	  	  
	  
The	  acknowledgment	  of	  a	  right	  to	  align	  prices,	  even	  if	  they	  are	  below	  costs,	  is	  worthy	  of	  note	  because	  
the	   ECJ’s	  Wanadoo	   ruling	   suggests	   that	   such	   a	   plea	   does	   not	   exist	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   EU	   law.891	  
However,	  the	  author	  believes	  that	  the	  EWS	  and	  Bouygues	  decisions	  provide	  useful	  nuances	  to	  –	  and	  are	  
not	   necessarily	   inconsistent	   with	   –	   the	  Wanadoo	   ruling.	   The	   EWS	   decision	   acknowledges	   that	   an	   in-­‐
depth	   analysis	   of	   the	   relevant	   context	   may	   show	   that	   below-­‐cost	   pricing	   to	   meet	   competition	   can	  
actually	  be	  pro-­‐competitive	   instead	  of	  abusive.	  There	   is	  no	   reason	  to	  assume	  that	  Wanadoo	  disallows	  
dominant	   undertakings	   from	   aligning	   their	   prices	   to	   those	   of	   competitors	   if	   this	   does	   not	   negatively	  
affect	  competition.	  
	  
As	   to	   the	  Bouygues	   case,	   the	  Autorité’s	  approach	  seems	   to	  have	  been	   influenced	  by	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  
case	  concerned	  an	  application	  for	  interim	  relief.	  Such	  cases	  necessarily	  involve	  a	  limited	  examination	  of	  
the	  appropriate	  cost	  benchmark,	  which	  makes	  it	  riskier	  to	  attach	  legal	  consequences	  to	  prices	  that	  are	  
allegedly	  below	  costs.	   Indeed,	   in	   its	  more	  expansive	   investigation	   in	  GlaxoSmithKline,	   the	  Autorité	  did	  
reject	   a	  meeting	   competition	   defence,	   as	   it	   found	   that	   GlaxoSmithKline’s	   predation	   strategy	   had	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
888	  Ibid.,	  at	  C204.	  
889	  Ibid.,	  at	  C205.	  Subsequent	  court	  rulings	  in	  a	  follow-­‐on	  action	  for	  damages	  by	  the	  CAT	  and	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  
focus	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  causation,	  but	  do	  not	  provide	  relevant	  observations	  on	  the	  question	  of	  objective	  justification.	  
See	  Enron	  Coal	  Services	  (in	  liquidation)	  v	  EWS	  [2009]	  CAT	  36	  and	  Enron	  Coal	  Services	  (in	  liquidation)	  v	  EWS	  [2009]	  
EWCA	  Civ	  647.	  
890	  Autorité	  decision	  of	  23	  December	  1999,	  Bouygues/France	  Télécom,	  Case	  99-­‐MC-­‐12.	  
891	  See	  Case	  T-­‐340/03	  France	  Télécom	  v	  Commission	  (‘Wanadoo’)	  [2007]	  ECR	  II-­‐107,	  para	  182;	  as	  confirmed	  by	  Case	  
C-­‐202/07	  P	  France	  Télécom	  v	  Commission	  (‘Wanadoo’)	  [2009]	  ECR	  I-­‐2369,	  para	  47.	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effect	  of	  hindering	  the	  entry	  of	  certain	  generic	  drugs.892	  More	  generally,	  the	  Autorité	  suggested	  in	  that	  
case	  that	  the	  meeting	  competition	  defence	  is,	  in	  principle,	  not	  available	  to	  a	  dominant	  firm.893	  Like	  EWS,	  
the	  Autorité’s	  decisions	   thus	   show	   the	   importance	  of	   context	  while	  examining	  a	  meeting	   competition	  
plea.	  
	  
A	  meeting	   competition	  defence	   should	   require	  particularly	  persuasive	   reasoning	   if	  prices	  are	  not	  only	  
below	   average	   total	   costs,	   but	   also	   below	   average	   variable	   costs.	   In	   Tetra	   Pak	   II,	   building	   upon	   its	  
precedent	  in	  AKZO,	  the	  ECJ	  held	  that	  such	  prices	  ‘must	  always	  be	  considered	  abusive’.894	  This	  statement	  
implies	  that	  prices	  below	  average	  variable	  costs	  can	  never	  be	  justified.	  The	  more	  recent	  Wanadoo	  and	  
Post	  Danmark	   judgments,	  however,	  suggest	  that	  the	  ECJ	  has	  become	  more	  permissive	  in	  its	  approach.	  
Although	  prices	  below	  average	  variable	  costs	  must	  ‘in	  principle’	  be	  regarded	  as	  abusive,895	  the	  dominant	  
firm	  may	  argue	  that	  it	  had	  ‘economic	  justifications	  other	  than	  the	  elimination	  of	  a	  competitor’.896	  	  
	  
Notwithstanding	  Wanadoo	  and	  Post	  Danmark,	  the	  precise	  scope	  of	  available	  justification	  pleas	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  
prices	   below	   average	   variable	   costs	   remains	   unclear.	   This	   is	   why	   the	   Irish	   Drogheda	   Independent	  
Company	  (‘DIC’)	  case	  is	  of	   interest.	   In	  DIC,	  the	  Irish	  Competition	  Authority	  (‘ICA’)897	  examined	  whether	  
prices	   for	  advertising	   space	  could	  be	   justified	  even	   though	   they	  were	  below	  average	  variable	  costs.898	  
Assuming	  that	  DIC	  held	  a	  dominant	  position,899	  the	  ICA	  observed	  that	  it	  had	  a	  ‘business	  justification’	  for	  
its	   prices.900	   The	   ICA	   considered	   that	   DIC’s	   conduct	   was	   designed	   to	   meet	   competition	   and	   had	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
892	  Autorité	  decision	  of	  14	  March	  2007,	  GlaxoSmithKline,	  Case	  07-­‐D-­‐09.	  	  
893	  Ibid.,	  at	  179.	  	  
894	  Case	  C-­‐333/94	  P	  Tetra	  Pak	  International	  v	  Commission	  (‘Tetra	  Pak	  II’)	  [1996]	  ECR	  I-­‐5951,	  para	  41;	  Case	  C-­‐62/86	  
AKZO	  v	  Commission	  [1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐3359,	  para	  71.	  
895	  Case	  C-­‐209/10	  Post	  Danmark	  v	  Konkurrencerådet	  [2012]	  nyr,	  para	  27.	  See	  also	  Wanadoo,	  supra	  note	  891,	  para	  
109,	  where	  the	  ECJ	  suggested	  that	  prices	  below	  average	  variable	  costs	  are	  prima	  facie	  abusive	  (instead	  of	  abusive	  
as	  such).	  
896	  See	  Wanadoo	  (ibid.,	  para	  111)	  and	  Post	  Danmark	  (ibid.,	  para	  27).	  
897	  Officially	  the	  Irish	  NCA	  is	  called	  The	  Competition	  Authority,	  but	  I	  think	  the	  use	  of	  that	  name	  would	  be	  confusing	  
in	  a	  comparative	  article	  such	  as	  this	  one.	  
898	  ICA	  decision	  of	  7	  December	  2004,	  Drogheda	  Independent	  Company,	  Case	  COM/05/03.	  
899	  The	  ICA	  was	  not	  convinced	  that	  DIC	  actually	  held	  a	  dominant	  position.	  
900	  Ibid.,	  paras	  2.53	  and	  2.55.	  The	  ICA’s	  assessment	  of	  a	  business	  justification	  seems	  to	  focus	  on	  an	  alternative	  
explanation	  as	  to	  what	  motivated	  the	  relevant	  behavior.	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benefitted	  consumers	  by	  offering	  more	  choice	  and	  better	  quality	  of	   local	  newspapers.	   In	  sum,	  the	   ICA	  
saw	  no	  obvious	  adverse	  effect	  that	  resulted	  from	  DIC’s	  prices.901	  The	  DIC	  decision	  is	  a	  fine	  example	  how	  
an	   in-­‐depth	   examination	   of	   the	   relevant	   context	   can	   show	   that	   practices	   that	   appear	   abusive	   at	   first	  
sight	   may	   not	   be	   abusive	   after	   all.	   Caution	   is	   warranted,	   however.	   NCAs	   should	   be	   particularly	  
meticulous	   in	   their	   analysis	  when	   they	   consider	   justifications	   that	  EU	  case	   law	  seems	   to	  allow	  only	   in	  
exceptional	  circumstances.902	  	  
	  
3.3 Objective	  necessity	  	  
	  
Objective	   necessity	   can	   be	   a	   compelling	   type	   of	   justification,	   but	   should	   be	   applied	  with	   care.	   In	  my	  
opinion,	   objective	   necessity	   ought	   only	   be	   accepted	   if	   circumstances	   leave	   the	   dominant	   with	   no	  
possibility	  to	  act	  otherwise.	  Some	  domestic	  cases	  seem	  to	  have	  used	  the	  concept	  of	  objective	  necessity	  
even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  such	  impossibility,903	  but	  I	  think	  such	  an	  approach	  risks	  rendering	  the	  whole	  idea	  
of	  ‘necessity’	  superfluous.904	  
	  
An	   example	   of	   force	   majeure	   is	   the	  Aberdeen	   Journals	   case,	   where	   the	   OFT	   investigated	   below-­‐cost	  
pricing	  of	  advertising	  space.905	  Although	  Aberdeen	   Journal’s	  prices	  were	  at	   some	  point	  below	  average	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
901	  Ibid.,	  para	  2.64.	  
902	  Also	  consider	  that	  the	  DIC	  decision	  was	  taken	  in	  2004,	  before	  the	  ECJ	  laid	  down	  its	  rulings	  in	  Wanadoo	  (supra	  
note	  891)	  and	  Post	  Danmark	  (supra	  note	  895).	  
903	  For	  example,	  the	  Saint-­‐Honorat	  (infra	  note	  949)	  and	  Total	  (infra	  note	  941)	  cases	  in	  France	  refer	  to	  ‘objective	  
necessity’,	  but	  I	  believe	  they	  are	  more	  properly	  understood	  as	  applications	  of	  a	  public	  interest	  plea,	  because	  the	  
dominant	  firm	  could	  still	  have	  acted	  otherwise	  (as	  discussed	  in	  paragraph	  3.5).	  Another	  example	  is	  the	  decision	  in	  
Flybe	  (supra	  note	  816,	  at	  6.99),	  where	  the	  OFT	  examined	  whether	  an	  airline	  can	  justify	  below-­‐cost	  pricing	  on	  a	  new	  
route.	  Although	  the	  OFT	  does	  refer	  to	  ‘objective	  necessity’,	  its	  analysis	  does	  not	  emphasize	  Flybe’s	  (lack	  of)	  
alternatives,	  but	  rather	  focuses	  on	  whether	  Flybe’s	  conduct	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  ‘normal	  commercial	  practice’.	  	  
904	  See	  also	  Guidance	  on	  the	  Commission's	  enforcement	  priorities	  in	  applying	  Article	  [102]	  of	  the	  [TFEU]	  to	  abusive	  
exclusionary	  conduct	  by	  dominant	  undertakings,	  OJ	  [2009]	  C	  45/7,	  para	  29:	  ‘The	  question	  of	  whether	  conduct	  is	  
objectively	  necessary	  and	  proportionate	  must	  be	  determined	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  factors	  external	  to	  the	  dominant	  
undertaking’.	  
905	  In	  July	  2001,	  the	  OFT	  laid	  down	  its	  first	  decision	  (OFT	  decision	  of	  16	  July	  2001,	  Aberdeen	  Journals,	  Case	  
CA98/5/2001).	  In	  March	  2002,	  the	  CAT	  set	  aside	  the	  decision	  on	  procedural	  grounds	  (Aberdeen	  Journals	  v	  Director	  
General	  of	  Fair	  Trading	  [2002]	  CAT	  4).	  According	  to	  the	  CAT,	  the	  OFT	  had	  provided	  insufficient	  reasoning	  for	  its	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variable	  costs,906	  the	  OFT	  did	  accept	  an	  objective	  justification	  for	  the	  period	  in	  which	  Aberdeen	  Journals	  
incurred	   high	   costs	   due	   to	   a	   threat	   of	   industrial	   action.907	   The	   prima	   facie	   predatory	   prices	   were	  
seemingly	   caused	   by	   exceptionally	   high	   costs,	   rather	   than	   low	   prices	   targeted	   at	   excluding	  
competition.908	   There	   is	   a	   sound	   reason	   to	   condone	   prices	   below	   average	   variable	   costs	   if	   it	   is	   truly	  
impossible	  for	  the	  dominant	  firm	  to	  prevent	  the	  prima	  facie	  abuse.	  Allowing	  such	  a	  justification	  can	  be	  
aligned	  with	  EU	  case	  law,	  as	  the	  ECJ’s	  predation	  case	  law	  is	  based	  on	  the	  premise	  that	  the	  dominant	  firm	  
sets	  its	  prices	  by	  choice.909	  
	  
Objective	   necessity	  may	   also	   exist	   if	   the	   dominant	   firm	   refuses	   supply	   because	   of	   a	   lack	   of	   available	  
capacity.	  An	  example	   is	  the	  Luxembourg	  Tanklux	  case,	  where	  the	  NCA	  (‘Conseil	  de	   la	  Concurrence’,	  or	  
‘Conseil’)	  found	  that	  insufficient	  capacity	  justified	  a	  refusal	  by	  a	  manager	  of	  a	  port	  facility	  to	  provide	  fuel	  
storage	  capacity.910	  Similarly,	   the	  Spanish	  Competition	  Tribunal	  held	   in	  Pharma/Glaxo	   that	  a	  refusal	   to	  
supply	  may	  be	  justified	  if	  a	  client	  suddenly	  and	  substantially	  increases	  its	  orders	  to	  such	  an	  extent	  that	  
the	  dominant	  firm	  cannot	  meet	  its	  request.911	  
	  
In	  my	   view,	   objective	   necessity	   requires	  more	   than	   simply	   stating	   in	   general	   terms	   that	   the	   available	  
capacity	   is	   insufficient	  (as	  the	  Conseil	  seems	  to	  have	  done	  in	  Tanklux).	  Such	  a	  plea	  should	  explain	  why	  
the	   dominant	   firm	   could	   not	   have	   acted	   in	   a	   less	   anti-­‐competitive	   manner.	   Perhaps	   a	   simple	  
readjustment	   in	   capacity	   allocation	   could	   have	   avoided	   the	   exclusion.	   Indeed,	   the	   German	   NCA	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
market	  definition.	  The	  OFT’s	  second	  decision	  confirmed	  its	  earlier	  findings,	  and	  included	  a	  more	  elaborate	  
treatment	  of	  the	  market	  definition	  (OFT	  decision	  of	  25	  September	  2002,	  Aberdeen	  Journals	  (remitted	  case),	  Case	  
CA98/14/2002).	  The	  CAT	  upheld	  the	  second	  OFT	  ruling	  (Aberdeen	  Journals	  v	  Director	  General	  of	  Fair	  Trading	  [2003]	  
CAT	  11).	  
906	  The	  OFT	  presumes	  this	  conduct	  to	  be	  abusive	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  AZKO	  case	  (supra	  note	  894).	  See	  the	  OFT	  
decision	  of	  25	  September	  2002	  (ibid),	  paras	  175-­‐180.	  
907	  Ibid.,	  para	  205.	  
908	  One	  could	  also	  wonder	  if	  the	  prices	  under	  review	  were	  capable	  of	  excluding	  competition,	  and	  thus	  whether	  
they	  were	  prima	  facie	  abusive	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  
909	  See,	  eg	  AKZO	  and	  Tetra	  Pak	  II	  (supra	  note	  894).	  
910	  Conseil	  decision	  of	  3	  August	  2009,	  Tanklux,	  Case	  2009-­‐FO-­‐02.	  See	  also	  Conseil	  decision	  of	  23	  April	  2007,	  Rock	  
Fernand	  Distributions,	  Case	  2007-­‐FO-­‐01.	  
911	  Tribunal	  de	  Defensa	  de	  la	  Competencia	  ruling	  of	  13	  October	  2004,	  Spain	  Pharma/Glaxo,	  Case	  R	  611/2004.	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(‘Bundeskartellamt’,	  or	  ‘BKartA’)	  displays	  a	  strict	  approach	  towards	  insufficient	  capacity	  in	  its	  Scandlines	  
decision.	  The	  decision	  notes	  that	  such	  a	  plea	  requires	  compelling	  evidence,	  and	  may	  be	  rejected	  if	  the	  
refusal	  results	  in	  the	  removal	  of	  all	  competition	  at	  the	  downstream	  level.912	  I	  support	  a	  rigorous	  analysis	  
of	   alleged	   capacity	   constraints.	  However,	   once	   it	   appears	   that	   those	   constraints	   are	   genuine,	   there	   is	  
little	  reason	  to	  examine	  the	  effects	  on	  competition	  (as	  the	  BKartA	  seems	  to	  have	  done	  in	  Scandlines)	  as	  
objective	  necessity	  implies	  that	  the	  dominant	  firm	  had	  no	  alternative	  course	  of	  action.	  
	  
Objective	  necessity	  may	  also	  exist	  if	  the	  State	  forces	  the	  dominant	  firm	  to	  act	  in	  a	  particular	  way.	  As	  was	  
shown	   above,	   the	   UK	   and	   Irish	   Competition	   Acts	   explicitly	   provide	   for	   such	   a	   situation.	   The	   CAT	  
confirmed	  in	  Floe	  that	  competition	  law	  does	  not	  require	  a	  dominant	  firm	  to	  act	  illegally;	  in	  such	  cases	  a	  
dominant	   firm	   can	   rely	   on	   its	   lack	   of	   alternatives.913	   Otherwise,	   however,	   I	   have	   not	   found	   cases	  





The	  following	  paragraphs	  discuss	  various	  cases	  that	  assessed	  whether	  efficiency	  benefits	  could	  justify	  a	  
prima	   facie	   abuse.	   The	   plea	   requires	   that,	   on	   balance,	   the	   conduct	   under	   review	   entails	   efficiency	  
benefits	  that	   lead	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  consumer	  welfare.	  Allowing	  such	  a	  plea	  is	  consistent	  with	  ECJ	  case	  
law,	  notably	  the	  British	  Airways	  and	  Post	  Danmark	  judgments.914	  	  
	  
3.4.2 Domestic	  cases	  on	  efficiencies	  
Tenants	   of	   storage	   facilities	   triggered	   the	   Luxembourg	   Tanklux	   case,	   complaining	   inter	   alia	   that	   they	  
were	  required	  to	  deal	  with	  a	  transport	  company	  pre-­‐selected	  by	  port	  manager	  Tanklux.915	  The	  Conseil	  
disagreed	   with	   the	   complaint,	   finding	   the	   requirement	   to	   be	   justified	   based	   on	   several	   grounds,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
912	  Bundeskartellamt	  decision	  of	  27	  January	  2010,	  Scandlines,	  Case	  B9-­‐188/05.	  For	  the	  reasoning	  on	  objective	  
justification,	  see	  pages	  49	  et	  seq.	  
913	  Supra	  note	  841.	  
914	  British	  Airways,	  supra	  note	  866.	  See	  also	  Case	  C-­‐209/10	  Post	  Danmark	  v	  Konkurrencerådet	  [2012]	  ECR	  nyr,	  para	  
42.	  
915	  Tanklux,	  supra	  note	  910,	  paras	  51-­‐52.	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including	  its	  efficiency	  benefits.	  According	  to	  the	  Conseil,	  regular	  contacts	  between	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  
companies	  can	  bring	  down	  costs	  and	  thus	  produce	  considerable	  efficiency	  benefits.916	  
	  
In	  the	  Canal+	  decision,	  the	  French	  Autorité	  focused	  on	  the	  question	  whether	  Canal+,	  a	  pay-­‐TV	  company,	  
abused	  its	  dominant	  position	  by	  tying	  its	  flagship	  Canal+	  product	  with	  other	  TV	  content.917	  The	  Autorité	  
found	  that	  the	  tie	  produced	  cost	  savings,918	  and	  provided	  consumers	  the	  benefit	  of	  receiving	  only	  one	  
invoice	  and	  of	  obtaining	  both	  services	  through	  one	  decoder.919	  The	  Autorité	  concluded	  that	  Canal+	  had	  
not	  abused	  its	  dominant	  position.	  The	  Paris	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  upheld	  the	  Autorité’s	  decision,	  confirming	  
that	   the	   conduct	   lead	   to	   cost	   reductions	   and	   efficiency	   gains.920	   Another	   relevant	   decision	   from	   the	  
Autorité	   is	   Coca-­‐Cola,	   triggered	   by	   a	   complaint	   against	   Coca-­‐Cola’s	   new	   pricing	   scheme	  with	   a	   tiered	  
structure.921	  The	  Autorité	  held	  that	  the	  new	  scheme	  lead	  to	  efficiencies	  and	  produced	  distribution	  costs	  
savings	  that	  could	  be	  passed	  on	  to	  clients	  and	  consumers.922	  
	  
Of	   course,	   the	   efficiency	   plea	   does	   not	   always	   succeed.	   Although	   the	  OFT	   saw	   no	   reason	   for	   further	  
action	  in	  the	  Flybe	  predation	  case	  (introduced	  in	  Section	  C.2.b),	  it	  did	  reject	  Flybe’s	  efficiency	  plea.	  First,	  
the	  OFT	  did	  not	   find	   that	   the	   claimed	  efficiencies	  were	   fully	   attributable	   to	   Flybe.923	   Second,	   the	  OFT	  
considered	  that	  if	  Flybe	  were	  to	  become	  the	  sole	  operator	  of	  the	  relevant	  route,	  the	  current	  efficiencies	  
would	  not	  be	  sufficient	  to	  offset	  the	  long-­‐term	  detrimental	  effects	  that	  would	  result.924	  This	  approach	  is	  
worthy	  of	  note,	  as	  it	  allows	  the	  efficiency	  analysis	  to	  take	  into	  account	  future	  effects	  instead	  of	  merely	  
considering	  effects	  that	  have	  already	  materialised.	  Although	  I	  agree	  that	  this	  is	  the	  most	  comprehensive	  
and	  correct	  approach	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  efficiency	  approach,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  quantification	  of	  all	  the	  potential	  
effects	  will	  be	  anything	  but	  easy.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
916	  Ibid.,	  para	  56.	  
917	  Autorité	  decision	  of	  18	  March	  2005,	  Canal+,	  Case	  05-­‐D-­‐13.	  	  
918	  Ibid.,	  para	  67.	  
919	  Ibid.	  
920	  Paris	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  judgment	  of	  15	  November	  2005,	  Canal+,	  Case	  2005/08308,	  page	  9.	  
921	  Autorité	  decision	  of	  18	  April	  2003,	  Coca-­‐Cola,	  Case	  03-­‐D-­‐20.	  
922	  Ibid.,	  para	  54-­‐55.	  
923	  Flybe,	  supra	  note	  816,	  at	  6.97.	  
924	  Ibid.,	  at	  6.104	  and	  6.108.	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Another	  issue	  is	  how	  the	  benefits	  should	  be	  distributed.	  There	  is	  obviously	  little	  reason	  to	  condone	  an	  
efficiency	   defence	   in	   the	   absence	   of	  any	   net	   benefit	   to	   consumer	  welfare.	   The	  Genzyme	   case,	   on	   an	  
alleged	   margin	   squeeze,	   offers	   an	   example.	   Genzyme	   produced	   a	   drug	   and	   also	   provided	   homecare	  
services,	   delivering	   that	   drug	   to	   patients	   in	   their	   homes.	   A	   complaint	   by	   an	   alternative	   provider	   of	  
homecare	  services	  alleged	  that	  it	  was	  left	  with	  an	  insufficient	  margin	  to	  viably	  compete.	  Both	  the	  OFT925	  
and	   the	   CAT926	   agreed	   that	   Genzyme	   had	   entered	   into	   an	   illegal	   margin	   squeeze.	   The	   CAT	   rejected	  
Genzyme’s	  argument	  that	   its	  conduct	   led	  to	  efficiencies,	  because	  the	  concept	  of	  objective	   justification	  
requires	  that	  benefits	  not	  only	  accrue	  to	  the	  dominant	  undertaking,	  but	  to	  customers	  as	  well.927	  	  
	  
Perhaps	  a	  more	  difficult	  question	  is	  whether	  the	  mere	  existence	  of	  any	  net	  benefit	  to	  consumer	  welfare	  
is	  sufficient	  for	  the	  efficiency	  plea,	  or	  if	  it	  also	  requires	  that	  consumers	  must	  at	  least	  receive	  a	  ‘fair’	  share	  
of	   the	   resulting	  benefits.	   French	   statutory	   law	   indeed	  contains	   such	  a	   fair	   share	   requirement,	  but	   the	  
other	  jurisdictions	  under	  review	  do	  not	  make	  clear	  how	  large	  the	  benefit	  to	  consumer	  welfare	  must	  be.	  
In	  my	  view,	  the	  proportionality	  (stricto	  sensu)	  criterion,	  as	  examined	  in	  Section	  4.4	  below,	  could	  be	  used	  
to	  reject	  a	   justification	   if	   the	  benefit	   to	  consumer	  welfare	   is	  blatantly	  unfair	  compared	  to	  the	  benefits	  
that	  accrue	  to	  the	  dominant	  firm.	  
	  
Finally,	  a	  common	  weakness	  of	   the	  cases	  described	  above	   is	   that	   the	  efficiency	  reasoning	  tends	   to	  be	  
too	  generic.	  The	  cases	  should	   include	  a	  clear	  balancing	  act	  between	  pro-­‐	  and	  anti-­‐competitive	  effects.	  
Decisions	   would	   also	   gain	   in	   clarity	   if	   NCAs	   and	   domestic	   courts	   explicitly	   mention	   which	   type	   of	  
efficiencies	   they	   consider	   particularly	   relevant	   for	   their	   examination	   (i.e.	   allocative,	   productive	   and	  
dynamic	   efficiency).928	   For	   example,	   cases	   such	   as	  Tanklux	   and	  Coca-­‐Cola	   could	   have	  made	   clear	   that	  
productive	   efficiency	   cost	   savings	   were	   considered	   to	   outweigh	   a	   possible	   decline	   in	   allocative	  
efficiency.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
925	  OFT	  decision	  of	  27	  March	  2003,	  Genzyme,	  Case	  CA98/3/03.	  
926	  Genzyme	  v	  OFT	  [2004]	  CAT	  4.	  
927	  Ibid.,	  para	  583.	  The	  CAT	  also	  considered	  that	  Genzyme’s	  conduct	  bereft	  patients	  of	  a	  choice	  between	  homecare	  
providers,	  see	  paras	  585	  and	  612.	  
928	  In	  essence,	  allocative	  efficiency	  implies	  output	  maximization;	  productive	  efficiency	  implies	  cost	  minimization	  
and	  dynamic	  efficiency	  implies	  innovation	  maximization.	  These	  various	  types	  of	  efficiency	  are	  often	  at	  odds:	  for	  
example,	  cost	  minimization	  can	  have	  an	  adverse	  effect	  on	  innovation.	  For	  a	  further	  explanation	  of	  these	  types	  of	  
efficiencies,	  see	  e.g.	  A.	  Jones	  &	  B.	  Sufrin,	  EC	  Competition	  Law	  (OUP:	  Oxford	  2008),	  at	  8.	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3.5 Public	  interest	  
	  
3.5.1 Introduction	  
Several	  domestic	  cases	  have	  accepted	  public	  interest	  grounds	  as	  a	  reason	  to	  justify	  prima	  facie	  abusive	  
conduct.	  These	  cases	  can	  offer	  valuable	  lessons	  for	  our	  understanding	  of	  such	  justifications,	  considering	  
the	  lack	  of	  clear	  ECJ	  guidance.929	  In	  my	  view,	  it	  makes	  sense	  that	  NCAs	  and	  domestic	  courts	  acknowledge	  
that	   competition	   law	  does	   not	   exist	   in	   a	   vacuum,	   and	   that	   non-­‐competition	   interests	  may	   be	   able	   to	  
trump	  the	  finding	  of	  an	  abuse.	  However,	  the	  plea	  does	  require	  careful	  analysis	  to	  ensure	  that	   it	   is	  not	  
used	  simply	  as	  a	  pretext	  for	  anti-­‐competitive	  conduct.	  
	  
3.5.2 Security	  &	  safety	  standards	  
The	  Hilti	  case	  raised	  the	  question	  whether	  the	  protection	  of	  security	  and	  safety	  standards	  could	  justify	  a	  
prima	  facie	  abuse	  under	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  Although	  the	  General	  Court	  rejected	  this	  plea	  on	  the	  facts,	  it	  
did	   not	   reject	   the	   possibility	   to	   invoke	   such	   considerations	   as	   a	  matter	   of	   law.930	   Similarly,	   in	   the	  UK	  
Genzyme	   case	   (introduced	   in	   Section	   3.4.2	   of	   this	   Chapter),	   the	   dominant	   firm	   tried	   to	   justify	   the	  
exclusion	   of	   an	   alternative	   provider	   of	   homecare	   services	   by	   stating	   that	   it	   was	   unfit	   to	   deliver	   such	  
services.	  The	  CAT	  rejected	  this	  submission,	  as	  the	  National	  Health	  Service	  had	  approved	  the	  new	  entrant	  
as	  a	  capable	  and	  competent	  homecare	  provider.931	  
	  
However,	   some	   domestic	   cases	   did	   accept	   the	   need	   to	   uphold	   safety	   or	   security	   standards	   as	   a	  
justification.	  Two	  examples	  originate	  from	  the	  ORR’s	  decisional	  practice.	  The	  ORR’s	  Portec	  decision	  was	  
triggered	  by	  a	  complaint	  from	  NTM,	  a	  supplier	  of	  grease	  for	  use	  in	  trackside	  lubricators.932	  NTM	  alleged	  
that	  Portec	  (a	  supplier	  of	  both	  trackside	  lubricators	  and	  grease)	  had	  unlawfully	  demanded	  lengthy	  field	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
929	  See	  e.g.	  Case	  T-­‐30/89	  Hilti	  v	  Commission	  [1990]	  ECR	  II-­‐163	  and	  Case	  T-­‐83/91	  Tetra	  Pak	  International	  v	  
Commission	  [1994]	  ECR	  II-­‐755.	  The	  ECJ	  upheld	  both	  judgments.	  For	  an	  elaborate	  examination	  of	  public	  policy’s	  
relevance	  as	  to	  Article	  101	  TFEU,	  see	  C.	  Townley,	  Article	  81	  EC	  and	  Public	  Policy	  (Hart	  Publishing,	  Oxford	  and	  
Portland,	  Oregon:	  2009).	  
930	  See	  Hilti	  (ibid.).	  	  
931	  Genzyme,	  supra	  note	  926,	  para	  612.	  
932	  ORR	  decision	  of	  12	  August	  2005,	  NTM	  v	  Portec,	  paras	  168-­‐185.	  Available	  at	  
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/ca98_public_register/decisions/orr.pdf.	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trials	  (instead	  of	  the	  standard	  tests)	  before	  allowing	  the	  use	  of	  NTM’s	  grease	  in	  Portec’s	  new	  trackside	  
lubricator.933	   In	   its	  assessment	  of	  a	  possible	  objective	  justification,934	  the	  ORR	  referred	  extensively	  to	  a	  
report	  that	  found	  the	  performance	  of	  various	  greases	  to	  be	  substandard.	  The	  poor	  performance	  risked	  
ineffective	   protection	   of	   trackside	   lubricators,	   leading	   to	   operational	   and	   safety	   hazards.935	   The	   ORR	  
concluded	  that	  the	  need	  for	  extended	  field	  trials	  was	  objectively	  justified.936	  	  
	  
In	  P.	  Way	  &	  Suretrack,	  complainants	  alleged	  that	  the	  London	  Underground	  Group	  (‘LUG’)	  had	  abused	  its	  
dominant	  position	  by	  not	  allowing	  them	  to	  supply	  safety	  critical	  personnel.937	  The	  ORR	  found	  insufficient	  
evidence	  that	  LUG’s	  policy	  adversely	  affected	  competition	  or	  consumers.938	  But	  even	  if	  there	  would	  have	  
been	   such	  evidence,	   the	  ORR	  held	   that	   safety	   reasons	   justified	   LUG’s	   conduct.939	   The	  ORR	  considered	  
LUG’s	  safety	  policy	  as	   ‘fair	  and	  objective’,	  notably	  because	  its	  criteria	  sought	  to	  directly	  address	  safety	  
failings	  identified	  in	  a	  report	  following	  the	  1999	  Ladbroke	  Grove	  rail	  accident.940	  
	  
In	  Total,	  the	  French	  Autorité	  did	  not	  regard	  the	  refusal	  by	  oil	  company	  Total	  to	  provide	  access	  to	  its	  sea-­‐
line	  (an	  off-­‐shore	  docking	  platform)	  as	  abusive.941	  Besides	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Autorité	  did	  not	  consider	  the	  
sea-­‐line	  to	  be	  an	  essential	  facility,	  it	  held	  that	  Total’s	  conduct	  could	  be	  objectively	  justified	  in	  any	  case.	  
Total	  refused	  to	  provide	  access	  if	  a	  party	  requesting	  access	  did	  not	  comply	  with	  certain	  security	  rules	  on	  
verification	   and	   acceptance	   of	   boats.	   These	   so-­‐called	   ‘vetting	   rules’,	   designed	   to	  minimize	   the	   risk	   of	  
accidents,	   were	   not	   published	   and	   thus	   unknown	   to	   third	   parties.942	   The	   Autorité	   accepted	   Total's	  
argument	  that	  its	  vetting	  rules	  need	  not	  be	  disclosed,	  as	  it	  was	  customary	  for	  oil	  companies	  not	  to	  do	  so	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
933	  Ibid.,	  para	  11.	  
934	  Ibid.,	  paras	  168-­‐185.	  
935	  Ibid.,	  paras	  168,	  178	  and	  179.	  
936	  Ibid.,	  para	  184.	  
937	  ORR	  non-­‐infringement	  notice	  of	  23	  June	  2004,	  Suretrack	  Rail	  Services	  Ltd	  and	  P.	  Way	  Services	  Ltd,	  available	  at	  
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/ca98_public_register/decisions/suretrackrailservices.pdf.	  
938	  Ibid.,	  para	  65.	  
939	  Ibid.,	  paras	  61-­‐65.	  	  
940	  Ibid.,	  paras	  64-­‐65.	  
941	  Autorité	  decision	  of	  20	  November	  2008,	  Total,	  Case	  08-­‐D-­‐27,	  para	  32.	  
942	  Ibid.,	  para	  26.	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for	  reasons	  of	  security.943	  The	  case	  aptly	  shows	  the	  importance	  of	  context,	  in	  particular	  as	  to	  the	  degree	  
that	   a	   dominant	   undertaking	   can	   rely	   on	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   conduct	   under	   review	   is	   simply	   normal	  
business	  practice	  in	  its	  sector.	  
	  
In	  Tanklux,	  the	  Luxembourg	  Conseil	  examined	  the	  requirement	  for	  tenants	  of	  a	  port	  facility	  to	  deal	  with	  
a	   pre-­‐selected	   transport	   company.	   It	   observed	   that	   domestic	   law	   requires	   operators	   of	   petroleum	  
storage	   facilities,	   such	   as	   Tanklux,	   to	   manage	   all	   potential	   security	   issues.944	   The	   Conseil	   found	   that	  
Tanklux’s	  pre-­‐selection	  of	  a	  single	  transport	  company	  would	  facilitate	  safety	  management.945	  	  
	  
Finally,	  the	  Scandlines	  decision	  by	  the	  BKartA	  shows	  that	  a	  plea	  based	  on	  security	  standards	  to	  justify	  a	  
refusal	   to	   provide	   access	  may	   be	   rejected	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   concrete	   evidence	   that	   the	   refusal	   was	  
genuinely	   based	   on	   such	   worries.946	   In	   the	   BKartA’s	   view,	   the	   alleged	   security	   issues	   seemed	   solely	  
based	  on	  the	  fear	  of	  competition	  and	  of	  losing	  customers	  rather	  than	  actual	  safety	  concerns.	  The	  BKartA	  
also	   appears	   to	   have	   taken	   into	   account	   that,	   in	   this	   case,	   the	   refusal	   resulted	   in	   a	   complete	   lack	   of	  
competition	  on	  the	  downstream	  market	  for	  the	  provision	  of	  ferry	  services.	  
	  
3.5.3 Public	  interest	  –	  other	  reasons	  
Several	  cases	  mention	  the	  potential	  relevance	  of	  public	  interest	  concerns	  other	  than	  upholding	  security	  
or	  safety	  standards.	  In	  the	  Luxembourg	  Tanklux	  case,	  for	  instance,	  the	  Conseil	  found	  the	  pre-­‐selection	  of	  
one	  particular	  transport	  company	  benefitted	  the	  national	  interest,	  as	  it	  was	  ‘likely’	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  
security	  of	  Luxembourg’s	  energy	  supply.947	  	  
	  
Maintaining	  the	  security	  of	  energy	  supply	  was	  also	  invoked	  in	  the	  Dutch	  SEP	  case.	  The	  case	  involved	  a	  
refusal	   by	   electricity	   transmission	   grid	   SEP	   to	   provide	   access	   to	   new	   entrant	  Hydro	   Energy.	   The	  ACM	  
rejected	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  security	  of	  supply	  would	  be	  at	  risk,	  as	  bilateral	  agreements	  between	  SEP	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
943	  Ibid.,	  para	  33.	  
944	  Tanklux,	  supra	  note	  910,	  para	  51.	  
945	  Ibid.,	  paras	  51-­‐52.	  
946	  Scandlines,	  supra	  note	  912.	  
947	  Tanklux,	  supra	  note	  910,	  para	  58.	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and	  energy	  companies	  should	  have	  been	  able	  to	  solve	  any	  potential	  production	  planning	  difficulties.948	  
As	  SEP	  could	  have	  resorted	  to	  less	  anti-­‐competitive	  alternatives,	  the	  ACM	  rejected	  the	  justification	  plea.	  
	  
Finally,	  in	  the	  Saint-­‐Honorat	  case,	  the	  French	  Autorité	  reviewed	  a	  refusal	  by	  the	  organization	  in	  charge	  
of	   traveling	   services	   to	   the	   island	   of	   Saint-­‐Honorat	   to	   accept	   third	   parties	   to	   deliver	   such	   services	   as	  
well.949	   The	  Autorité	   considered	   that	   the	   refusal	  was	   justified,	   considering	   the	   unique	   geography	   and	  
privacy	   of	   the	   island,	   and	   the	   need	   to	   ensure	   the	   control	   of	   the	   flow	   of	   visitors	   by	   the	   island’s	   only	  
inhabitants,	  a	  local	  congregation.950	  
	  
	  




The	  analysis	  of	  domestic	  case	  law	  and	  decisional	  practice	  has	  shown	  that	  many	  factors	  can	  influence	  the	  
availability	   of	   an	   objective	   justification.	   The	   type	   of	   procedure	   is	   one	   of	   them.	   The	   French	  Bouygues	  
decision951	  and	  the	  UK	  Getmapping	  ruling952	  suggest	  that	  a	  dominant	  firm	  may	  find	  it	  relatively	  easy	  to	  
rely	   on	   objective	   justification	   where	   a	   third	   party	   seeks	   interim	   relief.	   In	   Getmapping,	   for	   instance,	  
Laddie	   J	   held	   that	   the	   conduct	   by	   the	   dominant	   firm	   must	   be	   ‘clearly	   unjustified’.953	   Other	   cases	   in	  
France954	   and	   the	   UK955	   indicate,	   however,	   that	   the	   lessons	   of	   Bouygues	   and	  Getmapping	   cannot	   be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
948	  ACM	  administrative	  appeal	  decision	  of	  27	  March	  2000,	  Case	  650/Hydro	  Energy	  v	  SEP,	  para	  98.	  In	  its	  decision,	  
the	  ACM	  sides	  with	  the	  views	  of	  the	  advisory	  committee.	  The	  Trade	  &	  Industry	  Appeals	  Tribunal	  (‘CBb’)	  upheld	  the	  
ACM	  decision,	  but	  did	  lower	  the	  fines	  substantially.	  See	  CBb	  judgment	  of	  28	  May	  2004,	  LJN:	  AP	  1336,	  para	  6.3.	  
949	  Autorité	  decision	  of	  8	  November	  2005,	  Saint-­‐Honorat,	  Case	  05-­‐D-­‐60.	  	  
950	  The	  Paris	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  rejected	  an	  appeal	  against	  the	  decision;	  see	  its	  judgment	  of	  4	  July	  2006,	  Case	  
2005/23732.	  	  
951	  Supra	  note	  890.	  
952	  Getmapping	  v	  Ordnance	  Survey	  [2002]	  UKCLR	  410.	  	  
953	  Ibid.,	  at	  52.	  	  In	  Suretrack	  Rail	  Services	  v	  Infraco	  [2002]	  EWHC	  1316	  (Ch),	  Laddie	  J	  mentioned	  a	  test	  where	  ‘no	  
rational	  and	  fair	  person	  could	  justify	  the	  relevant	  conduct’.	  
954	  Autorité	  decision	  in	  GlaxoSmithKline,	  supra	  note	  892,	  at	  179.	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easily	  transposed	  to	  situations	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  proceedings	  for	  interim	  relief.	  Apart	  from	  the	  type	  
of	  procedure,	  several	  substantive	  elements	  should	  be	  considered	  as	  well.	  This	  shall	  be	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  
following	  paragraphs,	  which	  follow	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  proportionality	  test	  as	   is	  often	  used	  in	  EU	  law.	  
This	   test	   includes	   an	   examination	   of	   (i)	   whether	   the	   conduct	   has	   a	   legitimate	   aim	   and	   is	   suitable	   to	  
achieve	  that	  aim;	  (ii)	  is	  necessary	  for	  achieving	  that	  aim	  (‘the	  necessity	  test’)	  and	  (iii)	  whether	  there	  is	  no	  
disproportional	  balance	  between	   the	   interests	  of	   the	  parties	   involved	   (‘the	  proportionality	   test	  stricto	  
sensu’).	  
	  
4.2 Legitimate	  aim	  &	  suitability	  
	  
A	  dominant	   firm	  cannot	   rely	  on	  objective	   justification	   in	   the	  abstract,	  but	   should	  make	  clear	  why	   the	  
goal	   it	   pursues	   is	   legitimate.	   In	  my	   view,	   such	   a	   legitimate	   aim	   should	   relate	   to	   one	   of	   the	   ‘types’	   of	  
objective	   justification	   described	   earlier,	   i.e.	   considerations	   based	   on	   legitimate	   business	   behaviour,	  
efficiencies	   or	   public	   interest.	   None	   of	   the	   cases	   in	   this	   study	   seem	   to	   have	   rejected	   a	   particular	  
legitimate	   aim	   as	   such,956	   displaying	   the	   wide	   scope	   of	   available	   goals	   that	   a	   dominant	   firm	  may,	   in	  
principle,	   legitimately	  pursue.	  Notwithstanding	   this	  wide	  scope,	  an	  objective	   justification	  plea	  shall	  be	  
more	  persuasive	  if	  the	  dominant	  firm	  invokes	  a	  clearly	  delineated	  objective.	  A	  precise	  description	  of	  the	  
legitimate	  aim	  allows	  the	  conduct	  under	  review	  to	  be	  subjected	  to	  an	  accurate	  legal	  test.	  
	  
Timing	   can	  be	  a	   crucial	   factor	  when	  assessing	  a	   legitimate	  aim.	  A	   justification	   is	   less	  persuasive	   if	   the	  
dominant	   firm	   is	   unable	   to	   produce	   any	   evidence	   that	   it	   sought	   to	   achieve	   a	   legitimate	   aim	   before	  
engaging	   in	  the	  prima	  facie	  abusive	  conduct.	  The	  Cardiff	  Bus	  case	  offers	  an	  example,	  as	  the	  dominant	  
firm	  was	  unable	   to	  produce	  evidence	   showing	   the	  will	   to	   conduct	  a	  market	   test.957	  Another	   revealing	  
example	  is	  Purple	  Parking.	  Two	  parking	  services	  companies	  accused	  Heathrow	  Airport	  Limited	  (‘HAL’)	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
955	  OFT	  decision	  in	  Genzyme,	  supra	  note	  925,	  at	  352.	  See	  also	  the	  High	  Court	  judgment	  in	  Purple	  Parking	  and	  
Meteor	  Parking	  v	  Heathrow	  Airport	  [2011]	  EWHC	  987	  (Ch),	  at	  234.	  
956	  In	  EWS	  (supra	  note	  864,	  at	  C253),	  the	  ORR	  did	  appear	  very	  skeptical	  of	  EWS’s	  plea	  that	  EWS	  simply	  sought	  to	  
secure	  additional	  revenue.	  The	  ORR	  noted:	  ‘The	  fact	  that	  a	  dominant	  undertaking	  wishes	  to	  secure	  additional	  
revenue	  in	  this	  way,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  additional	  business	  is	  profitable,	  cannot	  generally	  act	  as	  a	  
justification	  for	  adopting	  methods	  that	  depart	  from	  normal	  competitive	  practices	  and	  have	  the	  effect	  of	  
strengthening	  its	  dominant	  position’.	  
957	  Supra	  note	  821.	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an	   abuse,	   as	   HAL	   decided	   to	   deny	   them	   access	   to	   the	   forecourts	   at	   various	   airport	   terminals.958	   HAL	  
argued	   that	   its	   refusal	   sought	   to	   remedy	   various	   congestion,	   safety,	   security	   and	   environmental	  
issues.959	  The	  High	  Court	  rejected	  the	  plea,	  finding	  that	  the	  ‘real	  motivation’	  for	  HAL’s	  conduct	  was	  not	  
based	   on	   the	   alleged	   justifications	   that	   ‘had	   never	   really	   occurred	   to	   anyone	   in	   the	   decision-­‐making	  
process’.	   960	  Careful	  analysis	  of	  the	  evidence	  should	  reveal	  the	   ‘real	  motivation’	   for	  the	  conduct.	  Apart	  
from	   timing,	   differentiated	   treatment	   may	   also	   be	   suspect.	   If	   HAL	   genuinely	   wanted	   to	   reduce	  
congestion,	   there	   is	   no	   clear	   reason	   why	   it	   should	   have	   excluded	   two	   rival	   parking	   operators	   while	  
leaving	  its	  own	  parking	  venture	  unaffected.	  	  
	  
The	  question	  whether	  the	  conduct	   is	  suitable	  to	  attain	  the	  relevant	  goal	  may	  also	  play	  a	  part.	   In	  EWS,	  
the	  ORR	  considered	  that	  the	  price	  differentiation	  under	  review	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  remedy	  the	  alleged	  
operational	  difficulties	  by	  the	  company	  requesting	  access.961	  Suitability	  was	  also	  highly	  relevant	  in	  Purple	  
Parking,	   as	   the	  High	  Court	   rejected	   the	   plea	   that	   the	   exclusion	  of	   two	  parking	   operators	  would	  work	  
towards	   solving	   the	   apparent	   congestion	   issues.	   Notwithstanding	   these	   examples,	   most	   cases	   have	  
focused	  on	  the	  question	  if	  the	  conduct	  was	  necessary	  –	  rather	  than	  suitable	  –	  to	  achieve	  the	  stated	  aim.	  
	  
4.3 Necessity	  &	  availability	  of	  alternatives	  
	  
A	  necessity	  test	  examines	  whether	  a	  legitimate	  aim	  could	  have	  been	  achieved	  through	  alternative,	  less	  
anti-­‐competitive,	  means.	  To	  my	  mind,	  a	   separate	  necessity	   test	  has	   little	  added	  value	   if	  a	   situation	  of	  
force	  majeure	  has	  been	  established,	  as	  the	  acceptance	  of	  that	  plea	  means	  that	  the	  dominant	  firm	  had	  
no	  alternative	  ways	  to	  act.962	  
	  
A	  necessity	  test	  is	  relevant,	  however,	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  a	  public	  interest	  plea.	  Several	  domestic	  cases	  denied	  such	  
a	  plea	  because	  the	  dominant	  firm	  had	  less	  anti-­‐competitive	  alternatives	  available	  to	  achieve	  its	  desired	  
objectives.	   In	   cases	   such	   as	   Genzyme	   (UK)963	   and	   Scandlines	   (Germany),964	   the	   exclusionary	   conduct	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
958	  Supra	  note	  955.	  
959	  Ibid.,	  at	  179.	  
960	  Ibid.,	  at	  189,	  195-­‐196	  and	  204.	  
961	  Supra	  note	  864.	  
962	  See	  e.g.	  Aberdeen	  Journals,	  supra	  note	  444.	  
963	  Supra	  note	  931.	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under	   review	   was	   not	   considered	   indispensable	   to	   uphold	   safety	   and	   security	   standards.	   Another	  
example	  includes	  the	  Purple	  Parking	  ruling.	  Mann	  J	  rejected	  an	  objective	  justification	  plea,	  noting	  that	  
there	  were	  alternative	  solutions	  to	  deal	  with	  congestion	  and	  potential	  security	   issues	  short	  of	  refusing	  
access	   to	   rival	   parking	  operators.965	   Similarly,	   in	  Mainova,	   the	  BKartA	  held	   that	   an	  electricity	  network	  
company	   had	   abused	   its	   dominant	   position	   by	   refusing	   to	   deal	   with	   other	   energy	   companies.966	  
According	   to	   the	   decision,	   Mainova’s	   refusal	   was	   unnecessary	   for	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   security	   of	  
supply.967	   The	   decision	   appears	   to	   require	   a	   dominant	   firm	   to	   choose	   the	   conduct	   that	   is	   capable	   of	  
achieving	  its	  legitimate	  aims	  with	  the	  least	  possible	  ‘hindrance’	  to	  other	  market	  participants.968	  
	  
The	  necessity	  test	  is	  also	  relevant	  if	  a	  dominant	  firm	  wishes	  to	  invoke	  efficiencies	  as	  a	  justification.	  There	  
is	   no	   reason	   to	   condone	   an	   efficiency	   plea	   if	   the	   conduct	   under	   review	   is	   not	   indispensable	   for	   the	  
claimed	   efficiencies	   to	   materialise	   (as	   was	   found,	   for	   example,	   in	   Flybe),969	   because	   the	   efficiencies	  
would	  have	  arisen	  even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  prima	  facie	  abuse.	  
	  
Unfortunately,	  several	  domestic	  cases	  on	  public	  interest	  and	  efficiencies	  do	  not	  provide	  a	  clear	  analysis	  
of	   indispensability,	  making	  their	  reasoning	  less	  persuasive.	  For	  example,	   in	  the	  Saint-­‐Honorat	  case,	  the	  
French	  Autorité	  accepted	  a	  ban	  for	  third	  parties	  to	  deliver	  traveling	  services	  to	  the	  Saint-­‐Honorat	  island,	  
but	   did	   not	   explain	   why	   there	   were	   no	   other	   means	   to	   protect	   the	   island’s	   apparently	   unique	  
character.970	  Another	  example	  is	  P.	  Way	  &	  Suretrack,	   in	  which	  the	  ORR	  upheld	  a	  justification	  based	  on	  
security	  benefits	  without	  explaining	  why	  excluding	  various	  companies	   from	  delivering	  so-­‐called	   ‘safety	  
critical	   personnel’	   (rather	   than	   simply	   requiring	   them	   to	   abide	   by	   certain	   quality	   standards)	   was	  
indispensable	   to	   safeguard	   security	   standards.971	   Several	   domestic	   cases	   that	   have	   accepted	   an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
964	  Supra	  note	  946.	  
965	  Supra	  note	  955,	  at	  209	  and	  227-­‐228.	  
966	  Bundeskartellamt	  decision	  of	  8	  October	  2003,	  Mainova,	  Case	  B11–12/03.	  	  
967	  The	  Dutch	  SEP	  case	  contains	  similar	  reasoning,	  see	  supra	  note	  948.	  	  
968	  Bundesgerichtshof	  judgment	  of	  22	  September	  1981,	  Original-­‐VW	  Ersatzteile	  II,	  KVR	  8/80.	  
969	  Supra	  note	  816.	  
970	  Supra	  note	  949.	  
971	  Supra	  note	  937.	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efficiency	  plea	  similarly	  lack	  a	  clear	  necessity	  test:	  notable	  examples	  include	  the	  French	  Total	  decision972	  
and	  the	  Luxembourg	  Tanklux	  decision.973	  
	  
Analysis	  of	   the	  necessity	  criterion	  should	  take	  a	   less	  prominent	  role	  when	  a	  dominant	   firm	   invokes	   its	  
commercial	  freedom.	  Such	  freedom	  implies	  that	  the	  dominant	  firm	  is	  not	  necessarily	  required	  to	  opt	  for	  
a	   particular	   course	   of	   action,	   such	   as	   the	   one	   with	   the	   least	   anti-­‐competitive	   impact.	   This	   position	  
appears	  to	  be	  supported	  by	  several	  of	  the	  cases	  under	  review,	  such	  as	  Ryanair	  (Spain),974	  Interpay	  (the	  
Netherlands),975	  as	  well	  as	  Armor	  Hélicoptère976	  and	  Jaeger	  LeCoultre	  (France).977	  	  
	  
On	   the	   other	   hand,	   some	   cases	   do	   suggest	   that	   the	   necessity	   test	   is	   not	   wholly	   irrelevant	   when	  
examining	  a	  plea	  based	  on	  commercial	  freedom.	  In	  Burgess,	  the	  justification	  plea	  failed,	  partly	  because	  
the	  CAT	  considered	  that	  the	  dominant	  firm	  still	  had	  a	  wealth	  of	  solutions	  available	  –	  other	  than	  a	  refusal	  
to	   deal	   –	   to	   solve	   its	   strenuous	   business	   relationship	   with	   the	   firm	   requesting	   access.978	   Similarly,	   in	  
National	  Grid,	  both	  Ofgem	  and	  the	  CAT	  considered	  that	  National	  Grid	  had	  several	  alternatives	  to	  cover	  
sunk	  costs	  without	  completely	  foreclosing	  the	  market.979	  	  
	  
4.4 Proportionality	  &	  reasonableness	  
	  
The	  proportionality	  criterion,	  stricto	  sensu,	   involves	  a	  balancing	  exercise	  between	  the	  various	  interests	  
at	   stake.	   It	   can	   be	   particularly	   useful	   to	   explore	   the	   outer	   rims	   of	   a	   dominant	   firm’s	   commercial	  
freedom.	  This	  method	  allows	  a	  balanced	  approach	  between	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  dominant	  firm	  and	  the	  
effects	  on	  competition.	  In	  Krankentransportunternehmen	  II,	  the	  German	  Bundesgerichtshof	  examined	  a	  
health	   insurer’s	   refusal	   to	   deal	   with	   a	   private	   provider	   of	   patient	   transports,	   because	   it	   wanted	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
972	  Supra	  note	  941.	  
973	  Supra	  note	  910.	  
974	  Supra	  note	  813.	  
975	  Supra	  note	  856.	  
976	  Supra	  note	  811.	  
977	  Supra	  note	  812.	  
978	  Supra	  note	  833,	  paras	  364-­‐365.	  
979	  National	  Grid	  could	  have	  done	  so	  by	  still	  allowing	  replacement	  of	  gas	  meters	  by	  competitors.	  See	  Ofgem	  
decision	  in	  National	  Grid,	  supra	  note	  872,	  at	  4.186,	  and	  CAT	  ruling	  in	  National	  Grid,	  supra	  note	  875,	  at	  143.	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preserve	  the	  market	  exclusively	  for	  public	  providers	  of	  such	  transports.	  The	  Bundesgerichtshof	  rejected	  
the	   justification	  plea,	  as	   the	  refusal	  had	  a	  disproportionate	  adverse	  effect	  on	  competition	  by	   raising	  a	  
significant	   barrier	   to	   entry.980	   In	   EWS,	   the	   ORR	   rejected	   a	   justification	   plea	   as	   it	   found	   EWS´s	   price	  
differentiation	   to	   be	   disproportionate.981	   Finally,	   in	   National	   Grid,	   the	   CAT	   emphasized	   that	   the	  
arrangements	  under	  review	  were	  disproportionate,	  as	  they	  involved	  high	  charges	  for	  switchers	  and	  led	  
to	   a	   foreclosure	   effect	   that	   was	   ‘too	   severe’	   to	   be	   justified	   by	   National	   Grid’s	   ‘admittedly	   legitimate	  
interest’.982	  	  
	  
In	  several	  other	  cases,	  however,	  the	  dominant	  firm	  did	  meet	  the	  proportionality	  test	  (stricto	  sensu).	   In	  
the	  German	  Lufthansa	   case,	   the	  dominant	   firm	  was	  not	   found	   to	  have	   acted	  disproportionately,	   thus	  
removing	  the	  need	  of	  an	  in-­‐depth	  examination.983	  Before	  cancelling	  certain	  commissions	  paid	  to	  travel	  
agencies,	  Lufthansa	  allowed	  them	  ample	  time	  for	  readjusting	  their	  business.	  The	  EPM/NMPP	  decision	  of	  
the	   French	   Autorité	   offers	   another	   example	   that	   a	   dominant	   firm	   will	   find	   it	   easier	   to	   justify	   a	   new	  
pricing	   scheme	   if	   it	   is	   introduced	   gradually.984	   Turning	   back	   to	   Lufthansa,	   the	   BKartA	   also	   found	   no	  
adverse	  effect	  on	  competition,	  because	  travel	  agencies	  would	  be	  able	  to	  charge	  their	  customers	  directly	  
for	   their	   services.	   The	   OFT	   used	   similar	   arguments	   to	   reject	   a	   complaint	   that	   British	   Airways	   had	  
abusively	   reduced	   the	   booking	   payments	   to	   travel	   agents.985	   The	   OFT	   found	   it	   reasonable	   to	   expect	  
customers	  that	  choose	  to	  book	  through	  travel	  agents	  to	  pay	  more	  to	  cover	  the	  additional	  costs	  and	  to	  
enjoy	  the	  benefits	  of	  the	  extra	  services	  that	  they	  provide.986	  
	  
The	  OFT´s	  decision	  also	  suggests	  that	  a	  dominant	  firm	  will	  find	  it	  easier	  to	  meet	  the	  proportionality	  test	  
if	  its	  conduct	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  ‘reasonable’.	  For	  example,	  in	  Leyland	  DAF,	  the	  UK	  High	  Court	  found	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
980	  Bundesgerichtshof	  judgment	  of	  12	  March	  1991,	  Krankentransportunternehmen	  II,	  WuW/E	  2707.	  See,	  similarly,	  
Bundesgerichtshof	  judgment	  of	  7	  October	  1980,	  Neue	  Osnabrücker	  Zeitung,	  KZR	  8/80.	  
981	  Supra	  note	  864,	  at	  B134.	  
982	  Supra	  note	  875,	  at	  98.	  
983	  Bundeskartellamt	  press	  release	  of	  26	  July	  2004,	  Lufthansa,	  available	  at	  
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wDeutsch/archiv/PressemeldArchiv/2004/2004_07_26.php.	  
984	  Autorité	  decision	  of	  12	  July	  2007,	  EMP/NMPP,	  Case	  07-­‐D-­‐23.	  	  
985	  Supra	  note	  830,	  paras	  46-­‐47.	  
986	  Ibid.,	  at	  44.	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refusal	  to	  supply	  to	  be	   justified,	  as	  the	  party	  requesting	  supply	  had	  not	  paid	   its	  bills.987	   In	  Floe,	  Ofcom	  
found	  that	  a	  refusal	  to	  deal	  served	  a	  legitimate	  interest,	  because	  the	  refusal	  prevented	  the	  provision	  of	  
a	  service	  that	  was	  allegedly	  contrary	  to	  UK	  law.988	  Finally,	  the	  Irish	  High	  Court	  noted	  in	  the	  Irish	  League	  
of	   Credit	   Unions	   (‘ILCU’)	   case	   that,	   while	   examining	   a	   refusal	   to	   deal,	   ‘fair	   play’	   and	   ‘equitable	  
considerations’	  ‘must	  have	  some	  importance’	  while	  considering	  an	  objective	  justification	  plea.989	  Indeed,	  
it	  seems	  that	  ‘reasonable’	  conduct	  can	  be	  largely	  equated	  with	  conduct	  that	  strikes	  an	  equitable	  balance	  
between	   the	   interests	   of	   various	   market	   participants	   –	   hence	   its	   conceptual	   proximity	   with	  
proportionality	  stricto	  sensu.	  
	  
	  
5 PROMISING	  PRACTICES	  
	  
From	  the	  examination	  above,	  I	  distil	  a	  number	  of	  promising	  practices	  that	  I	  think	  will	  lead	  to	  a	  better	  and	  
more	  consistent	  application	  of	  the	  objective	  justification	  concept	  in	  the	  EU.	  A	  first	  observation	  is	  that	  it	  
does	   not	   seem	   necessary	   to	   enact	   objective	   justification	   in	   domestic	   legislation.	   It	   is	   not	   codified	   in	  
Article	  102	  TFEU	  either,	  and	  the	  jurisdictions	  under	  review	  that	  have	  no	  such	  codification	  seem	  to	  have	  
little	  difficulty	  incorporating	  the	  concept	  into	  their	  competition	  practice.	  	  
	  
However,	  where	  such	  (partial)	  codification	  does	  exist,	  NCAs	  and	  domestic	  courts	  should	  clarify	  whether	  
the	   justification	   they	   examine	   is	   derived	   from	   domestic	   legislation	   or	   rather	   an	   interpretation	   of	  
objective	  justification	  as	  meant	  by	  the	  ECJ.	  They	  rarely	  make	  this	  distinction	  clear.	  More	  generally,	  NCAs	  
should	   provide	   more	   transparency	   by	   publishing	   guidance	   on	   their	   interpretation	   of	   objective	  
justification.	   In	  my	   view,	   the	   guidance	   ought	   to	   focus	   on	   the	   types	   of	   available	   justifications	   and	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
987	  Supra	  note	  825.	  
988	  Supra	  note	  844,	  para	  248.	  Ofcom	  considered	  its	  approach	  to	  be	  in	  line	  with	  Case	  27/76	  United	  Brands	  v	  
Commission	  [1978]	  ECR	  207,	  para	  189.	  
989	  Irish	  High	  Court	  22	  October	  2004,	  decision	  by	  Kearns	  J.	  [2004]	  IRLHC	  330,	  at	  page	  85.	  Although	  the	  Irish	  
Supreme	  Court	  overturned	  the	  High	  Court	  ruling	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  market	  definition	  (Irish	  Supreme	  Court	  8	  May	  
2007,	  [2005]	  No.	  077),	  it	  did	  not	  rule	  upon	  Kearn	  J.’s	  observations	  on	  objective	  justification.	  At	  page	  86,	  Fennelly	  J.	  
suggests	  that	  a	  justification	  will	  be	  more	  difficult	  to	  uphold	  in	  the	  case	  of	  ‘super-­‐dominance’,	  a	  concept	  that	  
Fennelly	  also	  applied	  in	  his	  capacity	  as	  Advocate-­‐General	  in	  Case	  C-­‐395/96	  P	  Compagnie	  Maritime	  Belge	  [2000]	  
ECR	  I-­‐1365,	  para	  136.	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appropriate	   legal	   conditions.	   Ideally,	   NCAs	   should	   discuss	   the	   substance	   of	   such	   guidance	  within	   the	  
framework	  of	  the	  European	  Competition	  Network	  to	  avoid	  undue	  divergences	  between	  Member	  States.	  
Next	  to	  providing	  such	  guidance,	  NCAs	  and	  domestic	  courts	  should	  attempt,	  in	  individual	  cases,	  to	  make	  
a	   clear	   distinction	   between	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	  prima	   facie	   abuse	   and	   the	   objective	   justification	   plea.	  
Although	   such	   a	   distinction	  will	   not	   always	   be	   easy	   to	  make,	   it	   does	   have	   the	   potential	   of	   improving	  
analytical	  clarity	  –	  as	  the	  UK	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  also	  emphasised	  in	  National	  Grid.990	  
	  
Justifications	   should	  only	  be	   accepted	  on	   the	  basis	   of	   specific	   and	  persuasive	  evidence	  explaining	   the	  
reason	   why	   the	   dominant	   firm	   acted	   in	   a	   particular	   way	   (Scandlines	   offers	   a	   prime	   example).991	  
Conversely,	   it	   should	   be	   rejected	   if	   the	   dominant	   firm	   supports	   its	   justification	   plea	   only	   by	   generic	  
reasoning	   and	   fails	   to	   clearly	   explain	   the	   link	   between	   the	   justification	   and	   the	   prima	   facie	   abuse	  
(contrary	  to	  the	  decision	  in	  Tanklux).992	  
	  
As	   to	   the	   available	   types	   of	   justification,	   NCAs	   and	   domestic	   courts	   have	   often	   relied	   on	   a	   notion	   of	  
legitimate	   business	   behaviour.	   Such	   a	   justification	   can	   accommodate	   the	   commercial	   freedom	   of	  
dominant	   firms,	   and	   accordingly	   should	   not	   have	   pre-­‐defined	   limitations.	   An	   analysis	   of	   such	   a	  
justification	   should	   pay	   heed	   to	   the	   relevant	   nexus	   between	   the	   dominant	   position	   and	   the	   conduct	  
under	   review:	   the	  more	   likely	   it	   is	   that	   the	   dominant	   firm	  would	   also	   have	   engaged	   in	   that	   conduct	  
without	   being	   in	   a	   dominant	   position,	   the	   easier	   a	   justification	   can	   be	   applied.	   A	   plea	   based	   on	  
legitimate	  business	  behaviour	  shall	  be	  more	  persuasive	  if	  the	  dominant	  firm	  can	  provide	  evidence	  that,	  
at	   the	   time	   when	   the	   relevant	   decision	   was	   taken,	   it	   sought	   to	   achieve	   a	   regular	   business	   objective	  
rather	  than	  an	  anti-­‐competitive	  purpose.	  	  
	  
There	  ought	  to	  be	  a	  particularly	  convincing	  case	   if	  a	   justification	  plea	   is	  based	  on	  a	  reasoning	  that	  has	  
been	  awarded	  only	  limited	  scope	  in	  the	  ECJ’s	  case	  law.	  Notable	  examples	  are	  the	  meeting	  competition	  
defence,993	  and	  the	  possibility	  to	  legitimately	  price	  below	  average	  variable	  costs.994	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
990	  Supra	  note	  878.	  	  
991	  Supra	  note	  912.	  
992	  Supra	  note	  910.	  
993	  See	  e.g.	  EWS	  (supra	  note	  864)	  and	  Bouygues	  (supra	  note	  890).	  	  
994	  See	  e.g.	  Aberdeen	  Journals	  (supra	  note	  442).	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As	  to	  the	  applicable	   legal	  conditions,	  an	  analysis	  of	  potentially	   less	  anti-­‐competitive	  conduct	  would	  be	  
inappropriate,	   as	   that	  would	   defeat	   the	   very	   idea	   of	   commercial	   freedom.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   several	  
domestic	  cases	  –	   rightfully,	   in	  my	  view	  –	  acknowledge	   the	   importance	  of	  a	  proportionality	   test	  stricto	  
sensu,	  and	  often	  also	  assess	  whether	  the	  dominant	  firm’s	  conduct	  is	  reasonable.995	  	  
	  
I	   believe	   that	  objective	  necessity	   can	  be	  a	  particularly	   forceful	   form	  of	   legitimate	  business	  behaviour,	  
provided	  it	  is	  properly	  understood	  as	  an	  actual	  impossibility	  for	  the	  dominant	  firm	  to	  act	  otherwise	  –	  for	  
instance	   in	   the	   case	   of	   government	   compulsion	   or	   a	   situation	   of	   force	   majeure.996	   A	   refusal	   to	   deal	  
triggered	  by	  a	  lack	  of	  capacity	  could	  also	  be	  subsumed	  under	  this	  heading,	  but	  only	  if	  there	  is	  a	  genuine	  
constraint	  on	  the	  dominant	  firm	  that	  cannot	  be	  resolved	  through	  less	  anti-­‐competitive	  means.997	  While	  
examining	  an	  objective	  necessity,	  the	  suitability	  and	  necessity	  conditions	  should	  take	  centre	  stage.	  Once	  
those	   hurdles	   have	   been	   taken,	   there	   is	   little	   reason	   to	   examine	   proportionality	   stricto	   sensu,	   as	   the	  
analysis	  has	  already	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  dominant	  firm	  could	  not	  have	  acted	  differently.	  
	  
Another	  type	  of	  justification	  is	  an	  efficiency	  plea.	  This	  plea	  is	  likely	  to	  gain	  importance	  in	  a	  more	  effects-­‐
based	  understanding	  of	  dominance	   law.998	  NCAs	  and	  domestic	   courts	   should	  make	  clear	  what	   type	  of	  
efficiencies	   they	   deem	   relevant,	   and	   how	   they	   strike	   a	   balance	   between	   various	   pro-­‐	   and	   anti-­‐
competitive	   effects.	   Moreover,	   the	   dominant	   firm	   must	   show	   that	   the	   conduct	   under	   review	   is	  
indispensable	   to	   achieve	   the	   pro-­‐competitive	   effects.	  Many	   domestic	   cases,	   however,	   simply	   state	   in	  
general	   terms	   that	   the	   conduct	  will	   lead	   to	   certain	   efficiencies,	   but	   fail	   to	  make	   an	   explicit	   balancing	  
test.999	  This	  allows	  much	  room	  for	  improvement.	  I	  recognize	  that	  an	  elaborate	  quantification	  of	  effects	  
will	   often	   prove	   highly	   difficult.	   However,	   at	   the	   very	   least,	   NCAs	   and	   domestic	   courts	   should	   clearly	  
explain	  why	  they	  decided	  that	  one	  effect	  should	  be	  considered	  greater	  than	  the	  other,	  for	  example	  by	  
an	  approximation	  of	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  relevant	  effects.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
995	  See	  e.g.	  Krankentransportunternehmen	  II	  and	  Neue	  Osnabrücker	  Zeitung	  (supra	  note	  980),	  and	  EWS	  (supra	  note	  
864).	  
996	  See	  e.g.	  Aberdeen	  Journals	  (supra	  note	  442).	  
997	  See	  e.g.	  Scandlines	  (supra	  note	  912).	  
998	  Commission	  guidance	  on	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  enforcement	  priorities,	  OJ	  [2009]	  C	  45/7-­‐20.	  
999	  See	  e.g.	  Tanklux	  (supra	  note	  910)	  and	  Coca-­‐Cola	  (supra	  note	  921).	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Thirdly,	  dominant	  firms	  may	  also	  rely	  on	  public	  interest	  to	  justify	  their	  conduct.	  In	  a	  number	  of	  domestic	  
cases,	  NCAs	   have	   acknowledged	   the	   importance	   to	   uphold	   safety	   and	   security	   standards.1000	   A	   public	  
interest	   plea	   should	  make	   clear	  what	  objective	   the	   conduct	   seeks	   to	   attain	   and	  why	   it	   should	  prevail	  
over	   competition	   concerns	   (so,	   in	   other	  words,	  why	   the	  dominant	   firm	   is	   right	   to	   go	  beyond	   its	   legal	  
requirements	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  a	  particular	  public	  interest).	  The	  conduct	  should	  be	  suitable	  and	  necessary	  to	  the	  
stated	   aim.	   In	   addition,	   if	   the	   dominant	   firm	   engaged	   in	   conduct	   that	   differentiates	   between	   its	   own	  
(downstream)	   operations	   and	   third	   parties,	   it	   should	   clarify	   why	  working	   towards	   the	   public	   interest	  
leaves	  its	  own	  activities	  unaffected.1001	  The	  quality	  of	  domestic	  decisions	  and	  judgments	  would	  increase	  





This	  chapter	  has	  sought	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  objective	  justification	  at	  the	  Member	  State	  level	  
through	   the	   examination	   of	   domestic	   cases.	   The	   cases	   have	   shown	   the	   importance	   of	   objective	  
justification	   for	   the	  purposes	   of	   competition	   law	  at	   the	   EU	  Member	   State	   level.	   The	   examination	  has	  
revealed	   that	   the	   types	   of	   justification	   identified	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter	   –	   legitimate	   business	  
behaviour,	   efficiency	   and	  public	   interest	   –	   are	   all	   present	   in	   domestic	   cases.	   In	   particular,	   there	   have	  
been	  many	  cases	  exploring	  the	  degree	  of	  commercial	  freedom	  (in	  my	  view	  part	  of	  ‘legitimate	  business	  
behaviour’)	  that	  dominant	  undertakings	  are	  still	  considered	  to	  have.	  In	  addition,	  several	  domestic	  cases	  
–	   in	   particular	   decisions	   by	   NCAs	   –	   have	   relied	   on	   public	   interest	   concerns	   to	   condone	   prima	   facie	  
abusive	  conduct;	  an	  interesting	  finding	  considering	  the	  scepticism	  that	  many	  have	  on	  the	  relevance	  that	  
public	  interest	  can	  play	  in	  abuse	  cases.	  
	  
The	  domestic	  cases	  serve	  as	  a	  source	  of	  inspiration	  for	  further	  debate	  on	  this	  issue.	  Such	  a	  debate	  would	  
hopefully	  create	  more	  clarity	  on	  the	  available	  types	  of	  justifications	  and	  the	  applicable	  legal	  conditions	  
at	  the	  domestic	  level.	  The	  chapter	  counsels	  in	  favour	  of	  NCA	  guidance,	  preferably	  through	  international	  
fora	  such	  as	  the	  ECN,	  to	  mitigate	  the	  risk	  of	  an	  undue	  divergent	  approach	  towards	   justifications.	  Such	  
guidance	  is	  likely	  to	  improve	  the	  quality	  and	  consistency	  of	  decisions	  and	  rulings,	  and	  would	  strengthen	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1000	  See	  e.g.	  Portec	  (supra	  note	  932),	  P.	  Way	  &	  Suretrack	  (supra	  note	  937),	  Total	  	  (supra	  note	  941)	  and	  Tanklux	  	  
(supra	  note	  910).	  
1001	  The	  dominant	  firm	  failed	  to	  do	  so	  in	  Purple	  Parking,	  supra	  note	  955.	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legal	  certainty.	   It	   is	   time	  to	  take	  objective	   justification	  out	  of	   its	  benighted	  situation	  and	   into	  the	  area	  
where	  it	  belongs	  –	  shone	  upon	  by	  the	  limelight	  of	  the	  competition	  law	  arena.	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As	   the	  previous	   chapters	  have	   shown,	   in	   the	  EU	  a	  dominant	   firm	  may	   invoke	  a	   justification	   for	  prima	  
facie	  abusive	  conduct.	  This	  chapter	  will	  show	  that	  several	  jurisdictions	  outside	  of	  the	  EU	  have,	  similarly,	  
accepted	   that	   a	   firm	   with	   market	   power	   may	   offer	   a	   justification	   for	   unilateral	   conduct	   that	   would	  
otherwise	  be	   contrary	   to	   the	   competition	   rules.1002	   In	  order	   to	  obtain	  a	  better	  understanding	  on	  how	  
jurisdictions	   around	   the	   world	   deal	   with	   the	   justification	   concept,	   this	   chapter	   examines	   the	   laws	   of	  
various	  countries:	  Australia,	  Canada,	  Hong	  Kong,	  South	  Africa,	  Singapore	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  
	  
The	   examination	   focuses	   on	   legislative	   texts,	   cases	   and	   –	   where	   available	   –	   guidance	   documents	   by	  
National	   Competition	   Authorities	   (NCAs)	   of	   the	   countries	   under	   review.	   The	   chapter	   seeks	   to	   clarify,	  
discuss	   and	   compare	   how	   these	   jurisdictions	   deal	   with	   justifications.	   The	   jurisdictions	   have	   been	  
selected	   because	   of	   various	   commonalities	   that	   facilitate	   a	   comparison	   between	   them.	   They	   share	   a	  
common	   law	   tradition1003	   and	   boast	   similar	   prohibitions	   of	   anti-­‐competitive	   unilateral	   conduct.1004	   In	  
addition,	   the	   economies	   of	   these	   countries	   are	   global	   or	   regional	   leaders,	   suggesting	   that	   their	   legal	  
regimes	  have	  an	  impact	  well	  beyond	  their	  respective	  borders.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
♦	  A	  revised	  version	  of	  this	  chapter	  has	  been	  published	  as	  T.	  van	  der	  Vijver,	  ‘Justifications	  and	  anti-­‐competitive	  
unilateral	  conduct:	  an	  international	  analysis’,	  (2014)	  37	  World	  Competition	  27.	  
1002	  See	  e.g.	  Brian	  A.	  Facey	  and	  Dany	  H.	  Assaf,	  Monopolization	  and	  Abuse	  of	  Dominance	  in	  Canada,	  the	  United	  
States,	  and	  the	  European	  Union:	  A	  Survey,	  70(2)	  Antitrust	  L.J.	  513,	  521	  (2002-­‐2003).	  	  
1003	  Of	  course	  common	  law	  reception	  varies	  from	  country	  to	  country:	  South	  Africa,	  for	  example,	  has	  also	  had	  
notable	  influence	  from	  the	  civil	  law	  tradition	  through	  Roman	  Dutch	  law.	  Although	  this	  study	  focuses	  on	  common	  
law	  countries,	  it	  does	  not	  examine	  the	  common	  law	  doctrine	  of	  restraint	  of	  trade,	  but	  rather	  the	  interpretation	  of	  
competition	  statutes	  enacted	  in	  the	  jurisdictions	  under	  review.	  
1004	  The	  chapter	  does	  not	  examine	  cases	  on	  price	  discrimination	  since	  such	  conduct	  is	  usually	  regarded	  to	  be	  
separate	  from	  the	  standard	  prohibition	  of	  unilateral	  anti-­‐competitive	  conduct;	  notably	  in	  US	  (see	  also	  infra	  note	  
1174)	  and	  South	  African	  competition	  law.	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Of	   course	   a	   comparative	   analysis	  must	   take	   into	   account	   that	   there	   are	  many	   underlying	   differences	  
between	   these	   jurisdictions.	   Canada	   and	   the	   US	   have	   had	   a	   competition	   regime	   for	   over	   a	   century,	  
whereas	   Hong	   Kong’s	   competition	   rules	   have	   been	   enacted	   as	   recently	   as	   2012.	   In	   addition,	   a	  
competition	  regime	  cannot	  be	  detached	  from	  the	  context	  in	  which	  it	  functions.	  The	  historical,	  economic	  
and	  societal	  backgrounds	  of	  the	  competition	  regimes	  under	  review	  vary	  substantially,	  and	  (should)	  have	  
an	  impact	  on	  the	  interpretation	  and	  the	  objectives	  of	  competition	  law.	  	  
	  
In	   South	   Africa,	   for	   example,	   the	   competition	   rules	   were	   not	   only	   designed	   to	   promote	   economic	  
efficiency,	  but	  also	  to	  ensure	  inter	  alia	  that	  small	  and	  medium-­‐sized	  enterprises	  have	  a	  fair	  opportunity	  
to	  participate	  in	  the	  economy;	  and	  compensate	  for	  the	  imbalances	  caused	  by	  Apartheid.1005	  By	  contrast,	  
in	  Singapore	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  focus	  on	  stimulating	  efficiency	  and	  innovation.1006	  Australian	  competition	  
law	   focuses	   on	   the	   welfare	   of	   Australians,1007	   but	   also	   expresses	   concern	   for	   the	   plight	   of	   small	  
businesses.1008	  A	  2007	   report	  by	   the	   International	  Competition	  Network	  provides	  a	  broad	  overview	  of	  
the	   many	   different	   types	   of	   goals	   that	   competition	   law	   regimes	   throughout	   the	   world	   seek	   to	  
achieve.1009	   Justifications	  of	   otherwise	   illegal	   unilateral	   conduct,	   being	   an	   integral	   part	   of	   competition	  
law,	  should	  be	  interpreted	  consistently	  with	  the	  law’s	  stated	  objectives.	  
	  
Apart	  from	  their	  stated	  objectives,	  the	  competition	  regimes	  under	  review	  differ	  in	  many	  other	  respects	  
as	  well.	  To	  name	  but	  one	  example,	  anti-­‐competitive	  unilateral	  conduct	  may	  lead	  to	  an	  award	  of	  treble	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1005	  Sections	  2(a),	  2(e)	  and	  2(f)	  of	  the	  South	  African	  Competition	  Act.	  
1006	  Section	  6(1)(a)	  of	  the	  Singaporean	  Competition	  Act	  provides	  that	  the	  Competition	  Commission	  shall	  have	  the	  
function	  ‘to	  maintain	  and	  enhance	  efficient	  market	  conduct	  and	  promote	  overall	  productivity,	  innovation	  and	  
competitiveness	  of	  markets	  in	  Singapore’.	  
1007	  Section	  2	  CCA,	  which	  also	  mentions	  the	  means	  to	  achieve	  this	  goal:	  ‘the	  promotion	  of	  competition	  and	  fair	  
trading	  and	  provision	  for	  consumer	  protection’.	  
1008	  See	  e.g.	  Senate	  Inquiry	  into	  the	  Effectiveness	  of	  the	  Trade	  Practices	  Act	  1974	  in	  protecting	  small	  business	  
(March	  2004),	  available	  at	  
http://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/senate/committee/economics_ctte/completed_inquiries/2002-­‐
04/trade_practices_1974/report/report.pdf.	  
1009	  See	  the	  International	  Competition	  Network’s	  Report	  on	  the	  Objectives	  of	  Unilateral	  Conduct	  Laws,	  Assessment	  
of	  Dominance/Substantial	  Market	  Power,	  and	  State-­‐Created	  Monopolies,	  May	  2007,	  available	  at	  
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc353.pdf.	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damages	   (US),1010	   or	   simply	   an	   order	   to	   discontinue	   the	   conduct	   under	   review	   (Canada).1011	   It	   is	  
submitted	  that	  the	  first	  case	  warrants	  a	  more	  prudent	  and	  less	  expansive	  interpretation	  of	  competition	  
law	  than	  the	  second.	  Notwithstanding	  these	  differences,	  however,	   it	   is	  possible	  –	  and	  worthwhile	  –	  to	  
draw	  comparisons	  as	  to	  the	  way	  these	  jurisdictions	  deal	  with	  justifications	  of	  otherwise	  illegal	  unilateral	  
conduct.	  Stripped	  down	  to	  their	  core,	  the	  unilateral	  conduct	  laws	  clearly	  share	  a	  common	  focus.	  They	  all	  
purport	  to	  examine	  ‘the	  nature	  and	  purpose	  of	  the	  acts	  that	  are	  alleged	  to	  be	  anticompetitive	  and	  their	  
impact	  on	  competition	  in	  the	  market,	  while	  taking	  into	  account	  business	  and/or	  efficiency	  justifications	  
for	  such	  acts’.1012	  	  
	  
Even	  though	  this	  point	  of	  departure	  still	   leaves	  many	  divergences,	   I	  do	  think	  that	   it	  provides	  sufficient	  
common	  ground	  to	  build	  on.	  The	   jurisdictions	  under	  examination	  have	  comparable	   legal	  backgrounds,	  
which	  facilitates	  a	  joint	  discussion	  of	  their	  legal	  reasoning	  on	  a	  particular	  topic.	  More	  importantly,	  all	  the	  
jurisdictions	   under	   review	   have	   embraced	   the	   idea	   that	   a	   defendant	   may	   invoke	   a	   justification	   for	  
otherwise	  prohibited	  unilateral	   conduct.	  Apparently	   the	  possibility	   to	   invoke	  a	   justification	  appeals	   to	  
common	   legal	   sense,	   as	   a	  way	   to	   fine-­‐tune	   the	  application	  of	   the	  prohibition.	  No	   type	  of	   justification	  
should,	  a	  priori,	  be	  precluded	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  law.	  Only	  a	  thorough	  examination	  of	  all	  known	  factors1013	  
can	  reveal	  whether	  a	  particular	  justification	  plea	  is	  acceptable	  within	  the	  specific	  circumstances	  of	  that	  
case.	  
	  
The	  driving	  force	  behind	  this	  chapter	  is	  the	  realization	  that,	  even	  though	  the	  importance	  of	  justifications	  
related	   to	   anti-­‐competitive	   unilateral	   conduct	   is	   well	   established,	   there	   is	   little	   sign	   of	   a	   true	  
international	  debate	  on	  this	  topic.	  This	  chapter	  therefore	  seeks	  to	  provide	  insights	  for	  future	  debate	  by	  
exploring	  common	  ground	  and	  relevant	  differences	  on	  this	  topic.	  The	  chapter	  shall	  first	  give	  an	  account	  
of	   the	   jurisdictions	   under	   review,	   examining	   Australia	   (Section	   2),	   Canada	   (Section	   3),	   Hong	   Kong	  
(Section	   4),	   Singapore	   (Section	   5),	   South	   Africa	   (Section	   6)	   and,	   finally,	   the	   US	   (Section	   7).	   Section	   8	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1010	  See	  Section	  4	  of	  the	  US	  Federal	  Clayton	  Act.	  See,	  also,	  Eastman	  Kodak	  Co.	  v	  Southern	  Photo	  Man.	  Co.,	  273	  US	  
359	  (1927).	  
1011	  Under	  Canadian	  federal	  competition	  law.	  Such	  an	  order	  is	  made	  by	  the	  Competition	  Tribunal	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  
Section	  79(1)	  of	  the	  Competition	  Act.	  
1012	  Facey	  and	  Assaf	  2002-­‐2003,	  supra	  note	  1002,	  at	  521.	  
1013	  Canada	  Pipe,	  infra	  note	  1075,	  at	  88.	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2.1 Introduction	  &	  legislation	  
	  
In	   Australia,	   Section	   46(1)	   of	   the	   Competition	   and	   Consumer	   Act	   2010	   (CCA),	   formerly	   known	   as	   the	  
Trade	  Practices	  Act	  1974,	  prohibits	  a	  corporation	  with	  (i)	  a	  substantial	  degree	  of	  power	  in	  a	  market,	  to	  
(ii)	   take	   advantage	   of	   that	   power	   (iii)	   for	   the	   purpose	   of:	   (a)	   eliminating	   or	   substantially	   damaging	   a	  
competitor,	   (b)	   preventing	  market	   entry	  or	   (c)	   deterring	  or	   preventing	   a	   third	  party	   from	  engaging	   in	  
competitive	  conduct.	  Such	  conduct	  is	  also	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ‘misuse’	  of	  market	  power.	  
	  
The	  statutory	  text	  of	  the	  CCA	  does	  not	  explicitly	  mention	  the	  possibility	  to	  invoke	  a	  business	  justification	  
for	   conduct	   that	   falls	   within	   the	   scope	   of	   Section	   46(1)	   CCA.	   However,	   Section	   46(4A(b))	   CCA	   does	  
provide	  that	  the	  courts	  may	  have	  regard	  to	  the	  ‘reasons’	  for	  such	  conduct,	  seemingly	  allowing	  courts	  to	  
have	   regard	   to	   an	   alternative,	   pro-­‐competitive,	   motive	   for	   the	   conduct.	   In	   addition,	   Section	   51	   CCA	  
provides	  a	   ‘State	  action’	  defence,	  holding	   inter	  alia	   that	   the	  prohibition	  does	  not	  apply	   if	   the	  relevant	  
conduct	  is	  specifically	  authorised	  by	  an	  Act	  or	  regulation.	  	  
	  
Apart	   from	  the	  express	  provisions	   in	  the	  CCA,	  case	   law	  unambiguously	  shows	  the	  possibility	   to	   invoke	  
efficiency	  or	  other	  business	  justifications.	  The	  key	  cases	  shall	  be	  examined	  below.	  	  
	  
2.2 Case	  law	  
	  
The	   Australian	   public	   enforcement	   procedure	   is	   as	   follows.	   The	   Australian	   Competition	   &	   Consumer	  
Commission	  (ACCC)	  may	  bring	  cases	  to	  the	  trial	  judge	  in	  case	  of	  an	  alleged	  violation	  of	  the	  CCA.	  Appeals	  
are	  subsequently	  open	  to	  the	  Full	  Federal	  Court	  (FFC)	  and,	  finally,	  to	  the	  High	  Court.	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Several	   Australian	   cases	   on	  misuse	   of	  market	   power,	   especially	   those	   on	   refusals	   to	   deal,	  make	   clear	  
that	  a	  defendant	  may	  invoke	  a	  justification	  plea.1014	  The	  scope	  of	  potential	   justifications	  appears	  to	  be	  
relatively	   broad.	  As	  Marshall	   has	   noted,1015	   justifications	   for	   a	   refusal	   to	   deal	   have	  been	   accepted	   for	  
several	   reasons,	   including	   the	  protection	  of	   legitimate	   trade	  and	  business	   interests,1016	   to	  prevent	   the	  
unauthorised	  use	  of	  the	  defendant’s	  material	  and	  to	  maintain	  the	  integrity	  of	  its	  licensing	  system,1017	  as	  
a	  response	  to	  inappropriate	  product	  labelling	  and	  to	  rationalize	  the	  distribution	  chain,1018	  and	  to	  secure	  
payment	  of	  a	  debt.1019	  
	  
The	  Queensland	  Wire	   case	   showed	  some	  of	   the	  contours	  of	  business	   justifications.1020	  The	  High	  Court	  
examined	  Queensland	  Wire’s	   claim	   that	  BHP	  had	  misused	   its	  market	   power	  by	   effectively	   refusing	   to	  
supply1021	   Y-­‐Bar,	   a	   steel	   product.	   The	   Court	  made	   clear	   that,	   once	   it	   is	   established	   that	   a	   firm	   has	   a	  
substantial	  degree	  of	  market	  power,	  the	  issue	  is	  whether	  it	  has	  taken	  advantage	  of	  that	  power	  for	  one	  
of	  the	  proscribed	  purposes,1022	  requiring	  a	  causal	  link	  between	  the	  market	  power	  and	  the	  conduct	  under	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1014	  See	  e.g.	  Brenda	  Marshall,	  The	  Resolution	  of	  Access	  Disputes	  Under	  Section	  46	  of	  the	  Trade	  Practices	  Act,	  22(1)	  
University	  of	  Tasmania	  Law	  Review	  9,	  38	  (2003),	  referring	  to	  various	  authors	  who	  attach	  much	  relevance	  to	  the	  
examination	  of	  a	  possible	  legitimate	  business	  reason.	  See	  also	  e.g.	  Pont	  Data	  Australia	  v	  ASX	  Operations,	  FCA	  30	  (9	  
February	  1990),	  per	  Wilcox	  J.,	  at	  100,	  referring	  to	  (but	  not	  giving	  much	  guidance	  on)	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘legitimate	  
commercial	  interests’.	  See	  also	  ACCC	  v	  Australian	  Safeway	  Stores	  [2003]	  FCAFC	  149	  (30	  June	  2003).	  At	  330,	  the	  Full	  
Federal	  Court	  suggested	  that	  issues	  relating	  to	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  product,	  reliability	  of	  supply	  or	  ‘other	  legitimate	  
business	  consideration’	  could	  be	  relevant	  for	  the	  assessment	  of	  an	  exclusive	  dealing	  arrangement.	  
1015	  Brenda	  Marshall,	  Refusals	  to	  Supply	  Under	  Section	  46	  of	  the	  Trade	  Practices	  Act:	  Misuse	  of	  Market	  Power	  or	  
Legitimate	  Business	  Conduct?,	  8	  Bond	  Law	  Review	  182,	  193	  (1996);	  Marshall	  2003	  (ibid.),	  at	  43.	  	  
1016	  Top	  Performance	  Motors	  v	  Ira	  Berk	  (Queensland),	  [1975]	  ATPR	  40-­‐004.	  
1017	  Australasian	  Performing	  Rights	  Association	  v	  Ceridale,	  [1990]	  ATPR	  41-­‐042.	  
1018	  Berlaz	  v	  FineLeather	  Care	  Products,	  [1991]	  ATPR	  41-­‐118.	  
1019	  Natwest	  Australia	  Bank	  v	  Boral	  Gerrard	  Strapping	  Systems,	  [1992]	  ATPR	  41-­‐196.	  
1020	  Queensland	  Wire	  Industries	  v	  BHP,	  [1989]	  HCA	  6.	  See	  also	  F.	  Hanks	  &	  P.L.	  Williams,	  ‘Queensland	  Wire	  
Industries	  v	  BHP,	  Judgment	  of	  the	  High	  Court	  of	  Australia’,	  (1990)	  27	  Common	  Market	  Law	  Review	  151;	  K.	  
McMahon,	  ‘Refusals	  to	  supply	  by	  Corporations	  with	  Substantial	  Market	  Power’,	  (1994)	  22	  Australian	  Business	  Law	  
Review	  7,	  29-­‐30;	  Marshall	  1996,	  supra	  note	  1015,	  at	  183.	  
1021	  Queensland	  Wire	  argued	  that	  it	  was	  a	  constructive	  refusal	  because	  of	  particularly	  high	  prices.	  	  
1022	  Queensland	  Wire,	  supra	  note	  1020,	  per	  Mason	  C.J.	  and	  Wilson	  J.,	  at	  22.	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review.1023	  This	  means	  that	  a	  firm	  will	  not	  be	  found	  to	  have	  taken	  advantage	  of	  its	  market	  power	  if	  it	  can	  
show	  that	  it	  would	  have	  acted	  in	  the	  same	  way	  absent	  its	  market	  power.1024	  On	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  case,	  the	  
High	   Court	  was	   not	   convinced	   that	   BHP	  would	   have	   refused	   to	   supply	   absent	   its	  market	   power,	   and	  
concluded	  that	  it	  had	  misused	  its	  market	  power.1025	  
	  
Hanks	   and	  Williams	   have	   suggested	   that	   the	  Queensland	  Wire	   judgment	   requires	   that	   the	   notion	   of	  
‘taking	  advantage’	  must	  be	  seen	  in	  terms	  of	  efficiency.1026	   I	  prefer	  a	  broader	  reading:	  nowhere	  did	  the	  
High	  Court	   state	   that	  quantifiable	  efficiencies	   should	  be	   the	  exclusive	  means	  of	  assessment.	   The	  High	  
Court	  did	   try	   to	  make	   the	  point	   that	   ‘taking	  advantage’	   is	   ‘morally	   indifferent’.1027	   It	   does	  not	   require	  
hostile	  intent,1028	  nor	  does	  it	  demand	  morally	  blameworthy	  conduct.1029	  The	  judgment	  makes	  clear	  that	  
the	  High	  Court	  regards	  competition,	  ‘by	  its	  very	  nature’,	  as	  a	  ‘deliberate	  and	  ruthless’	  process.	  Indeed,	  
‘little	  criticism	  can	  be	  made	  of	  the	  conduct	  involved’	  if	  ‘success	  is	  due	  to	  no	  more	  than	  superior	  skill	  and	  
efficiency’.1030	   This	  means	   that	   companies,	  even	   those	  with	  market	  power,	   are	  allowed	   to	   injure	   their	  
competitors.1031	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1023	  Queensland	  Wire	  (ibid.),	  at	  24.	  I.e.	  the	  conduct	  must	  be	  made	  possible	  by	  the	  absence	  of	  competition;	  
considered	  by	  the	  Trade	  Practices	  Commission	  as	  the	  ‘true	  test’	  of	  Section	  46	  CCA.	  See	  its	  report	  Misuse	  of	  Market	  
Power:	  Section	  46	  of	  the	  Trade	  Practices	  Act:	  Background	  Paper	  (February	  1990),	  at	  33.	  
1024	  Queensland	  Wire	  (ibid.),	  per	  Mason	  CJ	  and	  Wilson	  J,	  at	  28.	  See	  also	  Rural	  Press	  v	  ACCC,	  [2002]	  FCAFC	  213,	  
confirmed	  by	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  High	  Court	  in	  Rural	  Press	  v	  ACCC,	  [2003]	  HCA	  75.	  See	  further	  Marshall	  1996,	  supra	  
note	  1015,	  at	  189,	  referring	  e.g.	  to	  possible	  explanations	  of	  a	  firm's	  refusal	  to	  supply	  in	  competitive	  conditions.	  
Finally,	  see	  F.	  Hanks	  and	  P.L.	  Williams,	  ‘Implications	  of	  the	  Decision	  of	  the	  High	  Court	  in	  Queensland	  Wire’,	  (1990)	  
17(4)	  Melbourne	  University	  Law	  Review	  437,	  445-­‐446.	  	  
1025	  Also	  note	  that	  BHP	  apparently	  ‘did	  not	  offer	  a	  legitimate	  reason	  for	  the	  effective	  refusal	  to	  sell’,	  see	  
Queensland	  Wire	  (ibid.),	  per	  Mason	  C.J.	  and	  Wilson	  J.,	  at	  29.	  
1026	  Hanks	  &	  Williams	  1990,	  supra	  note	  1024.	  See	  also	  Marshall	  2003,	  supra	  note	  1014,	  at	  40-­‐41.	  She	  argues	  that	  
efficiencies	  should	  be	  considered	  under	  the	  ‘taking	  advantage’	  requirement.	  In	  her	  view,	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  
justification	  pleas	  is	  available	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  ‘purpose’	  requirement.	  	  
1027	  Queensland	  Wire,	  supra	  note	  1020,	  per	  Deane	  J,	  at	  3.	  
1028	  Ibid.,	  per	  Mason	  C.J.	  and	  Wilson	  J.,	  at	  22.	  
1029	  Ibid.,	  per	  Deane	  J,	  at	  2-­‐3.	  	  
1030	  Ibid.,	  per	  Toohey	  J,	  at	  27.	  
1031	  Ibid.,	  per	  Mason	  C.J.	  and	  Wilson	  J.,	  at	  24.	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The	  Melway	  Publishing	  case,	  concerning	  an	  exclusive	  distributorship	   that	   resulted	   in	  a	   refusal	   to	  deal,	  
confirms	  that	  the	  acceptance	  of	  a	  justification	  means	  that	  a	  firm	  has	  not	  misused	  its	  market	  power.1032	  	  
The	   case	   also	   shows	   the	   relevance	   of	   examining	   whether	   the	   conduct	   under	   review	   can	   only	   be	  
explained	   by	   way	   of	   the	   firm’s	   market	   power.	   Applying	   the	   commercial	   conduct	   test	   of	  Queensland	  
Wire,	   the	  Trial	   Judge	  and	  the	  majority	  of	   the	  FFC	  rejected	  a	  business	   justification	  plea.	  Both	   instances	  
considered	  that	  a	  firm	  in	  a	  competitive	  market	  would	  not	  have	  refused	  this	  particularly	  large	  order,	  and	  
thus	  observed	  a	  link	  between	  Melway’s	  market	  power	  and	  its	  refusal	  to	  supply.1033	  
	  
However,	   in	   an	   opinion	   dissenting	   from	   the	   FFC	  majority,	   Heerey	   J	   held	   that	  Melway	   had	   not	   taken	  
advantage	   of	   its	   market	   power.	   Heerey	   J	   cautioned	   that	   courts	   ‘should	   be	   very	   reluctant	   to	   tell	   the	  
operators	   of	   businesses	   how	   to	   make	   commercial	   decisions’.1034	   On	   the	   facts,	   his	   Honour	   held	   that	  
Melway	   had	   a	   legitimate	   business	   purpose	   for	   its	   refusal,	   as	   it	   simply	   wanted	   to	   continue	   the	  
distribution	  model	  that	  predated	  its	  position	  of	  market	  power.1035	  
	  
Upon	  a	  further	  appeal,	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  High	  Court	  held	  that	  Melway	  had	  not	  taken	  advantage	  of	  its	  
market	   power.1036	   It	   largely	   endorsed	   Heerey	   J’s	   dissenting	   opinion	   and	   seemingly	   attached	   much	  
relevance	   to	   an	   economic	   analysis	   of	   the	   conduct	   under	   review.	   Referring	   to	   US	   precedent,1037	   the	  
majority	   considered	   Melway’s	   refusal	   as	   a	   legitimate	   termination	   of	   a	   distribution	   agreement.	   The	  
majority	  found	  no	  relevant	  connection	  between	  Melway’s	  market	  power	  and	  its	  distribution	  system	  (as	  
the	   latter	   already	   existed).1038	   This	   is	   a	   potent	   argument.	   If	   the	   company	   would	   not	   have	   behaved	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1032	  Robert	  Hicks	  v	  Melway	  Publishing,	  [1998]	  FCA	  1379	  (30	  October	  1998)	  (Trial	  Judge);	  Melway	  Publishing	  v	  
Robert	  Hicks,	  [1999]	  FCA	  664	  (20	  May	  1999)	  (Full	  Federal	  Court).	  
1033	  Melway	  (ibid.),	  per	  Sundberg	  and	  Finkelstein	  JJ,	  at	  44.	  
1034	  Ibid.,	  at	  19.	  
1035	  Ibid.,	  per	  Heerey	  J,	  at	  18-­‐25.	  
1036	  Melway	  Publishing	  v	  Robert	  Hicks,	  [2001]	  HCA	  13,	  per	  Gleeson	  CJ,	  Gummow,	  Hayne	  and	  Callinan	  JJ.	  At	  104,	  
Kirby	  J	  notes	  that	  the	  Court	  did	  unanimously	  agree	  that	  the	  conduct	  was	  covered	  by	  one	  of	  the	  proscribed	  
purposes,	  as	  it	  prevented	  the	  respondent	  from	  engaging	  in	  competitive	  conduct.	  
1037	  Ibid.,	  at	  18.	  The	  majority	  refers	  to	  Burdett	  Sound	  Inc	  v	  Altec	  Corporation,	  515	  F.2d	  1245	  (5th	  Cir.	  1975).	  See	  also	  
United	  States	  v	  Colgate	  &	  Co,	  250	  US	  300	  at	  307	  (1919);	  Byars	  v	  Bluff	  City	  News,	  609	  F	  2d	  843	  at	  854	  (6th	  Cir.	  
1979).	  
1038	  Ibid.,	  at	  61,	  62,	  66-­‐68.	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differently	  without	   its	  market	  power,	   there	   is	   little	  ground	   to	  conclude	   that	   it	  has	   taken	  advantage	  of	  
that	  market	  power.	  
	  
A	  dissenting	  opinion	  by	  Kirby	   J	   suggested	   that	   the	  majority	   had	   given	   too	  much	   leeway	   for	   unilateral	  
conduct.1039	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   his	   Honour	   agreed	   that,	   as	   a	   matter	   of	   principle,	   there	   may	   several	  
legitimate	   reasons	   for	  a	   refusal	   to	   supply.	   Such	  may	  be	   the	   case,	   for	  example,	   if	   the	  party	   requesting	  
supply	  is	  considered	  (as):1040	  
• ‘incompetent	  to	  handle	  a	  product	  that	  in	  some	  hands	  might	  be	  dangerous;	  
• a	  person	  with	  a	  poor	  credit	  record	  or	  with	  unacceptable	  business	  ethics;	  
• unqualified	  to	  offer	  essential	  after-­‐sales	  service;	  
• liable	  to	  damage	  the	  reputation	  of	  the	  supplier;	  
• being	  unable	  to	  maintain	  accurate	  records;	  
• prone	  to	  engage	  in	  deceptive	  advertising	  or	  unfair	  practices;	  or	  
• likely	  to	  breach	  persistently	  the	  reasonable	  terms	  of	  a	  distribution	  agreement.’	  
	  
On	  the	  facts,	  Kirby	  J	  did	  not	  find	  any	  of	  the	  justifications	  listed	  above	  to	  be	  applicable.1041	  However,	  his	  
Honour	  gives	  no	  clear	  explanation	  why	  the	  enumeration	  given	  above	  should	  be	  considered	  exhaustive.	  
The	  red	  thread	  of	  the	  list	  appears	  to	  be	  ‘reasonable’	  or	  ‘normal’	  business	  behaviour	  that	  any	  company,	  
irrespective	   of	   its	   market	   power,	   would	   engage	   in.	   I	   agree	   that,	   if	   such	   a	   link	   between	   conduct	   and	  
market	  power	  is	  completely	  absent,	  one	  cannot	  conclude	  that	  a	  company	  has	  misused	  its	  market	  power.	  	  
	  
A	   final	   relevant	   case	   is	   Boral	   Besser	   Masonry	   (BBM).	   According	   to	   the	   ACCC,	   BBM	   had	   engaged	   in	  
predatory	  pricing	  with	  the	  purpose	  to	  exclude	  a	  competitor.1042	  The	  Trial	  Judge,	  Heerey	  J,	  dismissed	  the	  
ACCC's	   application,	   holding	   that	   BBM	  did	   not	   have	  market	   power1043	   and,	   in	   any	   case,	   had	   not	   taken	  
advantage	   of	   that	   power.	  Heerey	   J	   considered	   that	   a	   business	   rationale	   could	   be	   ‘a	   factor’	   indicating	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1039	  Ibid.,	  per	  Kirby	  J,	  e.g.	  at	  103.	  
1040	  Ibid.,	  	  at	  104.	  His	  Honour	  cites	  various	  cases	  and	  academic	  articles.	  
1041	  Melway,	  supra	  note	  1036,	  per	  Kirby	  J,	  at	  117.	  His	  Honour	  argues	  that	  his	  approach	  is	  consistent	  with	  overseas	  
approaches,	  referring,	  inter	  alia,	  to	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐6/73	  &	  C-­‐7/73,	  ICI	  and	  Commercial	  Solvents	  v	  Commission,	  
[1974]	  ECR	  223;	  and	  United	  States	  v	  Aluminum	  Co	  of	  America,	  148	  F	  2d	  416	  (1945).	  
1042	  ACCC	  v	  BBM,	  [1999]	  FCA	  1318	  (22	  September	  1999).	  
1043	  Ibid.,	  at	  155.	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that	  there	  is	  no	  misuse	  of	  market	  power.1044	  His	  Honour	  also	  observed	  that	  if	  a	  company	  without	  market	  
power	  ‘would	  engage	  in	  certain	  conduct	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  commercial	  judgment,	  it	  would	  ordinarily	  follow	  
that	   a	   firm	   with	   market	   power	   which	   engages	   in	   the	   same	   conduct	   is	   not	   taking	   advantage	   of	   its	  
power’.1045	  Heerey	  J	  observed	  that	  selling	  below	  avoidable	  cost,	  even	  for	  a	  prolonged	  period,	  can	  be	  a	  
rational	   business	   decision	   as	   it	  may	   simply	   be	   the	   expression	  of	   ruthless	   competition.1046	   I	   agree	   that	  
below-­‐cost	   pricing	   is	   not	   necessarily	   anti-­‐competitive,	   especially	   if	   it	   is	   a	   loss-­‐minimizing	   strategy.	   An	  
examination	  of	  the	  counterfactual,	  being	  the	  situation	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  market	  power,	  may	  shed	  light	  
on	  a	  company’s	  rationale	  for	  entering	  into	  particular	  conduct.	  However,	  it	  should	  be	  remembered	  that	  
predatory	  conduct	  is	  only	  harmful	  to	  competition	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  market	  power	  –	  thus	  weakening	  the	  
value	  of	  the	  counterfactual	  for	  determining	  whether	  the	  practice	  should	  be	  condoned	  or	  not.	  It	  should	  
also	   be	   examined	   whether	   the	   conduct	   under	   review	   is	   capable	   of	   excluding	   equally	   efficient	  
competitors.	  
	  
On	   appeal,	   the	   FFC	   disagreed	  with	   the	   Trial	   Judge’s	   findings.1047	   The	   Judges	   held	   unanimously,	   yet	   in	  
separate	   opinions,	   that	   BBM	   had	   violated	   Section	   46	   CCA.	   Finkelstein	   J	   noted	   that	   there	   is	   a	   strong	  
inference	  of	  predation	  if	  a	  dominant	  firm	  persistently	  prices	  below	  average	  variable	  cost,	  and	  that	  it	   is	  
for	  the	  dominant	  firm	  to	  show	  that	  there	  was	  a	  legitimate	  purpose	  for	  its	  conduct.1048	  	  
	  
In	  a	  further	  appeal,	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  High	  Court	  overturned	  the	  FFC’s	  ruling.1049	  The	  majority	  held	  that	  
BBM	   did	   not	   have	   substantial	  market	   power,1050	   but,	   even	   if	   it	   did,	   had	   not	   taken	   advantage	   of	   that	  
power	  for	  a	  proscribed	  purpose.	  The	  majority	  seemed	  sceptical	  to	  prohibit	  a	  practice	  of	  cutting	  prices	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1044	  Ibid.,	  at	  158.	  	  
1045	  Ibid.	  
1046	  Ibid.,	  at	  175.	  
1047	  ACCC	  v	  BBM,	  [2001]	  FCA	  30	  (27	  February	  2001).	  	  
1048	  Even	  though,	  in	  Finkelstein	  J’s	  view,	  there	  is	  no	  cost	  below	  which	  prices	  should	  be	  per	  se	  illegal	  (ibid.,	  at	  269).	  
1049	  BBM	  v	  ACCC,	  [2003]	  HCA	  5	  (7	  February	  2003).	  Kirby	  J’s	  dissenting	  opinion	  criticizes	  ‘those	  who	  want	  to	  dissect	  
the	  concepts	  in	  s	  46’	  (at	  382),	  but	  does	  not	  offer	  further	  insights	  into	  the	  issue	  of	  justifications.	  
1050	  Ibid.,	  per	  McHugh	  J,	  at	  198.	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below	   costs,1051	   and	   considered	   that	   evidence	   on	   the	   subjective	   intent	   to	   hurt	   competitors	   is	   little	  
helpful	  in	  deciding	  whether	  the	  firm	  has	  taken	  advantage	  of	  its	  market	  power.1052	  
	  
Furthermore,	  Gleeson	  CJ	  and	  Callinan	  J	  noted	  that	  there	  may	  be	  several	  legitimate	  business	  reasons	  to	  
sell	   below	   costs.	   For	   example,	   the	   defendant	   may	   wish	   to	   bear	   short-­‐term	   losses	   in	   the	   hope	   that	  
market	   circumstances	  would	   improve,	   or	   has	   to	   deal	   with	   sunk	   or	   historic	   costs.1053	   I	   agree	  with	   the	  
majority’s	   apparent	   broad	   interpretation	   of	   ‘legitimate	   business	   considerations’,	   but	   think	   that	   the	  
opinion	  could	  have	  been	  much	  clearer	  about	  the	  applicable	  legal	  conditions.	  	  
	  
Without	  such	  a	   framework,	   it	   is	  difficult	   to	  gauge	  whether	  or	  not	  conduct	   is	  considered	   legitimate.	  At	  
the	  moment,	   one	   is	   left	  with	   the	   impression	   that	   the	  High	  Court	   is	   simply	   inclined	   to	   provide	   a	  wide	  
margin	  of	  discretion	  for	  conduct	  by	  firms	  with	  market	  power,	  with	  the	  result	  that	  their	  conduct	  will	  ex	  
post	   facto	   usually	   be	   considered	   legitimate.	   Some	   commentators	   couch	   this	   approach	   in	   terms	   of	  
efficiency.1054	   Although	   I	   agree	   that	   providing	  much	   discretion	   to	   companies	  with	  market	   power	  may	  
very	  well	   lead	   to	   efficiencies,	   the	   term	   can	   be	  misleading	   as	   the	   judgments	   discussed	   above	   did	   not	  





3.1 Introduction	  &	  legislation	  
	  
The	  Combines	   Investigation	  Act	   of	   1910	   introduced	   the	  Canadian	  prohibition	  of	  monopolization,	   as	   it	  
was	  then	  called.	  The	  prohibition	  remained	  largely	  unchanged	  until	  the	  entry	  into	  force	  of	  the	  Canadian	  
Competition	  Act	   (CA)	   in	  1986.1055	   The	   law	  prior	   to	  1986	   contained	  mainly	   criminal	   sanctions	   that	   also	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1051	  Ibid.,	  per	  Gaudron,	  Gummow	  and	  Hayne	  JJ,	  at	  159:	  ‘the	  Act	  has	  never	  contained	  any	  specific	  and	  
comprehensive	  prohibition	  of	  a	  practice	  of	  cutting	  prices	  to	  below	  cost’.	  
1052	  Ibid.,	  per	  Gleeson	  CJ	  and	  Callinan	  J,	  at	  122-­‐123.	  	  
1053	  Ibid.,	  at	  70.	  
1054	  Hank	  &	  Williams	  1990,	  supra	  note	  1024.	  
1055	  M.	  Trebilcock,	  R.A.	  Winter,	  P.	  Collins	  &	  E.M.	  Iacobucci,	  The	  Law	  and	  Economics	  of	  Canadian	  Competition	  Policy,	  
Toronto,	  Buffalo	  &	  London:	  University	  of	  Toronto	  Press	  2003,	  at	  504.	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applied	   to	   unilateral	   anti-­‐competitive	   conduct	   such	   as	   predation.	   Because	   of	   weak	   criminal	  
enforcement,	   the	   abuse	  of	   dominance	   is	   currently	   targeted	  by	   a	   non-­‐criminal	   sanction	   regime.	   I	   shall	  
focus	  on	  the	  law	  post-­‐1986.	  
	  
Section	   79	   CA	   prohibits	   the	   abuse	   of	   dominance.	   Section	   79(1)	   CA	   provides	   that	   the	   Competition	  
Tribunal	   (CT),	   on	  application	  by	   the	  Commissioner	  of	   the	  Competition	  Bureau	   (‘Competition	  Bureau’),	  
may	  prohibit	  conduct	  where	  it	  finds	  that	  there	  is	  (a)	  market	  power,	  (b)	  an	  anti-­‐competitive	  act	  and	  (c)	  a	  
substantial	   negative	   effect	   on	   competition	   in	   a	  market.	   Although	   Section	   79(1)	   CA	   does	   not	   explicitly	  
mention	   the	   possibility	   to	   invoke	   a	   justification	   for	   otherwise	   abusive	   conduct,	   other	   provisions	   do	  
provide	  clues	  as	  to	  the	  type	  of	  pleas	  that	  the	  dominant	  firm	  may	  put	  forward.	  
	  
Section	   78(1)	   CA	   provides	   a	   non-­‐exhaustive	   enumeration	   with	   examples	   of	   abusive	   conduct.	   The	  
examples	   include	   predation,	   margin	   squeeze	   and	   the	   temporary	   introduction	   of	   ‘fighting	   brands’	   to	  
discipline	   or	   eliminate	   a	   competitor.	   Several	   of	   the	   examples	   explicitly	   require	   an	   anti-­‐competitive	  
purpose,	  suggesting	  that	  there	  is	  no	  abuse	  absent	  such	  a	  purpose.	  
	  
Furthermore,	  Section	  79(4)	  CA	  requires	  the	  Competition	  Tribunal,	  in	  its	  assessment	  of	  anti-­‐competitive	  
effects,	   to	  consider	  whether	   the	  practice	  can	  be	  subsumed	  under	   ‘superior	  competitive	  performance’.	  
The	  provision	   seems	   to	  allow	  companies	   to	  argue	   that	   they	   simply	   competed	  on	   the	  merits,	   and	   that	  
their	   success	   is	  due	   to	   superior	  efficiency	   rather	   than	  anti-­‐competitive	  behaviour.	   In	  addition,	   Section	  
79(5)	  CA	  provides	  that	  the	  exercise	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  rights	  will	  not	  violate	  the	  competition	  rules.	  
	  
Another	  example	   is	   Section	  75	  CA,	  which	  deals	  with	   refusals	   to	  deal.	   Section	  75(1)(c)	  CA	  holds	   that	   a	  
refusal	  shall	  only	  be	  problematic	  if	  the	  company	  requesting	  supply	  is	  willing	  an	  able	  to	  meet	  ‘usual	  trade	  
terms’	   in	   respect	   of	   ‘payment,	   units	   of	   purchase	   and	   reasonable	   technical	   and	   servicing	  
requirements’.1056	  Reversely,	  if	  a	  company	  requesting	  supply	  does	  not	  abide	  by	  such	  terms,	  a	  refusal	  to	  
supply	  by	  a	  dominant	  company	  can	  be	  justified.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1056	  Section	  75(3)	  CA.	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Although	   the	   statutory	   text	   does	   not	   explicitly	   provide	   other	   reasons	   to	   condone	   behaviour,	   the	  
following	   paragraphs	   will	   show	   such	   reasons	   do	   in	   fact	   exist	   –	   especially	   where	   they	   promote	  
efficiencies.1057	  	  
	  
3.2 Case	  law	  
	  
The	  enforcement	  of	  Canadian	  competition	   law	   takes	  place	  by	   the	  Competition	  Bureau1058	  or	  a	  private	  
party	  bringing	  a	  case	  before	   the	  Competition	  Tribunal.	   Subsequently	  an	  appeal	  may	  be	   lodged	  before	  
the	   Federal	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   (FCA).	   If	   allowed,	   a	   further	   appeal	  may	   be	   brought	   before	   the	   Canadian	  
Supreme	  Court.	  Before	  discussing	  the	  landmark	  Canada	  Pipe	  judgment	  by	  the	  FCA,	  it	  is	  apt	  to	  examine	  
three	   rulings	   by	   the	   Competition	   Tribunal	   to	   provide	   sufficient	   context	   on	   the	   issue	   of	   justifications.	  
These	  judgments	  are	  Nielsen,	  Tele-­‐Direct	  and	  NutraSweet.	  	  
	  
The	  Nielsen	   case	   focused	   on	   the	   use	   of	   exclusive	   contracts	   to	   deny	   (potential)	   competitors	   access	   to	  
scanner	   data	   used	   for	   market	   tracking	   services.1059	   The	   Tribunal	   examined	   whether	   the	   exclusive	  
agreements	  were	  based	  on	  a	  valid	   ‘business	   justification’	   rather	   than	  an	  anti-­‐competitive	  purpose.1060	  
The	  Tribunal	  held	  that	  it	  may	  consider	  ‘any	  credible	  efficiency	  or	  pro-­‐competitive	  business	  justification’.	  
I	  believe	  that	  this	  terminology	  aptly	  reflects	  the	  wide	  range	  of	  available	  justification	  pleas.	  The	  Tribunal	  
also	  noted	  that	  the	  justification	  plea	  must	  be	  weighed	  ‘in	  light	  of	  any	  anti-­‐competitive	  effects’	  with	  the	  
aim	  ‘to	  establish	  the	  overriding	  purpose’	  of	  the	  challenged	  act.1061	   I	  agree	  that	  such	  a	  balancing	  test	   is	  
indeed	  instructive	  by	  accommodating	  all	  the	  different	  grounds	  and	  implications	  that	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  
the	  conduct	  under	  review.1062	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1057	  See	  Trebilcock	  et	  al.,	  supra	  note	  1055,	  at	  528:	  ‘efficiency	  considerations	  are	  crucial	  to	  deciding	  whether	  an	  act	  
has	  the	  requisite	  anti-­‐competitive	  purposes	  to	  be	  classified	  as	  an	  “anti-­‐competitive	  act”	  pursuant	  to	  section	  79’.	  
1058	  Formally	  speaking,	  Competition	  Tribunal	  cases	  were	  brought	  by	  the	  Director	  of	  Investigation	  and	  Research	  or,	  
more	  recently,	  the	  Commissioner	  of	  Competition.	  
1059	  Canada	  (Director	  of	  Investigation	  and	  Research)	  v	  D&B	  Companies	  of	  Canada	  (‘Nielsen’),	  [1995]	  CT-­‐1994-­‐001.	  	  
1060	  Ibid.,	  at	  67.	  
1061	  Ibid.,	  at	  69.	  Confirmed	  by	  Tele-­‐Direct	  (infra	  note	  1063),	  at	  259.	  
1062	  As	  long	  as	  ‘purpose’	  is	  not	  simply	  equated	  with	  subjective	  intent,	  which	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  the	  case.	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The	  Tele-­‐Direct	  ruling	   largely	  confirmed	  these	  principles.1063	  The	  Competition	  Bureau	  argued	  that	  Tele-­‐
Direct	   (a	   company	   active	   in	   the	   telephone	   directory	   market)	   had	   behaved	   anti-­‐competitively,	   in	  
particular	  by	  tying	  advertising	  space	  to	  sales	  services	  and	  refusing	  to	  deal	  with	  advertising	  consultants.	  
The	  Tribunal	  used	  a	  weighing	  exercise,	  holding	  that	  a	  business	  justification	  is	  a	  relevant	  factor	  to	  decide	  
whether	  an	  act	  is,	  on	  balance,	  anti-­‐competitive	  or	  not	  –	  other	  relevant	  factors	  include	  subjective	  intent	  
and	  the	  actual	  effects	  arising	  from	  the	  conduct.1064	  The	  Tribunal	  may	  reject	  a	  business	  justification	  if	  the	  
impugned	  act	  is	  not	  ‘in	  the	  public	  interest’	  or	  ‘socially	  beneficial’.1065	  I	  agree	  that	  there	  is	  no	  clear	  reason	  
to	   condone	   anti-­‐competitive	   behaviour	   if	   the	   alleged	   benefits	   only	   accrue	   to	   the	   firm	   with	   market	  
power.1066	  On	  the	  facts,	  the	  Tribunal	  accepted	  that	  Tele-­‐Direct’s	  conduct	  was	  justified	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  
certain	  commercial	  interests,	  such	  as	  securing	  payment	  for	  its	  services.1067	  The	  Tribunal	  also	  found	  that	  
the	  conduct	  was	   justified	  because	   it	   facilitated	  customers	   to	  understand	  with	  whom	  they	  are	  dealing;	  
even	  though	  this	  plea	  had	  not	  actually	  been	  raised	  by	  Tele-­‐Direct.1068	  
	  
The	  NutraSweet	  case	  revolved	  around	  various	  contract	  clauses	  between	  NutraSweet	  and	  its	  customers	  
for	   the	   purchase	   of	   aspartame,	   an	   artificial	   sweetener.1069	   Allegedly	   these	   contract	   arrangements	  
required	  or	   induced	  exclusivity,	  creating	  barriers	  for	  NutraSweet’s	  (potential)	  competitors.	  NutraSweet	  
held	   that	   the	   arrangements	   were	   justified,	   arguing	   that	   risks	   and	   costs	   are	   reduced	   if	   only	   a	   single	  
supplier	   holds	   inventory.1070	   Although	   the	   Tribunal	   did	   accept	   that	   efficiencies	   are	   relevant	   while	  
assessing	  whether	   conduct	   can	   substantially	   lessen	   competition,	   it	   rejected	  NutraSweet’s	   plea	   on	   the	  
facts.	   The	   Tribunal	   held	   that	   ‘[i]t	   can	   always	   be	   claimed	   that	   the	   risk	   and	   cost	   of	   holding	   plant	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1063	  Canada	  (Director	  of	  Investigation	  and	  Research)	  v	  Tele-­‐Direct,	  [1997]	  CT-­‐1994-­‐003.	  	  
1064	  Ibid.,	  at	  259	  (referring	  to	  Nielsen,	  supra	  note	  1059).	  The	  Tribunal	  confirmed	  this	  position	  in	  Air	  Canada,	  infra	  
note	  1086,	  at	  55.	  
1065	  Ibid.,	  at	  215-­‐216	  and	  248-­‐249.	  
1066	  An	  interesting	  example	  in	  UK	  competition	  law	  is	  Genzyme	  v	  OFT,	  [2004]	  CAT	  4,	  at	  583.	  
1067	  Tele-­‐Direct,	  supra	  note	  1063,	  at	  349-­‐350.	  Here,	  the	  Tribunal	  examines	  Tele-­‐Direct’s	  refusal	  to	  deal	  with	  
consultants	  who	  do	  not	  accept	  responsibility	  for	  payment	  for	  the	  advertising.	  
1068	  Ibid.,	  at	  357-­‐358.	  In	  a	  minority	  view,	  Roseman	  J.	  held	  Tele-­‐Direct	  had	  not	  advanced	  ‘any	  valid	  business	  
justification’	  (ibid.,	  at	  359-­‐360).	  
1069	  Canada	  (Director	  of	  Investigation	  and	  Research)	  v	  The	  NutraSweet,	  [1990]	  CT-­‐1989-­‐002.	  
1070	  Ibid.,	  at	  90.	  The	  Tribunal	  considered	  that	  the	  impugned	  conduct	  leaves	  (i)	  customers,	  on	  balance,	  better	  off	  and	  
(ii)	  that	  the	  customers	  pass	  on	  these	  cost	  savings	  to	  consumers.	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inventory	   are	   reduced	   if	   there	   is	   a	   single	   supplier	   rather	   than	   several.’1071	   Such	   a	   plea	   thus	   requires	  
specific	  evidence,	  for	  instance	  on	  the	  special	  characteristics	  of	  the	  company’s	  industry.1072	  The	  Tribunal	  
also	   rejected	   NutraSweet’s	   plea	   that	   the	   contracts	   were	   necessary	   to	   prevent	   competitors	   from	   free	  
riding	  on	  its	  investments.	  	  
	  
Even	   though	   the	   three	   cases	   discussed	   above	   continue	   to	   be	   relevant,	   the	   Canada	   Pipe	   judgment	   is	  
currently	  the	  leading	  Canadian	  case	  on	  justifications.	  The	  Competition	  Bureau	  argued	  that	  Canada	  Pipe	  
foreclosed	   competition	   by	   offering	   rebates	   to	   distributors	   in	   exchange	   for	   exclusive	   purchasing	  
agreements.	  The	  Tribunal	  disagreed,	  accepting	  Canada	  Pipe’s	  submission	  that	  the	  conduct	  under	  review	  
led	   to	   higher	   sales	   volumes	   and	   allowed	   it	   to	   ‘maintain	   in	   inventory	   smaller,	   less	   profitable	   but	  
nevertheless	   important	   products’.1073	   The	   Tribunal	   thus	   concluded	   that	   the	   practice	   under	   review	  
produced	  efficiencies	  and	  did	  not	  lead	  to	  any	  exclusionary	  effects.1074	  
	  
On	   appeal,1075	   the	   FCA	   held	   that,	   even	   though	   evidence	   of	   subjective	   intent	   is	   not	   required	   for	   the	  
purposes	   of	   paragraph	   79(1)(b),	   intention	   is	   an	   important	   element.	   The	   FCA	   observed	   that	   ‘a	   valid	  
business	   justification	   essentially	   provides	   an	   alternative	   explanation	   as	   to	  why	   the	   impugned	   act	  was	  
performed,	   which	   in	   the	   right	   circumstances	   might	   be	   sufficient	   to	   counterbalance	   the	   evidence	   of	  
negative	   effects	   on	   competitors	   or	   subjective	   intent	   in	   this	   vein’.1076	   The	   FCA	   thereby	   confirmed	   and	  
clarified	   the	   Tribunal’s	   earlier	   approach	   in	   Nielsen	   and	   Tele-­‐Direct	   that	   a	   business	   justification	   can	  
establish	  the	  ‘overriding	  purpose’.1077	  	  
	  
The	   FCA	   rejected,	   however,	   the	   Tribunal’s	   earlier	   ruling	   in	   Canada	   Pipe	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   it	   relied	  
primarily	  upon	  consumer	  welfare	  benefits	   to	  establish	  a	  business	   justification	  while	  assessing	  whether	  
the	   act	   was	   anti-­‐competitive.	   The	   FCA	   made	   a	   sharp	   distinction	   between	   the	   finding	   of	   an	   ‘anti-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1071	  Ibid.	  
1072	  Ibid.	  
1073	  Canada	  (Commissioner	  of	  Competition)	  v	  Canada	  Pipe,	  [2005]	  CT-­‐2002-­‐006,	  at	  212.	  Apparently	  the	  Competition	  
Tribunal	  considered	  these	  arguments	  more	  persuasive	  than	  those	  in	  NutraSweet,	  supra	  note	  1069,	  at	  90.	  	  
1074	  Ibid.,	  at	  256-­‐60.	  
1075	  Canada	  (Commissioner	  of	  Competition)	  v	  Canada	  Pipe,	  [2006]	  FCA	  233.	  
1076	  Ibid.,	  at	  87-­‐88.	  
1077	  Ibid.,	  at	  73,	  87	  and	  88.	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competitive	   act’	   (paragraph	   79(1)(b))	   and	   the	   question	   whether	   the	   practice	   substantially	   lessens	  
competition	   on	   the	   market	   (paragraph	   79(1)(c)).	   The	   FCA	   considered	   that,	   although	   the	   effects	   on	  
consumers	  may	  ‘be	  relevant	  in	  assessing	  the	  credibility	  and	  weight	  of	  a	  professed	  business	  justification’,	  
such	  evidence	  is	  ‘largely	  irrelevant’	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  paragraph	  79(1)(b)	  assessment,	  and	  is	  more	  
appropriately	  considered	  under	  paragraph	  79(1)(c).1078	  
	  
The	   FCA	   further	   held	   that	   the	   examination	   of	   paragraph	   79(1)(b)	   must	   focus	   on	   the	   effect	   on	   a	  
competitor	  rather	  than	  the	  wider	  effects	  on	  economic	  efficiency	  or	  consumer	  welfare.1079	  This	  appears	  
to	  be	  an	  overly	  formalistic	  reading	  of	  what	  constitutes	  ‘anti-­‐competitive	  acts’,	  and	  seems	  to	  have	  little	  
ground	  in	  business	  reality.	  A	  firm	  with	  market	  power	  may	  hurt	  its	  competitors	  simply	  because	  it	  is	  more	  
efficient	   or	   competes	   more	   vigorously,	   instead	   of	   acting	   anti-­‐competitively.	   The	   rejection	   of	   a	  
justification	   plea	   in	   such	   a	   context	   risks	   chilling	   the	   very	   competitive	   behaviour	   the	   Competition	   Act	  
seeks	  to	  protect.1080	  However,	  the	  FCA’s	  reasoning	  may	  still	  allow	  for	  an	  overall	  effects-­‐based	  approach	  
to	   the	   extent	   that	   the	   effects	   upon	  other	  market	   participants	   are	   only	   considered	  by	  way	  of	   a	  prima	  
facie	  finding	  of	  an	  illegal	  unilateral	  act1081	  –	  after	  which	  any	  efficiencies	  may	  still	  be	  fully	  taken	  on	  board	  
under	   paragraph	   79(1)(c).1082	   If	   an	   act	   has	   a	   net	   efficient	   effect,	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   see	   how	   it	   could	  
substantially	  lessen	  competition	  at	  the	  same	  time	  –	  thus	  failing	  the	  test	  set	  by	  paragraph	  79(1)(c).	  
	  
Apart	  from	  the	  question	  whether	  Canada	  Pipe	  can	  be	  interpreted	  more	  or	   less	  formalistically,	  the	  FCA	  
does	  provide	  a	  clear	  enumeration	  as	  to	  the	   legal	  conditions	  that	  should	  apply	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  
provision.	   It	   requires	   (i)	   a	   credible	   efficiency	   or	   pro-­‐competitive	   rationale	   for	   the	   relevant	   conduct,	  
showing	  the	  relevance	  of	  the	  underlying	  purpose.	  In	  addition,	  the	  justification	  must	  be	  (ii)	  attributable	  
to	   the	   respondent.	   Finally,	   the	   justification	   must	   (iii)	   relate	   to	   and	   (iv)	   counterbalance	   the	   anti-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1078	  Ibid.,	  at	  79.	  
1079	  Ibid.,	  at	  68.	  According	  to	  the	  FCA,	  the	  inquiry	  under	  paragraph	  79(1)(c)	  should	  relate	  to	  the	  broader	  state	  of	  
competition	  (ibid.,	  at	  83).	  
1080	  See	  G.	  Addy,	  J.	  Bodrug	  &	  C.	  Tingley,	  ‘Abuse	  of	  Dominance	  in	  Canada:	  Reflections	  on	  25	  Years	  of	  Section	  79’,	  
(2012)	  25(2)	  Canadian	  Competition	  Law	  Review	  276,	  289-­‐290.	  	  
1081	  One	  should	  consider	  that	  any	  exclusionary	  act	  may	  lead	  to	  a	  reduction	  of	  consumer	  welfare	  through	  the	  harm	  
inflicted	  upon	  other	  market	  participants.	  	  	  
1082	  Indeed,	  the	  FCA	  suggests	  that	  the	  effects	  on	  consumers	  are	  more	  appropriately	  considered	  under	  paragraph	  
79(1)(c).	  See	  Canada	  Pipe	  (FCA),	  supra	  note	  1075,	  at	  79-­‐83.	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competitive	   effects	   and/or	   subjective	   intent	   of	   the	   conduct.1083	   On	   the	   facts	   of	   the	   case,	   the	   FCA	  
concluded	  that	  the	  Tribunal	  had	  insufficiently	  shown	  why	  Canada	  Pipe	  had	  a	   legitimate	  explanation	  to	  
engage	  in	  the	  impugned	  conduct.1084	  
	  
Other	  Canadian	  cases	  on	  justifications	  include	  the	  following.	  The	  Xerox	  case	  made	  clear	  that	  a	  refusal	  to	  
deal	  may	  be	  justified	  if	  an	  upstream	  supplier’s	  decision	  to	  vertically	   integrate	   is	  dictated	  by	  reasons	  of	  
economic	  efficiency	  or	  if	  it	  is	  the	  norm	  in	  the	  industry.1085	  It	  shows	  that	  the	  examination	  of	  a	  justification	  
plea	   should,	   inter	   alia,	   pay	   heed	   to	   what	   are	   considered	   normal	   business	   practices	   in	   a	   particular	  
business	  sector.	  	  	  
	  
The	  Air	  Canada	  ruling	  concerned	  Air	  Canada’s	  response	  to	  the	  entry	  of	  competitors	  of	  certain	  routes	  by	  
engaging	   in	  selective	  capacity	   increases	  and	  price	  decreases	   in	  a	  manner	   that	  did	  not	  cover	  avoidable	  
costs.1086	   The	   Competition	   Bureau	   accepted	   that	   so-­‐called	   ‘network	   benefits’	   could	   constitute	   a	  
legitimate	   business	   justification	   for	   operating	   a	   flight	   below	   average	   avoidable	   costs.1087	   In	   the	  
Competition	  Bureau’s	  view,	  a	  legitimate	  business	  justification	  is	  also	  related	  to	  efficiency	  or	  actions	  that	  
favour	  competition.1088	   It	   referred	   to	   the	  1981	  Consumer’s	  Glass	   judgment.	  That	   judgment	  considered	  
that	   below-­‐cost	   prices	   can	   be	   justified	   if	   they	   are	   part	   of	   a	   loss-­‐minimizing	   strategy	   such	   as	   selling	  
excess,	   obsolete	   or	   perishable	   products	   below	   cost.1089	   For	   its	   part,	   the	   Tribunal	   confirmed	   that	  
legitimate	   business	   justification	   is	   one	   of	   the	   elements	   to	   determine	   whether	   a	   practice	   is	   an	   anti-­‐
competitive	  act	  contrary	  to	  section	  79	  CA.1090	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1083	  Canada	  Pipe	  (ibid.),	  at	  73.	  
1084	  Ibid.,	  at	  91.	  
1085	  Canada	  (Director	  of	  Investigation	  and	  Research)	  v	  Xerox	  (Canada),	  [1990]	  CT-­‐1989-­‐004.	  The	  Tribunal	  did,	  
however,	  reject	  the	  justification	  plea	  on	  the	  facts.	  
1086	  Commissioner	  of	  Competition	  v	  Air	  Canada,	  [2003]	  CT-­‐2001-­‐002,	  at	  paragraph	  1-­‐2.	  
1087	  Ibid.,	  at	  35.	  
1088	  Ibid.,	  at	  50-­‐51.	  The	  Commissioner	  gives	  the	  example	  of	  the	  operation	  of	  a	  flight	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  end	  in	  order	  
to	  position	  it	  for	  the	  following	  day,	  a	  so-­‐called	  ‘balancing’	  or	  ‘positioning’	  flight.	  
1089	  R.	  v	  Consumers	  Glass	  Co.	  Ltd.,	  [1981]	  57	  C.P.R.	  (2d)	  1	  (Ont.	  H.C.J.).	  	  
1090	  Air	  Canada,	  supra	  note	  1086,	  at	  55.	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In	   Laidlaw,1091	   a	   case	   concerning	   various	   allegedly	   exclusionary	   contractual	   clauses,	   shows	   that	   a	  
justification	  plea	  requires	  cogent	  evidence.	  The	  Tribunal	  was	  not	  convinced	  that	  these	  clauses,	  taken	  as	  
a	  whole,	  had	  an	   ‘identifiable	  efficiency	   rationale’.1092	  The	  Tribunal	   rejected	   the	  efficiency	   justifications	  
invoked	  by	  Laidlaw,	  observing	  that	  the	  clauses	  only	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  retaining	  customers	  and	  excluding	  
competitors.1093	   The	   Tribunal	   also	   held	   that	   actions	   are	   presumed	   to	   have	   intended	   the	   effects	   that	  
actually	  occur	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  evidence	  showing	  otherwise.1094	  
	  
Finally,	   the	   B-­‐Filer	   ruling	   shows	   how	   a	   regulatory	   framework	   may	   provide	   a	   justification.1095	   The	  
applicant	  in	  B-­‐Filer	  argued	  that	  the	  termination	  of	  banking	  services	  by	  its	  bank	  was	  an	  illegal	  refusal	  to	  
deal.	   The	  Competition	  Tribunal	   rejected	   the	  application,	   finding	   that	   it	   did	  not	  make	   sufficiently	   clear	  
that	   the	  refusal	   to	  deal	  had	  an	  adverse	  effect	  on	  competition.1096	  But	  even	   if	   such	  an	  effect	  had	  been	  
shown,	  the	  bank	  would	  still	  not	  necessarily	  have	  breached	  the	  Competition	  Act.	  A	  refusal	  to	  deal	  may	  be	  
caused	  by	  a	  customer’s	  failure	  to	  meet	  usual	  contractual	  terms	  or	  by	  a	  dominant	  firm’s	  wish	  to	  comply	  
with	   a	   regulatory	   framework.	   In	   such	   a	   case,	   the	   refusal	   to	   deal	   does	   not	   result	   from	   ‘insufficient	  
competition’,1097	  but	  rather	  from	  an	  ‘objectively	  justifiable	  business	  reason’.1098	  On	  the	  facts,	  the	  refusal	  
could	   be	   justified	   as	   a	   continuation	   of	   the	   banking	   services	  would	   have	   exposed	   the	   Bank	   to	   various	  
legal,	   regulatory	   and	   reputational	   risks.1099	   The	  B-­‐Filer	   judgment	   thus	   shows	   the	   breadth	   of	   potential	  
justification	  pleas	  that	  are	  available	  under	  Canadian	  competition	  law.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1091	  Canada	  (Director	  of	  Investigation	  and	  Research)	  v	  Laidlaw	  Waste	  Systems	  Ltd,	  [1992]	  CT-­‐1991-­‐02.	  	  
1092	  Ibid.,	  at	  91.	  
1093	  Ibid.,	  at	  93-­‐96.	  The	  Tribunal	  held:	  ‘The	  tying	  of	  the	  customers	  to	  Laidlaw	  operates	  to	  exclude	  other	  competitors	  
from	  the	  market’.	  The	  Tribunal	  also	  took	  into	  account	  that	  the	  relevant	  services	  only	  represented	  a	  minor	  cost	  for	  
customers,	  which	  means	  there	  is	  little	  incentive	  to	  contest	  price	  increases.	  
1094	  Ibid.,	  at	  96.	  
1095	  B-­‐Filer	  Inc.	  et	  al.	  v	  The	  Bank	  of	  Nova	  Scotia,	  [2006]	  CT-­‐2005-­‐006.	  Note	  that	  this	  case	  concerned	  Section	  75	  CA,	  
that	  deals	  specifically	  with	  refusals	  to	  deal,	  rather	  than	  the	  general	  prohibition	  of	  dominance	  abuses	  in	  Section	  79	  
CA.	  
1096	  Ibid.,	  at	  2.	  
1097	  Ibid.,	  at	  193.	  
1098	  Ibid.,	  at	  147.	  
1099	  Ibid.,	  at	  148.	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3.3 Competition	  Bureau	  guidance	  	  
	  
The	   Competition	   Bureau	   has	   published	   various	   documents	   that	   provide	   guidance	   on	   the	   topic	   of	  
justifications.	   I	   shall	   focus	   on	   those	   elements	   that	   have	   not	   already	   been	   discussed,	   as	   the	   guidance	  
relies	  to	  a	  great	  extent	  on	  the	  case	  law	  discussed	  above.1100	  
	  
3.3.1 The	  2009	  draft	  enforcement	  guidelines	  
In	   January	  2009,	   the	  Competition	  Bureau	  published	  a	  draft	  update	  of	   its	  2001	  enforcement	  guidelines	  
(‘the	   2009	   draft’).1101	   Largely	   inspired	   by	   the	   FCA	   ruling	   in	   Canada	   Pipe,	   the	   2009	   draft	   contains	   an	  
elaborate	   discussion	   of	   business	   justifications.	   The	   document	   upholds	   a	   particularly	   wide	   notion	   of	  
justifications,	   stating	   that	   it	   could	   include	  any	  activities	   that	   seek	   to	  minimize	  costs	  or	   that	   improve	  a	  
firm’s	  business.1102	  If	  a	  firm’s	  conduct	  leads	  to	  efficiencies	  as	  well	  as	  anti-­‐competitive	  effects,	  the	  Bureau	  
will	  examine	  the	  credibility	  and	  likelihood	  of	  any	  efficiency	  claims	  before	  assessing	  the	  overall	  purpose	  
of	   these	   activities.	   The	   Bureau	   also	   requires	   that	   the	   conduct	   is	   necessary	   for	   achieving	   the	   claimed	  
efficiencies.1103	  
	  
3.3.2 The	  2012	  enforcement	  guidelines	  
In	  September	  2012,	  the	  Competition	  Bureau	  published	  a	  final	  version	  of	  its	  new	  enforcement	  guidelines	  
on	   the	   abuse	   of	   dominance,	   replacing	   the	   2001	   guidelines	   (‘the	   2012	   guidelines’).1104	   The	   2012	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1100	  Such	  as	  the	  Predatory	  Pricing	  Enforcement	  Guidelines,	  published	  by	  the	  Competition	  Bureau	  in	  July	  2008,	  
available	  at	  http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-­‐bc.nsf/eng/02713.html.	  
1101	  See	  the	  2009	  draft	  guidelines	  http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-­‐bc.nsf/eng/02942.html.	  This	  
document	  gives	  much	  more	  clarity	  on	  ‘business	  justifications’	  than	  the	  enforcement	  guidelines	  of	  July	  2001.	  See	  
http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-­‐bc.nsf/eng/01251.html.	  
1102	  2009	  draft	  guidelines	  (ibid.),	  page	  17.	  The	  Bureau	  adds:	  ‘Beyond	  this	  definition,	  there	  may	  be	  general	  business	  
justifications	  that	  are	  not	  strictly	  credible	  efficiencies	  or	  pro-­‐competitive	  rationales,	  but	  might	  nevertheless	  be	  
accepted	  as	  valid	  by	  the	  Tribunal’.	  
1103	  Ibid.	  The	  Bureau	  adds:	  ‘When	  assessing	  any	  cost-­‐related	  business	  justification,	  the	  Bureau	  will	  focus	  on	  verified	  
efficiencies	  that	  do	  not	  arise	  from	  anti-­‐competitive	  reductions	  in	  output	  or	  service’.	  
1104	  Competition	  Bureau,	  Enforcement	  Guidelines:	  The	  Abuse	  of	  Dominance	  Provisions	  (September	  2012),	  available	  
at	  http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-­‐bc.nsf/eng/03497.html	  .	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guidelines	  no	  longer	  contain	  the	  thorough	  discussion	  of	  legitimate	  business	  justifications	  that	  was	  found	  
in	  the	  2009	  draft.	  	  
	  
However,	  the	  2012	  guidelines	  still	  appear	  to	  give	  a	  broad	  interpretation	  of	  business	   justifications.	  Pro-­‐
competitive	   aims	   that	   shall	   be	   taken	   into	   account	   include	   ‘reducing	   the	   firm’s	   costs	   of	   production	   or	  
operation,	   or	   improvements	   in	   technology	   or	   production	   processes	   that	   result	   in	   innovative	   new	  
products	  or	  improvements	  in	  product	  quality	  or	  service’.1105	  In	  its	  assessment	  of	  the	  overriding	  purpose	  
of	   an	   alleged	   anti-­‐competitive	   act,	   the	  Competition	  Bureau	   shall	   examine:1106	   (i)	   the	   credibility	   of	   any	  
efficiency	   or	   pro-­‐competitive	   claims,	   (ii)	   its	   link	   to	   the	   alleged	   anti-­‐competitive	   practice,	   and	   (iii)	   the	  
likelihood	  of	  these	  claims	  being	  achieved.	  	  
	  
Although	   the	   2012	   guidelines	   thus	   provide	   some	   clarity	   on	   how	   the	   Competition	   Bureau	   seeks	   to	  
implement	  case	  law	  on	  justifications	  in	  its	  enforcement	  policy,	  it	  remains	  unclear	  why	  it	  has	  vacated	  the	  
elaborate	   treatment	   of	   justifications	   in	   the	   2009	   draft.1107	   The	   lack	   of	   guidance	   as	   to	   how	   the	  
Competition	  Bureau	  will	  apply	  this	  concept	  has	  an	  adverse	  impact	  on	  legal	  certainty.1108	  
	  
	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1105	  Ibid.,	  at	  11.	  
1106	  Ibid.	  
1107	  This	  issue	  drew	  criticism,	  inter	  alia,	  from	  the	  Canadian	  Bar	  Association.	  See	  the	  Association’s	  comments	  on	  a	  
March	  2012	  draft	  text	  that,	  with	  few	  major	  changes,	  eventually	  led	  to	  the	  September	  2012	  guidelines,	  available	  at	  
http://www.cba.org/cba/submissions/pdf/12-­‐34-­‐eng.pdf,	  at	  6	  and	  15.	  
1108	  Ibid.,	  at	  15.	  For	  similar	  remarks,	  see	  e.g.	  J.B.	  Musgrove	  and	  A.	  Neil	  Campbell,	  ‘More	  abuse?:	  the	  Competition	  
Bureau	  proposes	  revised	  guidelines	  on	  abuse	  of	  dominant	  market	  position’,	  available	  at	  
http://www.mcmillan.ca/more-­‐abuse-­‐-­‐the-­‐Competition-­‐Bureau-­‐proposes-­‐revised-­‐guidelines-­‐on-­‐abuse-­‐of-­‐
dominant-­‐market-­‐position.	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After	   years	  of	   intense	  debate,	   the	   Legislative	  Council	   of	   the	  Hong	  Kong	   Special	  Administrative	  Region	  
(‘Hong	  Kong’)	  adopted	   the	   final	   text	  of	   the	  Competition	  Ordinance	   in	   June	  2012.1109	  The	  Secretary	   for	  
Commerce	  and	  Economic	  Development	  will	  decide	  the	  exact	  date	  on	  which	  the	  Competition	  Ordinance	  
(CO)	  will	  enter	  into	  force.1110	  The	  CO	  establishes	  the	  Competition	  Commission	  (HKCC)	  as	  an	  investigative	  
body	  and	  the	  Competition	  Tribunal	  as	  an	  adjudicative	  body.	  Section	  35	  of	  the	  CO	  provides	  that	  the	  HKCC	  
will	   issue	   guidelines	   to	   indicate	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   it	   expects	   to	   interpret	   and	   give	   effect	   to	   the	  
conduct	   rules.	  Only	   after	   the	   guidelines	   have	  been	   finalized	  will	   the	   substantive	  provisions	   enter	   into	  
force.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  writing,	  no	  enforcement	  action	  has	  yet	  taken	  place,	  as	  the	  guidelines	  have	  not	  yet	  




Section	  21(1)	  of	  the	  CO	  prohibits	  the	  abuse	  of	  a	  substantial	  degree	  of	  market	  power	  in	  Hong	  Kong.	  The	  
prohibition	  is	  also	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ‘second	  conduct	  rule’.1111	  Section	  21(2)	  CO	  provides	  two	  examples	  
of	  abuses:	  (i)	  predatory	  behaviour	  and	  (ii)	  limiting	  production,	  markets	  or	  technical	  development	  to	  the	  
prejudice	   of	   consumers.	   The	   legislative	   text	   refers	   to	   ‘market	   power’,	   which	   in	   economic	   theory	   is	   a	  
more	  gradient	  concept	  than	  the	  rather	  binary	  legal	  notion	  of	  dominance.	  Hopefully	  the	  HKCC	  will	  specify	  
in	  its	  guidelines	  if	  the	  second	  conduct	  rule	  will	  indeed	  be	  applied	  according	  to	  a	  sliding	  scale	  approach,	  
where	   firms	  with	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  market	  power	  will	  be	  scrutinized	  more	  severely	  compared	   to	   firms	  
with	  a	  weaker	  degree	  of	  market	  power.	  	  
	  
The	   CO	   does	   not	   contain	   a	   general	   provision	   on	   justifications	   within	   the	   framework	   of	   the	   second	  
conduct	  rule.	  However,	  it	  does	  contain	  a	  number	  of	  exclusions	  and	  exemptions	  that	  the	  second	  conduct	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1109	  The	  Hong	  Kong	  Competition	  Ordinance,	  as	  passed	  in	  June	  2012,	  is	  available	  at	  http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-­‐
12/english/ord/ord014-­‐12-­‐e.pdf.	  
1110	  Section	  1(2)	  CO.	  
1111	  Section	  21(4)	  CO.	  The	  ‘first	  conduct	  rule’	  prohibits	  anti-­‐competitive	  agreements	  between	  undertakings,	  see	  
Section	  6	  CO.	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rule	  would	  otherwise	  prohibit.	   Schedule	  1	  of	   the	  CO	  provides	   various	  exclusions.	   The	   second	  conduct	  
rule	   does	   not	   apply	   to	   conduct	   that	   seeks	   to	   comply	   with	   a	   legal	   requirement.1112	   In	   addition,	   the	  
conduct	   rules	   do	   not	   apply	   to	   an	   undertaking	   entrusted	   with	   the	   operation	   of	   services	   of	   general	  
economic	  interest	  in	  so	  far	  as	  the	  conduct	  rule	  would	  obstruct	  the	  performance	  of	  those	  services.1113	  
	  
Subdivision	   2	   of	   division	   3	   of	   the	   CO	   specifies	   various	   exemptions	   from	   the	   conduct	   rules.	   The	   Chief	  
Executive	   in	  Council	   (the	  head	  of	   the	  Hong	  Kong	  government)	  may	  exempt	   specific	   conduct	   from	   the	  
application	  of	  the	  second	  conduct	  rule,	  provided	  that	  there	  are	  exceptional	  and	  compelling	  reasons	  of	  
public	  policy.	  The	  exemptions	  apply	  in	  the	  event	  of	  public	  policy	  issues1114	  and	  Hong	  Kong’s	  international	  
obligations.1115	  
	  
The	  exemptions	  and	  exclusions	  mentioned	  by	   the	  CO	  primarily	   relate	   to	  State	   intervention,	  giving	   the	  
Hong	  Kong	  executive	  an	   important	   role	   to	  determine	   the	  scope	  of	   such	   justifications.	  A	  key	  challenge	  
shall	  be	  to	  create	  guidance	  that	  clearly	  explains	  what	  dominant	  firms	  may	  expect	  under	  these	  headings.	  
In	  addition,	  the	  HKCC	  should	  make	  clear	  to	  what	  extent	  companies	  may	  rely	  on	  justifications	  other	  than	  
the	   exclusions	   and	   exemptions	   mentioned	   by	   the	   CO.	   Perhaps	   it	   can	   look	   for	   inspiration	   in	   other	  
jurisdictions,	  such	  as	  the	  enumeration	  provided	  by	  Kirby	  J	  in	  Melway.	  
	  
Although	  the	  CO	  is	  not	  particularly	  clear	  on	  justifications,	  the	  legislative	  text	  does	  suggest	  that	  they	  shall	  
not	  be	  easily	  condoned.	  Section	  22	  CO	  provides	  that,	  where	  conduct	  has	  more	  than	  one	  object	  or	  effect,	  
including	  the	  object	  or	  effect	  to	  prevent,	  restrict	  or	  distort	  competition,	  such	  conduct	  will	  be	  considered	  
to	  solely	  have	  such	  an	  anti-­‐competitive	  object	  or	  effect.	  	  
	  
It	   seems	   that	   this	   provision	   is	   likely	   to	   limit	   the	   availability	   of	   justifications	   within	   the	   scope	   of	   the	  
second	   conduct	   rule.	   A	   justification	   should	   only	   become	   relevant	   if	   the	   conduct	   under	   review	   has	   at	  
least	  some	  anti-­‐competitive	  ‘object’	  or	  ‘effect’.	  But	  if,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  Section	  22	  CO,	  such	  a	  prima	  facie	  
finding	  leads	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  conduct	  solely	  had	  an	  anti-­‐competitive	  ‘object’	  or	  ‘effect’,	  there	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1112	  Section	  2(2)	  of	  Schedule	  1	  CO.	  
1113	  Section	  3	  of	  Schedule	  1	  CO.	  
1114	  Section	  31	  CO.	  
1115	  Section	  32	  CO.	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appears	   to	   be	   no	   room	   left	   for	   a	   justification	   plea	   stating	   e.g.	   that	   the	   pro-­‐competitive	   effects	  
outweighed	  the	  anti-­‐competitive	  effects.	  
	  
The	  HKCC	  should	  make	  clear	  that	  justifications	  are	  available	  even	  beyond	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  statutory	  
exemptions	   and	   exclusion,	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   an	   overly	   broad	   application	   of	   the	   second	   conduct	   rule.	  
Other	   jurisdictions	   with	   similar	   legislative	   acts,	   such	   as	   Singapore	   and	   the	   UK,1116	   have	   also	  
acknowledged	  the	  relevance	  of	  a	  justification	  plea	  even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  comprehensive	  codification	  
of	   that	   principle.	   As	   to	   Section	   22	  CO,	   the	  HKCC	  may	   indicate	   that	   conduct	  will	   only	   be	   seen	   as	   anti-­‐
competitive	   by	   ‘object’	   or	   ‘effect’	   if	   a	   contextual	   analysis,	   including	   an	   examination	   of	   possible	  
justification,	   has	   shown	   such	   to	   be	   the	   case.	   This	   may	   be	   a	   way	   to	   consider	   justifications	   while	   still	  





5.1 Introduction	  &	  legislation	  
	  
Section	   47	   of	   the	   Singaporean	   Competition	   Act	   (SCA),	   as	   of	   January	   2006,	   prohibits	   the	   abuse	   of	   a	  
dominant	  position	  in	  Singapore.	  Section	  47(2)	  SCA	  provides	  a	  non-­‐exhaustive	  list	  of	  examples	  of	  abusive	  
conduct:	  
• ‘predatory	  behaviour	  towards	  competitors;	  
• limiting	  production,	  markets,	  or	  technical	  development	  to	  the	  prejudice	  of	  consumers;	  
• applying	   dissimilar	   conditions	   to	   equivalent	   transactions	   with	   other	   trading	   parties,	   thereby	  
placing	  them	  at	  a	  competitive	  disadvantage;	  
• making	  the	  conclusion	  of	  contracts	  subject	  to	  acceptance	  by	  the	  other	  parties	  of	  supplementary	  
obligations	  which,	  by	  their	  nature	  or	  according	  to	  commercial	  usage,	  have	  no	  connection	  with	  
the	  subject	  of	  the	  contracts’.	  
	  
Apart	  from	  the	  suggestion	  in	  Section	  47(2)(d)	  SCA	  that	  the	  ‘nature’	  or	   ‘commercial	  usage’	  can	  justify	  a	  
tying	   arrangement,	   Section	   47	   contains	   no	   general	   reference	   to	   justifications	   of	   otherwise	   abusive	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1116	  For	  an	  examination	  of	  Singaporean	  competition	  law,	  see	  below.	  See	  also	  the	  UK	  Competition	  Act	  1998.	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conduct.	  The	  SCA	  does,	  however,	  provide	  various	  exclusions	  of	   the	  competition	   rules	   insofar	   they	  are	  
related	  to	  conduct	  required	  by	  the	  government.	  
	  
The	  Third	  Schedule	  of	  the	  SCA	  excludes	  certain	  activities	  from	  the	  scope	  of	  Section	  47	  SCA.	  The	  Schedule	  
contains	  a	  general	  reference	  to	  services	  of	  general	  economic	  interest,	  but	  also	  refers	  to	  specific	  activities	  
such	  as	  the	  supply	  of	  piped	  potable	  water.	  In	  addition,	  the	  Third	  Schedule	  of	  the	  SCA	  makes	  clear	  that	  
Section	   47	   SCA	   does	   not	   apply	   in	   the	   following	   cases:	   (i)	   if	   the	   conduct	   seeks	   to	   comply	  with	   a	   legal	  
requirement,	   or	   (ii)	   if	   the	   Singaporean	  Minister	   for	   Trade	   and	   Industry	   has	   issued	   an	   order	   indicating	  
that	  the	  conduct	  is	  necessary	  for	  exceptional	  and	  compelling	  reasons	  of	  public	  policy.	  
	  
Such	   ‘State	   action’	   provisions	   show	   that	   the	   Singaporean	   executive	   plays	   an	   important	   role	   in	  
determining	   the	   SCA’s	   scope	   of	   application.	   The	   absence	   of	   an	   enumeration	   of	   the	   applicable	   legal	  
conditions	  suggests	  that	  the	  legislator	  has	  attempted	  to	  provide	  the	  executive	  with	  ample	  discretionary	  
powers,	  similar	  to	  the	  statutory	  text	  in	  Hong	  Kong.	  This	  may	  risk	  arbitrary	  application.	  Policy	  guidelines	  
may	   be	   able	   to	   improve	   legal	   certainty	   and,	   in	   draft,	   could	   foster	   a	   debate	   on	  what	   kind	   of	   conduct	  
should	  (or	  should	  not)	  be	  condoned	  in	  the	  name	  of	  public	  policy.	  
	  
As	   the	  statutory	   text	  of	   the	  SCA	  provides	   little	  guidance	  on	  objective	   justification,	   it	   is	  wise	   to	   turn	   to	  
different	  sources.	  The	  Competition	  Commission	  of	  Singapore	   (CCS),	   the	  enforcement	  body	  of	   the	  SCA,	  
has	  published	  particularly	  useful	  guidance	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  objective	  justification.	  The	  following	  paragraph	  




In	   2007,	   the	   CCS	   published	   guidelines	   on	   the	   prohibition	   of	   the	   abuse	   of	   dominance	   in	   Singapore.	  
According	   to	   these	   guidelines,	   Section	   47	   SCA	   prohibits	   unilateral	   conduct	   only	   if	   it	   is	   unrelated	   to	  
competitive	  merit.1117	  The	  guidelines	  cautiously	   state	   that	   the	  CCS	   ‘may	  consider’	   the	  possibility	  of	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1117	  CCS	  guidelines	  on	  the	  Section	  47	  prohibition	  (2007),	  at	  2.1,	  available	  at	  
http://www.ccs.gov.sg/content/dam/ccs/PDFs/CCSGuidelines/s47_Jul07FINAL.pdf.	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objective	   justification	   while	   assessing	   an	   alleged	   abuse.1118	   The	   guidelines	   refer	   to	   two	   types	   of	   an	  
objective	  justification.	  	  
	  
First,	   the	   guidelines	   mention	   the	   possibility	   to	   justify	   conduct	   based	   on	   ‘legitimate	   commercial	  
interest’.1119	   For	   example,	   poor	   creditworthiness	   of	   the	   buyer	   or	   capacity	   constraints	   may	   justify	   a	  
refusal	  to	  supply.1120	  The	  CCS	  also	  suggests	  that	  a	  dominant	  firm	  is	  not	  allowed	  to	  take	  more	  restrictive	  
measures	  than	  are	  necessary	  to	  achieve	  the	  legitimate	  interest.1121	  Such	  a	  necessity	  criterion	  should	  be	  
used	  with	   caution,	   as	   it	  may	   prove	   overly	   burdensome.	   For	   example,	   a	   dominant	   firm	   that	  wishes	   to	  
discontinue	  supply	  based	  on	  poor	  creditworthiness	  of	   its	  customer	  will	  almost	  surely	  fail	   the	  necessity	  
test,	  as	  there	  will	  usually	  be	  less	  restrictive	  measures	  available	  (such	  as	  requiring	  a	  bank	  guarantee).	  	  
	  
A	  second	  possibility	  for	  a	  justification	  applies	  if	  the	  dominant	  undertaking	  is	  able	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  its	  
conduct	  has	  countervailing	  benefits.1122	  Seemingly	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  gains	  may	  be	  subsumed	  under	  this	  
heading.	   The	   main	   question	   should	   be	   whether	   the	   dominant	   firm	   has	   succeeded	   in	   providing	   a	  
coherent	   narrative	   as	   to	  why	   the	   benefits	   that	   it	   relies	   on	   should	   be	   deemed	   relevant	   in	   the	   specific	  
circumstances	   of	   that	   case.	   Again	   the	   dominant	   undertaking	   will	   have	   to	   show	   that	   its	   conduct	   is	  
proportionate	   to	   the	   claimed	  benefits.	   Such	   conduct	  will	   not	   be	   allowed	   if	   its	   ‘primary	   purpose’	   is	   to	  
harm	  competition.1123	  	  
	  
Apart	   from	  the	   two	   types	  of	   justifications	   introduced	  above,	   the	  guidelines	  also	  mention	   justifications	  
while	  discussing	  various	  types	  of	  abuses.	  In	  its	  treatment	  of	  predation,	  the	  CCS	  notes	  that	  prices	  below	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1118	  Ibid.,	  at	  4.4.	  See	  for	  an	  earlier	  reference	  to	  justifications,	  C.	  Tay	  Swee	  Kian,	  ‘New	  Developments	  in	  Competition	  
Law	  in	  Singapore’,	  (2006)	  27	  Business	  Law	  Review	  120,	  122.	  
1119	  Ibid.,	  at	  4.4.	  
1120	  Ibid.,	  at	  11.26.	  See	  also	  the	  CCS	  answers	  to	  a	  questionnaire	  by	  the	  International	  Competition	  Network	  on	  the	  
issue	  of	  refusal	  to	  deal	  (November	  2009),	  available	  at	  
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/questionnaires/uc%20refusals/singapore.pdf,	  at	  7.	  
1121	  CCS	  guidelines,	  supra	  note	  1117,	  at	  4.4.	  
1122	  Ibid.	  See	  also	  the	  CCS	  answers	  to	  a	  questionnaire	  by	  the	  International	  Competition	  Network,	  supra	  note	  1120,	  
at	  7.	  
1123	  Ibid.	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average	  variable	  costs,	  even	  though	  presumed	  to	  be	  abusive,1124	  may	  still	  be	  objectively	  justified.1125	  The	  
CCS	  guidelines	  refer	  to	  three	  legitimate	  commercial	  reasons	  in	  particular,	  such	  as	  in	  the	  event	  of	  short-­‐
run	   promotions.1126	   Other	   types	   of	   prima	   facie	   abuses	   that	   can	   be	   justified	   include	   discounts1127	   and	  
discriminatory	  practices.1128	  	  
	  
It	   should	  be	  applauded	   that	   the	  CCS	  has	  endeavoured	   to	  provide	  clarity	  on	   justifications	  of	  otherwise	  
prohibited	  unilateral	  conduct.	  It	  is	  also	  appealing	  that	  the	  CCS	  steers	  clear	  of	  a	  formalistic	  approach,	  and	  
instead	  focuses	  on	  the	  overall	  context	  and	  the	  likely	  effects	  of	  the	  conduct	  under	  review.	  This	  may	  lead	  
to	   fewer	   hard-­‐and-­‐fast	   rules,	   but	   it	   does	   bring	   more	   business	   reality	   into	   the	   enforcement	   of	  
competition	  law.	  	  
	  
5.3 Case	  law	  
	  
The	  Singaporean	  public	  enforcement	  procedure	   in	  Singapore	   is	   similar	   to	   that	  of	   the	  UK.	  The	  CCS	  can	  
adopt	  an	  infringement	  decision	  if	  it	  finds	  that	  a	  company	  has	  acted	  contrary	  to	  the	  SCA.	  Such	  a	  decision	  
can	   be	   appealed	   to	   the	   Competition	   Appeal	   Board	   (CAB).1129	   A	   further	   appeal	   is	   open	   to	   the	   High	  
Court,1130	  and	  finally	  to	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  –	  Singapore’s	  highest	  court.	  	  
	  
The	  2010	  SISTIC	  decision	  was	  the	  first	  case	  in	  which	  the	  CCS	  found	  an	  abuse.1131	  The	  decision	  held	  that	  
SISTIC,	   the	   dominant	   ticketing	   company	   in	   Singapore,	   contravened	   Section	   47	   SCA	   by	   foreclosing	  
competition	  in	  the	  ticketing	  services	  market	  through	  a	  web	  of	  exclusive	  agreements.1132	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1124	  Ibid.,	  at	  11.4.	  
1125	  Ibid.,	  at	  11.6.	  
1126	  Ibid.,	  at	  11.6.	  
1127	  Ibid.,	  at	  11.12.	  
1128	  Ibid.,	  at	  11.16.	  
1129	  Sections	  71	  and	  72	  SCA.	  
1130	  Section	  74	  SCA.	  
1131	  CCS	  decision	  of	  June	  2010,	  SISTIC,	  available	  at	  
http://www.ccs.gov.sg/content/dam/ccs/PDFs/Public_register_and_consultation/Public_register/Abuse_of_Domi
nance/SISTIC%20Infringement%20Decision%20(Non-­‐confidential%20version).pdf.	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Referring	   to	   its	   own	   guidelines,	   the	   CCS	   devotes	   an	   entire	   chapter	   on	   the	   examination	   of	   objective	  
justification.1133	  The	  CCS	  examined	  whether	  the	  following	  conditions	  applied:	  1134	  
1. The	  conduct	  was	  in	  defence	  of	  a	  legitimate	  commercial	  interest,	  	  
2. The	  firm	  has	  not	  taken	  more	  restrictive	  measures	  than	  were	  necessary,	  	  
3. The	  restriction	  resulted	  in	  certain	  benefits;	  
4. The	  restrictions	  are	  proportionate	  to	  the	  claimed	  benefits.	  	  
	  
On	   the	   facts,	   the	   CCS	   rejected	   SISTIC’s	   plea	   that	   exclusivity	   was	   necessary	   to	   maintain	   investments,	  
holding	   that	   it	   is	   competition,	   rather	   than	   immunity	   from	   competition,	   that	   fosters	   investment	   and	  
innovation.1135	   In	   addition,	   the	   CCS	   held	   that	   SISTIC	   failed	   the	   necessity	   test,1136	   as	   it	   had	   not	  
demonstrated	   that	   its	   investments	   were	   (i)	   specific	   and	   (ii)	   directly	   attributable	   to	   the	   exclusivity	  
agreements.1137	   The	   approach	   by	   the	   CCS	  makes	   sense,	   as	   there	   is	   no	   reason	   to	   condone	   behaviour	  
because	   of	   benefits	   that	   would	   have	   arisen	   even	  without	   that	   conduct.	   The	   CCS	   also	   noted	   that	   the	  
conduct	  under	  review	  does	  not	  meet	  the	  proportionality	  test,	  as	  third-­‐party	  event	  promoters	  (a	  group	  
which	  it	  considers	  one	  of	  the	  ‘stakeholders’)	  do	  not	  benefit	  from	  the	  discounts.1138	  It	  is	  unclear	  why	  the	  
CCS	  has	   relied	  on	   this	  observation.	  As	   the	  SCA	   statute	   is	   clearly	   geared	   towards	  encouraging	  efficient	  
market	   conduct,1139	   it	   is	   unclear	   why	   every	   stakeholder	   should	   necessarily	   benefit	   from	   the	   conduct	  
under	  review.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1132	  The	  CCS	  found	  that	  SISTIC	  was	  the	  dominant	  ticketing	  service	  provider	  in	  Singapore	  with	  a	  persistent	  market	  
share	  of	  around	  85-­‐95%.	  
1133	  See	  Chapter	  8	  of	  the	  SISTIC	  decision,	  supra	  note	  1131.	  This	  chapter	  provides	  several	  references	  to	  case	  law	  by	  
the	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice.	  
1134	  Ibid.,	  at	  8.1.2.	  The	  CCS	  refers	  to	  at	  4.4	  of	  the	  CCS	  guidelines	  (supra	  note	  1117).	  
1135	  Ibid.,	  at	  8.2.2.	  and	  8.2.3.	  The	  CCS	  refers	  to	  the	  Second	  Reading	  speech	  for	  the	  Competition	  Bill	  on	  19	  October	  
2004.	  
1136	  Ibid.	  See	  e.g.	  at	  8.2.12.	  and	  8.2.13.	  Unfortunately	  large	  parts	  are	  left	  blank	  due	  to	  confidentiality.	  
1137	  Ibid.,	  at	  8.2.8.	  The	  CCS	  refers	  to	  the	  Commission’s	  guidance	  on	  enforcement	  priorities,	  at	  30.	  
1138	  Ibid.,	  at	  8.3.6.	  
1139	  See	  Section	  6(1)(a)	  SCA.	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On	  appeal,	   the	  CAB	  confirmed	  the	  CCS’s	   findings	  on	  the	   facts	  of	   the	  case.1140	  Crucially,	   the	  CAB	  found	  
that	  the	  exclusive	  agreements	  under	  review	  had	  an	  adverse	  effect	  on	  competition	  and	  did	  not	  have	  any	  
net	  economic	  benefit.1141	  As	  the	  exclusivity	  arrangements	  had	  no	  legitimate	  purpose,	  the	  CAB	  concluded	  
that	  SISTIC	  had	  indeed	  abused	  its	  dominant	  position.	  	  
	  
	  




Perhaps	  more	   than	  with	   the	   other	   jurisdictions,	   it	   is	   fitting	   to	   discuss	   the	  wider	   context	   in	  which	   the	  
South	  African	  competition	  rules	  came	  into	  being.1142	  During	  the	  Apartheid	  regime,	  major	  corporations	  –	  
exclusively	   under	   white	   ownership	   –	   were	   often	   heavily	   protected	   by	   the	   State,	   leading	   to	   high	  
concentration	   levels	  and	   limited	  competition.1143	  After	  the	  fall	  of	  Apartheid,	   the	  1998	  Competition	  Act	  
was	   introduced	   to	   benefit	   society,	   inter	   alia	   by	   providing	   more	   opportunities	   for	   smaller	   firms.1144	  
History	  has	  left	  a	  mark	  on	  the	  type	  of	  dominance	  cases	  brought	  in	  South	  Africa,	  where	  most	  of	  the	  cases	  
that	   have	   been	   brought	   relate	   either	   to	   (formerly)	   State-­‐owned	   companies	   (such	   as	   South	   African	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1140	  Competition	  Appeal	  Board	  decision	  of	  28	  May	  2012,	  SISTIC	  v	  CCS,	  at	  287,	  available	  at	  
http://www.mti.gov.sg/legislation/Documents/SISTIC%20Appeal%20-­‐
%20CAB%20Decision%20(1%20June%202012)%20-­‐%20Redacted.pdf.	  
1141	  Ibid.,	  at	  318.	  
1142	  The	  introduction	  makes	  use	  of	  a	  publication	  by	  the	  Competition	  Commission	  and	  Competition	  Tribunal	  to	  
celebrate	  the	  tenth	  anniversary	  of	  the	  South	  African	  Competition	  Act:	  Unleashing	  Rivalry:	  Ten	  years	  of	  
enforcement	  by	  the	  South	  African	  competition	  authorities	  (2009),	  available	  at	  
http://www.comptrib.co.za/assets/Uploads/Reports/unleashing-­‐rivalry.pdf.	  
1143	  Ibid.,	  at	  2.	  See	  also	  the	  preamble	  of	  the	  South	  African	  Competition	  Act,	  which	  reads	  that:	  ‘apartheid	  and	  other	  
discriminatory	  laws	  and	  practices	  of	  the	  past	  resulted	  in	  excessive	  concentrations	  of	  ownership	  and	  control	  within	  
the	  national	  economy,	  inadequate	  restraints	  against	  anti-­‐	  competitive	  trade	  practices,	  and	  unjust	  restrictions	  on	  
full	  and	  free	  participation	  in	  the	  economy	  by	  all	  South	  Africans’.	  For	  a	  further	  assessment,	  see	  e.g.	  V.	  Chetty,	  The	  
place	  of	  public	  interest	  in	  South	  Africa’s	  competition	  legislation:	  some	  implications	  for	  international	  antitrust	  
convergence,	  paper	  submitted	  for	  the	  53rd	  Spring	  Meeting	  by	  the	  ABA	  Section	  of	  Antitrust	  Law	  (2005),	  available	  at	  
http://apps.americanbar.org/antitrust/at-­‐committees/at-­‐ic/pdf/spring/05/aba-­‐paper.pdf.	  
1144	  See	  Section	  2	  SACA,	  noting	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  Act.	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Airways,	   Telkom	   and	   Sasol)	   or	   to	   companies	   that	   have	   otherwise	   been	   extensively	   supported	   by	  
government	  (such	  as	  Senwes).	  In	  such	  a	  context,	  a	  company	  cannot	  be	  said	  to	  have	  achieved	  its	  market	  
power	   through	   superior	   efficiency.	   It	   is	   therefore	   understandable	   that	   the	   Act	   has	   a	   relatively	   tough	  




Section	   8	   of	   the	   South	   African	   Competition	   Act	   (SACA)	   prohibits	   the	   abuse	   of	   dominance.1145	   The	  
provision	   brings	   forward	   several	   of	   examples	   of	   abuses,	   covering	   both	   exclusionary	   and	   exploitative	  
abuses.	  It	  is	  prohibited	  for	  a	  dominant	  firm	  to:	  
• ‘charge	  an	  excessive	  price	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  consumers;	  
• refuse	  to	  give	  a	  competitor	  access	  to	  an	  essential	  facility	  when	  it	  is	  economically	  feasible	  to	  do	  
so;	  
• engage	  in	  an	  exclusionary	  act,	  other	  than	  an	  act	   listed	  in	  paragraph	  (d),	   if	  the	  anti-­‐competitive	  
effect	  of	  that	  act	  outweighs	  its	  technological,	  efficiency	  or	  other	  pro-­‐competitive	  gain;	  or	  
• engage	   in	   any	   of	   the	   following	   exclusionary	   acts,	   unless	   the	   firm	   concerned	   can	   show	  
technological,	   efficiency	   or	   other	   pro-­‐competitive	   gains	   which	   outweigh	   the	   anti-­‐competitive	  
effect	  of	  its	  act.’	  This	  subsection	  is	  followed	  by	  a	  list	  of	  five	  exclusionary	  practices,	  such	  as	  tying	  
and	  predation.	  
	  
Section	  8	  SACA	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  general	  reference	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  justifications.	  Section	  8(a)	  SACA	  
appears	   not	   to	   allow	   any	   justification,	   whereas	   Section	   8(b)	   SACA	   seems	   to	   allow	   dominant	   firms	   to	  
argue	  that	  providing	  access	  to	  an	  essential	  facility	  is	  not	  economically	  feasible.	  By	  contrast,	  Sections	  8(c)	  
and	  8(d)	  SACA	  provide	  a	  broad	  possibility	  to	  justify	  otherwise	  prohibited	  conduct	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  it	  
has	   a	   technological,	   efficiency	   or	   other	   pro-­‐competitive	   gain.	   The	   main	   difference	   between	   the	   two	  
subsections	   is	   that	   Section	   8(c)	   SACA	  places	   the	   burden	   to	   negate	   a	   justification	   on	   the	   complainant,	  
whereas	  the	  burden	  under	  Section	  8(d)	  SACA	  is	  on	  the	  respondent.1146	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1145	  See,	  more	  generally,	  the	  anniversary	  document	  by	  the	  Competition	  Commission	  and	  Competition	  Tribunal,	  
supra	  note	  1142,	  at	  3.	  The	  South	  African	  Competition	  Act	  ‘drew	  heavily	  from	  laws	  in	  jurisdictions	  such	  as	  Canada,	  
Australia	  and	  the	  European	  Union’.	  
1146	  Competition	  Commission	  v	  South	  African	  Airways	  (‘SAA	  I’),	  [2005]	  Case	  18/CR/Mar01,	  at	  99.	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6.3 Case	  law	  
	  
Competition	   law	   enforcement	   in	   South	   Africa	   takes	   place	   as	   follows.	   The	   South	   African	   Competition	  
Commission	   (SACC)	   –	   or	   another	   appellant	   –	   may	   bring	   competition	   cases	   before	   the	   Competition	  
Tribunal	   (SACT).	   A	   further	   appeal	   is	   possible	   before	   the	   Competition	   Appeal	   Court	   (CAC).	   Although	  
competition	   cases	   usually	   do	   not	   go	   beyond	   this	   point,	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   may	   review	   a	  
judgment	  by	  the	  CAC.	  A	  final	  appeal	  is	  possible	  before	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  if	  a	  constitutional	  issue	  is	  
at	  play.	  
	  
South	  African	  case	  law	  shows	  particular	  concern	  for	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  conduct	  under	  review.	  In	  the	  SAA	  
II	  judgment,	  a	  case	  dealing	  with	  various	  incentive	  schemes,	  the	  Competition	  Tribunal	  noted	  that	  an	  anti-­‐
competitive	  effect	  could	  manifest	   itself	   in	  two	  ways:	  either	  by	  direct	  evidence	  of	  an	  adverse	  effect	  on	  
consumer	  welfare	  or,	  alternatively,	  by	  evidence	  that	  the	  exclusionary	  act	  has	  a	  substantial	  or	  significant	  
foreclosure	  effect.	  1147	  
	  
If	   there	   is	   evidence	   that	   certain	   conduct	   has	   an	   anti-­‐competitive	   effect,1148	   the	   dominant	   firm	   may	  
invoke	  efficiency	   gains	   that	   outweigh	   those	  effects.1149	   In	  Senwes,1150	   the	   SACT	   confirmed	   that	   such	   a	  
plea	   calls	   for	   a	   balancing	   exercise	   between	   pro-­‐	   and	   anti-­‐competitive	   effects.1151	   The	   evidence	   on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1147	  Nationwide	  Airlines	  and	  Comair	  v	  South	  African	  Airways	  (‘SAA	  II’),	  [2010]	  Case	  80/CR/SEPT06,	  at	  183.	  
1148	  Ibid.,	  at	  189.	  For	  instance	  due	  to	  higher	  prices	  and/or	  reduced	  choice.	  
1149	  Ibid.,	  at	  240.	  
1150	  Competition	  Commission	  v	  Senwes,	  [2009]	  Case	  110/CR/Dec06.	  Senwes,	  dominant	  in	  the	  South	  African	  grain	  
storage	  market,	  had	  allegedly	  made	  it	  impossible	  for	  storage	  users	  to	  compete	  with	  its	  downstream	  trading	  
operations.	  For	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  Tribunal	  judgment,	  see	  L.	  Kelly	  &	  T.	  van	  der	  Vijver,	  ‘Less	  is	  more:	  Senwes	  and	  the	  
concept	  of	  “margin	  squeeze”	  in	  South	  African	  competition	  law’,	  (2009)	  126	  South	  African	  Law	  Journal	  246.	  
Subsequently,	  the	  case	  went	  to	  the	  Competition	  Appeal	  Court,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  and	  the	  Constitutional	  
Court.	  Finally,	  the	  parties	  settled	  the	  case	  by	  a	  Competition	  Tribunal	  Order	  of	  25	  April	  2013,	  Competition	  
Commission	  v	  Senwes,	  Case	  110/CR/Dec06.	  
1151	  Ibid.,	  at	  170.	  This	  may	  include	  a	  quantitative	  analysis	  of	  the	  anti-­‐competitive	  effects	  at	  stake;	  see	  SAA	  I,	  supra	  
note	  1146,	  at	  110.	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efficiencies	   must	   have	   a	   minimum	   level	   of	   credibility.	   The	   CAC	   held	   that	   if	   the	   proof	   is	   of	   ‘dubious	  
quality’,	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  enter	  into	  a	  balancing	  exercise.1152	  	  
	  
Quite	  rightly,	  the	  case	   law	  requires	  a	   ‘logical	  nexus’	  between	  the	  efficiency	  claims	  and	  the	  mechanism	  
according	   to	   which	   the	   conduct	   leads	   to	   the	   alleged	   benefits.1153	   This	   means	   that	   the	   exclusionary	  
conduct	   must	   be	   necessary,	   or	   a	   sine	   qua	   non,	   for	   the	   pro-­‐competitive	   gains	   to	   be	   realized.1154	   This	  
condition	  was	  not	  met	  in	  the	  Patensie	  case,	  which	  involved	  an	  agricultural	  cooperative	  that	  induced	  its	  
members	  not	  to	  deal	  with	  a	  competitor.1155	  The	  SACT	  held	  that	  the	  respondent	  had	  not	  shown	  that	  the	  
exclusionary	   act	   was	   necessary	   for	   the	   alleged	   benefits	   of	   raising	   capital	   or	   achieving	   scale	  
economies.1156	  
	  
Apart	   from	  efficiencies	   stricto	   sensu,	   the	   statutory	   justifications	   in	   Sections	  8(c)	   and	  8(d)	  SACA	  clearly	  
allow	   other	   benefits	   as	   well.	   Conduct	   may	   be	   condoned	   based	   on	   its	   ‘technological’	   or	   ‘other	   pro-­‐
competitive	   gain[s]’,	   allowing	   for	   the	   consideration	   of	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   alleged	   benefits.	   In	   SAA	   I,	   for	  
instance,	   the	   SACT	   agreed	   to	   consider	   quality	   benefits	   as	   producing	   pro-­‐competitive	   benefits,	   even	  
though	   it	   rejected	   the	   plea	   on	   the	   facts.1157	   Another	   example	   is	   the	   BATSA	   judgment.1158	   The	   case	  
concerned	   agreements	   between	   tobacco	   company	   BATSA	   and	   retailers	   that	   allowed	   BATSA	   to	  
determine	   the	  position	   and	   space	   allocation	   for	   its	   own	   cigarette	  brands	   and	   those	  of	   competitors	   in	  
dispensing	  units	  at	  the	  retailer’s	  premises.	  Although	  the	  Tribunal	  did	  not	  engage	  into	  a	  balancing	  test	  in	  
the	   BATSA	   case	   (as	   it	   did	   not	   find	   anti-­‐competitive	   effects),	   it	   did	   suggest	   that	   the	   notion	   of	   pro-­‐
competitive	  benefits	  is	  relatively	  broad.	  In	  BATSA,	  such	  benefits	  included	  the	  free	  provision	  of	  cigarette	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1152	  Senwes	  v	  Competition	  Commission,	  [2009]	  Case	  87/CAC/FEB09,	  at	  70.	  See	  also	  South	  African	  Airways	  v	  Comair	  
and	  Nationwide	  Airlines,	  [2011]	  Case	  92/CAC/MAR10,	  at	  147.	  The	  CAC	  noted	  that	  there	  was	  no	  credible	  evidence	  
of	  any	  efficiency	  achieved	  through	  the	  incentive	  schemes	  under	  review.	  
1153	  SAA	  I,	  supra	  note	  1146,	  at	  256.	  
1154	  Patensie	  v	  Competition	  Commission,	  [2003]	  Case	  16/CAC/Apr02,	  at	  page	  30.	  	  
1155	  Competition	  Commission	  v	  Patensie,	  [2002]	  Case	  37/CR/Jun01.	  	  
1156	  Ibid.,	  at	  99-­‐105.	  
1157	  SAA	  I,	  supra	  note	  1146,	  at	  248-­‐250.	  
1158	  Competition	  Commission	  &	  JTI	  v	  BATSA,	  [2009]	  Case	  05CRFeb05.	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dispensing	  units	  by	  BATSA	  and	  maintenance	  of	  an	  orderly	  point	  of	  sale.1159	  The	  Tribunal	  concluded	  that	  
BATSA	  chose	  a	  legitimate	  form	  of	  competition	  –	  namely	  that	  for	  retail	  shelf	  space	  and	  positioning.1160	  
	  
Apart	   from	  a	  balancing	  test	   to	  weigh	  pro-­‐	  and	  anti-­‐competitive	  effects,	  South	  African	  competition	   law	  
also	  seems	  to	  allow	  dominant	   firms	  to	  engage	   in	   ‘normal’	  or	   ‘reasonable’	  business	  conduct	   (what	  was	  
earlier	  termed	  ‘legitimate	  commercial	  conduct’).	  Even	  dominant	  firms	  still	  have	  a	  degree	  of	  commercial	  
freedom.	   Such	   a	   plea	   is	   particularly	   persuasive	   if	   the	   dominant	   firm	   abides	   by	   generally	   accepted	  
business	  standards.	  In	  York	  Timbers,1161	  the	  CAC	  confirmed	  that	  even	  exclusionary	  behaviour	  can	  still	  be	  
seen	  as	  a	  ‘normal	  [act]	  of	  competition’.1162	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  dominant	  firm	  did	  not	  abuse	  its	  dominance,	  
because	   its	   conduct	   simply	   sought	   to	   improve	   the	   terms	   of	   its	   contracts	   –	   instead	   of	   extending	   its	  
market	  power.1163	  	  
	  
Another	   example	   is	   the	  Bulb	  Man	   judgment,	   in	  which	   the	   applicant	   sought	   interim	   relief	   against	   the	  
refusal	  of	  a	  supplier	  to	  keep	  supplying	  on	  the	  terms	  that	  they	  had	  previously	  agreed	  upon.1164	  The	  SACT	  
considered	   that	   the	   refusal	  was	  more	  probably	   caused	  by	   a	   ‘breakdown	   in	   the	  business	   relationship’,	  
rather	   than	   ‘an	   attempt	   to	   wield	   market	   power	   or	   to	   exclude	   the	   applicant	   for	   an	   anti-­‐competitive	  
end’.1165	  It	  appears	  that,	  in	  the	  assessment	  of	  anti-­‐competitive	  effects,	  commercial	  considerations	  such	  
as	  a	  lack	  of	  trust	  may	  provide	  reason	  to	  accept	  a	  ‘legitimate	  business	  justification’	  for	  the	  refusal.1166	  	  
	  
The	   SACT’s	   Telkom	   judgment	   offers	   a	   further	   confirmation	   that	   a	   justification	   plea	   may	   be	   available	  
beyond	  those	  mentioned	  in	  Section	  8	  SACA.	  The	  case	  concerned,	   inter	  alia,	  a	  refusal	  to	  provide	  access	  
with	   the	   aim	   of	   excluding	   independent	   value	   added	   network	   service	   (VANS)	   providers.1167	   Telkom	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1159	  Ibid.,	  at	  314.	  
1160	  Ibid.,	  at	  282.	  
1161	  York	  Timbers	  v	  SA	  Forestry	  Company,	  [2001]	  Case	  09/CAC/May01,	  at	  6.9.	  
1162	  Ibid.,	  at	  6.9.	  
1163	  Ibid.,	  at	  8.3	  and	  8.4.	  See,	  for	  the	  earlier	  ruling,	  York	  Timbers	  v	  SA	  Forestry	  Company,	  [2001]	  Case	  15/IR/Feb01,	  
at	  91	  and	  97.	  	  
1164	  The	  Bulb	  Man	  (SA)	  v	  Hadeco,	  [2006]	  Case	  81/IR/Apr06.	  	  
1165	  Ibid.,	  at	  61.	  
1166	  Ibid.,	  at	  57.	  
1167	  Competition	  Commission	  v	  Telkom	  SA,	  [2012]	  Case	  11/CR/Feb04.	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argued	  that	  its	  refusal	  was	  justified,	  as	  the	  VANS	  providers	  were	  allegedly	  engaged	  in	  conduct	  contrary	  
to	  the	  South	  African	  Telecommunications	  Act,	  thereby	  invoking	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘illegality	  defence’.1168	  The	  
SACT	  rejected	  the	  plea	  on	  the	  facts.	  An	  examination	  by	  the	  South	  African	  telecom	  regulator	  ICASA	  had	  
revealed	   that	   the	  VANS	  providers	   had	  not	   engaged	   in	   illegal	   activities.1169	   But	   even	   in	   the	   absence	  of	  
such	  a	  finding	  by	  the	  regulator,	  the	  SACT	  would	  have	  rejected	  the	  plea	  as	  Telkom	  had	  been	  inconsistent	  
and	  selective	  in	  its	  refusal	  –	  freezing	  some,	  but	  not	  all,	  of	  the	  networks	  that	  it	  considered	  illegal.1170	  The	  
SACT	  thus	  appears	  open	  to	  consider	  an	  illegality	  defence	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  law,	  and	  is	  right	  to	  be	  sceptical	  
of	  such	  a	  plea	  if	  the	  dominant	  firm	  cannot	  offer	  a	  sound	  reason	  for	  the	  selectivity	  of	  its	  behaviour.1171	  	  
	  
In	  sum,	  the	  York	  Timbers,	  Bulb	  Man	  and	  Telkom	  cases	  above	  confirm	  that	  (even	  apart	  from	  efficiencies)	  
exclusionary	  conduct	  can	  be	  justified	  if	  it	  is	  based	  on	  perfectly	  acceptable	  reasons,	  such	  as	  a	  ‘normal’	  or	  
‘reasonable’	  business	  conduct	  or	  the	  illegality	  defence.	  	  
	  
	  
7 UNITED	  STATES	  
	  
7.1 Introduction	  &	  legislation	  
	  
The	  1890	  Sherman	  Act	   is	  the	  key	  US	  statute	  governing	  federal	  antitrust	   law.	  Section	  2	  of	  the	  Sherman	  
Act	  prohibits	  anti-­‐competitive	  unilateral	  conduct,	  referring	  to	  the	  act	  of	  monopolization	  or	  the	  attempt	  
to	  monopolize.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1168	   Ibid.,	   at	   31.	   Cf.	   UK	   law,	  where	   telecom	   regulator	  Ofcom	   clearly	   endorsed	   the	   illegality	   defense.	   See	  Ofcom	  
decisions	  of	  3	  November	  2003	  and	  28	  June	  2005	  in	  Floe	  Telecom.	  The	  UK	  Competition	  Appeal	  Tribunal	  agreed	  with	  
that	  position	   in	  principle.	  However,	  on	   the	   facts	  of	   the	  case,	   it	  held	   that	   it	  was	  anything	  but	   clear	   that	   the	   firm	  
requesting	  access	  had	  acted	  illegally.	  See	  Floe	  Telecom	  v	  Ofcom,	  [2004]	  CAT	  18,	  at	  289,	  333	  and	  336;	  Floe	  Telecom	  
v	  Ofcom	  [2006]	  CAT	  17,	  at	  352-­‐353.	  	  
1169	  Ibid.,	  at	  87	  and	  94.	  
1170	  Ibid.,	  at	  88.	  The	  evidence	  thus	  suggested	  that	  the	  refusal	  was	  a	  matter	  of	  commercial	  strategy,	  rather	  than	  
legal	  compliance.	  
1171	  Selectivity	  has	  also	  been	  found	  relevant	  in	  cases	  in	  other	  jurisdictions.	  See	  e.g.	  the	  judgment	  by	  the	  High	  Court	  
of	  England	  &	  Wales	  in	  Purple	  Parking	  and	  Meteor	  Parking	  v	  Heathrow	  Airport	  [2011]	  EWHC	  987	  (Ch).	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The	  Sherman	  Act	  does	  not	  elaborate	  on	  the	  legal	  requirements	  of	  monopolization,	  nor	  does	  it	  refer	  to	  
any	  possible	  justifications.	  It	  is	  clear,	  however,	  that	  if	  an	  entity	  in	  a	  regulated	  sector	  acts	  in	  compliance	  
with	  a	  detailed	  statutory	  scheme,	  it	  may	  be	  shielded	  from	  antitrust	  scrutiny	  by	  the	  doctrine	  of	  implied	  
immunity.1172	  In	  addition,	  the	  case	  law	  has	  shown	  that	  a	  monopolist	  may	  invoke	  so-­‐called	  ‘valid	  business	  
reasons’1173	   to	   justify	   conduct	   that	   would	   otherwise	   have	   been	   prohibited	   under	   Section	   2	   of	   the	  
Sherman	   Act.1174	   The	   following	   paragraph	   discusses	  what	   this	   concept	  means	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   US	  
federal	  antitrust	  law.	  
	  
7.2 Case	  law	  
	  
In	   terms	   of	   procedure,	   a	   plaintiff	   may	   bring	   a	   federal	   antitrust	   case	   before	   a	   District	   Court.	   Such	   a	  
plaintiff	   is	   usually	   a	   private	   party,	   but	   can	   also	   be	   one	   of	   the	   enforcement	   agencies	   of	   US	   federal	  
antitrust	  law;	  namely	  the	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission	  (‘FTC’)	  or	  the	  Antitrust	  Division	  of	  the	  Department	  
of	  Justice	  (‘DoJ’).	  A	  subsequent	  appeal	  is	  open	  to	  a	  Circuit	  Court.	  If	  granted	  certiorari,	  a	  further	  appeal	  is	  
open	  to	  the	  US	  Supreme	  Court.	  	  
	  
The	  seminal	  US	  Supreme	  Court	  judgment	  in	  Grinnell	  has	  made	  clear	  that	  a	  claim	  based	  on	  Section	  2	  of	  
the	  Sherman	  Act	   requires	  evidence	  of	   ‘the	  willful	  acquisition	  or	  maintenance	  of	   [monopoly]	  power	  as	  
distinguished	  from	  growth	  or	  development	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  a	  superior	  product,	  business	  acumen,	  or	  
historic	  accident.’1175	   	  Such	  an	  exercise	  of	  monopoly	  power	  involves	  ‘specific	   intent’1176	  to	  behave	  anti-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1172	  See	  e.g.	  United	  States	  v	  National	  Assn.	  of	  Securities	  Dealers,	  Inc.,	  422	  US	  694	  (1975);	  Gordon	  v	  New	  York	  Stock	  
Exchange,	  Inc.,	  422	  US	  659	  (1975).	  
1173	  Also	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘legitimate	  business	  justification’,	  see	  T.A.	  Piraino,	  Jr.,	  ‘Identifying	  Monopolists’	  Illegal	  
Conduct	  under	  the	  Sherman	  Act’,	  (2000)	  75	  NYU	  L.	  Rev.	  847.	  At	  851,	  the	  author	  proposes	  a	  standard	  for	  refusal	  to	  
deal	  cases	  where	  the	  hurdle	  of	  a	  finding	  of	  prima	  facie	  monopolization	  is	  relatively	  low,	  and	  the	  examination	  of	  a	  
justification	  plea	  takes	  centre	  stage.	  
1174	  The	  analysis	  does	  not	  cover	  justifications	  of	  conduct	  that	  would	  otherwise	  be	  prohibited	  under	  different	  laws,	  
such	  as	  the	  prohibition	  of	  price	  discrimination	  under	  the	  Robinson	  Patman	  Act.	  	  
1175	  United	  States	  v	  Grinnell	  Corp.,	  384	  US	  563,	  571	  (1966).	  This	  position	  was	  confirmed,	  inter	  alia,	  by	  Eastman	  
Kodak	  v	  Image	  Technical	  Services,	  Inc.,	  504	  US	  451	  (1992);	  Aspen	  Skiing	  Co.	  v	  Aspen	  Highlands	  Skiing	  Corp.,	  472	  US	  
585,	  596	  (1985).	  
1176	  Also	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘monopolistic’	  intent.	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competitively,	  implying	  that	  the	  defendant’s	  conduct	  cannot	  be	  explained	  by	  a	  ‘valid	  business	  reason	  or	  
concern	  for	  efficiency’.1177	  A	  defendant	  can	  provide	  a	  pro-­‐competitive	  justification	  for	  its	  conduct	  once	  a	  
prima	  facie	  case	  under	  Section	  2	  of	  the	  Sherman	  Act	  has	  been	  established.1178	  If	  accepted,	  a	  legitimate	  
business	   reason	  can	  offset	  a	   finding	  of	   ‘specific	   intent’,1179	  by	  providing	  an	  alternative	  explanation	   for	  
the	  monopolist’s	  predominant	  motivation.1180	  	  
	  
If	  a	  plaintiff	  has	  carried	  its	  initial	  burden	  of	  showing	  a	  restraint	  on	  competition,1181	  the	  defendant	  bears	  
the	   burden	   of	   persuasion	   that	   its	   conduct	   can	   be	   justified	   by	   a	   business	   purpose.1182	   A	   business	  
justification	   has	   to	   be	   ‘credible’	   rather	   than	   simply	   ‘plausible’.1183	   The	   plea	   shall	   be	   accepted	   if	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1177	  So	  ‘[i]f	  there	  is	  a	  valid	  business	  reason	  for	  [the	  defendant's]	  conduct,	  there	  is	  no	  antitrust	  liability’,	  High	  Tech.	  
Careers	  v	  San	  Jose	  Mercury	  News,	  996	  F.2d	  987,	  990	  (9th	  Cir.	  1993).	  See	  also,	  inter	  alia,	  LePage’s	  v	  3M,	  324	  F.3d	  
141	  (3rd	  Cir.	  2003);	  Great	  Western	  Directories	  v	  Sw.	  Bell	  Tel.	  Co.,	  63	  F.3d	  1378,	  1385-­‐86	  (5th	  Cir.	  1995);	  Midwest	  
Radio	  Co.,	  Inc.	  v	  Forum	  Pub.	  Co.,	  942	  F.2d	  1294,	  1297-­‐1298	  (8th	  Cir.	  1991);	  Oksanen	  v	  Page	  Memorial	  Hosp.,	  945	  
F.2d	  696,	  710	  (4th	  Cir.	  1991)	  (en	  banc);	  Becker	  v	  Egypt	  News	  Co.,	  713	  F.2d	  363,	  366	  (8th	  Cir.	  1983)	  at	  370.	  
1178	  Facey	  and	  Assaf	  2002-­‐2003,	  supra	  note	  1002,	  at	  566-­‐567.	  
1179	  Times-­‐Picayune	  Publ.	  Co.	  v	  United	  States,	  345	  US	  594,	  627	  (1953);	  United	  States	  v	  Columbia	  
Steel	  Co.,	  334	  US	  495	  (1948).	  See	  also	  Eastman	  Kodak	  Co.	  v	  Southern	  Photo	  Material	  Co.,	  295	  F.	  98	  (5th	  Cir.	  1923),	  
Aff'd	  273	  US	  359	  (1927)	  and	  Six	  Twenty-­‐Nine	  Prods.,	  Inc.	  v	  Rollins	  Telecasting,	  Inc.	  365	  F.2d	  478,	  486	  (5th	  Cir.	  1966).	  
See	  also	  A.Y.	  Kapen,	  ‘Duty	  to	  cooperate	  under	  Section	  2	  of	  the	  Sherman	  Act:	  Aspen	  Skiing’s	  slippery	  slope’,	  (1986-­‐
1987)	  72	  Cornell	  L.	  Rev.	  1047,	  1062.	  He	  explains	  that	  anti-­‐competitive	  intent	  is	  inferred	  from	  proof	  of	  adverse	  
effects	  and	  that,	  subsequently,	  ‘[t]he	  monopolist	  can	  negate	  this	  inference	  only	  by	  establishing	  a	  valid	  business	  
justification	  for	  its	  conduct.’	  See	  also	  See	  B.	  Hawk,	  ‘Attempts	  to	  Monopolize	  -­‐	  Specific	  Intent	  as	  Antitrust's	  Ghost	  in	  
the	  Machine’,	  (1973)	  58	  Cornell	  L.	  Rev.	  1121,	  1163.	  
1180	  Times-­‐Picayune	  (ibid.),	  at	  622	  and	  627.	  See	  also	  S.C.	  Salop,	  ‘Preserving	  Monopoly:	  Economic	  Analysis,	  Legal	  
Standards	  and	  Microsoft’,	  (1999)	  7	  George	  Mason	  Law	  Review	  617.	  He	  advocates	  a	  test	  based	  on	  the	  company’s	  
primary	  purpose.	  
1181	  Capital	  Imaging	  v	  Mohawk,	  996	  F.2d	  537	  (2nd	  Cir.	  1993).	  In	  Jefferson	  Parish,	  466	  US	  at	  31,	  104	  S.Ct.	  at	  1568,	  
the	  US	  Supreme	  Court	  also	  held	  that	  an	  ‘actual	  adverse	  effect	  on	  competition’	  must	  be	  shown.	  
1182	  Aspen	  Skiing,	  supra	  note	  1175,	  at	  608-­‐611.	  According	  to	  the	  Court,	  the	  petitioner	  had	  failed	  to	  offer	  any	  
efficiency	  justification	  for	  its	  conduct.	  For	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  implications	  of	  Aspen,	  see	  e.g.	  Kapen	  1986-­‐1987	  (supra	  
note	  1179);	  and	  J.B.	  Baker,	  ‘Promoting	  innovation	  competition	  through	  the	  Aspen/Kodak	  rule’,	  (1998-­‐1999)	  7	  
George	  Mason	  Law	  Review	  495.	  
1183	  Eastman	  Kodak,	  supra	  note	  1175,	  at	  478-­‐79.	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defendant	  can	  show	  that	  pro-­‐competitive	  benefits	  outweigh	  the	  anti-­‐competitive	  effects.1184	  This	  does	  
not	   necessarily	   entail	   an	   actual	   weighing	   of	   effects,1185	   but	   appears	   to	   require	   an	   examination	   ‘of	  
whether	  the	  challenged	  action	  purports	  to	  promote	  or	  to	  destroy	  competition.’1186	  Once	  the	  defendant	  
has	  discharged	   its	  burden	  of	  showing	  a	  valid	  business	   justification,	  the	  burden	  shifts	  to	  the	  plaintiff	   to	  
prove	  that	  the	  justification	  brought	  forward	  is	  ‘pretextual’.1187	  
	  
US	  case	   law	  offers	   few	  discernable	   legal	   tests	  applicable	  to	   justifications.	  Some	   judgments	  did	  suggest	  
that	   the	   objectives	   proffered	   by	   a	   defendant	   could	   not	   have	   been	   achieved	   through	   less	   anti-­‐
competitive	  means.1188	  Other	  judgments,	  however,	  have	  cast	  doubt	  on	  the	  relevance	  of	  such	  a	  test.	  For	  
example,	  in	  Trinko,	  the	  US	  Supreme	  Court	  held	  that	  the	  Sherman	  Act	  ‘does	  not	  give	  judges	  carte	  blanche	  
to	   insist	   that	  a	  monopolist	  alter	   its	  way	  of	  doing	  business	  whenever	  some	  other	  approach	  might	  yield	  
greater	   competition’.1189	   This	   statement	   appears	   to	   have	   an	   impact	   for	   justifications:	   the	   more	  
commercial	   liberty	   is	   awarded	   to	   a	  monopolist,	   the	  wider	   the	   scope	  becomes	  of	   a	   potential	   business	  
justification	  plea.	  	  
	  
The	  importance	  of	  this	  link	  clearly	  emerged	  from	  Byars	  v	  Bluff	  City	  News.	  The	  Sixth	  Circuit	  held	  that	  ‘[a]	  
finding	  of	  anti-­‐trust	  liability	  in	  a	  case	  of	  a	  refusal	  to	  deal	  should	  not	  be	  made	  without	  examining	  reasons	  
which	  might	   justify	   the	   refusal	   to	  deal’,	   because	   ‘we	  must	   give	   [monopolists]	   some	   leeway	   in	  making	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1184	  California	  ex	  rel.	  Harris	  v	  Safeway,	  Inc.,	  651	  F.3d	  1118,	  1133	  n.10	  (9th	  Cir.	  2011).	  However,	  see	  	  
United	  States	  v	  Microsoft	  Corporation,	  253	  F.3d	  34	  (DC	  Cir.	  2001),	  where	  the	  plaintiff	  had	  to	  show	  that	  the	  anti-­‐
competitive	  effects	  outweighed	  the	  pro-­‐competitive	  effects.	  
1185	  For	  example,	  the	  D.C.	  Circuit	  Court	  did	  not	  do	  so	  in	  Microsoft	  (ibid.,	  at	  59),	  even	  though	  it	  did	  attach	  much	  
weight	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  practices	  under	  review.	  
1186	  Capital	  Imaging,	  supra	  note	  1181.	  	  
1187	  See	  e.g.	  Morris	  Commc'ns	  Corp.	  v	  PGA	  Tour,	  Inc.,	  364	  F.3d	  1288,	  1295	  (11th	  Cir.	  2004).	  An	  example	  where	  an	  
efficiency	  justification	  was	  found	  to	  be	  ‘pretextual’	  is	  United	  States	  v	  Dentsply	  Int’l,	  Inc.,	  399	  F.3d	  181,	  (3rd	  Cir.	  
2005)	  at	  197.	  
1188	  Eastman	  Kodak,	  supra	  note	  1175,	  at	  483.	  California	  Dental	  Association	  v	  FTC,	  128	  F	  3d	  720	  (9th	  Cir.	  1997);	  rev’d	  
526	  US	  756	  (1999).	  
1189	  Verizon	  Communications,	  Inc.	  v	  Law	  Offices	  of	  Curtis	  V.	  Trinko,	  LLP,	  540	  US	  398	  (2004),	  124	  S.Ct.	  at	  883.	  	  For	  an	  
analysis	  of	  this	  judgment,	  see	  e.g.	  H.A.	  Shelanski,	  ‘The	  case	  for	  rebalancing	  Antitrust	  and	  Regulation’,	  (2011)	  109	  
Michigan	  Law	  Review	  683;	  E.D.	  Cavanagh,	  ‘Trinko:	  A	  Kinder,	  Gentler	  Approach	  To	  Dominant	  Firms	  Under	  The	  
Antitrust	  Laws’,	  (2007)	  59	  Maine	  Law	  Review	  111.	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business	  decisions’.1190	  Other	   judgments	  by	  Circuit	  Courts	  affirmed	  that	  a	   lawful	  monopolist	  should	  be	  
‘free	  to	  compete	  like	  everyone	  else’1191	  and	  is	  ‘encouraged	  to	  compete	  aggressively	  on	  the	  merits’.1192	  In	  
Trinko,	  the	  US	  Supreme	  Court	  followed	  this	  line	  of	  reasoning	  by	  holding	  that	  the	  opportunity	  to	  charge	  
monopoly	  prices	  is	  precisely	  what	  attracts	  business	  acumen.1193	  Lower	  courts	  have	  often	  relied	  on	  Trinko	  
to	  justify	  a	  refusal	  to	  provide	  access,	  especially	  if	  the	  plaintiff	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  ‘free	  rider’.1194	  
	  
This	   hands-­‐off	   approach	   seems	   induced	   by	   a	   wish	   not	   to	   chill	   pro-­‐competitive	   behaviour.	   It	   raises	  
questions	   as	   to	   the	   continued	   relevance	   of	   case	   law	   that	   required	   benefits	   not	   only	   to	   accrue	   to	   the	  
monopolist.	   For	  example,	   earlier	   judgments	  had	   rejected	  business	   justification	  pleas	   that	  were	   simply	  
based	  on	  the	  desire	  to	  maintain	  a	  monopoly	  market	  share1195	  or	  on	  the	  monopolist’s	  promotion	  of	   its	  
(economic)	  self-­‐interest	  alone.1196	  The	   laissez-­‐faire	  approach	  may	  also	  partly	  explain	  why	  US	  Antitrust,	  
for	  all	   its	  preoccupations	  with	  efficiency,	  rarely	  enters	   into	  an	  actual	  balancing	  test	  of	  effects.	   Instead,	  
the	   focus	   is	   on	   providing	   ample	   commercial	   freedom	   for	   monopolists	   that	   allow	   them	   to	   engage	   in	  
conduct	  that	  is	  almost	  automatically	  associated	  with	  efficiency.	  
	  
Various	   precedents	   seem	   to	   confirm	   the	   importance	   of	   commercial	   freedom	   as	   a	   justification.	   For	  
example,	  as	  to	  a	  work	  protected	  by	  IP	  law,	  the	  First	  Circuit	  considered	  a	  monopolist's	  ‘desire	  to	  exclude	  
others’	   from	   this	   work	   ‘a	   presumptively	   valid	   business	   justification	   for	   any	   immediate	   harm	   to	  
consumers.’1197	  In	  the	  Brunswick	  case,	  which	  focused	  on	  a	  scheme	  of	  discounts,	  the	  Eighth	  Circuit	  simply	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1190	  Byars,	  supra	  note	  1037,	  at	  862.	  Kapen	  (supra	  note	  1179,	  at	  1070)	  noted	  that	  the	  US	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  Aspen	  
Skiing	  ‘apparently	  ignored	  the	  need	  to	  allow	  monopolists	  some	  discretion	  in	  making	  business	  decisions’.	  
1191	  See	  Olympia	  Equipment	  Leasing	  Company	  v	  Western	  Union	  Telegraph	  Company,	  797	  F.2d	  370	  (7th	  Cir.	  1987).	  	  	  
1192	  Foremost	  Pro	  Color,	  Inc.	  v	  Eastman	  Kodak	  Co.,	  703	  F.2d	  534,	  544	  (9th	  Cir.	  1983).	  
1193	  Trinko,	  supra	  note	  1189,	  124	  S.	  Ct.	  at	  879.	  
1194	  J.A.	  Keyte,	  ‘The	  Ripple	  Effects	  of	  Trinko:	  How	  It	  Is	  Affecting	  Section	  2	  Analysis’,	  (2005)	  20	  Antitrust	  44,	  46.	  	  
1195	  Data	  Gen.	  Corp.	  v	  Grumman	  Sys.	  Support	  Corp.,	  36	  F.3d	  1147,	  1183	  (1st	  Cir.	  1994).	  In	  Aspen	  Skiing	  (supra	  note	  
1175,	  at	  608-­‐11),	  the	  Court	  found	  no	  rationale	  for	  the	  conduct	  under	  review	  other	  than	  a	  wish	  to	  eliminate	  the	  
plaintiff	  as	  a	  competitor.	  See	  also	  Otter	  Tail	  Power	  Co.	  v	  United	  States,	  410	  US	  366,	  378	  (1973).	  	  
1196	  Otter	  Tail	  (ibid.),	  at	  389.	  The	  Court	  transposed	  the	  reasoning	  that	  it	  had	  applied	  earlier	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  Section	  1	  of	  the	  
Sherman	  Act	  in	  United	  States	  v	  Arnold,	  Schwinn	  &	  Co.,	  388	  US	  365,	  375	  (1967).	  For	  a	  more	  recent	  confirmation	  of	  
this	  line	  of	  reasoning,	  see	  LePage,	  supra	  note	  1177,	  at	  153,	  154	  and	  163.	  
1197	  Data	  General,	  supra	  note	  1195,	  at	  1187.	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referred	   to	   the	  business	   justification	   that	  Brunswick	  was	   ‘trying	   to	   sell	   its	  product.’1198	   In	  Grinnell,	   the	  
First	  Circuit	  held	  that	  an	  exclusive	  dealing	  arrangement	  was	  justified	  considering	  the	  desire	  to	  achieve	  ‘a	  
stable	   source	   of	   supply’,	   ‘a	   stable,	   favorable	   price’	   and	   ‘production	   planning	   that	  was	   likely	   to	   lower	  
costs.’1199	   In	   addition,	   in	   terms	  of	   a	   predation	   case,	   no	   inference	   of	   predatory	   intent	   arises	  when	   the	  
defendant	   shows	   that	   below-­‐cost	   price	   level	   was	   reached	   defensively,1200	   or	   where	   the	   price	   cuts	  
constituted	  a	  legitimate	  competitive	  response	  to	  market	  conditions.1201	  	  
	  
Furthermore,	  a	  defendant	  may	  bring	  forward	  a	  valid	  business	  reason	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  refusal	  to	  deal	  
case	   (Aspen	  Skiing),1202	   and	   in	   the	  presence	  of	  exclusionary	   conduct	   (Eastman	  Kodak1203).	   Examples	  of	  
valid	   business	   reasons	   included	   the	   prevention	   of	   free-­‐riding,1204	   ‘engineering	   factors’	   that	   prevented	  
the	   defendant	   from	   entering	   into	   a	   wholesale	   contract,1205	   and	   the	   abandonment	   of	   an	   unprofitable	  
operation.1206	   Courts	   have	   also	   accepted	   a	   defendant’s	   reluctance	   to	   deal	   with	   other	   firms	   on	   the	  
following	  grounds:	  
• The	  customer	  is	  unable	  to	  maintain	  accurate	  records.1207	  	  
• The	  customer	  has	  engaged	  in	  deceptive	  advertising	  or	  unfair	  practices.1208	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1198	  Brunswick,	  207	  F.3d	  1039,	  1062	  (8th	  Cir.	  2000).	  
1199	  Barry	  Wright	  Corp.	  v	  ITT	  Grinnell	  Corp.,	  724	  F.2d	  227,	  236-­‐237	  (1st	  Cir.	  1983).	  
1200	  General	  Foods	  Corporation,	  103	  FTC	  204	  (1984).	  
1201	  Richter	  Concrete	  Corp.	  v	  Hilltop	  Concrete	  Corp.,	  691	  F	  2d	  818	  (6th	  Cir.	  1982).	  	  
1202	  Aspen	  Skiing,	  supra	  note	  1175,	  at	  602-­‐605,	  608-­‐611,	  where	  the	  US	  Supreme	  Court	  found	  that	  the	  defendant	  
had	  failed	  to	  offer	  any	  ‘efficiency	  justification’	  for	  its	  conduct.	  See	  also	  US	  Football	  League	  v	  National	  Football	  
League,	  842	  F.2d	  1335,	  1359	  n.21	  (2nd	  Cir.	  1988).	  Note	  that	  in	  Trinko,	  supra	  note	  1189,	  the	  US	  Supreme	  Court	  held	  
that	  it	  had	  never	  acknowledged	  the	  essential	  facilities	  doctrine.	  
1203	  Eastman	  Kodak,	  supra	  note	  1175,	  at	  453	  and	  483-­‐486.	  
1204	  Cont'l	  T.V.,	  Inc.	  v	  GTE	  Sylvania	  Inc.,	  433	  US	  36,	  55	  (1977).	  In	  this	  case	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  referred	  to	  ‘legitimate	  
business	  purpose’.	  See	  also	  Int'l	  Rys.	  of	  Cent.	  Am.	  v	  United	  Brands	  Co.,	  532	  F.2d	  231,	  239-­‐40	  (2nd	  Cir.	  1976),	  cert.	  
denied,	  429	  US	  835	  (1976).	  This	  ruling	  states	  that	  proof	  of	  a	  company's	  reasonable	  steps	  to	  preserve	  its	  business	  
interests	  does	  not,	  without	  more,	  raise	  a	  genuine	  issue	  of	  material	  fact	  under	  Section	  2	  of	  the	  Sherman	  Act,	  and	  
appears	  comparable	  to	  the	  ECJ	  ruling	  in	  Case	  27/76	  United	  Brands	  v	  Commission	  [1978]	  ECR	  207.	  
1205	  Otter	  Tail,	  supra	  note	  1195,	  at	  378.	  
1206	  Intern'l	  Railways	  of	  Cent.	  America	  v	  United	  Brands,	  532	  F.2d	  231,	  239-­‐40	  (2nd	  Cir.	  1976),	  cert.	  denied,	  429	  US	  
835	  (1976).	  
1207	  Byars,	  supra	  note	  1037.	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• The	  defendant	  has	  moral	  or	  ethical	  concerns	  with	  the	  customer.1209	  
	  
The	  US	  approach	  should	  be	  applauded	   for	  giving	  no	  pre-­‐defined	   limits	  of	  what	  may	  constitute	  a	  valid	  
business	  reason,	  enabling	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  possible	  pleas	  that	  take	  due	  account	  of	  the	  relevant	  context.	  
At	   the	   same	   time,	  US	  courts	   could	   step	  up	   their	  effort	   in	  making	  clear	  what	   legal	   requirements	  apply	  
when	  a	  company	  invokes	  such	  justifications.	  At	  the	  moment	  the	  examination	  of	  valid	  business	  reasons	  




The	  Antitrust	  Division	  of	   the	  US	  Department	  of	   Justice	   (DoJ)	   and	   the	  Federal	   Trade	  Commission	   (FTC)	  
could	  equally	  step	  up	  their	  efforts	  to	  clearly	  explain	  their	  views	  of	  valid	  business	  reason	  for	  the	  purposes	  
of	  Section	  2	  of	  the	  Sherman	  Act,	  as	  current	  guidance	  documents	  provide	  little	  insight.	  	  
	  
The	  DoJ’s	  guidance	  on	  single	  firm	  conduct	  under	  Section	  2	  of	  the	  Sherman	  Act	  of	  September	  2008	  does	  
provide	  a	  number	  of	  references	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  valid	  business	  reason.1210	  For	  example,	  the	  guidance	  
document	  notes	  that	  the	  DoJ	  is	  open	  to	  consider	  an	  efficiency	  defence	  within	  the	  context	  of	  a	  predation	  
case.	  Overall,	  however,	  the	  document	  provides	  limited	  guidance	  on	  the	  DoJ’s	  own	  views	  of	  this	  topic.	  In	  
addition,	   the	  2008	   guidelines	  were	  not	   endorsed	  by	   the	   FTC	   and	  were	  withdrawn	   in	  May	  2009.	   They	  
have	  not	  yet	  been	  replaced	  by	  another	  comprehensive	  guidance	  document.	  Hopefully	  the	  DoJ	  and	  FTC	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1208	  Homefinders	  of	  America	  Inc	  v	  Providence	  Journal	  Co,	  621	  F	  2d	  441	  (1980).	  
1209	  America's	  Best	  Cinema	  Corp	  v	  Fort	  Wayne	  Newspapers,	  Inc.	  347	  F	  Supp	  328	  (1972),	  concerning	  a	  refusal	  to	  
accept	  advertisements	  of	  X-­‐rated	  films.	  
1210	  DoJ	  single	  firm	  conduct	  guidelines	  of	  September	  2008,	  at	  71,	  available	  at	  
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.pdf.	  This	  may	  be	  the	  case	  if	  ‘the	  conduct	  is	  part	  of	  a	  firm’s	  
procompetitive	  efforts	  to	  promote	  or	  improve	  its	  product	  or	  reduce	  its	  costs	  and	  may,	  in	  the	  long	  term,	  reduce	  the	  
price	  consumers	  pay	  for	  its	  goods	  and	  services	  or	  increase	  the	  value	  of	  those	  goods	  or	  services’.	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In	  a	  study	  that	  spans	  a	  variety	  of	  jurisdictions	  with	  many	  diverging	  characteristics,	  it	  is	  tempting	  to	  focus	  
on	  their	  differences	  rather	  than	  their	  commonalities.	  In	  my	  opinion,	  such	  a	  focus	  would	  risk	  missing	  the	  
forest	  for	  the	  trees.	  The	  analysis	  above	  has	  shown	  that,	  despite	  the	  obvious	  differences,	  there	  are	  also	  
many	   cross-­‐border	   similarities.	   The	   paragraphs	   below	   examine	   the	   elements	   that	   I	   found	   particularly	  
interesting.	  
	  
8.2 Cross-­‐border	  influences	  
	  
Several	  of	  the	  judgments	  discussed	  above	  refer	  explicitly	  to	  foreign	  case	  law	  justifications	  of	  prima	  facie	  
anti-­‐competitive	   conduct.	   Such	   references	   confirm	   that	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   transpose	   lessons	   and	   best	  
practices	  regarding	  justifications	  across	  borders.	  
	  
Australian	  case	  law	  on	  unilateral	  conduct	  provides	  many	  references	  to	  US	  and	  EU	  case	  law.1211	  US	  case	  
law	   has	   been	   particularly	   influential,	   prompting	  Williams	   to	   note:	   ‘the	   [Australian]	   High	   Court,	   has	   in	  
effect,	   adopted	   the	   business	   justification	   test	   used	   in	   the	   United	   States’.1212	   More	   generally,	   South	  
African	  competition	  law	  also	  seems	  relatively	  open	  to	  overseas	  jurisprudence,1213	  referring	  to	  case	  law	  in	  
the	   EU,1214	   the	   UK1215	   and	   the	   US.1216	   In	   Singapore,	   the	   CCS	   used	   the	   legal	   test	   mentioned	   by	   the	  
European	  Commission’s	  guidance	  on	  enforcement	  priorities	  in	  its	  SISTIC	  decision.1217	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1211	  See	  e.g.	  Queensland	  Wire,	  supra	  note	  1020,	  at	  23	  (referring	  to	  Olympia	  Leasing,	  supra	  note	  22);	  Melway,	  supra	  
note	  1032,	  at	  26	  (referring	  to	  Aspen	  Skiing,	  supra	  note	  1175);	  BBM,	  supra	  note	  1049,	  at	  138	  (referring	  to	  Case	  C-­‐
395/96	  P	  Compagnie	  Maritime	  Belge	  v	  Commission	  [2000]	  ECR	  I	  –	  1365)	  and	  249	  (referring	  to	  Case	  C-­‐85/76	  
Hoffmann-­‐La	  Roche	  v	  Commission	  [1979]	  ECR	  461).	  
1212	  M.	  Williams,	  Section	  46	  of	  the	  Trade	  Practices	  Act	  1974:	  Misuse	  of	  Market	  Power	  -­‐	  A	  modern	  day	  catch	  22?,	  22	  
Queensland	  Law	  Society	  Journal	  377,	  384	  (1992).	  
1213	  Indeed,	  the	  South	  African	  Competition	  Act	  ‘drew	  heavily	  from	  laws	  in	  jurisdictions	  such	  as	  Canada,	  Australia	  
and	  the	  European	  Union’.	  See	  the	  anniversary	  document,	  supra	  note	  1144,	  at	  3.	  
1214	  E.g.	  SAA	  I,	  supra	  note	  1146,	  at	  35,	  referring	  to	  Commercial	  Solvents,	  supra	  note	  1041.	  
1215	  E.g.	  Senwes,	  supra	  note	  1150,	  at	  142,	  referring	  to	  Genzyme,	  supra	  note	  1066.	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It	   should	   be	   applauded	   that	   some	   judges	   and	   NCAs	   are	   open	   to	   consider	   interpretations	   of	   foreign	  
jurisdictions,	  and	  apply	  such	  interpretations	  if	  they	  find	  them	  persuasive.	  An	  open-­‐minded	  approach	  is	  
likely	   to	   enhance	   the	   quality	   of	   their	   case	   law,	   as	   it	   infuses	   domestic	   competition	   law	   with	   well-­‐
considered	  deliberations	   from	  overseas	   institutions	  that	  have	  tackled	  similar	   issues	   in	  the	  past.	  Strong	  
cross-­‐border	   influences	  may	  also	  support	  substantive	  convergence,	   thus	   facilitating	   legal	  certainty	  and	  
consistency	  across	  borders.	  
	  
8.3 The	  legal	  framework	  of	  justifications	  	  
	  
Justifications	  exist	  to	  exonerate	  conduct	  that	  is	  considered	  acceptable	  behaviour,	  even	  though	  it	  may	  be	  
prima	  facie	  anti-­‐competitive.	  It	  is	  thus	  wise	  to	  consider	  what	  type	  of	  conduct	  competition	  law	  does	  not	  
seek	  to	  prohibit.	  	  
	  
It	   is	   clear	   that	  US	   law	  prohibits	   a	  monopolist	   from	  wilfully	   acquiring	   or	  maintaining	  monopoly	   power	  
only	  when	  it	  competes	  on	  some	  basis	  other	  than	  the	  merits.1218	  Similarly,	  Canadian	  law	  allows	  conduct	  
that	  results	  from	  ‘superior	  competitive	  performance’.1219	  In	  addition,	  Singaporean	  and	  South	  African	  law	  
seem	  to	  permit	  conduct	  that	  is	  related	  to	  ‘competitive	  merit’1220	  or	  ‘competition	  on	  the	  merits’.1221	  	  
	  
I	   agree	   that	   competition	   law	   should	   allow	   firms	   to	   compete	   on	   the	   merits.	   It	   reflects	   the	   idea	   that	  
competition	   law	   does	   not	   bar	   firms	   to	   compete	   vigorously	   simply	   because	   they	   have	  market	   power.	  
Prohibiting	   such	   conduct	   would	   have	   a	   serious	   competition	   chilling	   effect,	   and	   would	   come	   close	   to	  
banning	  market	  power	  as	  such.	  Justifications	  can	  play	  a	  valuable	  part	  in	  exempting	  conduct	  that	  is	  seen	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1216	  E.g.	  SAA	  I,	  supra	  note	  1146,	  at	  116,	  referring	  to	  Microsoft	  (supra	  note	  1184);	  at	  118,	  referring	  to	  Brooke	  Group	  
Ltd.	  v	  Brown	  &	  Williamson	  Tobacco	  Corp.,	  509	  US	  209	  (1993);	  at	  121,	  referring	  to	  Lorain	  Journal	  Co.	  v	  United	  
States,	  342	  US	  143	  (1951)	  and	  Otter	  Tail	  (supra	  note	  1195).	  
1217	  SISTIC,	  supra	  note	  1131,	  at	  8.2.8;	  referring	  to	  at	  30	  of	  the	  Commission’s	  guidance	  on	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  [ex	  82	  
EC]	  enforcement	  priorities,	  OJ	  [2009]	  C	  45.	  
1218	  Aspen	  Skiing,	  supra	  note	  1175.	  
1219	  Subsection	  79(4)	  Canadian	  Competition	  Act.	  
1220	  CCS	  guidelines,	  supra	  note	  1117,	  at	  2.1.	  
1221	  SAA	  I,	  supra	  note	  1146,	  at	  313.	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as	   competition	   on	   the	   merits,	   as	   shall	   be	   shown	   below.1222	   Australian	   competition	   law	   has	   a	  
commendable	  approach,	  as	  it	  puts	  great	  weight	  on	  the	  causal	  link	  between	  a	  firm’s	  market	  power	  and	  
its	   conduct.	   A	   weak	   link	   indeed	   provides	   a	   strong	   indication	   that	   a	   firm	   is	   simply	   competing	   on	   the	  
merits	  in	  a	  way	  that	  it	  would	  also	  have	  done	  absent	  its	  market	  power.1223	  	  
	  
This	   brings	   us	   to	   the	   role	   that	   justifications	   play	   in	   the	   legal	   analysis	   of	   unilateral	   conduct.	   Some	  
jurisdictions	   have	  made	   this	   role	   perfectly	   clear.	   For	   example,	   in	  US	   law,	   a	   valid	   business	   justification	  
may	   provide	   an	   alternative	   explanation	   why	   the	   firm	   was	   not	   ‘predominantly	   motivated’	   by	   its	  
monopolistic	   intent.1224	   A	   justification	   plea	   under	   Singaporean	   law,	   if	   accepted,	   connotes	   that	   the	  
‘primary	  purpose’	  of	  the	  firm	  was	  not	  anti-­‐competitive.1225	  Similarly,	  in	  Canada,	  unilateral	  conduct	  shall	  
be	  allowed	  if	  the	  ‘overriding	  purpose’	  is	  not	  anti-­‐competitive.1226	  	  
	  
One	  should	  be	  cautious	  to	  not	  equate	  the	  notion	  of	  such	  ‘purpose’	  with	  subjective	  intent.	  Australian	  and	  
Canadian	  law	  are	  particularly	  clear	  that	  subjective	  anti-­‐competitive	  intent	  is	  not	  required	  for	  conduct	  to	  
be	  prohibited,	  even	  though	  it	  may	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  as	  a	  relevant	  circumstance.1227	  Similarly,	  in	  US	  
antitrust	  intent	  ‘is	  relevant	  only	  to	  the	  extent	  it	  helps	  us	  understand	  the	  likely	  effect	  of	  the	  monopolist's	  
conduct’.1228	  In	  my	  view,	  this	  should	  also	  mean	  that	  the	   lack	  of	  subjective	  anti-­‐competitive	  intent	  is,	   in	  
itself,	  insufficient	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  justification,	  even	  though	  it	  can	  be	  relevant	  while	  assessing	  a	  justification	  
plea.	  A	  finding	  of	  subjective	  intent	  to	  hurt	  competitors	   is	  of	   limited	  value	  in	  jurisdictions	  that	  explicitly	  
encourage	   firms,	   even	   those	  with	  market	   power,	   to	   compete	   aggressively.	  US	   and	  Australian	   law,	   for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1222	  Another	  possibility	  is	  that	  such	  conduct	  falls	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  competition	  law	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  
1223	  Even	  though	  the	  conduct	  may	  still	  have	  an	  anti-­‐competitive	  effect	  precisely	  because	  of	  the	  market	  power.	  	  
1224	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  supra	  note	  1179,	  at	  622	  and	  627.	  
1225	  CCS	  guidelines,	  supra	  note	  1117,	  at	  4.4.	  
1226	  See	  e.g.	  Canada	  Pipe,	  supra	  note	  1075,	  at	  87,	  and	  the	  Canadian	  Competition	  Tribunal’s	  judgments	  in	  Nielsen,	  
supra	  note	  1059),	  at	  69	  and	  Tele-­‐Direct	  (supra	  note	  1063),	  at	  259.	  
1227	  In	  terms	  of	  Australian	  law,	  see	  Kirby	  J	  in	  Rural	  Press,	  supra	  note	  1024;	  Queensland	  Wire,	  supra	  note	  1020,	  per	  
Mason	  C.J.	  and	  Wilson	  J.,	  at	  22.	  In	  terms	  of	  Canadian	  law,	  see	  Tele-­‐Direct,	  supra	  note	  1063,	  at	  259.	  
1228	  Microsoft,	  supra	  note	  1184,	  at	  58-­‐59.	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example,	  consider	  a	  firm’s	  wish	  to	  harm	  its	  competitors	  as	  one	  of	  the	  hallmarks	  of	  competition,	  rather	  
than	  an	  indication	  of	  anti-­‐competitive	  conduct.1229	  	  
	  
In	  addition,	  case	  law	  should	  make	  clear	  that	  an	  alternative	  ‘purpose’	  can	  not	  only	  set	  aside	  a	  finding	  of	  
anti-­‐competitive	   intent,	   but	   a	   finding	   of	   anti-­‐competitive	   effect	   as	   well;	   a	   position	   clearly	   set	   out	   in	  
Canadian	  case	   law.1230	   In	  my	  view,	  this	   is	  a	  commendable	  approach	  as	   it	  shows	  that	  a	   justification	  can	  
apply	   in	   two	   distinct	  ways.	   If	   it	   concerns	   a	   plea	   based	   on	   commercial	   freedom,	   one	   should	   focus	   on	  
whether	  a	  dominant	  firm’s	  overriding	  purpose	  was	  truly	  anti-­‐competitive	  or	  not.	  However,	   in	  terms	  of	  
an	  efficiency	  plea,	  the	  examination	  should	  concentrate	  on	  effects.	  If	  the	  conduct	  under	  review	  does	  not	  
have	  a	  net	  anti-­‐competitive	  effect,	  one	  may	  –	  with	  hindsight	  –	  then	  conclude	  that	  the	  primary	  purpose	  
was	  pro-­‐competitive.	  
	  
Finally,	  competition	  law	  should	  clarify	  who	  bears	  the	  evidentiary	  burden	  showing	  a	  justification.	  After	  an	  
act	  has	  been	   identified	  as	  prima	  facie	  anti-­‐competitive,	   the	  evidentiary	  burden	  to	  prove	  a	   justification	  
should,	   first,	   be	   put	   on	   the	   defendant.	   The	   defendant	   is	   the	   most	   likely	   party	   to	   have	   the	   requisite	  
information	   and	   has	   the	   greatest	   incentive	   to	   offer	   a	   comprehensive	   justification	   plea.	   Canadian,1231	  
South	  African1232	   and	  US1233	   case	   law	  have	  confirmed	   this	  approach.	  Considering	   this	   allocation	  of	   the	  
evidentiary	   burden,	   courts	   should	   be	   hesitant	   to	   entertain	   pleas	   that	   have	   not	   been	   raised	   by	   the	  
defendant,	   as	  was	   seemingly	   done	   by	   the	   Canadian	   Competition	   Tribunal	   in	  Tele-­‐Direct.1234	   As	   to	   the	  
appropriate	   standard	   of	   proof,	   Canadian	   and	   US	   law	   make	   clear	   that	   the	   justification	   plea	   must	   be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1229	  For	  US	  law,	  see	  e.g.	  Olympia	  Leasing	  (supra	  note	  22),	  Eastman	  Kodak	  (supra	  note	  1192)	  and	  Trinko	  (supra	  note	  
1189).	  For	  Australian	  law,	  see	  e.g.	  Melway,	  dissenting	  opinion	  by	  Heerey	  J,	  supra	  note	  1032,	  at	  19.	  The	  High	  Court	  
agreed	  with	  the	  approach	  by	  Heerey	  J,	  supra	  note	  1036.	  
1230	  See	  also	  Canada	  Pipe,	  supra	  note	  1075,	  at	  87.	  According	  to	  the	  FCA,	  the	  relevant	  effects	  under	  paragraph	  
79(1)(b)	  are	  those	  on	  competitors.	  
1231	  B-­‐Filer,	  supra	  note	  1095.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  see	  the	  submission	  by	  the	  Canadian	  Bar	  Association,	  supra	  note	  
1107,	  at	  16,	  noting	  that	  	  ‘the	  business	  justification	  doctrine	  is	  not	  a	  defence’.	  
1232	  SAA	  I,	  supra	  note	  1146,	  at	  243.	  
1233	  Aspen	  Skiing,	  supra	  note	  1175,	  at	  608.	  
1234	  Tele-­‐Direct,	  supra	  note	  1063,	  at	  357-­‐358.	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credible.1235	   Indeed,	   a	   justification	   plea	   should	   go	   beyond	   merely	   asserting	   that	   there	   was	   ‘some’	  
justification	  for	  the	  plea.1236	  	  
	  
8.4 Available	  types	  of	  justification	  
	  
8.4.1 Introduction	  
The	   analysis	   of	   statutory	   provisions,	   case	   law	   and	  NCA	   guidance	   has	   not	   revealed	   clearly	   pre-­‐defined	  
limitations	   to	   the	   types	  of	  pleas	   that	   can	   function	  as	  a	   justification.	   I	   agree	   that	   the	   law	  should	  not	  a	  
priori	  preclude	  firms	  to	  invoke	  a	  particular	  justification	  plea	  that	  befits	  their	  situation.	  This	  does	  not,	  and	  
should	  not,	  mean	  that	  every	  single	  justification	  plea	  will	  be	  treated	  alike.	  It	  simply	  means	  that	  only	  an	  in-­‐
depth	  examination	  of	  the	  relevant	  context	  can	  reveal	  whether	  such	  a	  plea	  should	  be	  accepted.1237	  There	  
is	  one	   important	  proviso,	  however.	  The	  success	  or	   failure	  of	  a	   justification	  plea	  should	  not	  depend	  on	  
factors	   that	   seem	   irreconcilable	   with	   the	   stated	   objectives	   of	   a	   jurisdiction’s	   competition	   law.	   For	  
instance,	   if	   a	   jurisdiction	  only	  attaches	   relevance	   to	  efficiencies,	  harm	  to	  competitors	   should	  not	  be	  a	  
factor	  in	  rejecting	  a	  justification	  plea.1238	  
	  
The	   case	   law	   examination	   above	   has	   revealed	   several	   broad	   descriptions	   as	   to	   the	   available	   types	   of	  
justification.	   In	  US	   law,	  a	  defendant	  may	   justify	   its	  conduct	  either	  based	  on	   ‘concern	   for	  efficiency’	  as	  
well	   as	   ‘valid	  business	   reason’.1239	   Similarly,	   the	  Canadian	  Competition	  Tribunal	  held	   that	   it	   is	  open	   to	  
efficiency	  pleas	  as	  well	   as	  any	  other	   ‘pro-­‐competitive	  business	   justification’.1240	   Likewise,	  Sections	  8(c)	  
and	   (d)	   of	   the	   South	   African	   Competition	   Act	   not	   only	   take	   into	   account	   efficiency	   benefits,	   but	  
‘technological’	   and	   ‘other	   pro-­‐competitive	   gain[s]’	   as	   well.	   Finally,	   guidelines	   by	   the	   Singaporean	  
regulator	  CCS	  mention	  that	  a	  dominant	  firm	  may	  justify	  conduct	  either	  based	  on	  its	  ‘benefits’	  or	  because	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1235	  Eastman	  Kodak,	  supra	  note	  1175,	  at	  478-­‐79.	  See	  also	  e.g.	  Canadian	  Competition	  Tribunal	  rulings	  in	  Nielsen	  
(supra	  note	  1059)	  and	  Tele-­‐Direct	  (supra	  note	  1063).	  
1236	  Contrary	  e.g.	  to	  the	  Canadian	  Competition	  Tribunal’s	  finding	  in	  NutraSweet,	  supra	  note	  1069.	  
1237	  Canadian	  competition	  law	  seems	  particularly	  sensitive	  to	  context.	  See	  e.g.	  NutraSweet	  (ibid.),	  at	  90.	  See	  also	  
Canada	  Pipe,	  supra	  note	  1075,	  at	  88.	  
1238	  Apart	  from	  the	  question	  whether	  attaching	  relevance	  to	  the	  impact	  on	  competitors	  is	  desirable	  in	  the	  first	  
place.	  
1239	  See	  the	  case	  law	  cited	  at	  supra	  note	  1177.	  	  
1240	  See	  e.g.	  Nielsen,	  supra	  note	  1059.	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of	   the	   ‘legitimate	   commercial	   interest’	   at	   play.	   1241	   The	   following	   paragraphs	   shall	   first	   examine	   the	  
efficiency	  plea,	  and	  subsequently	  discuss	  other	  possible	  justifications.	  
	  
8.4.2 Efficiencies	  
The	  efficiency	  plea	  is	  the	  most	  widely	  used	  justification	  in	  the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  jurisdictions	  under	  review.	  
The	  plea	  should	  succeed	  if	  the	  conduct	  under	  review	  has	  greater	  pro-­‐competitive	  than	  anti-­‐competitive	  
effects.	  This	  relevance	  of	  efficiencies	   is	  clearly	  acknowledged	  in	  Australia,1242	  Canada,1243	  Singapore,1244	  
South	  Africa1245	  and	  the	  US.1246	  	  
	  
However,	   the	   precise	   role	   of	   these	   efficiencies	   often	   remains	   unclear.	   Although	   an	   efficiency	   analysis	  
conceptually	   calls	   for	   an	   effects	   analysis,	   I	   have	   not	   found	   cases	   on	   unilateral	   conduct	   in	   which	   the	  
courts	  actually	  engage	  in	  a	  balancing	  test.	  This	  is	  perhaps	  understandable,	  as	  it	  is	  difficult	  for	  courts	  and	  
regulators	  to	  provide	  a	  reliable	  quantification.	  The	  US	  Supreme	  Court	  already	  noted	  this	  problem	  in	  its	  
1949	   Standard	  Oil	   ruling,	   suggesting	   that	   courts	   are	   ‘ill-­‐suited’	   to	   the	   task	   of	  weighing	   pro-­‐	   and	   anti-­‐
competitive	   effects.1247	   This	   is	   particularly	   the	   case	   for	   dynamic	   efficiencies,	   as	   the	   extent	   to	   which	  
conduct	   contributes	   to	   innovation	   is	   inherently	   difficult	   to	   gauge.1248	  More	   fundamentally,	   courts	   and	  
regulators	  may	  be	  hesitant	  to	  decide	  potential	  conflicts	  between	  effects	  on	  allocative	  efficiency	  (welfare	  
maximisation),	   productive	   efficiency	   (cost	   minimisation)	   and	   dynamic	   efficiency	   (innovation	  
maximisation).1249	   From	  a	   court’s	   perspective,	   there	  may	  not	   be	   a	   clear	   reason	   to	   favour	   one	   type	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1241	  CCS	  guidelines,	  supra	  note	  1117,	  at	  4.4.	  
1242	  Hanks	  &	  Williams	  1990,	  supra	  note	  1024.	  
1243	  See	  e.g.	  the	  Canadian	  cases	  Canada	  Pipe,	  supra	  note	  1075;	  and	  Nielsen,	  supra	  note	  1059.	  
1244	  SISTIC,	  supra	  note	  1131.	  
1245	  See	  e.g.	  Sections	  8(c)	  and	  8(d)	  of	  the	  SA	  Competition	  Act,	  and	  the	  South	  African	  Competition	  Tribunal	  rulings	  in	  
Senwes	  (supra	  note	  1150)	  and	  SAA	  I	  (supra	  note	  1146).	  	  
1246	  See	  e.g.	  Safeway,	  supra	  note	  1184:	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘valid	  business	  reasons’	  includes	  efficiency	  benefits.	  
1247	  Standard	  Oil	  Co.	  of	  California	  v	  United	  States,	  337	  US	  293,	  311	  (1949).	  
1248	  OECD	  Policy	  Roundtable,	  The	  Role	  of	  Efficiency	  Claims	  in	  Antitrust	  Proceedings,	  (2012),	  available	  at	  
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/EfficiencyClaims2012.pdf.	  At	  7-­‐8,	  the	  document	  stresses	  the	  importance	  of	  
dynamic	  efficiencies.	  SISTIC	  (supra	  note	  1131)	  is	  an	  example	  of	  a	  case	  where	  dynamic	  efficiencies	  were	  relevant.	  
1249	  OECD	  2012	  (ibid.).	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efficiency	   over	   the	   other.	   In	   addition,	   a	   court	  may	   struggle	  with	   deciding	  whether	   it	   should	   focus	   on	  
consumer	  welfare	  or	  total	  welfare.1250	  	  
	  
These	   difficulties	   may	   explain	   why	   courts,	   even	   if	   they	   appear	   to	   attach	   great	   weight	   on	   effects,1251	  
rarely	  examine	  what	  precise	  welfare	  effects	  the	  conduct	  under	  review	  has	  had.1252	  Instead,	  courts	  have	  
often	   preferred	   a	   looser	   examination,	   working	   with	   a	   less	   detailed	   approximation	   of	   effects.	   For	  
example,	   in	  SAA	  I,	   the	  South	  African	  Competition	  Tribunal	  held	   it	  simply	  requires	   ‘some	  notion’	  of	   the	  
quantitative	  effects.1253	  The	  examination	   focuses	  on	  whether	  a	  practice	  tends	   to	  have	  pro-­‐competitive	  
effects	   or	   not.	   The	  more	   value	   a	   jurisdiction	   attaches	   to	   efficiency	   and	   effects,	   the	   stronger	   the	   case	  
must	  be	  founded	  in	  economic	  price	  theory.1254	  
	  
Another	  possibility	  is	  that	  courts	  may	  use	  a	  proxy	  for	  efficiencies.	  US	  case	  law	  suggests	  that	  conduct	  by	  
companies	  with	  market	  power	  is	  associated	  with	  efficiency	  as	  long	  as	  it	  takes	  place	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  
the	   commercial	   freedom	   afforded	   to	   them.	   This	   may	   explain	   why	   US	   cases	   have	   often	   examined	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1250	  A.	  Neil	  Campbell	  and	  J.	  William	  Rowley,	  ‘The	  Internationalization	  of	  Unilateral	  Conduct	  Laws	  –	  Conflict,	  Comity,	  
Cooperation	  and/or	  Convergence?’,	  (2008-­‐2009)	  75(2)	  Antitrust	  L.J.	  267,	  319-­‐320.	  See	  also	  OECD	  2012	  (ibid.),	  at	  5-­‐
7,	  noting	  that	  economists	  are	  split	  over	  this	  issue.	  For	  example,	  Oliver	  Williamson	  supported	  a	  total	  welfare	  
approach,	  whereas	  Alfred	  Marshall	  advocated	  a	  consumer	  welfare	  approach.	  
1251	  Or	  even	  where	  courts	  explicitly	  state	  that	  an	  efficiency	  plea	  calls	  for	  a	  balancing	  exercise	  between	  pro-­‐	  and	  
anti-­‐competitive	  effects,	  see	  Senwes,	  supra	  note	  1150.	  	  
1252	  See	  e.g.	  Microsoft,	  supra	  note	  1184.	  For	  a	  critical	  view	  of	  the	  added	  value	  of	  efficiency	  balancing	  within	  merger	  
law,	  see	  e.g.	  W.	  Rosenfeld,	  Superior	  Propane:	  the	  case	  that	  broke	  the	  law,	  available	  at	  
http://www.goodmans.ca/docs/SuperiorPropane.pdf.	  At	  1,	  Rosenfeld	  notes:	  ‘The	  Canadian	  experience	  in	  elevating	  
efficiencies	  to	  a	  level	  which	  outranks	  anti-­‐competitiveness	  has	  been	  confused,	  costly,	  and	  proven	  ultimately	  
unacceptable’.	  See,	  differently,	  Campbell	  and	  Rowley	  2008-­‐2009,	  supra	  note	  1250,	  at	  319.	  They	  do	  favour	  an	  
approach	  based	  on	  efficiencies	  and	  argue	  that,	  because	  such	  efficiencies	  are	  usually	  not	  properly	  addressed,	  the	  
subsequent	  result	  has	  been	  a	  ‘piecemeal,	  ad	  hoc	  treatment	  of	  an	  issue	  of	  fundamental	  importance’.	  
1253	  SAA	  I,	  supra	  note	  1146,	  at	  110.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  Competition	  Tribunal	  seems	  to	  gradually	  put	  more	  
emphasis	  on	  a	  comprehensive	  analysis	  of	  effects.	  
1254	  See	  also	  Eleanor	  M.	  Fox,	  ‘Eastman	  Kodak	  Company	  v	  Image	  Technical	  Services,	  Inc.	  –	  Information	  Failure	  as	  
Soul	  or	  Hook’,	  (1993-­‐1994)	  62	  Antitrust	  L.J.	  759,	  767.	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whether	   the	   conduct	   under	   review	   ‘purports	   to	   promote	   or	   to	   destroy	   competition’,1255	   instead	   of	  
actually	  engaging	  into	  a	  balancing	  test.1256	  Australian	  law	  seems	  to	  take	  a	  similar	  approach.1257	  	  
	  
Finally,	   the	   case	   law	   analysis	   also	   offers	   food	   for	   thought	   as	   to	   the	   applicable	   legal	   test	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   an	  
efficiency	  plea.	  Of	  course	  the	  defendant	  must	  be	  able	  to	  show	  that	  efficiencies	  exist,	  as	  shown	  e.g.	  by	  
the	   Canadian	   Competition	   Tribunal’s	   judgment	   in	   Laidlaw1258	   and	   the	   Competition	   Commission	   of	  
Singapore’s	  SISTIC	  decision.1259	  The	  most	  important	  requirement,	  however,	  is	  that	  the	  relevant	  benefits	  
would	  not	  have	  arisen	  absent	  the	  conduct	  under	  review.	  There	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  accept	  anti-­‐competitive	  
conduct	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  efficiencies	  if	  those	  benefits	  would	  have	  materialized	  anyway.	  A	  clear	  example	  is	  
the	  South	  African	  Competition	  Appeal	  Court	  ruling	   in	  Patensie,	  noting	  that	  the	  efficiencies	  relied	  upon	  
must	   directly	   relate	   to	   and	   be	   dependent	   upon	   the	   conduct	   under	   review.1260	   Similarly,	   the	   SISTIC	  
decision	   suggests	   that	   the	  necessity	   test	   is	  also	   relevant	   for	   the	  purposes	  of	  Singaporean	  competition	  
law,	  as	   the	  proclaimed	  benefits	  must	  be	   ‘directly	  attributable’	   to	   the	   conduct	  under	   review.1261	  Other	  
jurisdictions	  would	  do	  well	  in	  providing	  more	  guidance	  as	  to	  the	  applicable	  legal	  conditions.	  	  
	  
8.4.3 Justifications	  other	  than	  efficiencies	  
The	  examination	  of	   this	  chapter	  has	   revealed	   that	   justifications	  have	  a	  much	  wider	  scope	   than	  simply	  
encompassing	  efficiencies.	  It	  usually	  concerns	  conduct	  that,	  in	  its	  specific	  context,	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  
legitimate	  business	  behaviour.	  In	  Hong	  Kong	  and	  Singapore,	  legislation	  provides	  that	  the	  prohibition	  of	  
unilateral	  anti-­‐competitive	  conduct	  does	  not	  apply	  if	  a	  compelling	  reason	  of	  public	  policy	  is	  at	  stake.1262	  
Both	   jurisdictions	  award	  their	   respective	  executive	  bodies	  with	  a	  high	   level	  of	  discretion	  to	  determine	  
the	   scope	   of	   the	   public	   policy	   exemption,	   and	   would	   benefit	   from	   guidance	   making	   clear	   how	   the	  
executive	  intends	  to	  make	  use	  of	  this	  discretion	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  the	  risk	  of	  arbitrary	  application.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1255	  See	  Capital	  Imaging,	  supra	  note	  1181.	  	  
1256	  Microsoft,	  supra	  note	  1184.	  
1257	  Queensland	  Wire,	  supra	  note	  1020.	  	  
1258	  Laidlaw	  supra	  note	  1091,	  at	  91.	  
1259	  SISTIC,	  supra	  note	  1131.	  
1260	  Patensie,	  supra	  note	  1154,	  at	  30.	  See	  also	  SAA	  I,	  supra	  note	  1146,	  at	  256.	  
1261	  SISTIC,	  supra	  note	  1131,	  para.8.2.8.	  	  
1262	  Subdivision	  2	  of	  division	  3	  of	  the	  Hong	  Kong	  Competition	  Ordinance	  and	  the	  Third	  Schedule	  of	  the	  Singapore	  
Competition	  Act.	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Australian,	   Hong	   Kong	   and	   Singaporean	   legislation	   also	   clearly	   provide	   that	   the	   conduct	   shall	   not	   be	  
forbidden	  if	  it	  seeks	  to	  comply	  with	  a	  legal	  requirement.1263	  In	  addition,	  US	  case	  law	  has	  confirmed	  that	  
the	  doctrine	  of	  implied	  immunity	  may	  shield	  an	  entity	  that	  seeks	  compliance	  with	  another	  statute	  from	  
antitrust	  scrutiny.1264	  Similarly,	  in	  Canada	  and	  South	  Africa,	  a	  refusal	  to	  deal	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  justified	  if	  the	  
company	   requesting	   supply	  does	  not	   comply	  with	   its	   regulatory	  obligations.1265	   I	   agree	   that	  unilateral	  
conduct	  should	  not	  be	  prohibited	  if	  a	  firm	  with	  market	  power	  does	  not	  act	  out	  of	  free	  will,	  but	  rather	  
out	  of	  necessity	  to	  abide	  by	  its	  legal	  obligations.1266	  
	  
Apart	   from	   these	   exemptions,	   however,	   the	   jurisdictions	   under	   review	   have	   also	   acknowledged	   the	  
relevance	  of	  what	   I	   term	   ‘legitimate	  commercial	   conduct’.	   The	   jurisdictions	  under	   review	   refer	   to	   this	  
concept	   in	   strikingly	   similar	  ways:	   ‘valid	   business	   reason’	   or	   ‘legitimate	   business	   justification’	   (US);1267	  
‘legitimate	  commercial	  interests’	  (Singapore);1268	  a	  ‘(pro-­‐competitive)	  business	  justification’	  (Canada),1269	  
‘legitimate	   business	   considerations’	   (Australia)1270	   or	   a	   ‘legitimate	   business	   justification’	   (South	  
Africa).1271	  These	  expressions	  reflect	  a	  similar	  concept,	  namely	  that	  unilateral	  conduct	  is	  not	  illegal	  if	  the	  
company	   under	   review	   does	   not	   transcend	   the	   boundaries	   of	   legitimate	   business	   behaviour	   (even	  
though,	  admittedly,	  the	  precise	  boundary	  between	  this	  plea	  and	  efficiencies	  is	  not	  always	  easy	  to	  draw).	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1263	  Section	  51	  of	  the	  Australian	  Competition	  and	  Consumer	  Act;	  Section	  2(2)	  of	  Schedule	  1	  of	  the	  Hong	  Kong	  
Competition	  Ordinance;	  Third	  Schedule	  of	  the	  Singapore	  Competition	  Act.	  	  
1264	  See	  e.g.	  the	  cases	  cited	  at	  supra	  note	  1172.	  
1265	  See	  B-­‐Filer,	  supra	  note	  1095;	  and	  Telkom,	  supra	  note	  1167.	  See	  also	  the	  UK	  Competition	  Appeal	  Tribunal	  
judgments	  in	  Floe,	  supra	  note	  1168.	  
1266	  In	  my	  view,	  this	  exemption	  should	  even	  be	  expanded	  to	  any	  unilateral	  conduct	  where	  the	  firm	  with	  market	  
power	  did	  not	  choose	  its	  course	  of	  action.	  However,	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  legislation	  or	  cases	  on	  this	  issue	  in	  the	  
jurisdictions	  under	  review,	  it	  shall	  not	  be	  discussed	  here.	  	  	  
1267	  See	  the	  case	  law	  cited	  at	  supra	  note	  1177.	  	  
1268	  CCS	  guidelines,	  supra	  note	  1117,	  at	  4.4.	  Singapore	  also	  refers	  to	  ‘objective	  justification’,	  the	  standard	  term	  also	  
used	  by	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  in	  its	  case	  law.	  
1269	  See	  e.g.	  Nielsen,	  supra	  note	  1059.	  
1270	  See	  e.g.	  BBM,	  supra	  note	  1049,	  at	  70.	  
1271	  Bulb	  Man,	  supra	  note	  1164,	  at	  57	  and	  60.	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An	  obvious	  follow-­‐up	  question	  is	  how	  far	  such	  commercial	  freedom	  extends.	  In	  my	  view,	  it	  is	  instructive	  
to	  consider	  whether	  there	  is	  any	  nexus	  between	  a	  firm’s	  market	  power	  and	  the	  conduct	  under	  review.	  
Such	  an	  examination	  may	  reveal	  if	  the	  firm	  would	  have	  acted	  in	  the	  same	  way	  absent	  its	  market	  power.	  
As	  a	  result,	  it	  can	  be	  an	  important	  indicator	  to	  show	  whether	  certain	  conduct	  is	  competitive	  or	  rather	  an	  
expression	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  competition.1272	  	  
	  
Such	  an	  assessment	  relies	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  firms	  with	  market	  power	  may	  usually	  act	  in	  the	  same	  
way	  as	  firms	  that	  lack	  market	  power.	  Under	  Australian	  and	  US	  law,	  such	  companies	  are	  clearly	  allowed	  
to	  compete	  just	  as	  vigorously	  compared	  to	  other	  companies.1273	  This	  approach	  suggests	  that	  companies	  
with	  market	  power	  do	  not	  have	   to	  show	  that	   their	  actions	  benefit	  a	  greater	  good	  –	   their	   competitive	  
conduct,	  as	   long	  as	   it	   stays	  within	   the	  sphere	  of	   their	  commercial	   freedom,	  can	  already	  considered	  to	  
benefit	  the	  economy	  at	  large.	  
	  
It	   is	  thus	  no	  surprise	  that	  the	  scope	  for	  a	   justification	  plea	  is	  narrower	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  a	   jurisdiction	  
affords	   less	   commercial	   leeway	   to	   companies	   with	   market	   power.	   For	   example,	   the	   Canadian	  
Competition	  Tribunal	  has	  taken	  into	  account	  whether	  the	  invoked	  justification	  is	  	  ‘in	  the	  public	  interest’	  
or	  ‘socially	  beneficial’,1274	  rather	  than	  solely	  in	  the	  ‘self-­‐interest’	  of	  the	  firm	  invoking	  the	  justification.1275	  
It	   is	  understandable	  that	  a	  justification	  plea	  will	  fail	   if	  the	  alleged	  benefits	  accrue	  only	  to	  the	  firm	  with	  
market	  power.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1272	  See	  Queensland	  Wire,	  supra	  note	  1020.	  	  
1273	  For	  Australian	  law,	  see	  e.g.	  Queensland	  Wire	  (ibid.),	  at	  191.	  For	  US	  law,	  see	  Olympia	  Leasing,	  supra	  note	  22.	  
See,	  similarly,	  the	  Judicial	  Committee	  of	  the	  Privy	  Council	  in	  Telecom	  Corp	  of	  New	  Zealand	  v	  Clear	  Communications	  
(New	  Zealand),	  [1994]	  UKPC	  36,	  at	  20:	  ‘A	  monopolist	  is	  entitled,	  like	  everybody	  else,	  to	  compete	  with	  its	  
competitors:	  if	  it	  is	  not	  permitted	  to	  do	  so	  it	  “would	  be	  holding	  an	  umbrella	  over	  inefficient	  competitors”’.	  
1274	  Tele-­‐Direct,	  supra	  note	  1063,	  at	  215	  and	  248-­‐249.	  At	  216,	  the	  Tribunal	  reiterated	  its	  doubts	  on	  whether	  ‘the	  
unrestricted	  pursuit	  of	  completeness,	  while	  it	  may	  be	  in	  Tele-­‐Direct's	  interest,	  is	  wholly	  in	  the	  public	  interest	  or	  
“socially	  optimal”’.	  
1275	  Ibid.,	  at	  67-­‐68.	  Note	  that	  certain	  US	  judgments,	  such	  as	  Otter	  Tail	  (supra	  note	  1195),	  have	  rejected	  a	  
justification	  plea	  as	  it	  was	  solely	  based	  on	  the	  monopolist’s	  self-­‐interest.	  It	  could	  be	  questioned,	  however,	  if	  this	  is	  
still	  good	  law	  considering	  more	  recent	  case	  law	  such	  as	  Trinko,	  supra	  note	  1189.	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At	   the	   same	   time,	   such	   requirements	  may	   go	   too	   far.	   In	   Singapore,	   one	  of	   the	   arguments	   to	   reject	   a	  
justification	  plea	  was	  that	  one	  of	  the	  ‘stakeholders’	  did	  not	  benefit	  from	  the	  conduct	  under	  review,	  even	  
though	   it	   is	   unclear	   why	   benefits	   should	   accrue	   to	   each	   and	   every	   market	   participant.1276	   Equally	  
puzzling	  is	  the	  stance	  by	  the	  Canadian	  Federal	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  that	  the	  law	  should	  take	  due	  account	  of	  
the	  impact	  upon	  competitors;1277	  a	  stance	  that	  risks	  a	  serious	  competition-­‐chilling	  effect.	  I	  think	  that	  the	  
law	  should	  make	  clear	  who	  must	  benefit	  from	  the	  alleged	  gains	  of	  the	  conduct	  (apart	  from	  the	  dominant	  
firm),	   and	  how	   a	  balance	   should	  be	   struck	  between	   the	  various	   interests.	   For	  example,	   in	  BATSA,	   the	  
South	   African	   Competition	   Tribunal	   accepted	   that	   a	   dominant	   firm’s	   category	   management	   was	   a	  
legitimate	  form	  of	  competition	  and	  left	  sufficient	  alternatives	  for	  competitors	  to	  augment	  their	  market	  
share	  –	  even	  though	  the	  practice	  undoubtedly	  had	  some	  adverse	  effect	  on	  third	  parties.	  1278	  
	  
The	   scope	   of	   commercial	   freedom	   appears	   to	   be	   particularly	   important	   in	   refusal	   to	   deal	   cases.	  
Australia,1279	  Canada,1280	   Singapore,1281	  and	   the	  US1282	  have	  confirmed	   that	  a	   refusal	   to	   supply	  may	  be	  
justified	   if	   the	   company	   requesting	   supply	   does	   not	   abide	   by	   ‘normal’	   business	   practice.	   Of	   course	  
several	  factors	  may	  indicate	  what,	  in	  the	  particular	  circumstances	  of	  the	  case.	  Again,	  a	  helpful	  analytical	  
tool	   is	   to	   consider	   whether	   a	   firm	   without	   market	   power	   would,	   in	   the	   same	   situation,	   also	   have	  
discontinued	  supply.	  
	  
In	   terms	   of	   the	   applicable	   legal	   conditions,	   the	   FCA’s	   judgment	   in	   Canada	   Pipe	   provides	   a	   useful	  
enumeration.	   A	   business	   justification	   requires	   a	   credible	   pro-­‐competitive	   rationale	   that	   is	   not	   only	  
attributable	  to	  the	  respondent,	  but	  also	  relates	  to	  and	  counterbalances	  the	  anti-­‐competitive	  elements	  
of	  the	  conduct.1283	  Although	  these	  conditions	  relate	  specifically	  to	  the	  assessment	  of	  paragraph	  79(1)(b)	  
CA,	   I	   think	   they	   can	   and	   should	   be	   considered	   by	   courts	   in	   other	   countries.	   A	   strong	   cross-­‐border	  
dialogue	   is,	   in	  my	   opinion,	   a	   good	  way	   to	   identify	   promising	   practices.	   And	   even	   if	   it	   does	   not	   bring	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1276	  SISTIC,	  supra	  note	  1131,	  at	  8.3.6.	  
1277	  Canada	  Pipe,	  supra	  note	  1075.	  	  
1278	  BATSA,	  supra	  note	  1158,	  at	  273-­‐282.	  
1279	  See	  the	  dissenting	  opinion	  by	  Kirby	  J	  in	  Melway,	  supra	  note	  1036,	  at	  104,	  and	  the	  case	  law	  cited.	  
1280	  Tele-­‐Direct,	  supra	  note	  1063.	  
1281	  CCS	  guidelines,	  supra	  note	  1117,	  at	  4.4.	  It	  gives	  the	  example	  of	  a	  customer’s	  poor	  creditworthiness.	  	  
1282	  See	  the	  case	  law	  cited	  at	  supra	  note	  1204	  –	  1209.	  
1283	  Canada	  Pipe,	  supra	  note	  1075,	  at	  73.	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competition	  law	  regimes	  closer	  together,	  it	  can	  at	  least	  show	  where	  competition	  law	  regimes	  differ	  and	  
where	  they	  resemble.	  This	  outcome	  would,	  in	  itself,	  be	  valuable	  for	  firms	  that	  operate	  globally	  and	  have	  
to	  take	  into	  account	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  competition	  law	  regimes.	  
	  
8.5 Lessons	  for	  EU	  law	  
	  
Before	  concluding	  this	  chapter,	   it	   is	  apt	  to	  consider	  what	  lessons	  can	  be	  drawn	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  EU	  
law.	  For	  a	  start,	  all	  the	  jurisdictions	  under	  review	  have	  acknowledged	  the	  importance	  of	  efficiencies	  as	  
well	  as	  a	  category	  of	  legitimate	  business	  conduct.	  In	  essence,	  the	  latter	  type	  of	  justification	  reflects	  the	  
notion	  that	  the	  firm	  with	  market	  power	  still	  has	  a	  degree	  of	  commercial	  freedom	  left	  –	  a	  position	  that	  
the	  ECJ	  would	  do	  well	  to	  articulate	  more	  clearly	  in	  its	  future	  case	  law.	  	  
	  
The	  experience	  of	  the	  non-­‐EU	  jurisdictions	  under	  review	  shows	  that	  the	  quantification	  of	  efficiencies	  is	  
highly	   complex.	   It	   explains	  why	  many	   cases	   show	   the	  use	  of	  proxies	   to	  establish	  why	   certain	   conduct	  
should	  be	  deemed	  efficient	  or	  not.	  The	  ECJ	  should	  be	  aware	  of	  such	  difficulties,	  and	  make	  clear	  to	  what	  
extent	   it	  allows	   the	  use	  of	  proxies	   to	  establish	  whether	  or	  not	   the	  conduct	  has	  a	  net	  pro-­‐competitive	  
effect.	  To	   the	  extent	   that	   the	  ECJ	  does	   require	  a	  quantification	  of	  effects,	   it	   should	  make	  clear	  how	  a	  
bias	  in	  favour	  of	  easily	  quantifiable	  effects	  can	  be	  avoided.	  The	  ECJ	  should	  also	  allow	  for	  efficiencies	  that	  
are	  difficult	   to	  gauge,	  but	  may	  have	  a	  vast	  welfare	  effect.	  A	  key	  assessment	   should	  be	   the	  causal	   link	  
between	  the	  prima	  facie	  anti-­‐competitive	  conduct	  and	  the	  efficiencies.	  
	  
In	   terms	   of	   justifications	   other	   than	   efficiencies,	   it	   is	   submitted	   that	   the	   ECJ	   should	   enunciate	   more	  
clearly	   that	   a	   dominant	   undertaking	   is	   still	   allowed	   to	   enter	   into	   ‘normal’	   competitive	   behaviour	   –	  
reflecting	   the	   commercial	   freedom	   that	   it	   still	   has.	   In	   essence,	   it	   calls	   for	   a	   contextual	   analysis	   of	   the	  
conduct,	   showing	  whether	  or	  not	   the	   conduct	  was	   truly	   anti-­‐competitive	  or	  not.	  Notwithstanding	   the	  
‘special	   responsibility’	   incumbent	   upon	   dominant	   firms,	   the	   ECJ	   should	   be	   very	   cautious	   to	   consider	  
conduct	  as	  an	  abuse	  if	  it	  is	  simply	  a	  normal	  business	  practice	  in	  that	  particular	  sector	  –	  otherwise	  such	  
firms	  may	  be	  unduly	   constrained,	   to	   the	  detriment	   of	   the	  public	   at	   large.	  A	   useful	   test	   is	   to	   examine	  
what	  the	  firm	  would	  have	  done	  absent	  its	  market	  power.	  Conduct	  should,	  in	  principle,	  not	  be	  an	  abuse	  if	  
there	  is	  no	  causal	  link	  between	  the	  conduct	  under	  review	  and	  the	  dominance	  of	  the	  undertaking.	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As	  a	  final	  remark,	  there	  are	  little	  signs	  of	  a	  separate	  ‘public	  interest’	  plea	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  identified	  in	  
the	  two	  previous	  chapters.	  It	  appears	  that	  such	  a	  plea	  can	  often	  be	  subsumed	  under	  a	  different	  heading.	  
In	   jurisdictions	   such	   as	   Hong	   Kong	   and	   Singapore,	   competition	   law	   provides	   ample	   room	   for	   public	  
interest	   related	  measures	  by	  executive	  bodies	  –	  although	   this	   still	   leaves	   the	  question	   to	  what	  extent	  
dominant	  firms	  can	  act	   in	  the	  public	   interest	  aside	  from	  government	  compulsion.	  Instead,	   jurisdictions	  
such	  as	  Australia	  and	   the	  US	  may	  subsume	  such	  a	  plea	  under	   the	  heading	  of	   commercial	   freedom.	   In	  






The	  prohibition	  of	   anti-­‐competitive	  unilateral	   conduct	  by	   companies	  with	  market	  power	   is	   clearly	  not	  
absolute.	   Jurisdictions	   across	   the	   globe	   have	   accepted	   that	   such	   conduct	   is	   only	   prohibited	   in	   the	  
absence	   of	   a	   justification.	   But	   despite	   its	   apparent	   importance,	   there	   seems	   to	   be	   little	   cross-­‐border	  
dialogue	   on	   this	   topic.	   In	   order	   to	   obtain	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	   how	   such	   justifications	   are	  
interpreted	   across	   the	   globe,	   this	   chapter	   has	   examined	   a	   number	   of	   jurisdictions:	   Australia,	   Canada,	  
Hong	  Kong,	  South	  Africa,	  Singapore	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  
	  
For	   all	   the	   differences	   between	   these	   jurisdictions,	   there	   are	   many	   similarities	   as	   well.	   Overall,	   the	  
jurisdictions	   under	   review	   ascribe	   a	   comparable	   role	   to	   justifications	   in	   their	   legal	   assessment	   of	  
unilateral	   conduct.	  Basically	   such	  a	   justification	  can	  provide	  an	  alternative	  explanation	  of	   the	   conduct	  
under	   review,	   setting	   aside	   a	   finding	   of	   an	   anti-­‐competitive	   purpose	   or	   effect.	   It	   is	   submitted	   that	  
dominant	   firms	   should	   not	  a	   priori	   be	   precluded	   from	   invoking	   any	   particular	   type	   of	   justification,	   as	  
only	   an	   in-­‐depth	   examination	   of	   the	   relevant	   context	   can	   reveal	   whether	   a	   justification	   should	   be	  
accepted.	  	  	  
	  
When	  a	  dominant	   company	  manages	   to	   show	   that	   its	   conduct	  has	   a	  net	  pro-­‐competitive	  effect,	   such	  
evidence	   should	   constitute	   a	   valid	   justification.	   Such	   a	   justification	   does	   not	   necessarily	   require	   a	  
weighing	  exercise	  of	  quantified	  effects,	  but	  rather	  an	  examination	  of	  whether	  the	  practice	  tends	  to	  be	  
pro-­‐competitive	  or	  not.	  Jurisdictions	  that	  are	  particularly	  effects-­‐focused,	  such	  as	  Australia	  and	  the	  US,	  
are	  likely	  to	  require	  the	  plaintiff	  to	  firmly	  base	  its	  case	  in	  economic	  price	  theory.	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In	   addition,	   conduct	  may	   also	   be	   justified	   on	   grounds	   other	   than	   efficiency.	   Often	   such	   behaviour	   is	  
simply	  considered	  ‘reasonable’	  within	  its	  specific	  context.	  This	  may	  be	  because	  the	  dominant	  company	  
seeks	   to	   comply	   with	   a	   legal	   requirement.	   It	   also	   includes	   conduct	   that	   can	   be	   subsumed	   under	  
‘commercial	   freedom’,	   reflecting	   the	   idea	   that	   companies	   with	   market	   power	   still	   have	   a	   degree	   of	  
leeway	   to	   freely	  decide	   their	  business	  behaviour	   (also	   referred	   to	  as	   ‘competition	  on	   the	  merits’).	  An	  
instructive,	  although	  not	  determinative,	  assessment	  to	  explore	  the	  boundaries	  of	  commercial	  freedom	  is	  
by	  examining	  whether	   the	   company	  would	  also	  have	  engaged	   in	   the	  practice	  under	   review	  absent	   its	  
market	  power.	  	  
	  
It	   is	   submitted	   that	   the	   comparative	   analysis	   has	   revealed	   ample	   common	   ground	   for	   further	  
contemplation	   on	   the	   issue	   of	   justifications	   of	  prima	   facie	   anti-­‐competitive	   unilateral	   conduct,	   which	  
would	  benefit	  cross-­‐border	   legal	  certainty	  and	  consistency.	  The	  concept	  of	   justifications	  of	  prima	  facie	  
anti-­‐competitive	  unilateral	  conduct	  is	  simply	  too	  important	  to	  be	  left	  ignored.	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CHAPTER	  VII CONCLUSION	  
	  
	  
1 JUSTIFICATIONS	  AND	  UNILATERAL	  CONDUCT	  LAW:	  THE	  GROUNDWORK	  
	  
This	   Chapter	   brings	   together	   the	  main	   observations	   from	  my	   PhD	   research.	   The	   thesis	   examines	   the	  
concept	   of	   justifications	   in	   EU	   law	   (the	   focal	   point	   of	   the	   research)	   as	  well	   as	   the	   laws	   of	   several	   EU	  
Member	  States	  and	  non-­‐EU	  jurisdictions.	  The	  study	  shows	  that	  all	  these	  jurisdictions	  have	  accepted	  the	  
availability	   of	   a	   justification	   plea	   for	   unilateral	   conduct	   that	   their	   competition	   laws	   would	   otherwise	  
prohibit.	  	  
	  
Even	   though	   the	   justification	   concept	   is	   obviously	   relevant	   to	   indicate	   the	   boundaries	   of	   prohibited	  
unilateral	  conduct,	  many	  questions	  remain	  as	  to	  its	  precise	  scope	  and	  to	  the	  applicable	  legal	  conditions.	  
In	  addition,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  little	  international	  dialogue	  on	  this	  topic.	  The	  lack	  of	  such	  a	  debate	  entails	  
risks	  for	  the	  quality	  and	  the	  consistency	  of	  the	  application	  of	  the	  justification	  concept	  across	  the	  globe.	  
	  
In	   this	   PhD	   thesis	   I	   explore	   how	   various	   jurisdictions	   have	   dealt	   with	   such	   justifications,	   and	   offer	  
suggestions	  as	  to	  how	  they	  should	  be	  dealt	  with.	  The	  examination	  seeks	  to	  encourage	  NCAs	  and	  courts	  
to	  draw	  from	  experiences	  in	  other	   jurisdictions,	   in	  order	  to	  achieve	  more	  cross-­‐border	  convergence	  of	  
the	   law	  on	  unilateral	   conduct.	  Perhaps	   the	  gap	  we	  need	   to	  bridge	   is	  narrower	   than	  we	   think.	   Indeed,	  
even	  though	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  little	  international	  debate	  on	  the	  topic	  at	  the	  moment,	  there	  are	  striking	  
similarities	  in	  the	  way	  that	  jurisdictions	  deal	  with	  justifications.	  
	  
The	   issue	   of	   justifications	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   prima	   facie	   anti-­‐competitive	   unilateral	   conduct	   does	   not	   stand	   in	  
isolation,	  but	  is	  inextricably	  linked	  with	  broader	  debates	  in	  competition	  law.	  A	  key	  element	  is	  how	  much	  
commercial	   freedom	   a	   jurisdiction	   wishes	   to	   afford	   to	   dominant	   companies.	   A	   jurisdiction	  may	   have	  
ample	   faith	   in	  market	   forces	   and	   less	   faith	   in	   the	   ability	   of	   regulators	   and	   courts	   to	   improve	  market	  
outcomes.	  Such	  a	  jurisdiction	  is	  likely	  to	  accept	  a	  relatively	  wide	  range	  of	  unilateral	  practices,	  in	  order	  to	  
avoid	  the	  competition-­‐chilling	  risk	  that	  over-­‐enforcement	  may	  entail.	  By	  contrast,	  a	  jurisdiction	  is	  likely	  
to	  opt	   for	  a	  stricter	   regime	   if	   it	  has	  a	  relatively	  small	  and	  closed-­‐off	  economy,	   in	  which	  self-­‐correcting	  
market	  mechanisms	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  adjust	  for	  any	  anti-­‐competitive	  practices.	  For	  example,	  companies	  
may	  dominate	  an	  economy	  not	  because	  of	   their	   superior	  efficiency,	  but	  because	   the	  government	  has	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shielded	  them	  from	  competitive	  forces	  for	  a	  prolonged	  period	  of	  time.	  Such	  imbalances	  can	  persist	  for	  
many	  years,	  even	  after	  the	  government	  has	  withdrawn	  its	  former	  protection.	  
	  
The	   discussion	   on	   justifications	   may	   also	   be	   broadened	   to	   include	   lessons	   from	   moral	   philosophy.	  
Consequentialism	   assumes	   that	  we	   should	   focus	   on	   effects	   to	   establish	  whether	   certain	   conduct	   has	  
moral	  worth.	  Consequentialism	  can	  provide	  a	  theoretical	  basis	  for	  considering	  an	  efficiency	  plea	  and	  a	  
public	   interest	   plea,	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   these	   pleas	   connote	   that	   the	   beneficial	   effects	   outweigh	   the	  
detrimental	   effects.	   By	   contrast,	   deontology	   suggests	   that	   we	   should	   only	   ascribe	   moral	   worth	  
depending	  on	  the	  nature	  or	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  conduct	  under	  review.	  Kantian	  ethics,	  more	  specifically,	  
can	  provide	  a	  dogmatic	  foundation	  for	  legitimate	  commercial	  conduct	  (to	  the	  extent	  that	  such	  conduct	  
conforms	   to	   the	   universal	   law),	   and	   public	   interest	   (to	   the	   extent	   that	   such	   conduct	   protects	   human	  
dignity).	   Furthermore,	   a	   deontological	   perspective	   that	   focuses	   on	   an	   actor’s	   intent	   may	   provide	   a	  
theoretical	  underpinning	  for	  a	  justification	  based	  on	  objective	  necessity,	  which	  implies	  that	  there	  is	  no	  
anti-­‐competitive	  intention.	  
	  
A	   distinction	   can	   be	   made	   between	   reasons	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   which	   unilateral	   conduct	   escapes	   the	  
prohibition	  altogether,	  and	  reasons	  that	  function	  as	  a	  genuine	  justification.	  This	  thesis	  deals	  with	  both	  
categories	  and	  does	  not	  propose	  any	  strict	  delineation	  between	  them.	  In	  most	  cases,	  similar	  arguments	  
can	   relate	   to	   both	   stages	   of	   the	   analysis.	   A	   discrimination	   case	   offers	   perhaps	   the	   best	   example:	   the	  
(alleged)	  explanation	  for	  differentiated	  treatment	  could	  be	  used	  when	  determining	  whether	  there	  has	  
been	  a	  prima	  facie	  abuse,	  or	  when	  determining	  whether	  a	   justification	  applies.	  A	   formalistic	  regime	   is	  
more	  likely	  to	  consider	  differentiation	  as	  a	  prima	  facie	  abuse.	  In	  such	  a	  regime,	  the	  arguments	  that	  may	  
have	  otherwise	  been	  treated	  during	  the	  first	  analytical	  step,	  can	  only	  be	  dealt	  with	  during	  the	  second	  
analytical	   step	   –	   i.e.	   the	   examination	   of	   a	   justification.	  With	   these	   comments	   in	  mind,	   the	   following	  
paragraphs	  provide	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  main	  findings	  of	  the	  PhD	  thesis.	  
	  
	  
2 LESSONS	  FROM	  OTHER	  AREAS	  OF	  EU	  LAW	  
	  
Chapter	   II	   puts	   the	   topic	   of	   the	   thesis	   in	   a	   broader	   EU	   law	   perspective.	   The	   Chapter	   examines	  what	  
lessons	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  other	  areas	  of	  EU	  law	  for	  the	  understanding	  of	  justifications	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  Article	  
102	  TFEU.	  It	  examines	  the	  law	  on	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods,	  Article	  101	  TFEU	  and	  merger	  control.	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*	  Free	  movement	  of	  goods	  
Article	  34	  TFEU	  prohibits	  State	  measures	  that	  impede	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods	  between	  EU	  Member	  
States.	  Domestic	  measures	  may,	  however,	  escape	  the	  prohibition	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  several	  grounds.	  The	  
first	   ground	   is	   the	   explicit	   derogation	   provided	   for	   by	   Article	   36	   TFEU.	   The	   provision	   contains	  mostly	  
‘non-­‐economic’	   interests	  that	  are	  normally	  associated	  with	  action	  by	  the	  State.	  However,	  the	  case	   law	  
has	  clearly	  shown	  that	  non-­‐State	  actors	  may	  also	  invoke	  the	  provision.1284	  It	  shows	  that,	  within	  EU	  law,	  
there	  is	  no	  conceptual	  impossibility	  for	  non-­‐State	  entities	  to	  rely	  on	  public	  interest	  type	  arguments.	  
	  
A	  second	  ground	  for	  removing	  State	  measures	  from	  the	  ambit	  of	  Article	  34	  TFEU	  applies	  if	  the	  conduct	  
under	   review	   falls	  under	  one	  of	   the	  unwritten	   ‘mandatory	   requirements’.	  The	  ECJ	  has	  been	  willing	   to	  
consider	   a	   wide	   array	   of	   unwritten	   justifications	   to	   compensate	   for	   an	   otherwise	   overly	   restrictive	  
prohibition.	  This	  suggests	  that	  ‘objective	  justification’	  may	  have	  a	  wide	  scope,	  even	  though	  Article	  102	  
TFEU	  does	  not	  explicitly	  mention	  the	  concept.	  Finally,	  the	  mandatory	  requirements	  test	  attaches	  great	  
importance	  to	  the	  surrounding	  context	  and	  is	  particularly	  cogent	  if	  the	  measure	  under	  review	  conforms	  
to	  values	  protected	  by	  the	  general	  principles	  of	  EU	  law.	  	  
	  
A	   third	   ground	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   which	   State	  measures	  may	   escape	   the	   application	   of	   Article	   34	   TFEU	  
exists,	  in	  short,	  if	  the	  measure	  does	  not	  truly	  impede	  inter-­‐State	  trade.	  The	  gist	  is	  that	  the	  Treaty	  should	  
not	  prohibit	  measures	  that	  do	  not	  materially	  hamper	  market	  access	  by	  operators	   from	  other	  Member	  
States.	   A	   lesson	   for	   Article	   102	   TFEU	   is	   that	   there	   must	   be	   a	   sufficiently	   strong	   nexus	   between	   the	  
relevant	   conduct	   and	   the	   interest	   that	   the	   Treaty	   provision	   seeks	   to	   protect	   (i.e.	   competition	  
undistorted	  by	  unilateral	  conduct).	  	  
	  
*	  Article	  101	  TFEU	  
Article	   101(1)	   TFEU	   prohibits	   anti-­‐competitive	   agreements	   which	  may	   affect	   trade	   between	  Member	  
States.	  Acknowledging	  that	  there	  may	  still	  be	  reasons	  to	  condone	  such	  agreements,	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU	  
provides	  a	  number	  of	   conditions	   for	  an	  exemption.	   I	  have	  argued	   in	   favour	  of	   conceptual	   consistency	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1284	  See	  para	  86	  of	  the	  Bosman	  judgment,	  as	  quoted	  by	  supra	  note	  142.	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between	  Article	  101	  TFEU	  and	  Article	  102	  TFEU,	  and	  tried	  to	  show	  that	  Article	  101	  TFEU	  contains	  various	  
lessons	  for	  the	  concept	  of	  justifications	  under	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  
	  
Article	   101(3)	   TFEU	   acknowledges	   that	   seemingly	   restrictive	   conduct	   by	   undertakings	   may	   have	  
diverging	   effects.	   Basically,	   the	   examination	  under	  Article	   101(3)	   TFEU	   seeks	   to	   examine	  whether	   the	  
benefits	  arising	   from	  the	  agreement	  can	  outweigh	   the	  harm	   identified	  under	  Article	  101(1)	  TFEU.	   It	   is	  
submitted	   that	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU	  may	  not	  only	  encapsulate	  efficiencies,	  but	  can	  accommodate	  non-­‐
efficiency	   considerations	   as	   well.	   An	   example	   is	   the	   internal	   market.	   This	   is	   clearly	   an	   important	  
objective	   that	   can	  put	  much	  weight	   in	   the	   scale	  of	  Article	  101	  TFEU,	  even	   though	   it	   is	  not	  a	   standard	  
directly	  based	  on	  efficiencies.1285	  
	  
As	  to	  the	  conditions	  of	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  benefits	  must	  have	  a	  wider	  remit	  than	  simply	  
accruing	  to	  the	  undertakings	  themselves.	  As	  regards	  the	  condition	  that	  the	  restriction	  may	  not	  eliminate	  
residual	   competition,	   it	   is	  worthy	  of	  note	   that	   the	  Commission	  proposes	  a	   sliding	   scale	  approach	   that	  
takes	   into	   account	   to	   what	   extent	   competition	   is	   ‘already	   weakened’	   by	   the	   restrictive	   agreement	   –	  
clearly	  in	  synch	  with	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  where	  the	  degree	  of	  residual	  competition	  should	  also	  be	  relevant.	  
	  
Apart	  from	  the	  justification	  in	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU,	  agreements	  may	  also	  escape	  the	  application	  of	  Article	  
101(1)	  TFEU	  altogether	  –	  even	  those	  that	  have	  some	  restrictive	  effect	  on	  competition.	  In	  some	  cases	  the	  
restriction	   under	   review	   was,	   in	   its	   context,	   simply	   not	   grave	   enough	   to	   merit	   application	   of	   Article	  
101(1)	   TFEU.	   In	   other	   cases	   the	   restriction	   was	   considered	   ‘ancillary’	   to	   otherwise	   efficient	   business	  
conduct	   or	   legitimate	   aims	   pursued	   by	   bodies	   with	   a	   distinct	   regulatory	   competence.	   The	   ECJ	   thus	  
seems	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  undertakings	  should	  have	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  commercial	  freedom,	  taking	  in	  
the	  realities	  of	  business	  practice	  and	  the	  relevant	  context.	  	  
	  
*	  Merger	  control	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1285	  It	  is	  true	  that	  the	  internal	  market	  objective	  can	  often	  be	  associated	  with	  efficiencies,	  as	  a	  well-­‐functioning	  
internal	  market	  is	  likely	  to	  lower	  costs	  for	  businesses	  (productive	  efficiency)	  and	  widen	  choice	  and	  lower	  prices	  for	  
consumers	  (allocative	  efficiency).	  However,	  the	  internal	  market	  goal	  should	  primarily	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  political	  
objective,	  which	  may	  even	  take	  precedence	  if	  this	  would	  lower	  efficiency	  –	  consider	  a	  situation	  of	  price	  
discrimination	  between	  Member	  States,	  that	  may	  be	  prohibited	  even	  though	  it	  could	  be	  beneficial	  from	  an	  
efficiency	  perspective.	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Merger	   control	  has	  various	   features	   that	  may	  be	   transposed	   to	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	   First,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	  
efficiencies	  can	  be	  highly	  relevant	  when	  determining	  whether	  a	  merger	   is	  anti-­‐competitive	  or	  not.	  The	  
efficiencies	  should	  be	  merger-­‐specific.	  There	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  uphold	  an	  efficiency	  plea	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  
a	  clear	  causal	  link	  between	  the	  merger	  and	  the	  stated	  efficiencies.	  In	  addition,	  the	  efficiencies	  shall	  only	  
be	  accepted	  if	  they	  cannot	  be	  achieved	  through	  other,	  less	  anti-­‐competitive,	  means.	  	  
	  
Second,	   merger	   control	   allows	   a	   ‘failing	   firm’	   defence.	   The	   plea	   acknowledges	   that	   there	  must	   be	   a	  
connection	  between	  the	  merger	  and	  the	  alleged	  impediment	  to	  competition.	  The	  plea	  can	  be	  compared	  
to	  a	  situation	  of	  objective	  necessity,	  as	  there	  is	  no	  viable	  alternative	  that	  is	  less	  anti-­‐competitive.	  	  
	  
Third,	  the	  Merger	  Regulation	  allows	  Member	  States	  to	  examine	  public	  interest	  concerns	  that	  may	  follow	  
from	  a	  merger	  with	  a	  EU	  dimension.	  Although	  such	  a	  domestic	  examination	  cannot	  alter	  the	  outcome	  of	  
the	   Commission’s	   competition	   assessment,	   it	   does	   provide	   an	   acknowledgment	   that	   non-­‐competition	  
interests	  may	  be	  legitimate	  as	  well,	  and	  can	  be	  affected	  by	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  competition	  assessment.	  
	  
	  
3 THE	  SUBSTANCE	  OF	  OBJECTIVE	  JUSTIFICATION	  AND	  ARTICLE	  102	  TFEU	  
	  
Chapter	   III	   turns	   to	   the	   core	   of	   the	   PhD	   research,	   discussing	   the	   substance	   of	   objective	   justification	  
within	  the	  framework	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  According	  to	  established	  ECJ	  case	   law,	  an	  undertaking	  does	  
not	   abuse	   its	   dominant	   position	   insofar	   it	   can	   rely	   on	   an	   objective	   justification.	   The	   ECJ’s	   approach	  
makes	  sense:	  the	  negative	  connotation	  of	  ‘abuse’	  implies	  that	  no	  justification	  applies.	  The	  absence	  of	  an	  
explicit	   derogation	   possibility,	   as	   found	   in	   Article	   101	   TFEU,	   does	   not	   make	   this	   any	   different.	   For	  
example,	  the	  ECJ’s	  introduction	  of	  unwritten	  ‘mandatory	  requirements’	  in	  internal	  market	  law	  show	  that	  
unwritten	  derogations	  may	  be	  used	  in	  order	  to	  narrow	  the	  scope	  of	  a	  prohibition	  that	  would	  otherwise	  
have	  an	  overly	  wide	  scope.	  The	  Chapter	  argues	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  objective	  justification	  can	  and	  should	  
have	   a	   key	   role	   in	   the	   Article	   102	   TFEU	   analysis.	   The	   concept	   can	   draw	   the	   provision	   away	   from	   a	  
formalistic	  application	  and	  can	  infuse	  competition	  enforcement	  with	  a	  more	  context-­‐based	  approach.	  	  
	  
Notwithstanding	  the	  relevance	  of	  objective	  justification,	  however,	  there	  are	  still	  many	  uncertainties	  as	  
to	   its	   scope	   and	   applicable	   legal	   conditions.	   To	   provide	  more	   clarity	   in	   the	   justification	   analysis,	   the	  
Chapter	   argues	   in	   favour	   of	   distinguishing	   between	   several	   ‘categories’	   of	   objective	   justification.	   The	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first	  category	  is	  legitimate	  business	  behaviour.	  Legitimate	  business	  behaviour	  provides	  a	  justification	  for	  
conduct	   that	   has	   an	   insufficiently	   strong	   nexus	  with	   the	   company’s	   dominant	   position.	   This	   category	  
should	  encompass	  competition	  on	  the	  merits,	  as	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  why	  competition	  law	  should	  prohibit	  
pro-­‐competitive	   conduct.1286	   A	   dominant	   undertaking	   still	   has	   a	   degree	   of	   commercial	   freedom,	  
notwithstanding	   its	   ‘special	   responsibility’	   not	   to	   impair	   effective	   competition.	   In	   addition,	   legitimate	  
business	  behavior	  should	  include	  objective	  necessity,	  where	  a	  dominant	  undertaking	  cannot	  reasonably	  
be	  expected	  to	  act	  differently.	  Only	  autonomous	  actions	  by	  an	  undertaking	  should	  lead	  to	  the	  possibility	  
of	  a	  competition	  law	  infringement.	  This	  criterion	  is	  clearly	  not	  met	  in	  the	  case	  of	  force	  majeure	  or	  State	  
compulsion,	  where	  factual	  or	   legal	  circumstances	  require	  the	  dominant	  firm	  to	  act	   in	  a	  specific	  way.	  A	  
situation	   of	   objective	   necessity	   may	   also	   exist	   in	   the	   case	   of	   pressing	   technical	   or	   commercial	  
requirements	   –	   even	   though	   the	   dominant	   firm	   must	   then	   be	   able	   to	   show	   why	   it	   could	   not	   have	  
resorted	  to	  potentially	  less	  anti-­‐competitive	  alternatives.	  	  	  
	  
Efficiency	  considerations	  are	  a	  second	  source	  of	  objective	  justification.	  If	  the	  conduct	  leads	  to	  a	  positive	  
net	  welfare	  effect,	  it	  may	  be	  objectively	  justified.	  The	  category	  fits	  in	  a	  context	  where	  the	  Commission	  is	  
pushing	  towards	  a	  more	  effects-­‐based	  approach	  of	  competition	   law.	  Recent	  ECJ	  case	   law	  confirms	  the	  
relevance	  of	  efficiencies	  within	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  For	  this	  purpose,	  the	  ECJ	  has	  in	  effect	  transposed	  the	  
conditions	   of	   Article	   101(3)	   TFEU	   to	   Article	   102	   TFEU.	   Although	   perhaps	   not	   a	   perfect	   fit,1287	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1286	  Of	  course	  it	  may	  be	  possible	  that	  competition	  on	  the	  merits	  does	  not	  arrive	  at	  the	  objective	  justification	  stage	  
if	  it	  is	  no	  prima	  facie	  abuse	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  To	  my	  mind,	  acknowledging	  that	  competition	  on	  the	  merits	  may	  also	  
be	  subsumed	  under	  an	  objective	  justification	  can	  function	  as	  a	  ‘safety	  valve’	  to	  ensure	  that	  such	  conduct	  is	  not	  
prohibited	  –	  in	  particular	  when	  the	  finding	  of	  a	  prima	  facie	  abuse	  can	  be	  made	  on	  relatively	  formal	  (i.e.	  non-­‐
context	  related)	  grounds.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  I	  support	  a	  formalistic	  approach	  towards	  abuse:	  it	  simply	  means	  
that,	  in	  EU	  law,	  a	  finding	  of	  a	  prima	  facie	  abuse	  has	  often	  been	  based	  on	  relatively	  formal	  grounds	  with	  little	  regard	  
to	  the	  surrounding	  context.	  
1287	  For	  example,	  the	  examination	  of	  less	  anti-­‐competitive	  alternatives	  may	  be	  relatively	  straightforward	  in	  terms	  
of	  Article	  101	  TFEU:	  the	  undertakings	  concerned	  can	  simply	  refrain	  from	  entering	  into,	  or	  prolonging	  the	  effect	  of,	  
the	  one	  agreement	  found	  to	  be	  anti-­‐competitive.	  By	  contrast,	  if	  unilateral	  conduct	  is	  found	  to	  be	  contrary	  to	  
Article	  102	  TFEU,	  it	  is	  often	  much	  less	  clear	  what	  the	  undertaking	  concerned	  is	  still	  allowed	  to	  do.	  For	  example,	  
rebates	  may	  be	  abusive	  if	  certain	  conditions	  have	  been	  met	  –	  but	  that	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  dominant	  firm	  is	  
completely	  barred	  from	  providing	  any	  rebates.	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transposition	  does	  have	  the	  advantage	  of	  strengthening	  consistency	  between	  the	  two	  provisions,	  and	  of	  
providing	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  with	  a	  tried	  and	  tested	  analytical	  framework.	  
	  
The	  framework	  may	  be	  of	  use	  for	  the	  many	  challenges	  that	  lie	  ahead.	  Although	  an	  efficiency-­‐balancing	  
test	   appears	   to	   be	   straightforward	   in	   theory,	   in	   practice	   it	   is	   anything	   but.	   It	   is	   highly	   complex	   to	  
establish	  a	  reliable	  and	  precise	  quantification	  of	  all	  the	  relevant	  effects.	  Furthermore,	  there	  is	  a	  risk	  of	  a	  
bias	   in	   favour	  of	  the	  types	  of	  efficiencies	  that	  are	  easier	  to	  quantify	  than	  others.	  The	  Commission	  and	  
the	   ECJ	   should	  make	   clear	   what	   types	   of	   efficiencies	   they	   deem	   relevant	   and	   how	   they	   decide	   on	   a	  
balancing	  test	  within	  the	  specific	  circumstances	  of	  that	  case.	  In	  my	  view,	  there	  should	  be	  a	  clear	  balance	  
between	   the	  magnitude	   of	   the	   effects	   and	   the	   likelihood	   with	   which	   they	   are	   thought	   to	   arise.	   The	  
context	   will	   be	   important,	   which	   also	   means	   that	   efficiencies	   should	   not	   be	   rejected	   a	   priori	   simply	  
because	  they	  are	   invoked	  by	  a	  super-­‐dominant	  firm.1288	  A	  separate	   issue	   is	  that	  a	   legal	  test	  where	  the	  
result	   can	   only	   be	   known	   ex	   post	   is	   difficult	   to	   reconcile	   with	   legal	   certainty.	   A	   more	   effects-­‐based	  
approach	   inherently	   leads	   to	   fewer	   clear-­‐cut	   rules	   than	   a	   formalistic	   approach,	   but	   this	   is	   arguably	   a	  
price	  worth	  paying	  if	  it	  leads	  to	  better	  rules.	  In	  addition,	  the	  legitimate	  business	  behaviour	  category	  may	  
be	  of	  use	  in	  situations	  where	  quantification	  appears	  difficult,	  as	  that	  category	  is	  less	  demanding	  in	  terms	  
of	  its	  effects	  analysis.	  
	  
A	   third	   source	   encompasses	   public	   interest	   considerations,	  where	   a	   public	   policy	   goal	   can	   trump	   the	  
application	  of	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  competition	  law	  should	  be	  the	  primary	  means	  
through	  which	  public	   interest	   is	  achieved,	  but	   rather	   that	  Article	  102	  TFEU	  should	  not,	  a	  priori,	   reject	  
such	  considerations	  as	   irrelevant.	  Taking	   into	  account	  public	   interest	  objectives	   is	   in	   line	  with	  ECJ	  case	  
law	  holding	  that	  EU	  law	  should	  be	   interpreted	  in	   light	  of	  the	  Union’s	  wider	  principles	  and	  objectives.	   I	  
think	  that	  a	  public	   interest	  plea	  is	  particularly	  persuasive	  if	  the	  relevant	  conduct	  protects	  a	  vital	  public	  
interest	  goal	  that	   is	  clearly	  protected	  by	  the	  Treaty,	  and	  presents	  only	  a	   limited	   issue	  for	  competition.	  
Although	  the	  ECJ	  has	  rejected	  the	  public	  interest	  plea	  in	  several	  cases	  on	  the	  facts,	  I	  still	  think	  that	  the	  
plea	  is	  available	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  law.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1288	  Even	  though,	  in	  this	  PhD,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  degree	  of	  market	  power	  should	  indeed	  be	  taken	  into	  
consideration	  as	  relevant	  context.	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Of	   course,	   there	   are	   no	   clear-­‐cut	   lines	   between	   the	   types	   of	   objective	   justification	   described	   above.	  
Indeed,	   they	  may	   have	   considerable	   overlaps.	   For	   example,	   competition	   on	   the	  merits	   is	   likely	   to	   be	  
strongly	   related	   with	   conduct	   that	   has	   a	   net	   efficient	   effect.	   Nevertheless,	   I	   believe	   that	   the	  
categorisation	   helps	   bringing	   more	   structure	   into	   the	   analysis	   of	   objective	   justification.	   The	  
categorisation	  shows	  its	  worth,	  inter	  alia,	  when	  one	  considers	  what	  legal	  test	  to	  apply.	  For	  example,	  an	  
efficiency	  plea	  should	  consider	  the	  necessity	  test,	  as	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  condone	  prima	  facie	  abusive	  
conduct	   if	   those	   efficiencies	   could	   have	   been	   achieved	   through	  different	  means	   as	  well.	   At	   the	   same	  
time,	  a	  necessity	  test	   is	  much	   less	  useful	  when	  examining	  force	  majeure,	  as	  such	  a	  plea	  connotes	  that	  
the	  dominant	  undertaking	  could	  not	  have	  acted	  differently	  in	  any	  event.	  Finally,	  the	  chapter	  also	  shows	  
that	  objective	  justification	  should	  be	  interpreted	  in	  line	  with	  the	  type	  of	  prima	  facie	  abuse	  that	  is	  at	  play.	  
In	   sum,	   objective	   justification	   can	   –	   and	   should	   –	   function	   as	   a	   structured	   plea	   that	   can	   provide	  
additional	  context	  into	  an	  abuse	  of	  dominance	  analysis.	  
	  
	  
4 THE	  PROCEDURE	  OF	  OBJECTIVE	  JUSTIFICATION	  AND	  ARTICLE	  102	  TFEU	  
	  
Chapter	  IV	  examines	  various	  procedural	  aspects	  of	  objective	  justification	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  Article	  
102	  TFEU.	  The	  focus	  is,	  in	  particular,	  on	  the	  applicable	  burden	  of	  proof,	  the	  evidentiary	  burden	  and	  the	  
standard	  of	  proof.	  	  
	  
The	   Commission	   and	   NCAs	   clearly	   bear	   the	   burden	   to	   prove	   an	   infringement	   of	   Article	   102	   TFEU.	  
However,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  they	  bear	  the	  evidentiary	  burden	  to	  prove	  the	  absence	  of	  objective	  
justification.	  The	  ECJ	  has	  determined	  that	  the	  latter	  burden	  will	  initially	  be	  borne	  by	  the	  dominant	  firm.	  
The	  evidentiary	  burden	  is	  then	  able	  to	  shift	  back	  and	  forth	  depending	  on	  what	  type	  of	  evidence	  is	  being	  
considered.	   To	   my	   mind,	   this	   approach	   makes	   sense:	   even	   though	   the	   absence	   of	   an	   objective	  
justification	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  constituent	  part	  of	  the	  abuse	  prohibition,	  it	  would	  go	  too	  far	  to	  require	  
the	   Commission	   to	   examine,	  a	   priori,	   every	   single	   justification	   that	   could	   hypothetically	   apply.	  When	  
contemplating	   the	   evidentiary	   burden,	   one	   should	   look	   closely	   at	   the	   legal	   consequences	   of	   that	   fact	  
being	   proven.	   If	   the	   dominant	   firm	   has	   discharged	   its	   initial	   burden	   of	   invoking	   (and	   showing)	   an	  
objective	   justification,	   it	   is	   up	   to	   the	   Commission	   to	   provide	   evidence	   why	   the	   invoked	   justification	  
should	  not	  apply.	  If	  the	  Commission	  is	  unable	  to	  do	  so,	  there	  is	  no	  abuse.	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It	   is	   submitted	   that	   the	   difficulty	   in	   meeting	   the	   standard	   of	   proof	   will	   vary	   according	   to	   the	  
circumstances	  of	  the	  case.	  The	  lower	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  firm’s	  conduct,	  the	  easier	  it	  will	  be	  to	  meet	  the	  
requisite	  standard	  for	  an	  objective	  justification	  plea.	  In	  my	  view,	  the	  difficulty	  in	  meeting	  that	  standard	  
should	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  depend	  on	  the	  type	  of	  objective	  justification	  that	  the	  dominant	  firm	  wishes	  to	  
invoke.	  	  
	  
It	  appears	  that,	  from	  the	  dominant	  firm’s	  perspective,	  the	  standard	  of	  proof	  may	  be	  relatively	  difficult	  to	  
meet	   in	   a	   plea	   based	   on	   efficiency	   or	   public	   interest.	   These	   types	   of	   justification	   require	   a	   difficult	  
balancing	  test	   that	  cannot	  be	  taken	   lightly	  –	  the	   loss	   in	  competition	  should	  be	  compensated	  either	  by	  
clear	   efficiency	   gains	   or	   benefits	   to	   a	   public	   interest	   goal.	   The	   standard	   of	   proof	   is	   perhaps	   easier	   to	  
meet	   if	   it	   concerns	   a	   plea	   based	   on	   legitimate	   business	   conduct.	   For	   example,	   there	   may	   be	   clear	  
evidence	  that	  the	  conduct	  arises	  from	  objective	  necessity,	   in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  dominant	  firm	  had	  no	  
alternative	  way	  to	  act.	  In	  addition,	  dominant	  firms	  should	  have	  the	  possibility	  to	  show	  that	  their	  conduct	  
is	   legitimate	   competition	   on	   the	   merits.	   Such	   a	   plea	   will	   be	   particularly	   persuasive	   if	   the	   dominant	  
company	  manages	  to	  show	  that	  the	  conduct	  under	  review	  was	  unrelated	  to	  its	  dominance.	  
	  
Matters	  become	  more	  complex	   in	  a	  private	   law	  context.	   In	  a	  stand-­‐alone	  action,	   the	  regular	  domestic	  
rules	  on	  burden	  and	  standard	  of	  proof	  apply.	  The	  most	  important	  demand	  that	  currently	  arises	  from	  EU	  
law	  is	  that	  these	  national	  rules	  may	  not	  be	  interpreted	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  would	  disable	  the	  effet	  utile	  of	  
the	  private	  enforcement	  of	  EU	  competition	  law.	  In	  a	  follow-­‐on	  action,	  a	  dominant	  firm	  will	   in	  principle	  
no	   longer	   be	   able	   to	   invoke	   an	   objective	   justification.	   Its	   best	   chance	   to	   escape	   civil	   liability	   is	   by	  
invoking	  domestic	   legal	   conditions	   that	  are	  not	  part	  of	   the	  objective	   justification	  plea,	   such	  as	   lack	  of	  
foreseeability.	   However,	   an	   objective	   justification	  may	   possibly	   be	   invoked	   if	   the	   domestic	   context	   is	  
different	   from	   the	   context	   in	   which	   the	   Commission	   took	   its	   decision;	   for	   example	   if	   the	   efficiency	  
analysis	  would	  render	  a	  different	  outcome	  at	  the	  domestic	  level	  than	  at	  the	  EU	  level.	  	  
	  
	  
5 OBJECTIVE	  JUSTIFICATION	  AT	  THE	  LEVEL	  OF	  EU	  MEMBER	  STATES	  
	  
Chapter	  V	  examines	  how	  EU	  Member	  States	  have	  interpreted	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘objective	  justification’	  for	  
the	  purposes	  of	   their	  domestic	  competition	   law,	   focusing	   in	  particular	  on	   its	   scope	  and	  the	  applicable	  
legal	   conditions.	   The	   examination	   discusses	   cases	   from	   France,	   Germany,	   Ireland,	   Luxembourg,	   the	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Netherlands,	  Spain	  and	  the	  UK.	  The	  Chapter	  uses	  the	  same	  categories	  of	  objective	  justification	  as	  were	  
introduced	  by	  Chapter	  III:	  legitimate	  business	  behaviour,	  efficiency	  benefits	  and	  public	  interest	  gains.	  	  
	  
Cases	   at	   the	   EU	   Member	   State	   level	   provide	   several	   examples	   of	   these	   types	   of	   justifications.	   The	  
examination	   of	   UK	   competition	   practice,	   in	   particular,	   has	   revealed	   several	   cases	  where	   justifications	  
have	  played	  an	  important	  role.	  The	  UK	  NCAs	  and	  courts	  should	  be	  commended	  for	  their	  efforts	  to	  apply	  
the	   objective	   justification	   concept	   in	   a	   structured	   and	   well-­‐conceived	   manner	   –	   even	   though	   such	  
deliberations	  may	  undoubtedly	  lead	  to	  findings	  that	  could	  be	  at	  odds	  with	  each	  other.	  If	  there	  are	  to	  be	  
inconsistencies,	  it	  is	  better	  to	  have	  them	  out	  in	  the	  open.	  
	  
As	   to	   the	   available	   types	  of	   justifications,	  NCAs	   and	  domestic	   courts	  have	  often	   relied	  on	  a	  notion	  of	  
legitimate	  business	  conduct.	  Several	  Member	  States	  clearly	  attach	  much	  weight	  to	  commercial	  freedom.	  
The	   Chapter	   argues	   that	   an	   analysis	   of	   such	   a	   justification	   should	   pay	   heed	   to	   the	   relevant	   nexus	  
between	   the	   dominant	   position	   and	   the	   conduct	   under	   review.	   The	   more	   likely	   it	   will	   be	   that	   the	  
dominant	  firm	  would	  also	  have	  engaged	  in	  that	  conduct	  without	  being	  in	  a	  dominant	  position,	  the	  easier	  
a	  justification	  can	  be	  applied.	  The	  proportionality	  test,	  stricto	  sensu,	  should	  provide	  the	  key	  method	  of	  
legal	  assessment.	  By	  contrast,	  an	  indispensability	  test	  (that	  examines	  whether	  the	  objective	  could	  have	  
been	  reached	  through	  alternative,	  less	  anti-­‐competitive,	  means)	  will	  be	  less	  relevant.	  
	  
Some	   domestic	   cases	   also	   show	   the	   relevance	   of	   objective	   necessity,	   implying	   that	   the	   dominant	  
company	  could	  not	  have	  been	  expected	  to	  act	  differently.	  The	  Aberdeen	  Journals	  case	  has	  shown	  that	  
force	  majeure	  may	  be	  accepted	  if	  the	  prima	  facie	  abuse	  follows	  completely	  from	  reasons	  external	  to	  the	  
dominant	   company.	   Furthermore,	   the	   UK	   Competition	   Appeal	   Tribunal	   took	   the	   position	   in	   Floe	   that	  
competition	   law	  cannot	   force	  undertakings	   to	  act	   against	   the	   law.1289	   It	   is	   true	   that	   such	  a	  position	   is	  
perhaps	  easier	  to	  uphold	  in	  a	  purely	  domestic	  setting	  compared	  to	  a	  situation	  where	  national	   law	  and	  
the	   EU	   competition	   rules	   are	   at	   odds	   (considering	   the	   differences	   in	   the	   hierarchy	   of	   norms).1290	  
However,	   the	   CAT’s	   approach	   does	   have	   benefits	   over	   the	   position	   seemingly	   taken	   by	   those	   ECJ	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1289	  Floe	  Telecom	  v	  Ofcom	  [2004]	  CAT	  18;	  Floe	  Telecom	  v	  Ofcom	  [2006]	  CAT	  17.	  
1290	  In	  a	  purely	  domestic	  setting,	  the	  generalist	  rules	  of	  competition	  law	  can	  be	  set	  aside	  by	  more	  specific	  rules	  
according	  to	  the	  lex	  specialis	  adage.	  However,	  this	  reasoning	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  the	  EU	  competition	  rules.	  These	  
rules	  are	  enacted	  in	  the	  Treaty	  and	  enjoy	  primacy	  over	  EU	  regulatory	  measures	  (enacted	  in	  secondary	  legislation	  
such	  as	  Regulations	  and	  Directives)	  and	  domestic	  measures.	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judgments	   that	   suggest	   that	   there	   may	   still	   be	   an	   infringement	   even	   in	   the	   presence	   of	   clear	   State	  
compulsion.1291	  
	  
Another	   type	  of	   justification	   is	   the	  efficiency	  plea.	  NCAs	  and	  domestic	   courts	   should	  make	  clear	  what	  
type	   of	   efficiencies	   they	   deem	   relevant,	   and	   how	   they	   weigh	   the	   various	   pro-­‐	   and	   anti-­‐competitive	  
effects.	   Moreover,	   the	   dominant	   firm	  must	   show	   that	   the	   conduct	   under	   review	   is	   indispensable	   to	  
achieve	   the	   pro-­‐competitive	   effects.	   Many	   domestic	   cases	   that	   have	   accepted	   efficiencies,	   however,	  
simply	   state	   in	   general	   terms	   that	   the	   conduct	   will	   lead	   to	   efficiencies,	   but	   fail	   to	   make	   an	   explicit	  
balancing	  test.	  There	  is	  much	  room	  for	  improvement	  here.	  	  
	  
Finally,	  surprisingly	  many	  domestic	  cases	  have	  relied	  on	  public	  interest	  –	  especially	  if	  one	  considers	  the	  
lack	  of	  guidance	  given	  by	  EU	  law	  (and,	  for	  that	  matter,	  the	  scepticism	  expressed	  by	  many	  commentators	  
about	   the	   viability	   of	   such	   a	   plea).	   Such	   cases	   confirm	   that	   public	   interest	   may	   indeed	   provide	   a	  
justification	  for	  a	  prima	  facie	  abuse.	  Several	  domestic	  cases	  show	  the	  importance	  to	  uphold	  safety	  and	  
security	  standards.	  	  A	  public	  interest	  plea	  should	  make	  clear	  what	  objective	  the	  conduct	  seeks	  to	  attain	  
and	  why	  it	  should	  prevail	  over	  competition	  concerns	  –	  so,	  in	  other	  words,	  why	  the	  dominant	  firm	  is	  right	  
to	  go	  beyond	  its	  legal	  requirements	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  a	  particular	  public	  interest.	  In	  addition,	  if	  the	  dominant	  firm	  
engages	   in	   conduct	   that	  differentiates	  between	   its	  own	   (downstream)	  operations	   and	   third	  parties,	   it	  
should	   clarify	   why	   working	   towards	   the	   public	   interest	   should	   have	   an	   adverse	   impact	   upon	   other	  
market	  participants,	  while	  leaving	  its	  own	  downstream	  activities	  unaffected.	  	  	  
	  
	  
6 JUSTIFICATIONS	  IN	  NON-­‐EU	  JURISDICTIONS	  
	  
Chapter	  VI	  discusses	  a	  number	  of	  jurisdictions	  outside	  the	  EU:	  Australia,	  Canada,	  Hong	  Kong,	  Singapore,	  
South	  Africa	  and	  the	  US.	  All	  these	  jurisdictions	  have	  accepted	  that	  a	  firm	  may	  invoke	  a	  justification	  plea	  
to	   justify	   otherwise	   prohibited	   unilateral	   conduct.	   A	   justification	   usually	   functions	   as	   an	   alternative	  
explanation	  for	  the	  dominant	  company’s	  allegedly	  anti-­‐competitive	  purpose.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1291	  See	  e.g.	  the	  case	  law	  cited	  at	  supra	  note	  459.	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The	   countries	   under	   review	   often	   couch	   their	   treatment	   of	   justifications	   in	   terms	   of	   efficiencies.	  
However,	   this	  has	   rarely	   led	  courts	   to	  engage	   in	  a	  quantification	  and	  subsequent	  balancing	  of	  effects.	  
Instead,	   courts	   usually	   assess	  whether	   the	   conduct	   under	   review	   tends	   to	   distort	   competition	  or	   not.	  
Although	  it	  will	  often	  prove	  cumbersome	  to	  have	  a	  precise	  and	  reliable	  quantification	  of	  effects,	  NCAs	  
and	  courts	   should	  –	  at	   the	  very	   least	  –	  make	  clear	  what	   they	  consider	   to	  be	   the	   relevant	  effects,	  and	  
what	  types	  of	  efficiencies	  they	  deem	  relevant.	  
	  
The	   examination	   has	   also	   shown	   how	   several	   cases	   in	   the	   jurisdictions	   under	   review	   have	   accepted	  
justifications	   other	   than	   efficiencies.	   A	   justification	  may	   be	   applicable	   if	   the	   conduct	   seeks	   to	   comply	  
with	   a	   legal	   requirement.	   Another	   possible	   justification	   exists	   if	   a	   company	   operates	   within	   the	  
boundaries	   of	   its	   commercial	   freedom.	   In	   such	   cases	   the	   link	   between	   a	   firm’s	  market	   power	   and	   its	  
conduct	  may	  simply	  be	  sufficiently	  weak,	  providing	  a	  strong	  indication	  that	  a	  firm	  is	  acting	  in	  a	  way	  that	  




7 KEY	  LESSONS	  
	  
The	  analysis	  in	  this	  PhD	  has	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  central	  research	  question,	  namely	  what	  it	  means	  to	  justify	  
unilateral	  conduct	  that	  would	  otherwise	  be	  contrary	  to	  the	  competition	  rules,	  and	  what	  it	  should	  mean.	  
The	  key	  lessons	  that	  I	  deduce	  from	  this	  research	  are	  as	  follows:	  
	  
• Many	  jurisdictions	  have	  acknowledged	  the	  importance	  of	  justifications	  of	  otherwise	  prohibited	  
unilateral	   conduct.	   And	   rightfully	   so:	   justifications	   are	   an	   indispensable	   part	   of	   the	   analysis	  
whether	   competition	   law	   should	   condone	  unilateral	   conduct	  or	  not.	   The	   comparative	  analysis	  
has	  shown	  that	  competition	  cases	  around	  the	  world	  have	  relied	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  justifications,	  
primarily	  as	  a	  means	  to	  put	  the	  conduct	  under	  review	  in	  its	  proper	  context.	  
• At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  topic	  remains	  highly	  under-­‐theorized.	  There	  are	  relatively	  few	  academic	  
studies	   on	   the	   subject	   –	   especially	   comparative	  work	   is	   scarce.	   In	   addition,	   there	   is	   relatively	  
little	  NCA	   guidance	   on	   the	   topic,	  which	  may	   negatively	   affect	   legal	   certainty	   and	   consistency.	  
NCAs	  should	  spend	  more	  effort	  on	  providing	  guidance,	  preferably	   in	   international	  forums	  such	  
as	  the	  International	  Competition	  Network.	  I	  encourage	  a	  more	  widespread	  reception	  of	  case	  law	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and	  decisional	  practice	   from	  other	   countries.	  Hopefully	   this	   research	  can	  contribute	   to	   such	  a	  
development.	  	  
• NCAs	  and	  domestic	  courts	  should	  attempt	  to	  differentiate	  between	  (i)	  a	  prima	  facie	   finding	  of	  
unilateral	  conduct	  that	  would	  otherwise	  be	  prohibited	  –	  and	  (ii)	  a	  justification	  plea.	  Admittedly,	  
there	   is	   no	   watertight	   barrier	   between	   these	   two	   steps,	   as	   arguments	   that	   could	   support	   a	  
justification	  plea	  may	  already	  be	  relevant	  in	  the	  determination	  whether	  there	  has	  been	  a	  prima	  
facie	  violation.	  For	  example,	  in	  a	  case	  on	  (price)	  discrimination,	  should	  the	  (alleged)	  explanation	  
for	  differentiation	  be	  subsumed	  under	  a	   justification,	  or	  rather	  as	  an	  element	  to	  consider	  why	  
there	  was	  no	  prima	   facie	   abuse	   in	   the	   first	  place?	  To	  my	  mind,	   jurisdictions	   that	  have	  a	  more	  
formalistic	  approach	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  consider	  such	  explanations	  as	  a	  justification	  (as	  the	  stage	  
of	  a	  prima	  facie	  abuse	  will	  be	  easily	  met).	  	  
• The	  way	  in	  which	  justifications	  operate	  should	  vary	  according	  to	  the	  circumstances,	  such	  as	  the	  
degree	  of	  dominance,	  the	  type	  of	  prima	  facie	  abuse	  and	  the	  type	  of	  justification	  at	  play.	  In	  my	  
view,	  competition	  law	  should	  not	  prohibit	  unilateral	  conduct	  in	  the	  following	  circumstances:	  
o If	   the	   dominant	   company	   engages	   in	   legitimate	   commercial	   conduct.	   Typically	   such	  
cases	  display	  an	  insufficiently	  strong	  nexus	  between	  the	  practice	  under	  review	  and	  the	  
company’s	   market	   power.	   Legitimate	   commercial	   conduct	   could	   follow	   from	   the	  
following	  situations:	  
§ If	   the	   practice	   under	   review	   falls	   within	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   dominant	   firm’s	  
commercial	  freedom;	  i.e.	  conduct	  that	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  ‘competition	  on	  the	  
merits’.	   Note	   that	   this	   category	   is	   particularly	   relevant	   in	   a	   formalistic	   abuse	  
regime,	  as	  one	  could	  wonder	  whether	  such	  conduct	  should	  be	  considered	  prima	  
facie	  abusive	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  
§ If	  the	  dominant	  company	  is	  confronted	  with	  a	  situation	  of	  ‘objective	  necessity’,	  
typically	   in	   a	   situation	   of	   force	   majeure.	   Objective	   necessity	   implies	   that	   the	  
dominant	   company	   has	   no	   possibility	   to	   act	   in	   an	   alternative	   way	   that	   could	  
have	  averted	  the	  abuse.	   In	  other	  words:	   there	   is	  no	  autonomous	  conduct	   that	  
could	  be	  considered	  an	  abuse.	  	  
o If	   the	   conduct	   under	   review	   produces	   efficiencies	   that	   lead,	   on	   balance,	   to	   a	   positive	  
welfare	  effect.	  Benefits	  must	  be	  able	  to	  compensate	  consumers	  for	  the	  anti-­‐competitive	  
aspects	  of	  the	  conduct.	  Although	  this	  category	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  a	  substantial	  overlap	  with	  
‘competition	  on	   the	  merits’,	   there	   is	  a	  difference	   in	  methodology.	  Competition	  on	   the	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merits	   concerns	   conduct	   that	   should	   be	   considered	   legitimate	   in	   its	   specific	   context,	  
often	   because	   there	   is	   no	   relevant	   nexus	   with	   the	   dominant	   firm’s	   market	   power.	  
However,	   that	   category	  does	  not	   require	  an	   intricate	  analysis	  of	  effects.	   Efficiency,	  on	  
the	   other	   hand,	   does	   require	   an	   examination	   of	   effects.	   If	   that	   examination	   shows	   a	  
positive	  outcome,	  the	  conduct	  may	  (with	  hindsight)	  be	  considered	  justified.	  
o If	  the	  conduct	  seeks	  to	  support	  a	  public	  interest	  that,	  in	  the	  specific	  context	  of	  the	  case,	  
ought	   to	   override	   the	   competition	   issues.	   In	   the	   EU	   context,	   a	   plea	   based	   on	   public	  
interest	  should	  refer	  to	  an	  objective	  that	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  clearly	  strives	  for.	  
• This	  leads	  to	  the	  following	  overview	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  objective	  justification	  in	  EU	  law:	  
Objective	  justification	  
Legitimate	  commercial	  conduct/business	  behaviour	   Efficiency	   Public	  interest	  
Commercial	  freedom	  	   Objective	  necessity	  
Competition	  on	  the	  merits	   Force	  majeure;	  State	  action	   Positive	  welfare	  effect	   Public	  interest	  gain	  
	  
• Apart	   from	   the	   legal	   reasons	   to	   make	   the	   categorisation	   described	   above,	  moral	   philosophy	  
contains	  useful	  perspectives	  as	  to	  the	  theoretical	  basis	  for	  these	  justifications.	  	  
o Consequentialism	  provides	  a	  basis	  for	  the	  acceptance	  of	  an	  efficiency	  and	  public	  interest	  
plea.	   Using	   an	   inclusive	   interpretation	   (which	   I	   favour),	   consequentialism	   can	   also	  
provide	   a	   basis	   for	   a	   plea	  based	  on	   commercial	   freedom	  and	  objective	  necessity.	   The	  
justifications	  examined	  in	  this	  thesis	  thus	  have	  a	  basis	  in	  consequentialism.	  	  
o By	  contrast,	  it	  is	  more	  difficult	  to	  transpose	  lessons	  from	  deontology.	  In	  particular,	  if	  one	  
establishes	  moral	  worth	  simply	  based	  on	   the	   inherent	  character	  of	  particular	  conduct,	  
there	  is	  little	  room	  left	  for	  a	  context-­‐driven	  approach.	  However,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  one	  
does	  consider	   such	  a	   transposition	   to	  be	  useful,	  Kantian	  ethics	  can	  provide	  a	  basis	   for	  
legitimate	  business	  behaviour	   (that	   conforms	   to	   the	  universal	   law)	  and	  public	   interest	  
(to	   the	   extent	   that	   the	   conduct	   protects	   human	   dignity).	   Finally,	   a	   deontological	  
perspective	   that	   focuses	   on	   intent	   can	   provide	   a	   foundation	   for	   the	   plea	   based	   on	  
objective	  necessity.	  	  
• An	  analysis	  of	  a	  justification	  plea	  should	  afford	  ample	  weight	  to	  the	  specific	  context	  of	  that	  case.	  
The	  legal	  analysis	  should	  normally	  include	  the	  following	  elements.	  
o The	  conduct	  should	  be	  suitable	  to	  attain	  the	  prescribed	  goal.	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o The	   conduct	   should	   normally	   be	   indispensable	   to	   attain	   the	   prescribed	   goal.	   This	   is	  
particularly	  relevant	  as	  regards	  a	  plea	  based	  on	  efficiency	  and	  public	  interest.	  
o The	   conduct	   should	   not	   have	   a	   disproportionate	   anti-­‐competitive	   effect.	   This	   is	  
especially	   relevant	   while	   examining	   a	   plea	   based	   on	   commercial	   freedom	   and	   public	  
interest.	  
o Evidence	  on	   intent	  may	  be	  relevant	   for	   the	  overall	   interpretation	  of	  evidence,	  but	  will	  
normally	  not	  be	  decisive.	  Evidence	  on	  effects	  can	  be	  decisive	  in	  specific	  circumstances,	  
in	  particular	  when	  the	  dominant	  undertaking	  has	  raised	  an	  efficiency	  plea.	  
• The	   evidentiary	   burden	   regarding	   objective	   justification	   lies	   initially	   with	   the	   dominant	  
company,	  and	  can	  shift	  as	  soon	  as	  it	  has	  discharged	  this	  burden.	  The	  standard	  of	  proof	  should	  be	  
no	  different	  compared	  to	  the	  standard	  for	  establishing	  a	  prima	  facie	  abuse.	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ANNEX	  A. ABBREVIATIONS	  
	  
ACCC	   Australian	  Competition	  and	  Consumer	  Commission	  	  
ACM	   Autoriteit	  Consument	  en	  Markt	  (NCA,	  the	  Netherlands)	  
AG	   Advocate-­‐General	  (EU)	  
ATC	   Average	  Total	  Costs	  
AVC	   Average	  Variable	  Costs	  
BHG	   Bundesgerichtshof	  (Federal	  Court	  of	  Appeal,	  Germany)	  
BKartA	   Bundeskartellamt	  (NCA,	  Germany)	  
CA	  (1)	   Competition	  Act	  1998	  (UK)	  
CA	  (2)	  (in	  Chapter	  VI)	   Competition	  Act	  1986	  (Canada)	  
CAC	   Competition	  Appeal	  Court	  (South	  Africa)	  
CAT	   Competition	  Appeal	  Tribunal	  (UK)	  
CCA	   Competition	  and	  Consumer	  Act	  2010	  (Australia)	  
CCS	   Competition	  Commission	  of	  Singapore	  
CdC	   Code	  de	  Commerce	  (Commercial	  Code,	  France)	  
Cir.	   Circuit	  (US)	  
CJ	   Chief	  Justice	  (e.g.	  in	  Australia)	  
CNC	   Comisión	  Nacional	  de	  la	  Competencia	  (NCA,	  Spain)	  
CSR	   Corporate	  Social	  Responsibility	  
CT	   Competition	  Tribunal	  (Canada).	  For	  South	  African	  Competition	  Tribunal,	  see	  
SACT	  
Cf	   Confer	  (compare)	  	  
D.C.	   District	  of	  Columbia	  
DoJ	   Department	  of	  Justice	  (US)	  
EC	  (1)	   European	  Communities	  
EC	  (2)	  (preceded	  by	  
number)	  
Treaty	  establishing	  the	  European	  Community	  
ECJ	   European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  
ECN	   European	  Competition	  Network	  
ECR	   European	  Court	  Reports	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E.g.	   Exempli	  gratia	  (for	  example)	  
EU	   European	  Union	  
EWCA	   Court	  of	  Appeal	  of	  England	  &	  Wales	  
EWHC	   High	  Court	  of	  England	  &	  Wales	  
FCA	   Federal	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  (Canada)	  
FFC	   Full	  Federal	  Court	  (Australia)	  
FTC	   Federal	  Trade	  Commission	  (US)	  
GC	   General	  Court	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  
GEMA	   Gas	  and	  Electricity	  Markets	  Authority	  (UK)	  
HC	   High	  Court	  
HCA	   High	  Court	  of	  Australia	  
ICA	   The	  Irish	  Competition	  Authority	  
ICN	   International	  Competition	  Network	  
Ibid.	   Ibidem	  (the	  same)	  
I.e.	   Id	  est	  (that	  is)	  
J	   Justice	  (e.g.	  in	  England	  &	  Wales	  and	  Australia)	  
LDC	   Ley	  de	  Defensa	  de	  la	  Competencia	  (Spain)	  
MEQR	   Measure	  having	  an	  equivalent	  effect	  as	  a	  quantitative	  restriction	  
NCA	   National	  Competition	  Authority	  
NMa	   Nederlandse	  Mededingingsautoriteit	  (NCA,	  the	  Netherlands)	  (as	  of	  1	  April	  
2013:	  ACM)	  
nyr	   Not	  yet	  reported	  (in	  European	  Court	  Reports)	  
OECD	   Organisation	  of	  Economic	  Cooperation	  and	  Development	  
Ofcom	   Office	  of	  Communications	  (UK)	  
Ofgem	   Office	  of	  Gas	  and	  Electricity	  Markets	  
OFT	   Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading	  (UK)	  (as	  of	  1	  April	  2014:	  Competition	  and	  Markets	  
Authority)	  
ORR	   Office	  of	  Rail	  Regulation	  
OJ	   Official	  Journal	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  
P.	   Page	  
Para	   Paragraph	  
SACA	   South	  African	  Competition	  Act	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SACT	   South	  African	  Competition	  Tribunal	  
SCA	   Singaporean	  Competition	  Act	  
TCA	   The	  Competition	  Authority	  (Ireland),	  see	  ICA	  
TEU	   Treaty	  on	  European	  Union,	  as	  amended	  by	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Lisbon	  
TFEU	   Treaty	  on	  the	  Functioning	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  as	  amended	  by	  the	  Treaty	  of	  
Lisbon	  
UK	   United	  Kingdom	  
US	   United	  States	  
v	  (or	  v.)	   Versus	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  ECR	  3369	  
− Case	  107/82	  AEG-­‐Telefunken	  v	  Commission	  [1983]	  ECR	  3151	  
− Case	  174/82	  Sandoz	  [1983]	  2445	  
− Case	  177	  and	  178/82	  Officier	  van	  Justitie	  v	  Van	  de	  Haar	  [1984]	  ECR	  1797	  
− Joined	   Cases	   240/82	   to	   242/82,	   261/82,	   262/82,	   268/82	   and	   269/82	   Stichting	  
Sigarettenindustrie	  and	  Others	  v	  Commission	  [1985]	  ECR	  3831	  
− Joined	  Cases	  29/83	  and	  30/83	  CRAM	  and	  Rheinzink	  v	  Commission	  [1984]	  ECR	  1679	  
− Case	  41/83	  Italy	  v	  Commission	  [1985]	  ECR	  873	  
− Case	  72/83	  Campus	  Oil	  [1984]	  ECR	  2727	  
− Case	  123/83	  BNIC	  v	  Clair	  [1985]	  ECR	  391	  
− Case	  177/83	  Kohl	  v	  Ringelhan	  &	  Rennet	  [1984]	  ECR	  3651	  
− Case	  240/83	  Procureur	  de	  la	  République	  v	  Association	  de	  défense	  des	  brûleurs	  d'	  huiles	  usagées	  
[1985]	  ECR	  531	  
− Case	  42/84	  Remia	  and	  Others	  v	  Commission	  [1985]	  ECR	  2545	  
− Case	  161/84	  Pronuptia	  [1986]	  ECR	  353	  
− Case	  178/84	  Commission	  v	  Germany	  [1987]	  ECR	  1227	  
− Case	  311/84	  CBEM	  v	  CLT	  and	  IPB	  (‘Télémarketing’)	  [1985]	  ECR	  3261	  
− Case	  C-­‐89/85	  Ahlström	  v	  Commission	  (‘Woodpulp	  II’)	  [1993]	  ECR	  I-­‐1307	  
− Case	  121/85	  Conegate	  [1986]	  ECR	  1007	  
− Case	  C-­‐62/86	  AKZO	  v	  Commission	  [1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐3359	  
− Case	  66/86	  Ahmed	  Saeed	  [1989]	  ECR	  803	  
− Case	  267/86	  Van	  Eycke	  v	  ASPA	  [1988]	  ECR	  4769	  
− Case	  302/86	  Commission	  v	  Denmark	  [1988]	  ECR	  4607	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− Case	  27/87	  Erauw-­‐Jacquery	  v	  La	  Hesbignonne	  [1988]	  ECR	  1919	  
− Case	  395/87	  Ministère	  Public	  v	  Tournier	  [1989]	  ECR	  2521	  
− Case	  18/88	  RTT	  v	  GB-­‐Inno-­‐BM	  [1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐5941	  
− Case	  C-­‐69/88	  Krantz	  v	  Ontvanger	  der	  Directe	  Belastingen	  [1990]	  ECR	  I-­‐583	  
− Case	  C-­‐145/88	  Torfaen	  v	  B&Q	  [1989]	  ECR	  3851	  
− Case	  C-­‐202/88	  France	  v	  Commission	  [1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐1223	  
− Case	  C-­‐331/88	  Fedesa	  [1990]	  ECR	  I-­‐4023	  
− Case	  C-­‐113/89	  Rush	  Portuguesa	  [1990]	  ECR	  I-­‐1417	  
− Case	  C-­‐154/89	  Commission	  v	  France	  [1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐659	  
− Case	  C-­‐180/89	  Commission	  v	  Italy	  [1991]	  I-­‐709	  
− Case	  C-­‐260/89	  ERT	  [1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐2925	  
− Case	  C-­‐2/90	  Commission	  v	  Belgium	  [1992]	  ECR	  I-­‐4431	  
− Case	  C-­‐42/90	  Bellon	  [1990]	  ECR	  I-­‐4863	  
− Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐271,	  281	  and	  289/90	  Spain,	  Belgium	  and	  Italy	  v	  Commission	  [1992]	  ECR	  I-­‐5833	  
− Case	  C-­‐169/91	  Stoke-­‐on-­‐Trent	  [1992]	  ECR	  I-­‐6635	  
− Case	  C-­‐185/91	  Reiff	  [1993]	  ECR	  I-­‐5801	  
− Case	  C-­‐228/91	  Commission	  v	  Italy	  [1993]	  ECR	  I-­‐2701	  
− Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐267/91	  and	  C-­‐268/91	  Criminal	  proceedings	  against	  Keck	  and	  Mithouard	   [1993]	  
ECR	  I-­‐6097	  
− Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐241/91	  P	  and	  C-­‐242/91	  P	  RTE	  and	  ITP	  v	  Commission	  (‘Magill’)	  [1995]	  ECR	  I-­‐743	  
− Case	  C-­‐320/91	  Corbeau	  [1993]	  ECR	  I-­‐2533	  
− Case	  C-­‐53/92	  P	  Hilti	  v	  Commission	  [1994]	  ECR	  I-­‐667	  
− Case	  C-­‐199/92	  P	  Hüls	  v	  Commission	  [1999]	  ECR	  I-­‐4287	  
− Case	  C-­‐275/92	  Schindler	  [1994]	  ECR	  I-­‐1039	  
− Case	  C-­‐235/92	  P	  Montecatini	  v	  Commission	  [1999]	  ECR	  I-­‐4539	  
− Case	  C-­‐393/92	  Gemeente	  Almelo	  and	  Others	  v	  Energiebedrijf	  IJsselmij	  [1994]	  ECR	  I-­‐1477	  
− Case	  C-­‐153/93	  Delta	  Schiffahrts-­‐	  und	  Speditionsgesellschaft	  [1994]	  ECR	  I-­‐2517	  
− Case	  C-­‐412/93	  Leclerc-­‐Siplec	  v	  TF1	  and	  M6	  [1995]	  ECR	  I-­‐179	  
− Case	  C-­‐415/93	  Bosman	  [1995]	  ECR	  I-­‐4921	  
− Case	  C-­‐418/93	  Semeraro	  Casa	  Uno	  [1996]	  I-­‐2975	  
− Case	  C-­‐55/94	  Gebhard	  [1995]	  ECR	  I-­‐4165	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− Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐68/94	  and	  C-­‐30/95	  France	  v	  Commission	  [1998]	  ECR	  I-­‐1375	  
− Case	  C-­‐96/94	  Centro	  Servizi	  Spediporto	  [1995]	  ECR	  I-­‐2883	  
− Case	  C-­‐333/94	  P	  Tetra	  Pak	  v	  Commission	  (‘Tetra	  Pak	  II’)	  [1996]	  ECR	  I-­‐5951	  
− Joined	   Cases	   C-­‐34/95,	   C-­‐35/95	   and	   C-­‐36/95	  Konsumentombudsmannen	   v	  De	   Agostini	   and	   TV-­‐
Shop	  [1997]	  ECR	  I-­‐3843	  
− Case	  C-­‐185/95	  P	  Baustahlgewebe	  v	  Commission	  [1998]	  ECR	  I-­‐8471	  
− Case	  C-­‐299/95	  Kremzow	  [1997]	  ECR	  I-­‐2629	  
− Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐359/95	  P	  and	  C-­‐379/95	  P	  Commission	  and	  France	  v	  Ladbroke	  Racing	  [1997]	  ECR	  I-­‐
6265	  
− Case	  C-­‐368/95	  Familiapress	  v	  Bauer	  Verlag	  [1997]	  ECR	  I-­‐3689	  
− Case	  C-­‐398/95	  Ypourgos	  Ergasias	  [1997]	  ECR	  I-­‐3091	  
− Case	  C-­‐157/96	  National	  Farmers'	  Union	  and	  Others	  [1998]	  ECR	  I-­‐2211	  
− Case	  C-­‐158/96	  Kohll	  v	  Union	  des	  caisses	  de	  maladie	  [1998]	  ECR	  I-­‐1931	  
− Case	  C-­‐348/96	  Criminal	  Proceedings	  Against	  Donatella	  Calfa	  [1999]	  ECR	  I-­‐11	  
− Joined	   Cases	   C-­‐395/96	   P	   and	   C-­‐396/96	   P	   Compagnie	   maritime	   belge	   and	   Dafra-­‐Lines	   v	  
Commission	  [2000]	  ECR	  I-­‐1365	  
− Case	  C-­‐7/97	  Bronner	  [1998]	  ECR	  I-­‐7791	  
− Case	  C-­‐126/97	  Eco	  Swiss	  [1999]	  ECR	  I-­‐3055	  
− Case	  C-­‐281/98	  Angonese	  v	  Cassa	  di	  Risparmio	  di	  Bolzano	  [2000]	  ECR	  I-­‐4139	  
− Case	  C-­‐344/98	  Masterfoods	  and	  HB	  Ice	  Cream	  [2000]	  ECR	  I-­‐11369	  
− Case	  C-­‐379/98	  PreussenElektra	  v	  Schleswag	  [2001]	  ECR	  I-­‐2099	  
− Case	  C-­‐398/98	  Commission	  v	  Greece	  [2001]	  I-­‐7915	  
− Case	  C-­‐405/98	  Konsumentombudsmannen	  v	  Gourmet	  International	  [2001]	  ECR	  I-­‐1795	  
− Case	  C-­‐35/99	  Arduino	  [2002]	  ECR	  I-­‐1529	  	  
− Case	  C-­‐54/99	  Église	  de	  Scientologie	  [2000]	  ECR	  I-­‐1335	  
− Case	  C-­‐163/99	  Portugal	  v	  Commission	  [2001]	  ECR	  I-­‐2613	  
− Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐238/99	  P,	  C-­‐244/99	  P,	  C-­‐245/99	  P,	  C-­‐247/99	  P,	  C-­‐250/99	  P	  to	  C-­‐252/99	  P	  and	  C-­‐
254/99	  P	  Limburgse	  Vinyl	  Maatschappij	  and	  Others	  v	  Commission	  [2002]	  ECR	  I-­‐8375	  
− Case	  C-­‐309/99	  Wouters	  v	  Algemene	  Raad	  van	  de	  Nederlandse	  Orde	  van	  Advocaten	  [2002]	  ECR	  I-­‐
1577	  
− Case	  C-­‐453/99	  Courage	  and	  Crehan	  [2001]	  ECR	  I-­‐6297	  
	   307	  
− Case	  C-­‐497/99	  P	  Irish	  Sugar	  v	  Commission	  [2001]	  ECR	  I-­‐5333	  
− Case	  C-­‐24/00	  Commission	  v	  France	  [2004]	  I-­‐1277	  
− Case	  C-­‐112/00	  Schmidberger	  v	  Austria	  [2003]	  I-­‐5659	  
− Case	  C-­‐172/00	  Ferring	  [2002]	  ECR	  I-­‐6891	  
− Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐204/00	  P,	  205/00	  P,	  211/00	  P,	  213/00	  P,	  217/00	  P	  &	  219/00	  P	  Aalborg	  Portland	  v	  
Commission	  [2004]	  ECR	  I-­‐123	  
− Case	  C-­‐15/01	  Paranova	  Läkemedel	  and	  Others	  [2003]	  ECR	  I-­‐4175	  
− Case	  C-­‐82/01	  P	  Aéroports	  de	  Paris	  v	  Commission	  [2002]	  ECR	  I-­‐9297	  
− Case	  C-­‐113/01	  Paranova	  [2003]	  ECR	  I-­‐4243	  
− Case	  C-­‐192/01	  Commission	  v	  Denmark	  [2003]	  ECR	  I-­‐9693	  
− Case	   C-­‐198/01	   Consorzio	   Industrie	   Fiammiferi	   v	   Autorità	   Garante	   della	   Concorrenza	   e	   del	  
Mercato	  (‘CIF’)	  [2003]	  I-­‐8055	  
− Case	  C-­‐236/01	  Monsanto	  Agricoltura	  Italia	  and	  Others	  [2003]	  ECR	  I-­‐8105	  
− Case	  C-­‐243/01	  Gambelli	  and	  Others	  [2003]	  ECR	  I-­‐13031	  
− Case	  C-­‐322/01	  Deutscher	  Apothekerverband	  [2003]	  ECR	  I-­‐14887	  
− Case	  C-­‐388/01	  Commission	  v	  Italy	  [2003]	  ECR	  I-­‐721	  
− Case	  C-­‐418/01	  IMS	  Health	  v	  NDC	  Health	  [2004]	  ECR	  I-­‐5039	  
− Case	  C-­‐36/02	  Omega	  [2004]	  ECR	  I-­‐9609	  
− Case	  C-­‐41/02	  Commission	  v	  Netherlands	  [2004]	  ECR	  I-­‐11375	  
− Case	  270/02	  Commission	  v	  Italy	  [2004]	  I-­‐1559	  
− Case	  C-­‐286/02	  Bellio	  Fratelli	  Srl	  v	  Prefettura	  di	  Treviso	  [2004]	  ECR	  I-­‐3465	  
− Case	  C-­‐12/03	  P	  Commission	  v	  Tetra	  Laval	  [2005]	  ECR	  I-­‐987	  
− Case	  C-­‐53/03	  Syfait	  v	  GlaxoSmithKline	  [2005]	  ECR	  I-­‐4609	  
− Case	  C-­‐109/03	  KPN	  v	  OPTA	  [2004]	  ECR	  I-­‐11273	  
− Case	  C-­‐514/03	  Commission	  v	  Spain	  [2006]	  ECR	  I-­‐963	  
− Case	  C-­‐551/03	  P	  General	  Motors	  v	  Commission	  [2006]	  ECR	  I-­‐3173	  
− Case	  C-­‐95/04	  P	  British	  Airways	  v	  Commission	  [2007]	  ECR	  I-­‐2331	  
− Case	  C-­‐105/04	  P	  FEG	  v	  Commission	  [2006]	  ECR	  I-­‐8725	  
− Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐295/04	  to	  C-­‐298/04	  Manfredi	  [2006]	  ECR	  I-­‐6619	  
− Case	  C-­‐519/04	  P	  Meca-­‐Medina	  and	  Majcen	  v	  Commission	  [2006]	  ECR	  I-­‐6991	  
− Case	  C-­‐110/05	  Commission	  v	  Italy	  (‘Motorcycle	  Trailers’)	  [2009]	  ECR	  I-­‐519	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− Case	  C-­‐171/05	  P	  Laurent	  Piau	  v	  Commission	  [2006]	  ECR	  I-­‐37	  
− Case	  C-­‐238/05	  Asnef-­‐Equifax	  [2006]	  ECR	  I-­‐11125	  
− Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐468/06	  to	  C-­‐478/06	  Sot.	  Lélos	  kai	  Sia	  and	  Others	  v	  GlaxoSmithKline	  [2008]	  ECR	  I-­‐
7139	  
− Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐501/06	  P,	  C-­‐513/06	  P,	  C-­‐515/06	  P	  and	  C-­‐519/06	  P	  GlaxoSmithKline	  Services	  and	  
Others	  v	  Commission	  [2009]	  ECR	  I-­‐9291	  
− Case	  C-­‐49/07	  MOTOE	  [2008]	  ECR	  I-­‐4863	  
− Case	  C-­‐52/07	  Kanal	  5	  and	  TV	  4	  v	  STIM	  [2008]	  ECR	  I-­‐9275.	  
− Case	  C-­‐202/07	  P	  France	  Télécom	  v	  Commission	  (‘Wanadoo’)	  [2009]	  ECR	  I-­‐2369	  
− Case	  C-­‐209/07	  Beef	  Industry	  Development	  Society	  and	  Barry	  Brothers	  (‘BIDS’)	  [2008]	  ECR	  I-­‐	  8637	  
− Case	   C-­‐8/08	   T-­‐Mobile	   and	   Others	   v	   Raad	   van	   Bestuur	   van	   de	   Nederlandse	  
Mededingingsautoriteit	  [2009]	  ECR	  I-­‐4529	  
− Case	  C-­‐153/08	  Commission	  v	  Spain	  [2009]	  ECR	  I-­‐9735	  
− Case	  C-­‐280/08	  P	  Deutsche	  Telekom	  v	  Commission	  [2010]	  ECR	  I-­‐9555	  
− Case	  C-­‐333/08	  Commission	  v	  France	  [2010]	  ECR	  I-­‐757	  
− Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐403/08	  and	  C-­‐429/08	  FAPL	  [2011]	  ECR	  I-­‐9083	  	  
− Case	  C-­‐413/08	  P	  Lafarge	  v	  Commission	  [2010]	  ECR	  I-­‐5361	  
− Case	  C-­‐52/09	  TeliaSonera	  [2011]	  ECR	  I-­‐527	   	  
− Case	  C-­‐108/09	  Ker-­‐Optika	  [2010]	  ECR	  I-­‐12213	  
− Case	  C-­‐272/09	  P	  KME	  Germany	  AG	  v	  European	  Commission	  [2011]	  ECR	  nyr	  
− Case	  C-­‐291/09	  Francesco	  Guarnieri	  &	  Cie	  v	  Vandevelde	  Eddy	  [2011]	  ECR	  I-­‐2685	  
− Case	  C-­‐360/09	  Pfleiderer	  v	  Bundeskartellamt	  [2011]	  ECR	  I-­‐5161	  
− Case	  C-­‐375/09	  Tele2	  Polska	  [2011]	  ECR	  I-­‐3055	  
− Case	  C-­‐421/09	  Humanplasma	  v	  Austria	  [2010]	  ECR	  I-­‐12869	  
− Case	  C-­‐439/09	  Pierre	  Fabre	  Dermo-­‐Cosmétique	  [2011]	  ECR	  I-­‐9419	  
− Case	  C-­‐209/10	  Post	  Danmark	  A/S	  v	  Konkurrencerådet	  [2012]	  nyr	  
− Case	  C-­‐386/10	  P	  Chalkor	  v	  Commission	  [2011]	  nyr	  	  
− Case	  C-­‐457/10	  P	  AstraZeneca	  v	  Commission	  [2012]	  nyr	  
− Case	  C-­‐549/10	  P	  Tomra	  Systems	  ASA	  and	  Others	  v	  Commission	  [2012]	  nyr	  
− Case	  C-­‐226/11	  Expedia	  v	  Autorité	  de	  la	  concurrence	  [2012]	  nyr	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− Case	  C-­‐1/12	  Ordem	  dos	  Técnicos	  Oficias	  de	  Contas	  (‘OTOC’)	  v	  Autoridade	  da	  Concorrência	  [2013]	  
nyr	  
− Case	   C-­‐68/12	   Protimonopolný	   úrad	   Slovenskej	   republiky	   v	   Slovenská	   sporiteľňa	   (‘Slovenská’)	  
[2013]	  nyr	  
− Case	  C-­‐136/12	  Consiglio	  nazionale	  dei	  geologi	  v	  AGCM	  [2013]	  nyr.	  
	  
General	  Court	  
− Case	  T-­‐30/89	  Hilti	  v	  Commission	  [1990]	  ECR	  II-­‐163	  
− Case	  T-­‐51/89	  Tetra	  Pak	  Rausing	  v	  Commission	  (‘Tetra	  Pak	  I’)	  [1990]	  ECR	  II-­‐309	  
− Case	  T-­‐65/89	  BPB	  Industries	  and	  British	  Gypsum	  v	  Commission	  [1993]	  ECR	  II-­‐389	  
− Joined	   Cases	   T-­‐68/89,	   T-­‐77/89	   and	   T-­‐78/89	   Società	   Italiana	   Vetro	   and	   Others	   v	   Commission	  
[1992]	  ECR	  II-­‐1403	  
− Case	  T-­‐117/89	  Sens	  v	  Commission	  [1990]	  ECR	  II-­‐198	  
− Case	  T-­‐83/91	  Tetra	  Pak	  International	  v	  Commission	  (‘Tetra	  Pak	  II’)	  [1994]	  ECR	  II-­‐755	  
− Case	  T-­‐17/93	  Matra	  Hachette	  v	  Commission	  [1994]	  ECR	  II-­‐595	  
− Case	  T-­‐513/93	  Consiglio	  nazionale	  degli	  spedizionieri	  doganali	  v	  Commission	  ECR	  II-­‐1810	  
− Joined	   Cases	   T-­‐528/93,	   T-­‐542/93,	   T-­‐543/93	   and	   T-­‐546/93	  Métropole	   television	   and	   Others	   v	  
Commission	  [1996]	  ECR	  II-­‐649	  
− Case	  T-­‐156/94	  Aristain	  v	  Commission	  [1999]	  ECR	  II-­‐645	  
− Case	  T-­‐305/94	  Limburgse	  Vinyl	  Maatschappij	  and	  Others	  v	  Commission	  [1999]	  ECR	  II-­‐931	  
− Case	  T-­‐348/94	  Enso	  Española	  v	  Commission	  [1998]	  ECR	  II-­‐1875J	  
− Joined	  Cases	  T-­‐374/94,	  T-­‐375/94,	  T-­‐384/94	  and	  T-­‐388/94	  European	  Night	  Services	  and	  Others	  v	  
Commission	  [1998]	  ECR	  II-­‐3141	  
− Case	  T-­‐86/95	  Compagnie	  générale	  maritime	  and	  Others	  v	  Commission	  [2002]	  ECR	  II-­‐1011	  
− Case	  T-­‐111/96	  ITT	  Promedia	  v	  Commission	  [1998]	  ECR	  II-­‐2937	  
− Joined	   Cases	   T-­‐185/96,	   T-­‐189/96	   and	   T-­‐190/96	  Riviera	   Auto	   Service	   and	  Others	   v	   Commission	  
[1999]	  ECR	  II-­‐93	  
− Case	  T-­‐5/97	  Industrie	  des	  Poudres	  Sphériques	  [2000]	  ECR	  II-­‐3759	  
− Case	  T-­‐228/97	  Irish	  Sugar	  v	  Commission	  [1999]	  ECR	  II-­‐2969	  
− Case	  T-­‐62/98	  Volkswagen	  v	  Commission	  [2000]	  ECR	  II-­‐2707	  
− Case	  T-­‐128/98	  Aéroports	  de	  Paris	  v	  Commission	  [2000]	  ECR	  II-­‐3929	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− Joined	  Cases	  T-­‐191/98,	  T-­‐212/98	  to	  T-­‐214/98	  Atlantic	  Container	  Line	  and	  Others	  v	  Commission	  
(‘TACA’)	  [2003]	  ECR	  II-­‐3275	  
− Case	  T-­‐219/99	  British	  Airways	  v	  Commission	  [2003]	  ECR	  II-­‐5917	  
− Case	  T-­‐342/99	  Airtours	  v	  Commission	  [2002]	  ECR	  II-­‐2585	  
− Joined	  Cases	   T-­‐67/00,	   T-­‐68/00,	   T71/00	  and	  T-­‐78/00	   JFE	   Engineering	  and	  Others	   v	   Commission	  
[2004]	  ECR	  II-­‐2501,	  paras	  179	  
− Joined	  Cases	  T-­‐185/00,	  T-­‐216/00,	  T-­‐299/00	  and	  T-­‐300/00	  M6	  and	  Others	  v	  Commission	   [2002]	  
ECR	  II-­‐3805	  
− Case	  T-­‐57/01	  Solvay	  v	  Commission	  [2009]	  ECR	  II-­‐4621	  
− Case	  T-­‐66/01	  ICI	  v	  Commission	  [2010]	  ECR	  II-­‐2631	  
− Case	  T-­‐151/01	  DSD	  v	  Commission	  [2007]	  ECR	  II-­‐1607	  
− Case	  T-­‐168/01	  GlaxoSmithKline	  Services	  v	  Commission	  [2006]	  ECR	  II-­‐2969	  
− Case	  T-­‐203/01	  Michelin	  v	  Commission	  (‘Michelin	  II’)	  [2003]	  ECR	  II-­‐4071	  
− Case	  T-­‐210/01	  General	  Electric	  v	  Commission	  [2005]	  ECR	  II-­‐	  5575	  
− Case	  T-­‐314/01	  Avebe	  v	  Commission	  [2006]	  ECR	  II-­‐3085	  
− Joined	  Cases	  T-­‐49	  to	  51/02	  Brasserie	  nationale	  and	  Others	  v	  Commission	  [2005]	  ECR	  II-­‐3033	  
− Case	  T-­‐56/02	  Bayerische	  Hypo-­‐	  und	  Vereinsbank	  v	  Commission	  [2004]	  ECR	  II-­‐3495	  
− Case	  T-­‐114/02	  BaByliss	  v	  Commission	  [2003]	  ECR	  II-­‐1279	  
− Case	  T-­‐193/02	  Laurent	  Piau	  v	  Commission	  [2005]	  ECR	  II-­‐209	  
− Case	  T-­‐313/02	  Meca-­‐Medina	  and	  Majcen	  v	  Commission	  [2004]	  II-­‐3291	  
− Case	  T-­‐53/03	  BPB	  v	  Commission	  [2008]	  ECR	  II-­‐1333	  
− Case	  T-­‐271/03	  Deutsche	  Telekom	  v	  Commission	  [2008]	  ECR	  II-­‐477	  
− Case	  T-­‐340/03	  France	  Télécom	  v	  Commission	  (‘Wanadoo’)	  [2007]	  ECR	  II-­‐10	  
− Case	  T-­‐201/04	  Microsoft	  v	  Commission	  [2007]	  ECR	  II-­‐3601	  
− Case	  T-­‐321/05	  AstraZeneca	  v	  Commission	  [2010]	  ECR	  II-­‐2805	  
− Case	  T-­‐336/07	  Telefónica	  v	  Commission	  [2012]	  ECR	  nyr	  
	  
Commission	  decisions	  –	  Antitrust	  
− Case	  IV/31.900	  BPB	  Industries	  [1989]	  L	  10/50	  
− Case	  IV/33.544	  British	  Midland	  v	  Aer	  Lingus	  [1992]	  OJ	  L	  96/34	  
− Case	  IV/33.814	  Ford/Volkswagen	  [1993]	  OJ	  L	  20/14	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− Case	  IV/34.600	  Night	  Services	  [1994]	  OJ	  L	  259/	  20	  
− Case	  94/119/EC	  Port	  of	  Rødby	  [1994]	  OJ	  L	  55/52	  
− Case	  97/745/EF	  Port	  of	  Genoa	  [1997]	  OJ	  L	  301/27	  
− Case	  COMP.F.1/37.894	  CECED	  [2000]	  OJ	  L	  187/47	  
− Case	  2000/521/EF	  Spanish	  Airports	  [2000]	  OJ	  L	  208/36	  
− Case	  COMP/38158	  Meca-­‐Medina	  and	  Majcen/IOC	  (1	  August	  2002)	  
− Case	  COMP/C-­‐3/37.792	  Microsoft	  (24	  March	  2004)	  
− Case	  COMP/37.685	  GVG/FS	  [2004]	  OJ	  L	  11/17	  
− Case	  COMP/C-­‐3/37.990	  Intel	  case	  (13	  May	  2009)	  
	  
Commission	  decisions	  –	  Merger	  control	  
− Case	  IV/M.50,	  AT&T/NCR	  (18	  January	  1991)	  
− Case	  IV/M.53,	  Aerospatiale-­‐Alenia	  /DeHavilland	  (2	  October	  1991)	  
− Case	  IV/M.308,	  Kali+Salz/MDK/Treuhand	  (14	  December	  1993)	  
− Case	  IV/M.1313,	  Danish	  Crown/Vestjyske	  Slagterier	  (9	  March	  1999)	  
− Case	  COMP/M.2333,	  De	  Beers/LVMH,	  (25	  July	  2001)	  
− Case	  COMP/M.2314	  BASF/Eurodiol/Pantochim	  (11	  July	  2001)	  
− Case	  COMP/M.2502,	  Cargill/Cerestar	  (18	  January	  2002)	  
− Case	  COMP/M.3108,	  Office	  Depot/Guilbert	  (23	  May	  2003)	  
− Case	  COMP/M.3099,	  Areva/Urenco/ETC	  (6	  October	  2004)	  
− Case	  COMP/M.4000,	  Inco/Falconbridge	  (4	  July	  2006)	  
− Case	  COMP/M.4057,	  Korsnäs/Assidomän	  Cartonboard	  (12	  May	  2006)	  
− Case	  COMP/M.4439,	  Ryanair/Aer	  Lingus,	  (27	  June	  2007)	  
− Case	  COMP/M.4854,	  TomTom/TeleAtlas	  (14	  May	  2008)	  
− Case	  COMP/M.4942,	  Nokia/Navteq	  (2	  July	  2008)	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− Paris	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  judgment	  of	  17	  September	  2008,	  Case	  2007/14904	  
	  	  
Autorité	  de	  la	  concurrence	  
− Autorité	  decision	  of	  23	  December	  1999,	  Bouygues/France	  Télécom,	  Case	  99-­‐MC-­‐12	  
− Autorité	  decision	  of	  1	  March	  2000,	  Armor	  Hélicoptère,	  Case	  00-­‐D-­‐13	  
− Autorité	  decision	  of	  18	  April	  2003,	  Coca-­‐Cola,	  Case	  03-­‐D-­‐20	  
− Autorité	  decision	  of	  18	  March	  2005,	  Canal+,	  Case	  05-­‐D-­‐13	  
− Autorité	  decision	  of	  28	  July	  2005,	  Jaeger	  LeCoultre,	  Case	  05-­‐D-­‐46	  
− Autorité	  decision	  of	  8	  November	  2005,	  Saint-­‐Honorat,	  Case	  05-­‐D-­‐60	  
− Autorité	  decision	  of	  14	  March	  2007,	  GlaxoSmithKline,	  Case	  07-­‐D-­‐09	  
− Autorité	  decision	  of	  12	  July	  2007,	  EPM/NMPP,	  Case	  07-­‐D-­‐23	  





− Bundesgerichtshof	  judgment	  of	  7	  October	  1980,	  Neue	  Osnabrücker	  Zeitung,	  KZR	  8/80	  
− Bundesgerichtshof	  judgment	  of	  30	  June	  1981,	  Adidas,	  KZR	  19/80	  
− Bundesgerichtshof	  judgment	  of	  22	  September	  1981,	  Original-­‐VW	  Ersatzteile	  II,	  KVR	  8/80	  
− Bundesgerichtshof	  judgment	  of	  9	  November	  1982,	  Gemeinsamer	  Anzeigenteil,	  WuW	  BGH	  1965	  
− Bundesgerichtshof	  judgment	  of	  25	  October	  1988,	  Lüsterbehangsteine,	  WuW/E	  2540	  
− Bundesgerichtshof	  judgment	  of	  12	  March	  1991,	  Krankentransportunternehmen	  II,	  WuW/E	  2707	  
− Bundesgerichtshof	  judgment	  of	  12	  November	  1991,	  Aktionsbeiträge,	  KZR	  2/90	  
− Bundesgerichtshof	  judgment	  of	  4	  November	  2003,	  Strom	  und	  Telefon	  I,	  KZR	  16/02	  
− Bundesgerichtshof	  judgment	  of	  4	  November	  2003,	  Strom	  und	  Telefon	  II,	  KZR	  38/02	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Bundeskartellamt	  
− Bundeskartellamt	  decision	  of	  8	  October	  2003,	  Mainova,	  Case	  B11–12/03	  






− Irish	  High	  Court,	  Irish	  League	  of	  Credit	  Unions	  [2004]	  IRLHC	  330	  
− Irish	  Supreme	  Court,	  Irish	  League	  of	  Credit	  Unions,	  [2005]	  No.	  077	  
	  
Irish	  Competition	  Authority	  




Conseil	  de	  la	  concurrence	  
− Conseil	  decision	  of	  3	  August	  2009,	  Tanklux,	  Case	  2009-­‐FO-­‐02	  	  





− CBb	  judgment	  of	  28	  May	  2004,	  LJN:	  AP	  1336	  
	  
Autoriteit	  Consument	  &	  Markt	  
− ACM	  initial	  decision	  of	  28	  March	  2003	  and	  administrative	  appeal	  decision	  of	  11	  October	  2004,	  
Case	  1205/FRHS	  v	  CR	  Delta	  
− ACM	  initial	  decision	  of	  28	  April	  2003	  and	  administrative	  appeal	  decision	  of	  29	  June	  2005,	  Case	  
2978/Superunie	  v	  Interpay	  
− ACM	   initial	   decision	  of	   26	  August	  1999	  and	  administrative	  appeal	  decision	  of	   27	  March	  2000,	  
Case	  650/Hydro	  Energy	  v	  SEP	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− ACM	  decision	  of	  25	  March	  2009,	  Case	  6424/Ziekenhuis	  Walcheren/Oosterscheldeziekenhuizen	  
− ACM	  initial	  decision	  of	  26	  June	  2009	  and	  administrative	  appeal	  decision	  of	  28	  April	  2011,	  Case	  





− Tribunal	  de	  Defensa	  de	  la	  Competencia	  judgment	  of	  29	  September	  1999,	  Eléctrica	  del	  Llémana,	  
Case	  442/98	  
− Tribunal	   de	   Defensa	   de	   la	   Competencia	   judgment	   of	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  R	  611/2004	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  law	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  liquidation)	  v	  EWS	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  non-­‐infringement	  notice	  of	  23	  June	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U.S.	  Supreme	  Court	  
− Dr.	  Miles	  Medical	  Co.	  v	  John	  D.	  Park	  &	  Sons	  Co.,	  220	  U.S.	  373	  (1911)	  
	   318	  
− United	  States	  v	  Colgate	  &	  Co,	  250	  U.S.	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  U.S.	  596,	  610	  (1972)	  
− Otter	  Tail	  Power	  Co.	  v	  United	  States,	  410	  U.S.	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  F.2d	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European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  
− ECtHR	  judgment	  of	  21	  February	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